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Re:Citizenship/Jurisdiction Cites
While the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended primarily for the benefit of the negro race, it also confers the right of citizenship upon persons of all other races, white, yellow, or red, born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." In re Rodriguez, W.D.Tex.1897, 81 F. 337.
"The Constitution of the United States [before the Fourteenth Amendment] does not declare who are and who are not citizens, nor does it attempt to describe the constituent elements of citizenship; it leaves that quality where it found it resting upon the fact of home birth and upon the laws of the several states." 1862, 10 Op.Atty.
Congress possesses authority to create standards for attainment of United States citizenship by foreign-born persons. Gonzalez de Lara v. U. S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1971, 439 F.2d 1316. Aliens 60;
It is within the exclusive power of Congress to confer the privilege of citizenship, and the court must strictly construe acts granting such privilege. U.S. v. Dang Mew Wan Lum, C.C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1937, 88 F.2d 88. Aliens 60;
Congress power over Indian tribes is plenary. Goodluck v. Apache County, D.C.Ariz.1975, 417 F.Supp. 13, affirmed 97 S.Ct. 225, 429 U.S. 876, 50 L.Ed.2d 160.
Once American citizenship has been recognized or conferred, Congress may not remove the status; it is for the citizen to abandon the citizenship voluntarily. Bellei v. Rusk, D.C.D.C.1969, 296 F.Supp. 1247, probable jurisdiction noted 90 S.Ct. 69, 396 U.S. 811, 24 L.Ed.2d 64, reversed on other grounds 91 S.Ct. 1060, 401 U.S. 815, 28 L.Ed.2d 499.
Naturalization is under the control of Congress, and aliens have no rights save as they are ordained by Congress. Petition of Caputo, E.D.N.Y.1954, 118 F.Supp. 870.
Congress may exclude aliens from the United States, prescribe the conditions under which they may enter, provide for their supervision, regulate their conduct, and fix their rights while in the United States. U.S. v. Frederick, S.D.Tex.1943, 50 F.Supp. 769, affirmed 146 F.2d 488, certiorari denied 65 S.Ct. 866, 324 U.S. 861, 89 L.Ed. 1418.
On the purpose of 18 USC 1401:
Former chapter 11 of this title was passed for purpose of effecting a complete revision of the laws relative to nationality in light of new conditions, to reconcile seemingly conflicting provisions of different statutes, and to facilitate naturalization of worthy candidates while protecting the United States against adding to its body of citizens persons who would be a potential liability rather than an asset. In re Thenault, D.C.D.C.1942, 47 F. Supp. 952.
Subsection (a)(7) of this section pertaining to who shall be nationals and citizens at birth, is not retroactive, and plaintiff whose claim to citizenship rests on single contention that such subsection by its retroactive application gives her that status, is not a citizen. Wolf v. Brownell, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1957, 253 F.2d 141, certiorari denied 78 S.Ct. 1393, 357 U.S. 942, 2 L.Ed.2d 1555, rehearing denied 79 S.Ct. 18, 358 U.S. 859, 3 L.Ed.2d 94. See, also, D'Alessio v. Lehman, C.A.Ohio 1961, 289 F.2d 317, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct. 41, 368 U.S. 822, 7 L.Ed.2d 27.
Subsection (a)(7) of this section liberalizing derivative citizenship requirement to provide for five years of residence in United States by parent after age of 14 years and prior to birth of citizenship-seeking child did not apply retroactively to persons born before its effective date. Palomo v. Mitchell, S.D.Tex.1972, 361 F.Supp. 455, affirmed 474 F.2d 1345.
The status of a foreign born person as an American citizen because of previous naturalization of his father was to be determined in accordance with requirements of such laws as were in effect at time of the person's birth and subsequent related events, where the person was born before the adoption of former chapter 11 of this title. Schaufus v. Attorney General of U.S., D.C.Md.1942, 45 F.Supp. 61.
It is domestic rather than international law which in most instances determines the acquisition or loss of nationality. Cabebe v. Acheson, C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1950, 183 F.2d 795.
Citizenship is not regulated by international law but depends entirely on municipal law, and in United States acquisition of citizenship is governed solely by Constitution and by Acts of Congress. Tomasicchio v. Acheson, D.C.D.C.1951, 98 F.Supp. 166.
The status of persons as citizens or aliens depends entirely upon the Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress pursuant thereto. Johnson v. U.S., Ct.Cl.1893, 29 Ct.Cl. 1, affirmed 16 S.Ct. 377, 160 U.S. 546, 40 L.Ed. 529. See, also, Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 776, L.R.A.1916D, 127, Ann.Cas.1915B, 261, affirmed 36 S.Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L.Ed. 297, Ann.Cas.1916E, 645.
