[planetmark]

Furthermore, we note a premise dating back at least to the
time of Plato: "The 'just powers' of government derive from the
consent of the governed.'" E. Rostow, "The Obligation To Obey
Valid Law In A Society Of Consent," in FRANKEL, supra, at 759.
Rostow concluded from this premise that

in a society of consent the powers of government are just in
Jefferson's sense: that is, they are legitimate, because
authorized and renewed by procedures of voting all must
respect. As a consequence, a citizen of such a society owes
his fellow citizens, and the state they have established
together, a moral duty to obey valid laws until they are
repealed or fall into desuetude.

Id. (emphasis original). Indeed, one of the maxims of common law
provides: "The sovereignty of the state over its citizens is
supreme." BLACKSTONE, supra, at 952.
[6] While our discussion of Gibson's first two issues has
been general, we are inevitably led to these specific
conclusions: The laws requiring an operator of a motor vehicle
to carry proof of liability insurance in his motor vehicle and to
register the motor vehicle annually are valid laws enacted by the
state. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842
(Ct.App.1984). Gibson has a legal duty to obey them.

III
[7, 8] Gibson also argues that he did not voluntarily
consent to being tried by a six-person jury and he therefore had
the "right to a Common Law Jury of twelve." Article 1, section 7
of the Idaho Constitution provides in part that "in cases of
misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any
court inferior to the district court, whether such case or action
be tried in such inferior court or in district court, the jury
shall consist of not more than six." (Emphasis added.) The
Idaho Constitution thus not
[1219]
only permits a six-person jury, but it forbids a greater number.
A jury composed of less than twelve is also permissible under the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). In
Williams, the trial court refused the defendant's request to seat
a twelve-person jury instead of a six-person jury. The Supreme
Court held that such refusal did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. The defendant's lack of consent in
Williams did not imbue him with the right to a jury of twelve;
nor did Gibson's lack of consent allow him to insist upon such a
jury. Neither the Idaho nor the United States Constitution
requires it.

IV
[9, 10] Gibson finally argues that the state cannot compel
him to pay his fines in federal reserve notes. This is not a
novel argument. See cases cited in Herald v. State, 107 Idaho
640, 691 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App.1984). He claims if a state can
require fines to be paid in federal reserve notes, that state
violates Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
The constitution does, in fact, forbid states to "make anything
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." However,
Congress, which is authorized to coin money and regulate its
value, has decreed federal reserve notes to be "legal tender for
all debts, public and private." 31 U.S.C. section 392 (emphasis
added). State officials are bound by the definition of legal
tender promulgated by Congress. If Congress has defined federal
reserve notes to be legal tender, states must abide by such a
definition. See Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan.App.2d 301, 564 P.2d 552
(1977). Therefore, the state may compel payment of fines in
federal reserve notes or other coins and currencies of the United
States. We wish to assure Gibson that payment of his debts by
means of federal reserve notes extinguishes those debts and
leaves him indebted to no one.
We have examined the other arguments presented in this case
and find them also to be without merit. The district court's
order is affirmed.

WALTERS, C.J., and BURNETT, J., concur.