"Money" created out of thin air

[iamfreeru2]

These are a couple of the cases that have been posted on Quatloos as proof of there claims regarding what they call "vapor money." Please would anyone show me where the "creation of money" issue was adressed anywhere in these 2 cases. Just more BS by attorneys using irrelevant cases as proof of claim, which by the way inept attorneys are good at.

615 F. Supp. 898, *; 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112, **

RONNIE L. R. NIXON, Plaintiff, v. THE INDIVIDUAL HEAD OF THE ST. JOSEPH MORTGAGE CO., ET AL., Defendants

Civil No. S 84-488

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, SOUTH BEND DIVISION

615 F. Supp. 898; 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112

August 6, 1985

CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: This matter was before the court on a motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by defendants, a mortgage company and the company's individual head. Plaintiff borrower proceeded in this action pro se. The borrower claimed that the mortgage company promised to pay "money," and by "paying" a bookkeeping entry, they violated constitutional provisions which he believed required that all money be gold or silver coin, thus tortiously harming him.

OVERVIEW: The borrower's claim against the mortgage company was that it failed to have lawful money in gold and silver coin in its vault equal to the amount of the loan, so that it did not loan dollars to the borrower as promised but mere "credit or checkbook money." The premise behind the amended complaint was that a check written on the mortgage company's credit was not lawful tender, as only government-issued currency was legal tender. The court found the borrower's claims absurd. First, a check issued by a bank or mortgage company need not be "legal tender" for a loan to be valid. Second, while the check was not legal tender in the sense of a dollar bill or coins, it nevertheless had many of the same qualities of negotiability. Third, a bank or mortgage company check could be converted into legal tender. Fourth, the borrower's arguments based on the restriction of U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, which mandated that no state shall make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts missed the mark here because private parties could enter into transactions to trade whatever they agreed on as having equal value; they were not limited to gold and silver coins.

OUTCOME: The motion to dismiss was granted. The cause was dismissed in its entirety. The borrower was ordered to pay money for attorney's fees as a sanction for filing the lawsuit. The borrower was also ordered to pay a fine to the clerk of the court as a further sanction.

JUDGES: [**1]

William C. Lee, Judge United States District Court.

OPINIONBY: LEE

OPINION: [*899] ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court's role is to ensure that the claims of pro se litigants are given "fair and meaningful consideration." Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982). This court also recognizes that federal courts have historically exercised great tolerance to ensure that an impartial forum remains available to plaintiffs invoking the jurisdiction of the court without the guidance of trained counsel. Pro se motions and complaints such as the petitioner's are held to less stringent pleading requirements; rigor in the examination of such motions, complaints and pleadings is inappropriate.

This cause arises out of a loan made by the St. Joseph Mortgage Company, Inc. to plaintiff Nixon. In September, 1981, Nixon and the [**2] Mortgage Company executed a loan agreement whereby the Mortgage Company loaned Nixon $24,900.00, and secured the loan with a mortgage on Nixon's home. Nixon now sues the Mortgage Company and others, claiming breach of contract, fraud, usury, "illegality," unjust enrichment and two counts of racketeering because the Mortgage Company did not have "legal money" (i.e., gold and silver coin) on deposit to back up the loan, but instead had only "credit and checkbook money" - a bookkeeping entry for the loan - which cannot be legal tender. Nixon claims that the Mortgage Company promised to pay "money," and by "paying" a bookkeeping entry, they violated the constitutional provisions which Nixon believes require that all money be gold or silver coin, thus tortiously harming Nixon.

The Individual Head of the Mortgage Company filed a motion to dismiss, which this court treats as being filed on behalf of all defendants in this cause. The court therefore turns to this motion.