A question as to status or citizenship arising in the United States is determinable by our own law; or, if it arose on the high seas, or anywhere out of the territorial jurisdiction of another country, it would be a question either under our own law or the public law, according to the circumstances under which the right was asserted or denied. 1867, 12 Op.Atty.Gen. 320.
Citizenship implies membership in a political society, the relation of allegiance and protection, identification with the state, and a participation in its functions, and while a temporary absence may suspend the relation between a state and its citizen, his identification with the state remains where he intends to return. Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co., W.D.Va.1918, 252 F. 910.
Mere residence in a foreign country, even by a naturalized American, has no effect upon such person's citizenship. U.S. v. Howe, S.D.N.Y.1916, 231 F. 546.
"Citizenship" is membership in a political society and imposes a duty of allegiance on the part of a member and a duty of protection on the part of society. U.S. v. Polzin, D.C.Md.1942, 48 F.Supp. 476.
The noun "citizen" has been defined to be one who enjoys the freedom and privileges of a city; a freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, or one not entitled to its franchises; an inhabitant of a city; a townsman; a person, native, or naturalized, of either sex, who owes allegiance to a government and is entitled to reciprocal protection from it; one who is domiciled in a country, and who is a citizen, though neither native nor naturalized, in such a sense that he takes his legal status from such country. In English law, the term means an inhabitant of a city; the representative of a city, in Parliament. In American law, a citizen is one who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for Representatives in Congress and other public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people; one of the sovereign people; a constituent member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the people; a member of the civil state, entitled to all its privileges. A person may be a citizen for commercial purposes and not for political purposes. Greenough v. Board of Police Com'rs of Town of Tiverton, R.I.1909, 74 A. 785, 30 R.I. 212, 136 Am.St.Rep. 953.
A citizen of the United States is a person of any race or color born within the limits of, or who has been naturalized under the laws of the United States. Prowd v. Gore, Cal.App. 2 Dist.1922, 207 P. 490, 57 Cal.App. 458.
The word "citizen," while not convertible with the word "resident," is often used synonymously with it, without any implication of political privileges. Prowd v. Gore, Cal.App. 2 Dist.1922, 207 P. 490, 57 Cal.App. 458.
All persons found within the limits of the government, whether their residence be permanent or temporary, are to be deemed citizens for jurisdictional purposes. Molyneux v. Seymour, Fanning & Co., Ga.1860, 30 Ga. 440, 76 Am.Dec. 662. See, also, Keerl v. Keerl, 1870, 34 Md. 21. Citizens 2;
A citizen is one who by birth, naturalization, or otherwise is a member of an independent political society called a "state," "kingdom," or "empire," subject to its laws, and entitled to its protection. Blanck v. Pausch, 1885, 113 Ill. 60.
Distinction between citizenship and electorship pervades the public law of the United States. 1857, 8 Op.Atty.Gen. 300.
In regard to the protection of our citizens in their rights at home and abroad, we have in the United States no law which divides them into classes or makes any difference whatever between them. 1859, 9 Op.Atty.Gen. 357.
The only classes of citizens are native born citizens and naturalized citizens, who did not acquire the status of citizens by birth. Zimmer v. Acheson, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1951, 191 F.2d 209.
There were only two types of "citizens," those who were native born and those who were naturalized, and there was no basis for differentiating between the status of those who were naturalized by court procedure prescribed by Congress and embraced Act of March 2, 1907, and former § 701 et seq. of this title, and those who became naturalized by a derivative right from their parents. Schaufus v. Attorney General of U.S., D.C.Md.1942, 45 F.Supp. 61.
A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state wherein he resides. Myers v. Murray, Nelson & Co., C.C.S.D.Iowa 1890, 43 F. 695.
One may be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state. Sharon v. Hill, C.C.Cal.1885, 26 F. 337, 11 Sawy. 290. See, also, Nichols v. Hill, C.C.Cal.1899, 92 F. 1; Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse de Russie, D.C.N.Y.1916, 231 F. 341; Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County, 1909, 48 So. 788, 160 Ala. 155; McDonel v. State, 1883, 90 Ind. 320.
