[Codee]

381. Fee for Chauffeur's License or Badge. Upon application for a chauffeur's license there shall be paid the department a fee of one dollar for the issuance of such license with a chauffeur's badge. Upon renewal of a chauffeur's license there shall be paid the department a fee of one dollar.
Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 151.

6.a.1. The first mention which I have found of the term "operator" is in the motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), ch. 325, sec.sec. 1(8) (set out in full above), 1(16), and 1(17) (emphasis added):

(8) ... provided however, that an employee of a manufacturer or of a dealer whose principal occupation is that of a salesman shall be exempted from this definition and shall be designated an operator; ...
Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640.
6.a.2. The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), � 1(16) reads (emphasis added):

(16) "operator" shall mean any person other than a chauffeur, who operates a motor vehicle;
Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640.
6.a.3. The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), � 1(17) reads:

(17) "person" shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls any motor vehicle as owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting as agent, salesman or otherwise.
Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640.
6.b. The first change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in the Motor Vehicle Act (1915), ch. 188, sec.sec. 1(15) and 1(16), and read (emphasis added):

(15) "operator" shall mean any person other that a chauffeur who operates a motor vehicle and any person who operates, rides, drives or propels any vehicle other that a motor vehicle;
Stats. 1915, ch. 188, p. 399.
(16) "person" shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals; and where the term "person" is used in conjunction with the registration of a vehicle, it shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls such vehicle as actual owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting, whether as agent, salesman, or otherwise;
Stats. 1915, ch. 188, p. 399.

6.c. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1923, ch. 266, sec.sec. 18 and 15, and reads (emphasis added):

SEC. 18. "Operator." Every person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway.
Stats. 1923, ch. 266, p. 519.
SEC. 15. "Person." Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.

6.d. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1925, ch. 412, sec. 1(b) and reads (emphasis added):

(b) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports by motor vehicle persons to and from or to and from attendance upon any public school or who solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation, but all persons operating freight carrying vehicles so exempted shall be required to obtain from the state board of equalization and to display exempt emblems in the manner hereinafter provided.
Stats. 1925, ch. 412, sec. 1(b), p. 833.
6.e. A California appellate court held:

"To drive" is defined as meaning, "to impel the motion and quicken"; whereas "to operate" means "to direct or superintend." (Century Dictionary.)
Bosse v. Marye (1926), 80 Cal.App. 109, 118.
6.f. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1933, ch. 339, p. 928, sec. 1(a), and reads (emphasis added):

An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately.
Section 1. The words and phrases used in this act shall be construed for the purposes of said act, unless such construction be contrary to or inconsistent with the context thereof, as follows:
(a) the word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly.
Stats. 1933, ch. 339, p. 928.

The Supreme Court of California held (italics in original, bracketed information and emphasis added):

The question thus presented is: Does the License Tax Act of 1933 [Stats. 1933, p. 928] apply solely and exclusively to common carriers and private contract carriers in the business of transporting persons and property upon the public highways for hire or compensation? ...[p. 48]
Section 1 of said act provides that: "the word 'operator' shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly. ...
...and the fact that the act expressly defines an operator as one who operates a motor vehicle for compensation, either directly or indirectly, supports the conclusion that the act was intended to have a wider application than to carriers alone....
The fact that subsequent acts enacted in 1935 which are not tax acts but regulatory acts (Stats.1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664) deal with the transportation of property for compensation or hire as a business and contain many terms employing the words "carrier" and "in the business" or "as a business" is not persuasive that the License Tax Act of 1933 was intended to deal solely with transportation operations as a business....
... the act was not intended to be limited to carrier service but was intended to include in addition other transportation upon the public highways for compensation.
... The history of such legislation discloses two distinct lines of statutes. One line was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of transportation by motor vehicles of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public highways. (Stats. 1917, p. 330, and amendments; Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664.) The following cases are pertinent to the subject of the regulation of such transportation operators: Western Assn. of Short Line Railroads v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 802 [162 Pac. 391, 1 A.L.R. 1455]; Frost v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 230 [240 Pac. 26]; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Com., 271 U.S. 583 [46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457]; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cl. 627, [242 Pac. 486]; Haynes v. MacFarland, 207 Cal. 529 [279 Pac. 436]; Forsyth v. San Joaquin Light etc. Corp., 208 Cal. 397 [281 Pac. 620]; Landis v. Railroad Com., 220 Cal. 470 [31 Pac. (2d) 345]. The License Tax Act of 1933 was enacted as a step in the second line, that of certain acts and constitutional provisions which were primarily revenue measures, designed to secure for the state a fair return for the use of the public highways of the state in transporting persons or property for compensation. (Stats. 1923, p. 706; Stats. 1925, p. 833; Stats. 1927, p. 1708; Stats. 1927, p. 1742; California Const., art. XIII, sec. 15; Pol. Code, sec. 3664aa; Stats. 1933, p. 928.) These enactments have been before the courts of this state in the following cases: Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235]; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42 [248 Pac. 244]; Los Angeles etc. Transp. Co. v. Suprerior Court, 211 Cal. 411 [295 Pac. 837]; Alward v. Johnson, 208 Cal. 359 [281 Pac. 389]; People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150 [17 Pac. (2d) 715]; People v. Lang Transp. Co., 217 Cal. 166 [17 Pac. (2d) 721]. An analysis of the legislative history discloses the fact that all the statutes dealing with the regulation of transportation agencies refer to persons in the business of transportation of persons or property upon the public highways for hire or compensation....
We are satisfied that the purpose of the enactment of the License Tax Act of 1933 was to secure a fair return to the state for the use of its public highways not only from carriers, both common carriers and private contract carriers, but also from the larger class of persons who fairly answer to the description of "operator" therein defined as taxable and who receive compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the use of the public highways. Although it is true that the legislature might legally have limited the application of such taxes to carriers, it evidently seemed more just and fair to the legislature, as it does to us, that all those who receive compensation directly or indirectly from the use of the public highways should bear a proportionate share of the burden of its maintenance.
In Re Bush (1936), 6 Cal.2d 43, 48-53.
6.h.1. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in the Vehicle Code of 1935, ch. 27, sec.sec. 70 and 65 read together (emphasis added):

.