[suijuris]

COURT CITES RELATING TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION:



“It is well established principle of law that all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears” Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 US 281 (1949)



“Constitutional restrictions and limitations were not applicable to the areas of land, enclaves, territories and possession over which Congress had exclusive legislative authority” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 US 244 (1901)



"There is a presumption against existence of federal jurisdiction; thus, party invoking federal court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332, 1332(c); Fed.Rules Civ. Proce. Rule 12(h)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. If parties do not raise question of lack of jurisdictino, it is the duty of the federal court to determine the matter sua sponte. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332. Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction, or stipulation. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332. Although defendant did not present evidence to support dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, burden rested with plaintiffs to prove affirmatively that jurisdiction did exist. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332." Basso v. Utah Power and Light Company, 495 F.2d 906 (1974)"



"The judicial power does not extend to the determination of abstract questions. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 , 31 S.Ct. 250; Liberty Warehouse Company v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74 , 47 S.Ct. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 , 48 S.Ct. 507; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 262 , 264 S., 53 S.Ct. 345, 87 A.L. R. 1191." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)



“It is clear that Congress as a legislative body, exercises two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects but extending all over the Union; the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265; 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)



“All legislation is prima facie territorial”

American Banana Co. v. U.S. Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 at 357-358



“Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction” New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836)



“There is a canon of legislative construction which teaches Congress that, unless a contrary intent appears [legislation] is meant to apply only within territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 at 222 (1949)



“the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in Alabama or any of the new states which were formed ... The United States has no Constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted ...”

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 213, 221, 223 (1845)



“... the states are separate sovereigns with respect to the federal government”

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985)



“No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction” [Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct.768]



"...Federal jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be clearly shown." Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F.2d 633



"Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity..." City Street Improv. Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640, 185 P. 962; O'Neill v. Dept of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234



“Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ‘assumed’, it must be proved to exist.” [Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca2d 751.211 P2s 389]



"The law requires PROOF OF JURISDICTION to appear on the Record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533 (1974)



"Therefore, it is necessary that the record present the fact establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal." Lowe v. Alexander 15C 296; People v. Board of Delegates of S.F. Fire Dept., 14 C 479



"A Justice's Court is an inferior court, and its jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively by a party relying upon, or claiming any right under, its judgments." Jolley v. Foltz (1867), C. 321.



"If any tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the case must be dismissed." Louisville RR v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42 (1908)



"A judgment is absolutely void if it appears that there was a want of jurisdiction in the court rendering it either of the subject matter or the person of the defendant." Hahn v. Morse (1868), C. 391.



"An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.



"Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held liable for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees." Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.



"Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law's rejection of a rule of judicial immunity from prospective relief. We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling effect on judicial independence." Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984); cited in Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.



"Judge acted in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of (personal) jurisdiction would be liable." Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488 (1984).



"In such case the judge has lost his judicial function, has become a mere private person, and is liable as a trespasser for damages resulting from his unauthorized acts."



"Judge's honesty of purpose and sincere belief that he was acting in discharge of his official duty was not available as defense in action."



"Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351." Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.



"A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible." Bradley v.Fisher,13 Wall 335, 351, 352.



"The immunity of judges for acts within their judicial role is beyond cavil." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).



"Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.



"All are presumed to know the law." San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.



"It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one." Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.



FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CITES RELATING TO JURISDICTION:



Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) provides the escape clause from federal prosecution for the Citizens of the 50 states:



Rule 12. Defenses and Objections--



(b) "...the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:



(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.



(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person.



...A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading..



(h)(3) "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."





FEDERAL STUDY ON JURISDICTION WITHIN THE STATES:



In June, 1957, the government of the United States published a work entitled Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within The States: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II. The Committee stated at pg. 45 :



"It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to clause 17 by a Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or by cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such jurisdiction being for exercise by the State, subject to non-interference by the State with Federal functions..."



"The consent requirement of Article I, section 8, clause 17 was intended by the framers of the Constitution to preserve the State's jurisdictional integrity against federal encroachment. The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a State," Id., at 46.



According to the April, 1956, report (Part I), pages 41-47 of the Interdepartmental Committee "Study Of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within The States," the court has recognized three methods by which the federal government may acquire exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a physical area:



Constitutional consent.--Other than the District of Columbia, the Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction-- purchase with State consent under article I, section 8, clause 17.



..."and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the creation of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings...."



"The debates in the Constitutional Convention and State ratifying conventions leave little doubt that both the opponents and proponents of Federal exercise of exclusive legislature jurisdiction over the seat of government were of the view that a constitutional provision such as clause 17 was essential if the Federal government was to have such jurisdiction.... While, as has been indicated in the preceding chapter, little attention was given in the course of the debates to Federal exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over areas other than the seat of government, it is reasonable to assume that it was the general view that a special constitution provision was essential to enable the United States to acquire exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any area..."



According to the 1956 report, pages 7-8, "... the provision of the second portion, for transfer of like jurisdiction [as the District of Columbia] to the Federal Government over other areas acquired for Federal purposes, was not uniformly exercised during the first 50 years of the existence of the United States. It was exercised with respect to most, but not all, lighthouse sites, with respect to various forts and arsenals, and with respect to a number of other individual properties. But search of appropriate records indicates that during this period it was often the practice of the Government merely to purchase the lands upon which its installations were to be placed and to enter into occupancy for the purposes intended, without also acquiring legislative jurisdiction over the lands."