An American citizen has two classes of privileges: (1) Those which he has as a citizen of the United States; and (2) those which he has as a citizen of the state where he resides. Ex parte Kinney, C.C.E.D.Va.1879, 14 F.Cas. 602, No. 7825.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14 citizenship in the United States is defined and is made independent of citizenship in a state, and the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution are such as belong of right to citizens of all free states, and those which in the Constitution are secured to the people, either as against the action of the Federal or of the state government. U. S. v. Hall, C.C.S.D.Ala.1871, 26 F.Cas. 79, 3 Chi.Leg.N. 260, No. 15282.
With the cession of populated areas by the Crown of Spain to the United States, persons collectively became nationalized but not naturalized, and Spanish subjects residing in ceded territory became nationals of the United States unless provided otherwise by treaty. Cabebe v. Acheson, C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1950, 183 F.2d 795.
Citizens of Phillippine Islands were not aliens, and owed allegiance to the United States. Roque Espiritu De La Ysla v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1935, 77 F.2d 988, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 138, 296 U.S. 575, 80 L.Ed. 406.
On a transfer of territory by one nation to another the political relations between the inhabitants of the ceded territory and the former government were changed. Tobin v. Walkinshaw, C.C.N.D.Cal.1856, 23 F.Cas. 1346, 1 McAll. 186, No. 14070. Citizens 5;
Naturalized citizens of territory ceded from one nation to another, who owed allegiance, purely statutory, when released therefrom, were remitted to their original status. Tobin v. Walkinshaw, C.C.N.D.Cal.1856, 23 F.Cas. 1346, 1 McAll. 186, No. 14070.
Citizenship of child born of Spanish parents in the province of New Mexico in 1809 was discussed. De Baca v. U.S., Ct.Cl.1901, 37 Ct.Cl. 482.
Citizens of Panama who were residents of the Canal Zone at the time of the treaty between the United States and Panama, and who had not taken any affirmative action to retain citizenship in that republic, owed allegiance to the United States and were entitled to passports. 1907, 26 Op.Atty.Gen. 376.
Mere ignorance of petitioner's status as an American citizen at birth in a foreign country would not alone preclude petitioner from asserting American citizenship, provided petitioner had not lost such status by his subsequent acts. Schaufus v. Attorney General of U.S., D.C.Md.1942, 45 F.Supp. 61.
In order for person who is United States citizen by virtue of his birth to be subject to deportation, government must demonstrate that he has lost his United States citizenship through expatriation and assumed status of an alien. Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1245, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 302, 404 U.S. 946, 30 L.Ed.2d 262. Aliens 53.1;
United States citizenship can be relinquished only voluntarily and not by legislative fiat. Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1245, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 302, 404 U.S. 946, 30 L.Ed.2d 262.
Where United States citizen could have obeyed selective service system, an alternative he found impossible solely because of his own moral code, his renunciation of United States citizenship was "voluntary" for purposes of determining whether he was in fact an alien who could be deported. Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1245, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 302, 404 U.S. 946, 30 L.Ed.2d 262.
"The law of nations 'is part of our law.' Hilton v. Guyot, N.Y.1895, 16 S.Ct. 139, 159 U.S. 163, 40 L.Ed. 95. It provides that in general all persons are citizens (subjects) of the countries (governments, sovereigns) of their birth, and in consequence owe them permanent allegiance. This status cannot be changed without their countries' consent. Shanks v. Dupont, S.C.1830, 3 Pet. 245, 7 L.Ed. 666. A person may be admitted to citizenship in another country without his country's consent, but the only result is that thereafter he is a citizen of two countries. His allegiance and obligations to the country of his birth are not diminished, and in so far as they conflict with his new allegiance, 'he becomes a citizen of the new country at his peril.' Talbot v. Janson, S.C.1795, 3 Dall. 164, 169, 1 L.Ed. 540." In re Siem, D.C.Mont.1922, 284 F. 868.
Children of Danish mother and American father were citizens for purposes of child custody proceeding even though children had been naturalized in Denmark. Zaubi v. Hoejme, W.D.Pa.1980, 530 F.Supp. 831.
One who becomes a citizen of United States by reason of birth retains it even though by law of another country he is also a citizen of it, and American citizenship thus acquired can be lost only through voluntary action, or through operation of a treaty or of an act of Congress. Lee Hong v. Acheson, N.D.Cal.1953, 110 F.Supp. 60.
The primary legal test by which United States citizenship is determined is place of birth. Kiyokuro Okimura v. Acheson, D.C.Hawai'i 1951, 99 F.Supp. 587, vacated on other grounds 72 S.Ct. 293, 342 U.S. 899, 96 L.Ed. 674.
