here is a snippet of the order dismissing my proposed declaratory judgment , the federal judge " The petitioner is apparently seeking a declaration that he has the right to travel upon the highways of Georgia without possessing a valid Georgia drivers license. The petitioner is correct that the Georgia legislature may not condition his ability to travel upon his obtaining a drivers license. However, the state may condition his ability to drive upon obtaining a valid drivers license. Although the plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that the ability to travel is a right, not a privilage subject to regulation by the state, thoses cases do not support his position. For example, Thompson v Smith, 154 S.E. 579 (Va.1930) quoted by the petitioner, specifically holds, "The exercise of such a common right the city, may under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare.......154 S.E. at 377. Furthermore, the us supreme court has specifically recognized that states may require drivers to possess valid licenses before being permitted to use the highways of the state. See e.g. bell v burson 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971), Ex Parte Poresky , 290 U.S. 30, 54 S.Ct.3 (1933). i will never again give a judge discretion to decide a case, im gonna do what winston strout recommends, f... this law stuff. if i come back and say im not a drivers, then they will come back with some more crap. here is what i found under bell vs burson, what the hell it got to do with the right to travel, its referring to due process of law with suspended or revoked licenses:

¶7 If, in fact, licensee's driver's license had been effectively revoked or she had been effectively deprived of her driving privileges, we might have to consider the effect of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed. 90 (1971), in connection with the constitutionality of our implied consent laws. In Bell, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the administrative and judicial proceedings under Georgia's motor vehicle safety responsibility statute, which provided for the suspension of driving privileges when a licensee became involved in an accident and failed to post security to cover the damages. The Court held, inter alia, that any state action to terminate an entitlement, whether denominated a "right" or a "privilege", must conform to the minimal requirements of due process. The essential due process requirements discussed in the Bell decision include the operative considerations in this case. Those are, in the words of the Supreme Court.



"* * *, it is fundamental that except in emergency situations * * * due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford `notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." (citations omitted).

and this from another case:

See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (a person cannot be deprived of his driver's license without being afforded a modicum of procedural due process). The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of mistakenly taking the driver's license of an innocent person requires application of at least the preponderance of proof standard, which is significantly higher than the probable cause standard. I have grave concern whether the preponderance standard was met in this case.

FINALLY SNIPPET FROM THE PORESKY CASE



U.S. Supreme Court

EX PARTE PORESKY, 290 U.S. 30 (1933)

290 U.S. 30



Ex parte PORESKY.



No. --, Original.

Decided Nov. 6, 1933.







Mr. Joseph Poresky, pro se.





PER CURIAM.



Leave is asked to file a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring District Judge Elisha H. Brewster, or other competent judge, to call to his assistance two other judges for the purpose of hearing and determining petitioner's application for an interlocutory injunction, as directed by statute. Jud. Code 266, 28 U.S.C. 380 (28 USCA 380).



Petitioner brought suit in the District Court of the United States against Joseph E. Ely, Governor, Joseph E. Warner, Attorney General, and Morgan T. Ryan, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, of Massachusetts, to enjoin the enforcement of chapter 90, 34A et seq., of the General Laws (Ter. Ed .) of Massa [290 U.S. 30, 31] chusetts relating to 'compulsory automobile liability insurance,' upon the ground that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Petitioner alleged in his complaint that he is a citizen of Massachusetts; that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles had refused registration and number plates for his car unless he complied with the statute, under which he 'must first post either bond or cash of $5,000, or procure insurance'; that the statute 'is only applicable to cars owned and operated within the State and does not include cars in interstate traffic'; that he cannot comply with the statute; that to disregard it would bring him fine and imprisonment; that he has no adequate remedy at law; and that his inability to comply with the statute 'is the Registrar's only reason for refusing him registration and number plates.'



The District Judge dismissed the complaint as to Governor Ely and Attorney General Warner upon the ground that they were improperly joined as parties, and later he dismissed the complaint as to the defendant Ryan, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, for the want of jurisdiction, as there was no diversity of citizenship and no substantial federal question.