Further, § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) uses the term
"investigation" in the context of articulating a creditor’s duties in the
consumer dispute process outlined by the FCRA. It would make little
sense to conclude that, in creating a system intended to give consumers
a means to dispute—and, ultimately, correct—inaccurate information
on their credit reports, Congress used the term "investigation" to
include superficial, unreasonable inquiries by creditors. Cf. Cahlin v.
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting analogous statute governing reinvestigations of consumer
disputes by credit reporting agencies to require reasonable
investigations); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir.
1986) (same). We therefore hold that § 1681s-2(b)(1) requires creditors,
after receiving notice of a consumer dispute from a credit reporting
agency, to conduct a reasonable investigation of their records to
determine whether the disputed information can be verified.
III.
MBNA next contends that even if § 1681s-2(b)(1) requires creditors
to conduct reasonable investigations of consumer disputes, no
evidence here supports a determination by the jury that MBNA’s
investigation of Johnson’s dispute was unreasonable. We review the
denial of MBNA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
See Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2001). We must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, the nonmovant,
and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing
the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility. See id. at 234-
35. "The question is whether a jury, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to [Johnson], could have properly reached the conclusion
reached by this jury." Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We must reverse if a reasonable jury could only rule in favor of
MBNA; if reasonable minds could differ, we must affirm. See id.
As explained above, MBNA was notified of the specific nature of
Johnson’s dispute—namely, her assertion that she was not a coobligor
on the account. Yet MBNA’s agents testified that their investigation
was primarily limited to (1) confirming that the name and
address listed on the ACDVs were the same as the name and address
contained in the CIS,3 and (2) noting that the CIS contained a code
3Under MBNA’s procedures, agents are only required to confirm two
out of four pieces of information contained in the CIS—name, address,
6 JOHNSON v. MBNA AMERICA BANK
indicating that Johnson was the sole responsible party on the account.

The MBNA agents also testified that, in investigating consumer disputes
generally, they do not look beyond the information contained
in the CIS and never consult underlying documents such as account
applications. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude
that MBNA acted unreasonably in failing to verify the accuracy
of the information contained in the CIS.
MBNA argues that other information contained in the CIS compels
the conclusion that its investigation was reasonable. For example, in
support of its alleged belief that Johnson was a co-applicant, MBNA
presented evidence that Johnson’s last name had been changed on the
account following her marriage to Slater and that Johnson’s name was
listed on the billing statements. But this evidence is equally consistent
with Johnson’s contention that she was only an authorized user on
Slater’s account and that, to the extent MBNA’s records listed her as
a co-obligor, those records were incorrect. MBNA also points to evidence
indicating that, during her conversations with MBNA following
Slater’s bankruptcy filing, Johnson attempted to set up a reduced payment
plan and changed the address on the account to her business
address. However, a jury could reasonably conclude that this evidence
showed only that Johnson had tried to make payment arrangements
even though she had no legal obligation to do so. Indeed, Johnson testified
that, during her conversations with MBNA, she had consistently
maintained that she was not responsible for paying the account.
Additionally, MBNA argues that Johnson failed to establish that
MBNA’s allegedly inadequate investigation was the proximate cause
of her damages because there were no other records MBNA could
have examined that would have changed the results of its investigation.
In particular, MBNA relies on testimony that, pursuant to its
five-year document retention policy, the original account application
was no longer in MBNA’s possession. Even accepting this testimony,
however, a jury could reasonably conclude that if the MBNA agents
had investigated the matter further and determined that MBNA no
social security number, and date of birth—in order to verify an account
holder’s identity. Johnson’s social security number and date of birth were
not listed on the CIS summary screen.
7 JOHNSON v. MBNA AMERICA BANK
longer had the application, they could have at least informed the
credit reporting agencies that MBNA could not conclusively verify
that Johnson was a co-obligor.4 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)
(West 1998) (providing that if disputed information "cannot be verified,
the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete that item
of information from the consumer’s file or modify that item of information,
as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation")
(amended Dec. 4, 2003).
IV.
MBNA next asserts that the district court improperly instructed the
jury regarding the standards for determining liability. We review challenges
to jury instructions for abuse of discretion. See S. Atl. Ltd.
P’ship of Tenn. v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 530 (4th Cir. 2002). "Instructions
are adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole
record, they adequately inform the jury of the controlling legal principles
without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the
objecting party." Id. (internal quotation marks & alterations omitted).
Even if we conclude that the challenged instructions are erroneous,
we will not reverse "unless the error seriously prejudiced the challenging
party’s case." Id.


A.
MBNA first argues that the district court erred in instructing the
jury that, in determining whether MBNA’s investigation was reasonable,
it should consider "the cost of verifying the accuracy of the
information versus the possible harm of reporting inaccurate information."
J.A. 767-68. MBNA apparently contends that the balancing test
described in this instruction is inapplicable here because it is derived
from cases involving the reasonableness of a credit reporting agency’s
reinvestigation, see, e.g., Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115
4Because we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support a jury
finding that MBNA failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Johnson’s
dispute, we do not consider Johnson’s argument that the judgment
should be affirmed on the alternative ground that MBNA failed to "report
the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agenc[ies]," 15
U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(C).
8 JOHNSON v. MBNA AMERICA BANK
F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d
280, 287 (7th Cir. 1994). We recognize that creditors and credit
reporting agencies have different roles and duties in investigating
consumer disputes under the FCRA. Nevertheless, we believe that the
general balancing test articulated by the district court—weighing the
cost of verifying disputed information against the possible harm to the
consumer—logically applies in determining whether the steps taken
(and not taken) by a creditor in investigating a dispute constitute a
reasonable investigation. The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in giving this instruction.
B.
MBNA also contends that, after instructing the jury that the FCRA
"does not require that credit card account records, including original
applications, be kept in any particular form," J.A. 770, the district
court erred in further instructing the jury that "the law does prohibit
MBNA from maintaining its record[s] in such manner as to consciously
avoid knowing that information it is reporting is
[in]accurate," id. MBNA claims that this instruction improperly permitted
the jury to assess the adequacy of MBNA’s record keeping
system. However, the other detailed instructions given by the district
court made clear that Johnson’s claim was based on MBNA’s failure
to conduct a reasonable investigation of its records, not on the inadequacy
of those records. And, it appears that the brief instruction challenged
by MBNA, which the district court gave near the end of its
jury instructions, was simply intended to clarify the legal effect of
MBNA not maintaining the original account application—not to
invite the jury to independently assess MBNA’s record keeping practices.
MBNA further claims that the challenged instruction improperly
incorporated a legal standard from another provision of § 1681s-2,
relating to the accuracy of information that creditors provide to credit
reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (West 1998)
(prohibiting creditors from furnishing consumer information to a
credit reporting agency "if the [creditor] knows or consciously avoids
knowing that the information is inaccurate") (amended Dec. 4, 2003).
MBNA emphasizes that this provision is enforceable only by government
agencies and officials, not by consumers. See 15 U.S.C.A.
9 JOHNSON v. MBNA AMERICA BANK
§ 1681s-2(d) (West 1998) (amended Dec. 4, 2003).