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But important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your Declaration therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of that State together with correlative supporting averments of Benefit Rejections ( Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in effect, and contracts have to be attacked for substantive reasons, such as Failure of Consideration, and do not roll over and die by your mere unilateral declarations of their nonexistence. )regardless of any statute that facially appears to force Residency Status on persons physically inhabited in that state for an extended period of time. In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal difference between a Domiciliary and a Resident. In Hammerstein vs. Lynee [200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court ruled that the word reside in the 14th Amendment's State Citizenship Clause also meant Domiciliary. One of the characteristics of the English Language is the lack of identity of some of the words that comprise its structure; many words have found multiple homes in different locations, and therefore meanings must be abated pending consideration of an enlarged context of the surrounding words. Residence and Domicile are two such words in Law that, on some occasions, are interchangeable, and on other occasions, are not interchangeable. The recurring semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly responsible for since they continuously refuse to define explicit meanings] to be inherently difficult broncos to tie down, was noted once by a Federal Court, when dealing with a Domiciliary question:
"The theoretical domicile which is equivalent to State Citizenship is always one which exists animo revertendi [meaning with intention to revert back]. The theoretical domicile which clings to a homeless wanderer, who never intends to return, has its uses in deciding rights of succession to property, in respect to taxation and to the administration of pauper laws, but is not, I think, equivalent to Citizenship in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the Judiciary Act. While domicile, in some sense, may not be lost by mere departure with intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost. In other words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home, where absence from domicile is amino revertendi, domicile may be equivalent to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists merely by legal fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent never to return to the state of domicile, the word is not synonymous with Citizenship." - Pannil vs. Roanoke Times Company, 252 Federal 910, at 915 (1918).
Therefore, correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the purely voluntary nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that you are an Inhabitant of that State without juristic benefits, and neither a Resident nor a Domiciliary Benefit Acceptant; but your self-proclaimed status as an inhabitant means nothing until you first reject all state constitutional benefits, and the benefits of Residency, and the police protectorate powers, in particular.
But if your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge generally will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated reciprocity terms of a Commercial contract (which Driver's Licenses can be applied to operate as a Commercial Enfranchisement Instrument under some limited circumstances) against a person, in a setting other than the originally specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that contract under compelled circumstances in order to avoid incarceration merely to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the Right to Travel), and without experiencing any Commercial benefit therefrom. State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme Court on grounds relating to Right to Travel. In Shapiro vs. Thompson [394 U.S. 618 (1969)], the Supreme Court ruled that the interstate right to travel overruled and annulled state residency statutes [where welfare grants offered by States restricted to persons living in that kingdom for at least one year, where annulled. This is a unique case in the sense that its reasoning will never surface anywhere else, as the claimed "chilling effect" the state residency statutes generated on the Interstate Right to Travel represented one of philosophical justification. Substitute the same "chilling effect" Right to Travel reasoning on any other Patriot state residency Protester case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.
That is the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to hear. The documentation and proof that the Supreme Court would want to see is a copy of the application for the Driver's License where it says you signed it under protest; proof of service of your Objection on state officials, the Objection itself, and a 30-day invitation to those state officials to let them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if the application of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed mandatory on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials to come out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to you they might not want you to know). Under your Declaratory Judgment, the Driver's License will be construed to act exclusively as Evidence of Competency under Motor Vehicle statutes only.
"Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle." - Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).
[...]
One of the evolving stages in the life of what are now contemporary penal Motor Vehicle Statutes had, as one of their previous stages, the purpose of assigning legal rights and liabilities to Motor Vehicle operators so that civil litigants can have fault and damages assessed against them in a courtroom.
For example, in Massachusetts, it originally was known as the Trespasser on the Highway Doctrine;( In 1692 the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts enacted a little slice of lex, called the Lord's Day Act, that said:
"... no traveller... shall travel on that day..."
In 1876, a negligent Defendant successfully invoked this statute to bar the recovery by a Plaintiff who was injured while walking on a Sunday [Smith vs. Boston and Maine R.R., 120 Mass. 490 (1876)]. To the Supreme Judicial Court, the Plaintiff was "... unlawfully traveling upon the highway" [id., at 492]. In 1877, the Massachusetts Legislature removed the civil liabilities that permeated the Lord's Day Act.and later evolved into a regulatory jurisdiction when Massachusetts enacted a comprehensive Motor Vehicle Act after automobiles made their highway appearance. )"... all automobiles... shall be registered" and "... no automobile... shall be operated... unless registered." - Massachusetts Acts, c.473, Section I,3 (1903).
Six years later, in Dudley vs. Northhampton Street Railway [202 Mass. 443 (1909)], the court denied an owner of an unregistered car recovery against a negligent Defendant on the ground that the former was a "trespasser on the highway." Although the Defendant pressed the analogy of the Lord's Day Cases, the court was able to find additional support for its ruling, by attributing to the statute a purpose of facilitating identification of motor travelers by requiring registration of vehicles. By also forbidding the operation an unregistered automobile, the court found it logical to charge the motor vehicle owner and operator of an unregistered motor vehicle with liability for damages caused to others, regardless of any mitigating negligence elements present in the factual setting. In Fairbanks vs. Kemp, 226 Mass. 75 (1917), the owner of an unregistered automobile, although exercising due care and caution, was held liable because of a statutory violation]. See, generally,
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Huddy in I Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, Section 249 (1932); Fifth Edition;
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Editor's Note in Trespasser on the Highway Doctrine, 46 Harvard Law Review (1946).
The talk from Patriots and Highway Contract Protesters that I hear constantly, about how the old Common Law says this and that about my rights to use Government Highways anyway that I feel like it, ( "Highways are public roads, which every Citizen has a right to use." - 3 Kent Commentaries 32.
See also; several English authorities:
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Sutcliffe vs. Greenwood, 8 Price 535;
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Rex vs. Camberworth, 3 B. & Adol. 108.
And for other English commentators, see:
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Shelford on Highways;
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Woolrych on Ways.
For American authorities, a point of beginning is:
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Makepeace vs. Worthen, 1 N.H. 16;
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Peck vs. Smith, 1 Connecticut 103;
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Robins vs. Borman, 1 Pick. 122;
*
Jackson vs. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 477;
*
Stackpole vs. Healy, 16 Massachusetts 33, and the many Case citations therein )is actually not relevant today in the United States.
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