Motion to Dismiss

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this court must take the well pleaded factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true. Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474 (7th [**3] Cir. 1980). A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). However, Conley has never been interpreted literally. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984). The test is whether a complaint contains either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984). This court must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the claimant. Henry C. Beck Co. v. Fort Wayne Structural Steel, 701 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1983). "The heavy costs of modern federal litigation . . . counsel against launching the parties into pretrial discovery if there is no reasonable prospect that the plaintiff can make out a cause of action from the events narrated in the complaint." Sutliff, 727 F.2d at 654. [**4]

Reduced to its bare essentials, Nixon's claim against the Mortgage Company is that it failed to have lawful money (in gold and silver coin) in its vault equal to the amount of the loan, so that it did not loan [*900] dollars to Nixon (as promised) but mere "credit or checkbook money." The premise behind the amended complaint is that a check written on the Mortgage Company's credit is not lawful tender, as only government-issued currency is legal tender.
The court finds Nixon's arguments and claims absurd for several reasons. First, a check issued by a bank or mortgage company need not be "legal tender" for a loan to be valid. Here, the Mortgage Company issued Nixon a check to use in buying his residence, and Nixon in fact got the house (subject, of course, to the mortgage entered into between the parties). What fraud was possibly worked on Nixon? He claims that the Mortgage Company said it would pay in dollars but did not have dollars available to back up the representation. Yet whether money was in the vault or not, the check issued by the Company had the same effect: it allowed Nixon to buy his house.

Second, while the check was not legal tender in the sense of a dollar [**5] bill or coins, it nevertheless had many of the same qualities of negotiability. The check itself is a negotiable instrument under the terms of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and because of those provisions, can be negotiated and used as a medium of exchange between private parties if they agree. HN3While dollar bills and coins have been declared by Congress as legal tender, see 31 U.S.C. § 5103, and so can be used to pay any debt, not all debts need be paid in legal tender if the parties agree. Here, the Mortgage Company issued a check to Nixon, who then gave it to the seller of the house which Nixon bought. The check apparently satisfied the seller, who has not sued Nixon for some "fraudulent payment," and Nixon received his house in exchange for turning the check over to the seller. Such transactions occur every day, and the negotiable check used in the transaction has value, so that the sale can be consummated.

[iamfreeru2]

Continued from above

Third, a bank or mortgage company check can be converted into legal tender. The seller of Nixon's house no doubt took the check to his bank and cashed it, or else used it in another transaction. Most any check (and certainly one drafted by a mortgage [**6] company) can be taken to a bank and "cashed" - that is, exchanged for federal reserve notes in an amount equal to the value stated on the check. Federal reserve notes are legal tender, see Birkenstock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d 1185, 1186 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 402-04 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S. Ct. 1134, 51 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1977), so that the Mortgage Company's check is like a promise to pay legal tender, redeemable at many banks or financial institutions. This promise to pay is an obligation of the Mortgage Company, which will at some point after issuing the check be forced to pay by giving something worth the face value of the check to the bearer or indorsee of the check. It represents a liability of the company, so that the Mortgage Company has in fact given something of value - its promise to pay the face amount of the check.

Fourth, Nixon's arguments based on HN4the restriction of article 1, § 10 of the Constitution, which mandates that "no state shall . . . make anything [**7] but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . ." misses the mark here. The defendants are private individuals and a mortgage company, not the State of Indiana (or any other state). HN5Private parties may enter into transactions to trade whatever they agree on as having equal value; they are not limited to gold and silver coins. Here, the Mortgage Company traded its check for Nixon's promise to pay on the promissory note executed at the time of the mortgage's creation. Nixon in turn traded the check for the house. Neither transaction implicates or violates a constitutional restriction on the states.

Finally, this lawsuit smacks of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. Nixon obtained the check in September, 1981 and used it to purchase his residence. In late [*901] 1984, after the Mortgage Company begins proceedings to foreclose the mortgage, Nixon suddenly files this suit seeking in effect to have the loan with which he obtained his residence declared illegal so as to back out of his contractual promise to pay on the loan. He has enjoyed the fruits of what the Mortgage Company's check bought, yet seeks to nullify that check on the basis of an absurd view that [**8] bank or mortgage company checks are worthless attempts to create "illegal tender." Nixon's own experience in getting a residence with the check indicates that the market place recognizes the value of "credit and checkbook money," so that Nixon has suffered no damages and has no valid claim to advance here.
In Nixon's other two cases, Nixon v. The Individual Head of the St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F. Supp. 253 (N.Ind. 1985), and Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F. Supp. 890 (N.Ind. 1985), this court found Nixon's claims frivolous and deserving of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This case warrants such sanctions as well, especially in light of the fact that Nixon used the allegedly worthless check to buy his home. Given the fact that this suit was filed near the time that the Mortgage Company began foreclosure proceedings against Nixon, there is also an element of attempting to harass these defendants through the filing of dilatory and groundless lawsuits, a practice which the Seventh Circuit has found worthy of the imposition of sanctions. Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, slip op. at 6 (7th Cir. 1985).

