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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE REGISTRATION OF AUTOMOBILES MUST BE UPHELD.

The original intent of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1905 allowed the registration of automobiles so that in case of an accident the identity of the citizen involved could be ascertained. In the current applications of the Vehicle Code, there are many other secret attachments to the registering of an automobile and the factor of "procedural unconscionability" is rampant see Shaffer v. Superior Ct. 39 Cal.Rptr2. 506:

1] The registration is used a proof that the applicant is a "resident" of the State of California and a second class citizen of California who hold primary allegiance to Washington, District of Criminals. And as the court is well aware that "resident" means alien to the state such as a U.S. citizen (actually in law a citizen of the District of Columbia).

2] The applicant for registration then gives the state power of attorney over the said item and agrees to hold the State harmless for any type of incident.

3] The applicant for registration also admits by implication that they are involved in a commercial activity, i.e. Interstate Commerce Clause and the so-called 14th Amendment.

4] The applicant for registration then admits that they are under contract for benefits as a ward of the government by having a social security number.

5] The applicant for registration then admits that they are citizens of the Federal government, and eligible to vote under the purview of the 15th Amendment as a voter on the federal voters register, via the Motor Voter Registration Act.

6] The applicant for registration then admits that the item on the request for registration is a vehicle of the type required to be registered as a commercial vehicle.
All these came about as a process of identification, regulation and control under the police powers, for purposes of taxation, adding to the original intent. The Legislature has no authority to modify the original intent by subterfuge.

"The requirements for registration were enacted in the interest of public welfare, and one of the purposes for the legislation is to afford identification of vehicles and persons responsible in cases of accident and injury."
Dorsey v Barba, 38 Cal.2d 350, 354; 240 P.2d 604 (Judicial Notice is requested)
It is not difficult to see that registration and numbering of automobiles is intimately connected with their safe operation in the streets. In a state like California many automobiles are precisely alike in external appearance. They are sometimes operated by persons whose faces are partially concealed and whose identity is uncertain. Those operators who are most reckless and indifferent - and those are the ones who endanger the safety of others - may violate this ordinance with impunity unless some method is adopted by which they or their automobile may be identified, and a identification process must be maintained. The state must establish two sets of registration (one) for the citizens who are not "residents" and hold primary allegiance to California as California Citizens; (two) for the U.S. citizens who are "resident" in the State of California under the Interstate Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment, and thus, subject to all federal and State laws.

The terms recording, registration, and filing are used interchangeably, the purpose and effect of each being to give notice and prevent fraud and deception.

Register means to record formally and exactly; to enroll; too enter precisely in a list or the like. Los Angeles County v Craig, 100 P.2d 818, 820, 38 Cal.App.2d 58 (Judicial Notice is requested) If the provision for registration and numbering - which involved no discrimination, and requires the payment of nothing more than is necessary to pay for the number which the municipality furnishes - can be regarded as a license, it is not a license for the purpose of raising revenue. If it were, it might well be contended that it did not pass an incident to the power to regulate. It is a license as a mere means of regulation.

II

THE REGISTRATION TAX IS IMPOSED UNDER REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE 10751 AS AN EXCISE TAX FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF USING THE ROADS.

It is plain that the levy is an excise for the privilege of using the highways. It is denominated a privilege tax. The commercial carrier cannot use the highways unless it is paid.
It is well settled that an excise tax is often used as synonymous with privilege or license tax, and privilege tax is an excise tax and is authorized as a license tax.

"We are of the opinion that if a tax in its nature is a privilege tax, it does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed." Ingels v Riley, 5 Cal.2d 154, 160 (Judicial Notice is requested)
An excise tax is one laid on licenses to pursue certain occupations, corporate privileges, or sales or consumption and use of certain of commodities, and an excise tax partakes of the nature of a license tax. In this case Revenue and Taxation Code §10751 (Judicial Notice is requested) is an excise tax for the use of the highways for any type of business or commercial activity.

A license fee or as it is otherwise called 'license tax" is the sum exacted for the privilege of carrying on a particular occupation or business. State ex rel. Arn v Consumers Co-op Ass'n, 183 P.2d 423, 449; 163 Kan. 324. (Judicial Notice is requested)

The fundamental idea of a highway is not only that it is public, but that it is public for free and unmolested passage thereon by all persons desiring to use it. The use of the highways is not a privilege, but a right. But this right does not extend to those who are under the Interstate Commerce Clause or using the highways for profit or gain.

" . .. If renting or leasing is what makes the vehicle a commercial vehicle, there is no need to use the word 'commercial'. It would be sufficient to use the word 'vehicle' or 'automobile used for transporting persons'.". . We conclude that the lower court's construction of Vehicle Code section 260 more reasonably conforms to the legislative intent and that the term "for hire" modifies the term "transportation," so that a commercial vehicle is one in which persons or property are transported for hire. Thus, "commercial vehicles" are of two types: (1) those put to the use of transporting persons for hire, and (2) those designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. In other words, vehicles used for the traditional purposes of public livery or conveyance, such as buses, taxicabs or other vehicles functioning as common carriers or otherwise, operate for profit."

Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Carrier Ins. Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 223, 228.(emp. added) (Judicial Notice is requested)
The preceding judicial clarification of CMVC § 260a establishes that the type of USE, not the type of vehicle determines whether the vehicle is required to be registered and it's driver licensed.

III

THE POLICE POWER CANNOT BE USED TO RAISE REVENUE

The police power cannot be used to raise revenue unless it be incident in the accomplishment of a proper end of promoting order, safety, health, morals or general welfare, to which end the fees have a reasonable relation. The object must always be regulation.


The police power cannot be exercised for purposes of exacting revenue. If the purpose of a license is regulation only, it is beyond the authority of the Legislature or a city government to impose it for the purpose of revenue. Viquesney v Kansas City (Mo. - 1924) 266 S.W. 700, 702 (Judicial Notice is requested)
The Judicial Branch acting in concert with the Executive Branch, utilizing Judicial powers to raise revenue violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, as the court is merely an Executive Administrative agency operating under color of law to raise revenue.