Complaint seeking declaration of citizenship and declaratory judgment holding retention requirements unconstitutional, which did not seek redress from Secretary of State regarding denial of application for passport, failed to state claim against Secretary of State. LeBrun v. Thornburgh, D.N.J.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1204.
"The distinguishing and supreme obligation of citizenship and its permanent allegiance is military service. It has its antecedent in the feudal system wherein the vassal makes oath of fealty to his lord and serves him in war, as a consideration and payment for the land and protection he receives from his lord. So the citizen born to or making oath of allegiance likewise renders military service to the country in payment of and in consideration for the advantages, rights, and protection it extends to him. As these latter are the possession of citizens, and not of aliens, the consequence is that the obligation of military service that attends them attaches only when the alien is admitted to citizenship. It cannot attach before admission. * * * To render military service, any country may recall its citizens from the ends of the earth. For these reasons, without his country's consent, a person neither can be rightfully compelled to enter the military service of a country wherein he is an alien, nor can he rightfully voluntarily do so. If either wrong against his country is committed, for the first it may have just cause for war, and for the second it may pursue and punish him. * * * All that can be rightfully exacted of an alien is the obligation of temporary allegiance due to the country wherein he is alien, viz. respect for municipal law, and civil duties of assistance and defense against calamities and robbers, pirates, and other evil persons who are enemies of no country in particular, but of society in general. * * * In respect to change of citizenship and allegiance, all leading countries, including this country and Norway, by treaties and statutes now give advance and general consent thereto." In re Siem, D.C.Mont.1922, 284 F. 868.
The citizenship of a person who becomes a citizen at birth must be deemed to continue unless he has been deprived of his citizenship through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by his voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles. In re Bolter, S.D.Cal.1946, 66 F.Supp. 566.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, every man is presumed to be a citizen of the country in which he resides. Gorman v. Forty Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. Ry. Co., N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.1924, 203 N.Y.S. 632, 208 A.D. 214 .
A wife, whose first husband resided and was employed in New York City for over two years, was presumed to be a citizen of the United States at the time of husband's death, and her citizenship was presumed to continue thereafter. Gorman v. Forty Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. Ry. Co., N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.1924, 203 N.Y.S. 632, 208 A.D. 214.
Where citizenship was not specifically alleged but residence was shown, legal presumption arose that plaintiff being natural person was a citizen. Atchley v. Varner, Okla.1929, 280 P. 616, 138 Okla. 156.
Where it was shown that one resided in Massachusetts, there was a presumption that he was a citizen of the United States, especially where it appeared that he was an officer in the United States merchant marine service. Buckley v. McDonald, Mont.1906, 84 P. 1114, 33 Mont. 483.
The law presumes all persons who reside here to be citizens of the United States, until the contrary appears. Jantzen v. Arizona Copper Co., Ariz.1889, 20 P. 93, 3 Ariz. 6. See, also, Quinby v. Duncan, Del.1846, 4 Har. 383; State v. Beackmo, Ind.1843, 6 Blackf. 488; Garfield M. & M. Co. v. Hammer, 1886, 8 P. 153, 6 Mont. 53 affirmed 9 S.Ct. 548, 130 U.S. 291, 32 L.Ed. 964.
It was presumed that the political status of an alien continued, and the mere fact of long residence in this country was not sufficient to overcome this presumption. Ehrlich v. Weber, Tenn.1905, 88 S.W. 188, 114 Tenn. 711. See, also, State v. Jackson, 1907, 65 A. 657, 79 Vt. 504.
Foreigners by birth are prima facie aliens. White v. White, 1859, 59 Ky. 185, 2 Metc. 185.
The mere fact that a man resided in Canada, and had for many years, was not ground for presuming that he was an alien. Gilman v. Thompson, 1839, 11 Vt. 643, 34 Am.Dec. 714.
Citizenship cannot be presumed from the holding of real estate or of office. Dryden v. Swinburne, W.Va.1882, 20 W.Va. 89.
Alienage must be proved by him who asserts it. Moore v. Wilson's Adm'rs, Tenn.1837, 18 Tenn. 406.
A passport issued to a Chinese person by the Secretary of State was not evidence of the citizenship of such person in the United States. Edsell v. D. Charlie Mark, C.C.A.9 (Wash.) 1910, 179 F. 292, 103 C.C.A. 121.
Defendant met requirements for United States citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, even though government of Costa Rica may also have recognized his citizenship, where defendant had registered for selective service, held American passport, and voted in United States presidential election. Las Vistas Villas, S.A. v. Petersen, M.D.Fla.1991, 778 F.Supp. 1202, affirmed 13 F.3d 409.
