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The authority for regulation of traffic over the highways is unquestionably a part of the police power of the State, and the State may impose reasonable restrictions and regulations over the use of the highways. See Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 154 Okl. 121, 7 P.2d 123, 130 (1931). The operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway "is not a natural, absolute right. . . ." Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Okla. 1972). "[T]he Legislature, in the exercise of its right to regulate the use of highways and of the inherent police power of the state, has the power to regulate circumstances under which automobiles may be operated upon the highways of the state." Brantley v. State, 548 P.2d 675, 676 (Okl.Cr. 1976). See also Miller v. State, 503 P.2d 886, 888 (Okl.Cr. 1972).
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BAILEY v. CITY OF TULSA
1971 OK CR 499
491 P.2d 316
http://www.oscn.net/applications/osc...p?citeid=59398
However, the motorist by refusing to take the test, and thereby losing the privilege to drive for six months, is not forced to forfeit one right in order to exercise another right since operating a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a right, which may be conditioned. In Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643 (1969), the Maine Supreme Court in considering the Implied Consent Law stated:
"The proposed statute in effect imposes a condition upon the holding of a license to operate a motor vehicle upon the public ways of this State. The condition is that the licensee voluntarily consent to taking a sobriety test under certain prescribed conditions. The statutory requirement rests upon the premise that there is no absolute right to obtain and hold an operator's license. There is rather a privilege which for valid reasons involving the public safety may be granted or withheld by the State. * * It is true that the State may not unreasonably, arbitrarily or capriciously withhold a license but it may properly condition the grant upon compliance with reasonable police power requirements."
In Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961), the Court in upholding the Nebraska Implied Consent Law held:
"The essence of the implied consent law is that by driving a motor vehicle on the public highway, the operator consents to the taking of a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his body fluid. By the act of driving his car, he has waived his constitutional privilege of self-incrimination, which has always been considered to be a privilege of solely personal nature which may be waived."
In Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963), which held the Virginia Implied Consent Law did not violate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the Court observed:
"Moreover, the defendant was not compelled under § 18.1-55 to submit to the blood test. He had a choice of either allowing the test to be made or refusing it. His refusal could not be used as evidence in his trial on the charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants but, if found to be unreasonable, constituted grounds for revocation of the privilege of operating his automobile upon the highways of this State. However, defendant is afforded a hearing on his latter issue subsequent to his trial for driving under the influence of intoxicants.
"The right to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State is not a property or unrestrained right, but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the State in the interest of public safety and welfare." 133 S.E.2d at 318.
BRANTLEY v. STATE
1976 OK CR 82
548 P.2d 675
http://www.oscn.net/applications/osc...asp?citeid=711
In State v. Moyers, 86 Okl.Cr. 101, 189 P.2d 952, this Court in its syllabus held that the Legislature, in exercise of its right to regulate the use of highways and of the inherent police power of the state, has the power to regulate circumstances under which automobiles may be operated upon the highways of the state. Section 6-112 of Title 47 provides as follows:
"Every licensee shall have his operator's or chauffeur's license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same upon demand of . . ., a peace officer, or a field deputy or inspector of the Department. . . ."
Oklahoma v Moyers
1948 OK CR 15
189 P.2d 952
86 Okl.Cr. 101
http://www.oscn.net/applications/osc...p?citeid=56871
Syllabus.)
2. Automobiles Power of Legislature Alone to Regulate Automobiles Upon Highways of State. Legislature, in exercise of right to regulate use of highways and of inherent police power of state alone, has power to regulate circumstances under which automobiles may be operated upon highways of state.