"Federal reservation.--In Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885), the Supreme Court approved a method not specified in the Constitution of securing legislative jurisdiction in the United States. Although the matter was not in issue in the case, the Supreme Court said (p. 526):



"The land constituting the Reservation was part of the territory acquired in 1803 by cession from France, and until the formation of the State of Kansas, and her admission into the Union, the United States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and sovereignty over it. For many years before that admission it had been reserved from sale by the proper authorities of the United States for military purposes, and occupied by them as a military post. The jurisdiction of the United States over it during this time was necessarily paramount. But in 1861 Kansas was admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States, that is, with the same rights of political dominion and sovereignty, subject like them only to the Constitution of the United States. Congress might undoubtedly, upon such admission, have stipulated for retention of the political authority, dominion and legislative power of the United States over the Reservation so long as it should be used for military purposes by the government; that is, it could have excepted the place from the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the uses of the general government. But from some cause, inadvertence perhaps, or over-confidence that a recession of such jurisdiction could be had whenever desired, no such stipulation or exception was made."(See also United States v. Gratoit concerning post-statehood reservation of mines, salt licks, salt springs, and mill seats in the (former) Eastern ceded territories.)



"State cession.--In the same case, ( Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe,) the United States Supreme Court sustained the validity of an act of Kansas ceding to the United States legislative jurisdiction over the Fort Leavenworth military reservation, but reserving to itself the right to serve criminal and civil process in the reservation and the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, and their franchises and property on the reservation. In the course of its opinion sustaining the cession of legislative jurisdiction , the Supreme Court said (p. 540):



"... Though the jurisdiction and authority of the general government are essentially different form those of the State, they are not those of a different country; and the two, the State and general government, may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to carry out the purposes of the Constitution. It is for the protection and interests of the States, their people and property, as well as for the protection and interests of the people generally of the United States, that forts, arsenals, and other buildings for public uses are constructed within the States. As instrumentalities for the execution of the powers of the general government, they are, as already said, exempt from such control of the States as would defeat or impair their use for those purposes; and if, to their more effective use, a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction by the State would be desirable, we do not perceive any objection to its grant by the Legislature of the State. Such cession is really as much for the benefit of the State as it is for the benefit of the United States."



The United States v. Worrall, 32 U.S. 384 (1798):



"Whenever a government has been established, I have always supposed, that a power to preserve itself, was a necessary, and an inseparable, concomitant. But the existence of the Federal government would be precarious, it could no longer be called an independent government, if, for the punishment of offences of this nature [bribery of a tax collector], tending to obstruct and pervert the administration of its affairs, an appeal must be made to the State tribunals, or the offenders must escape with absolute impunity. The power to punish misdemeanors, is originally and strictly a common law power; of which, I think, the United States are constitutionally possessed. It might have been exercised by Congress in the form of a Legislative act; but, it may, also, in my opinion be enforced in a course of Judicial proceeding. Whenever an offence aims at the subversion of any Federal institution, or at the corruption of its public officers, it is an offence against the well-being of the United States; from its very nature, it is cognizable under their authority; and, consequently, it is within the jurisdiction of this Court, by virtue of the 11th section of the Judicial act. [2 U.S. 384, 396] The Court being divided in opinion, it became a doubt, whether sentence could be pronounced upon the defendant; and a wish was expressed by the Judges and the Attorney of the District, that the case might be put into such a form, as would admit of obtaining the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court, upon the important principle of the discussion: But the counsel for the prisoner did not think themselves authorised to enter into a compromise of that nature. The Court, after a short consultation, and declaring, that the sentence was mitigated in consideration of the defendant's circumstances, proceeded to adjudge,



"That the defendant be imprisoned for three months; that he pay a fine of 200 dollars; and that he stand committed, 'till this sentence be complied with, and the costs of prosecution paid." [The United States v. Worrall, 32 U.S. 384 (1798)]



Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968): An "act of Congress" that has national scope and operates inside the states



"As its text reveals, the Thirteenth Amendment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 . It has never been doubted, therefore, "that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation," ibid., includes the power to enact laws "direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not." Id., at 23. 74



"Thus, the fact that 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective [392 U.S. 409, 439] can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The constitutional question in this case, therefore, comes to this: Does the authority of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation" include the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property? We think the answer to that question is plainly yes.



"By its own unaided force and effect," the Thirteenth Amendment "abolished slavery, and established universal freedom." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 . Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that - a question not involved in this case - it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that clause clothed "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)



Those who opposed passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 argued in effect that the Thirteenth Amendment merely authorized Congress to dissolve the legal bond by which the Negro slave was held to his master. 75 Yet many had earlier opposed the Thirteenth Amendment on the very ground that it would give Congress virtually unlimited power to enact laws for the protection of Negroes in every State. 76 And the majority leaders in Congress - who were, after all, the authors of the Thirteenth Amendment - had no doubt that its Enabling Clause contemplated the sort of positive legislation that [392 U.S. 409, 440] was embodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Their chief spokesman, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, had brought the Thirteenth Amendment to the floor of the Senate in 1864. In defending the constitutionality of the 1866 Act, he argued that, if the narrower construction of the Enabling Clause were correct, then



"the trumpet of freedom that we have been blowing throughout the land has given an `uncertain sound,' and the promised freedom is a delusion. Such was not the intention of Congress, which proposed the constitutional amendment, nor is such the fair meaning of the amendment itself. . . . I have no doubt that under this provision . . . we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts to nothing. It was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end." 77



"Surely Senator Trumbull was right. Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation. Nor can we say that the determination Congress has made is an irrational [392 U.S. 409, 441] one. For this Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery - its "burdens and disabilities" - included restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 . 78 Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil [392 U.S. 409, 442] War to restrict the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men [392 U.S. 409, 443] into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.



"Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a promise of freedom - freedom to "go and come at pleasure" 79 and to "buy and sell when they please" 80 - would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" 81 if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep." [Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968)]wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep." [Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968)]