State court decree under West's Cal.Ann.Health and Safety Code § 10600 et seq. establishing fact of birth in California is evidence of birthplace, but not conclusive proof of citizenship. Ex parte Lee Fong Fook, D.C.Cal.1948, 74 F.Supp. 68, remanded on other grounds 170 F.2d 245, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 604, 336 U.S. 914, 93 L.Ed. 1077.
Proof of alleged citizenship need not be clear and convincing, and no special quantum of proof should be exacted from any person claiming American citizenship merely because of his racial origin. Ng Yip Yee v. Barber, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1955, 225 F.2d 707.
When an indictment was attacked because of noncitizenship of grand juror, the grand juror could testify to the place of his birth and the facts surrounding his father's naturalization. State v. Chamberlin, Iowa 1917, 163 N.W. 428, 180 Iowa 685.
Evidence of declarations of one who could not be produced as a witness at the trial that he was a citizen, that he had voted at territorial elections, that his name appeared on the election register, and that he had located mining claims under the declaration that he was a citizen of the United States, was admissible to prove such citizenship. Providence Gold-Min. Co. v. Burke, Ariz.1899, 57 P. 641, 6 Ariz. 323.
"For the officers to require more conclusive evidence than the petitioner has furnished is to demand proof beyond all doubt and to a moral certainty, and such a requirement would constitute a fundamental error in the application of the law." Ex parte Cheung Tung, W.D.Wash.1923, 292 F. 997.
Uncontradicted evidence established the citizenship of a person of Chinese descent arrested for deportation. U.S. v. Charlie Dart, N.D.Ga.1918, 251 F. 394. Aliens 32(8)
In action for declaration of United States citizenship on behalf of a Chinese born male claimed to be the son of an American citizen, refusal of travel documents by the Consul General based on lack of sufficient proof of identity was a denial of nationality as basis of jurisdiction of the action. Soo Hoo Doo Wing v. Dulles, D.C.Conn.1956, 147 F.Supp. 862.
The evidence relied upon to overcome the presumption of citizenship arising from the party having voted, held office, or otherwise performed the functions or exercised the rights of citizenship, must be clear and satisfactory. State v. Chamberlin, Iowa 1917, 163 N.W. 428, 180 Iowa 685.
Evidence that a person born in the United States, of parents who were citizens thereof, came to Texas while it was a part of Mexico, with his mother, a widow in 1831, left there in 1835, was married in Louisiana, and was again living in Texas from 1859 to 1863, did not prove that he became a citizen of Mexico, or require any evidence from defendant to the contrary; plaintiff's right being based on the claim that such person did become a Mexican citizen. Ferguson v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App.1895, 33 S.W. 138, 11 Tex.Civ.App. 413, error refused.
Where witness was asked "Of what country was your father a subject?", his answer, "France--Paris," was too vague and unsatisfactory to prove that the father, who lived many years in this country and died here, was an alien. Torre v. Jeannin, Miss.1899, 25 So. 860, 76 Miss. 898.
The removal of a wife with her husband from the United States, and remaining abroad with her husband, who had renounced his citizenship of the United States, and died out of the United States, was prima facie evidence of the alienage of the wife, which was repealed by the fact that, within a short time after the death of the husband, she returned to the United States, and, as far as appeared, evinced no intention of leaving the country. Moore v. Tisdale, 1845, 44 Ky. 352, 5 B.Mon. 352.
When all that was known of a person's citizenship was that his residence and home had been in a foreign country, the mere statement of a stranger that he was a citizen of the United States was not sufficient to establish his citizenship in this country, against the presumption which would arise from his home being in another country. State v. Salge, Nev.1865, 1 Nev. 455.
The recital in a deed that the vendees were residents of the state of Mississippi was admissible, but not conclusive, to establish their alienage to the Republic of Mexico. Lacoste v. Odam, 1863, 26 Tex. 458.
Evidence of alienage, which should disfranchise a party, ought to be clear and conclusive, and not left to implication and inference. Jones v. McCoy, 1848, 3 Tex. 349.
An admission was insufficient to establish alienage. Groves v. Gordon, S.C.1812, 3 Brev. 245.
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When a statute, code, or court holding changes tomorrow, does reality change? Does truth change? Does right and wrong change?
If so, there are no absolutes, and the only logical conclusion is that reality, truth, and right and wrong are determined arbitrarily on a daily basis by those with the most power, guns, and money, and the rest of us can choose to run, fight, or be their slaves.
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