Examination of the court file in this case [**9] reveals that Nixon filed more than thirty-five do***ents, motions, affidavits, notices, and memoranda. They included such do***ents as a Lis Pendens, two Writs of Prohibition and Caveat and Nunc Pro Tunc, and a Notice of Common Law Lein (sic). These numerous filings required the attorneys of record to read, analyze, and respond to each filing, thereby requiring significant expenditure of time on a frivolous lawsuit. In addition, counsel attended a status conference in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and a second conference by phone which Nixon did not participate in. A very conservative estimate of the fees incurred in dealing with this case is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), which the court will award as attorneys' fees under Rule 11.

The burden on this court in dealing with Nixon's numerous filings and groundless claim is equally as great as that on defense counsel. The docket sheet in this case indicates no less than 72 different entries reflecting filings received and docketed by the court and other actions required by the court or its employees. The expenditure of judicial resources in this case is especially egregious in light of the facts, where Nixon obviously used the check to buy [**10] his house, and seeks to declare the check worthless only when the loan went into foreclosure. The "appropriate sanctions" recognized by Rule 11 can certainly include fines payable to the Clerk of this court. The court will therefore assess a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) as an appropriate and justified sanction under Rule 11.

For the reasons above, the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and this cause is DISMISSED in its entirety. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to pay one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for attorney's fees as a sanction for filing this lawsuit. In addition, plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) to the Clerk of this court as a further Rule 11 sanction.

William C. Lee, Judge United States District Court

[iamfreeru2]

Here is the next case

The plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that they applied for a mortgage through Citibank for "lawful money of the United States." (Compl., P 4). Instead of lending them such funds, the plaintiffs contend, Citibank fraudulently, and in breach of their contractual obligations, gave them a check (Compl., P . The plaintiffs contend that this check did not represent legal tender because it was not backed by "lawful money" (i.e., gold, coins, federal reserve notes). In essence, the plaintiffs' claim is that Citibank did not have an amount equal to the face value of their loan in their vault, so that Citibank did not loan plaintiffs legal tender but merely "transferred some book entries." (Compl., P 10). Springing from the premise that checks written on credit are not legal tender, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants, individually and collectively: (1) breached their contractual agreement; (2) engaged in wire and mail fraud "to collect this unlawful debt"; (3) violated state usury laws; and (4) violated the plaintiffs' civil rights.

The plaintiffs' claims are not entirely novel. In Nixon v. [**14] Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortg. Co., 615 F. Supp. 898 (D.C. Ind. 1985), affirmed without opinion, 792 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff sued the defendant mortgage company for breach of contract, fraud, usury, and racketeering because the mortgage company "did not have 'legal money' (i.e., gold and silver coin) on deposit to back up the loan, but instead had only 'credit and checkbook money'--a bookkeeping entry for the loan--which cannot be legal tender." Id. at 899. Similarly, in Thiel v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 646 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ind. 1986), dismissed & aff'd in part without opinion, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiffs raised racketeering claims because the defendant Savings and Loan provided them with a loan in the form of a check without having "money in the form of legal tender actually change hands." Id. at 595. In both cases the plaintiffs were not only denied their claims, but were also sanctioned for filing frivolous lawsuits. Nixon, 615 F. Supp. at 901; Thiel, 646 F. Supp. at 598. Here, the plaintiffs' claims fail for similar reasons stated by the Courts in Nixon and Thiel.

