[suijuris]

Unlike a land patent, which divests the Government of title, Congress under the Mineral Leasing Act has not only reserved to the United States the fee interest in the leased land, but has also subjected the lease to exacting restrictions and continuing supervision by the Secretary. Thus, assignments and subleases must be approved by the Secretary, 30 U. S. C. § 187; he may direct complete suspension of operations on the land, 30 U. S. C. § 209, or require the lessee to operate under a cooperative or unit plan, 30 U. S. C. (Supp. IV, 1963), § 226 (j); and he may prescribe, as he has, rules and regulations governing in minute detail all facets of the working of the land, 30 U. S. C. § 189; 30 CFR, pt. 221. In short, a mineral lease does not give the lessee anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, nor does it convey an unencumbered estate in the minerals.*fn7 Since the Secretary's connection with the land continues to subsist, he should have the power, in a proper case, to correct his own errors. BOESCHE v. UDALL (05/27/63)



*fn6 R. S. § 441, 5 U. S. C. § 485, charges the Secretary "with the supervision of public business relating to . . . public lands, including mines." He is directed by R. S. § 453, 43 U. S. C. § 2, to "perform all executive duties . . . in anywise respecting . . . public lands [of the United States]," and R. S. § 2478, 43 U. S. C. § 1201, authorizes him "to enforce and carry into execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions of . . . [the Title dealing with public lands] not otherwise specially provided for."



...land patents once delivered and accepted could be canceled only in judicial proceedings (e. g., Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530) BOESCHE v. UDALL (05/27/63)



A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under junior patents or titles until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal in a direct proceeding for that purpose. Moore v. Robins, 96 U.S. 533.



With the patent passes away all authority or control of the executive department over the land, and over the title which it has conveyed. Noble v. Union River Logging Ry., 147 U.S. 175; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 400.



he sovereign right of taxation belonging to a State is not defeated by the Federal Government patenting land within its territorial jurisdiction to a citizen of the State or of a foreign State. MOORE v. MCGUIRE (03/25/07)



The Government is estopped by its patent and by the leases. Peyton v. Smith, 5 Pet. 483.



It is true the Government sometimes claims immunity from certain species of estoppel, but the rule is well established that this immunity is limited to questions of delay and laches; it does not extend to general considerations of equity. Lowa v. Carr,191 Fed. 257.



This is in accordance with the general rule that possession alone, without title or color of title confers no right beyond the limits of actual possession. See Green v. Liter,8 Cranch, 229, 250; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 55; Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 47, 65; Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395, 401; Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt. 173, 179; Ryan v. Kilpatrick, 66 Ala. 332, 337.



In the case of lands granted under a Land patent, a “connected documentary chain of evidence” is on public record at the Recorder of Deeds for the county in which the land is located. Even the sovereign States themselves do not have the power to overturn Land patents and their effects upon the land, namely, the severance from the interference in them by the administration of government. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 102 (1871).



In order that this distribution of Public Lands could be carried out expeditiously and according to the desire to prevent the current, or any future, administration of government from invading property rights (as had the King), Congress placed the Land patent of the United States in positions above all other conveyances of property, by exempting lands granted under the Land patent from debt incurred prior to the patenting. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 107 (1918).



The effect of this legislation was to give to the patentee, once the patent was perfected via proper procedure, an ability to hold title that is nearly absolute. Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447, 454 (1882).



The validity of the patent could not be attacked except under fraud or clerical error and either of these circumstances has to be proven in a court of law, and the challenge must be brought within six months of the granting of the patent. In fact, in a court of law, the patent is the conclusive proof of legal title. Id. 452



In an action of ejectment (now called eviction or forcible entry and detainer) the right to the possession of the property must be positively proven by a legal title. Fenn v. Home, 21 How. 481, 483 (1858).



Furthermore, the states may not legislate a superior, or even an equal, instrument to the Land patent. Bagnell et. al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 451 (1839).



“No more can private property be so taken away by judicial decision and handed over, gratis, to the State. ‘The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government.’” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-298 (1967); California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, No. 89 Original (June 18, 1982); Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal. 373 (1859); Chipley v. Farris, 45 Cal. 527 (1873); Cassidy v. Carr, 48 Cal. 339 (1874); Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594, 49 P. 714 (1897), aff’d sub nom. Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co., 180 U.S. 71 (1901); Leese v. Clark, 18 Cal. 535 (1861);



“It [the patent] passes whatever interest the United States may then have possessed in the premises. It operates in consequence as an absolute bar to all claims under the United States having their origin subsequent to the petition.







But the patent has a still further operation and effect. It is not merely a deed of the United States, conveying whatever interest they may have held in the premises at the institution of the proceedings before the Land Commission. It is also a record of the Government, showing its action and judgment with respect to the title of the patentees at the date of the cession…This instrument, as we have stated, is the record of the Government upon the title of the patentee to the land described therein, declaring the validity of that title and that it rightfully attaches to the land. Upon all the matters of fact and law essential to authorize its issuance, it imports absolute verity; and it can only be vacated and set aside by direct proceedings instituted by the Government, or by parties acting in the name and by the authority of the Government. Until thus vacated it is conclusive, not only between the patentee and the Government, but between parties claiming in privity with either by title subsequent.” 18 Cal. 571-572 (citation omitted).



Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979).



United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924).





“Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change. Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the future only; but where courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions on the construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective, and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.” 265 U.S. at 486-487. (citations omitted)



“[i]f there is any one thing respecting the administration of the public lands which must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of the land department upon mere questions of fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the courts.” Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99 (1898). More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70, 83 (1888). Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354 (1942). [ambiguity] Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573 (1891); French v. Fyan, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 169 (1876); Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 447 (1882);



The patent serves to protect the patentee’s land from all incursions of administrative power. United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 535 (1864).





patent Unassailable



Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U.S 642, 35 L.Ed. 290







Right to Possess in patentee



Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534







Evidence of Title



U.S. v. Stone, 2 U.S. 525, 17 L.Ed. 768







patent as Legal Title



Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279

Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 32 L.Ed. 412

Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed 393

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters (U.S.) 408, 10 L.Ed. 264







patent as Estopple



Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849







Priority in general, for liens see;



26 U.S.C.A. § 6323

S. & S. Gasket Co. Inc. v. U.S., 635 F.2d 568

Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 72

MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass’n., 450 F. Supp. 179, affirmed 603 F. 2d 213

U.S. v. Hage, 417 F. Supp. 74

Matter of Fisher, 7 B.R. 490

26 U.S.C.A. § 7426

Peterson v. U.S., 511 F. Supp. 250

Angelos v. Maryland Cas. Co., 380 A. 2d. 646, 38 Md. App. 265

United States v. Champaign County, Fed. Supp. 474, 1958