
04-06-2008, 10:57 AM
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Mental Jujitsu
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Join Date: Dec 2007
Posts: 631
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utter nonsense
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Originally Posted by trooper2ls
Bonds
Court docs are negotiable instruments.
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This is hilarious proof that you have no idea how negotiable instruments are defined in the UCC.
Here, I'll lay it out for you. You need to be educated.
UCC section 3-104, Negotiable Instrument:
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
(b) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument.
(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of "check" in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.
(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this Article.
(e) An instrument is a "note" if it is a promise and is a "draft" if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both "note" and "draft," a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.
(f) "Check" means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or teller's check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as "money order."
(g) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.
(h) "Teller's check" means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or (ii) payable at or through a bank.
(i) "Traveler's check" means an instrument that (i) is payable on demand, (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (iii) is designated by the term "traveler's check" or by a substantially similar term, and (iv) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.
(j) "Certificate of deposit" means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.
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Court papers clearly do not qualify under this definition. As the U.S. District Court for Idaho said in U.S. v. Andra, 923 F.Supp. 157 (1996):
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Third, the defendants' "refusal for cause" is meaningless. The defendants claim they can refuse "presentment" of the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to U.C.C. 3-501. Apparently, the defendants are arguing that § 3-501(2)(c)(ii) is a defense which provides for the defendants' "refusal of payment or acceptance for failure of the presentment to comply with the terms of the instrument, an agreement of the parties, or other applicable law or rule." The defendants reliance on Chapter 3 of the U.C.C. is misplaced; Chapter 3 of the U.C.C. by its own definitions is only applicable to "negotiable instruments". The complaint filed by the plaintiff is not a negotiable instrument and the Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable. The defendants do not have the choice of whether or not to be defendants. If properly served, as this court has determined the defendants were, the Andras became parties to this lawsuit whether they wanted to be or not.
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Next silly theory?
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We reject Skurdal's argument that he is a "free man" exempt from the laws because he has "no contracts" with either the state or federal governments...No persons in Montana may exempt themselves from any law simply by declaring they do not consent to it applying to them...Accepting Skurdal's assertion of exempt status is an invitation to anarchy. We decline that invitation. - State v. Skurdal, Supreme Court of Montana, 235 Mont. 291, 767 P.2d 304 at 308 (1988).
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