|
"We are not persuaded by petitioner's argument - based on cases holding that land patents once delivered and accepted could be canceled only in judicial proceedings (e. g., Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530 ) - that the administrative cancellation power established by Cameron and the other cases cited is confined to so-called equitable interests, and that a lease which is said to resemble more closely the legal interest conveyed by a land patent, is not subject to such power. We think that no matter how the interest conveyed is denominated the true line of demarcation is whether as a result of the transaction "all authority or control" over the lands has passed from "the Executive Department." Moore v. Robbins, supra, at 533, or whether the Government continues to possess some measure of control over them.
Unlike a land patent, which divests the Government of title, Congress under the Mineral Leasing Act has not only reserved to the United States the fee interest in the leased land, but has also subjected the lease to exacting [373 U.S. 472, 478] restrictions and continuing supervision by the Secretary. Thus, assignments and subleases must be approved by the Secretary, 30 U.S.C. 187; he may direct complete suspension of operations on the land, 30 U.S.C. 209, or require the lessee to operate under a cooperative or unit plan, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1963), 226 (j); and he may prescribe, as he has, rules and regulations governing in minute detail all facets of the working of the land, 30 U.S.C. 189; 30 CFR, pt. 221. In short, a mineral lease does not give the lessee anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, nor does it convey an unencumbered estate in the minerals. 7 Since the Secretary's connection with the land continues to subsist, he should have the power, in a proper case, to correct his own errors. "BOESCHE v. UDALL, 373 U.S. 472 (1963), USSC
"'Nor is fraud in the patentee the only ground upon which a bill will be sustained. Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where the officer has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party has a higher equity and should have received the patent. In such cases courts of law will pronounce them void. The patent is but evidence of a grant, and the officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially. If he issues a patent for land reserved from sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority. But one officer of the land office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of a court. "MORAN v. HORSKY, 178 U.S. 205 (1900), USSC
|