First, there is no requirement [**15] that a loan must be made with legal tender before a court will deem it valid. See Nixon, 615 F. Supp. at 900. In fact, "while dollar bills and coins have been declared by Congress as legal tender, see 31 U.S.C. § 5103, and so can be used to pay any debt, not all debts need be paid in legal tender if the parties agree." Id. In this case, Citibank properly issued a check to the plaintiffs as a loan, secured by a mortgage. As demonstrated by their acceptance of the benefits of this transaction, the plaintiffs agreed to Citibank's use a negotiable instrument instead of legal tender. See Thiel, 646 F. Supp. at 596 (finding that by accepting the benefits of the loan, the plaintiffs agreed to the use of negotiable instrument).

Second, the plaintiffs do not complain that they did not reap the benefits of using this check as a negotiable instrument. Nor do they complain of not being able to access actual "legal tender" by cashing the check. Instead their complaint is that there were inadequate funds in the Citibank vault, so that the check drawn to them was "not backed by" legal tender. (Compl., P . However, whether or not there were adequate funds in Citibank's possession is [**16] irrelevant. The loan properly served the purpose of providing the plaintiffs with the funds they needed. Nixon, 615 F. Supp. at 900 (finding that although there were inadequate funds to back up the check issued to plaintiff, the check still had the same effect as legal tender because it enabled the plaintiff to purchase his home). Apparently, the plaintiffs have "enjoyed the fruits of what [Citibank's] check bought, yet [they] seek to nullify that check on the basis of [a] . . . view that bank or mortgage company checks are worthless attempts to create illegal tender." Id. at 901 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, it was only after they defaulted and foreclosure proceedings were completed, that plaintiffs [*545] came forward with their theory attacking the mortgage on this basis. Thiel, 646 F. Supp. at 596.

Since all the causes of action stem from the plaintiffs' premise that the check issued by Citibank was an attempt by the bank to create illegal tender, the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are granted, and the plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed its entirety.

Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544-545 (D.N.Y., 1999)

It does not take the learning of a lawyer to deduce that if the initial decision was made by a "non-official" court, there would be ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO OVERTURN by an official court! The mere fact that a higher court overturned the decision indicates they recognized the lower court.

All that was needed to arrive at that conclusion was common sense.

That certainly sounds right to me. Thanks, suijuris, for your fresh, common sense outlook!

I need to dig up that old thread and quote Lawyer from MT exactly so that we can sort it out or verify it or whatever. I think it may be possible to search my system for the phrase "Credit River" and find out which thread contains reference to it... since they are all saved as files.

Later... 8-)

[test]

To: Agents Bill Smith, buck09, et all

[quote]

Their so-called “proof” consists mainly of the mantra: “courts do not agree with you”. I don’t see where the courts have even dealt with the money origination info. The banks seem to have dodged that bullet so far.

[/qoute]

Let's say a thief is about to rob you, gets in your face and demands your "money".

Let's say you start explaining him why he should not rob you.

Do you think the thief is going to "agree with you"?

Of course he will not, he is there to steal your money!

I do not see any difference between saying "the courts do not agree with you" and "the thief does not agree with you", in fact I think these two statements are one and the same.

The thief could also say that your explanations are "frivolous" just like the institutionalized kleptocracy, I mean the courts will say.

[weishaupt1776]

Expanding on the thief concept.

Those who have been properly conditioned say, well you have a choice;
you can do this or that and those are the consequences, etc. .

That is the same thing as saying that you have a choice when the mugger is holding a gun to your head & saying , "your money or your life"

Some choice

[iamfreeru2]

Here is another quote from that other web site and show just how full of it they are over there.

Originally Posted by Heidi Guedel on Quatloos

And the Fed Res employees Walker Todd, et al… plus the entire Ludwig Von Mises Institute, and published economists Murray Rothbard and Milton Friedman don’t think it’s a theory at all… they believe it’s a FACT.

Originally Posted by Response on Quatloos

And, again there is NO evidence that any of these economists think that the ME theories are any more than junk, although Heidi attempts to repeat this lie over and over in the hopes that someday it might come true.

Now comes Truth4all and I gotta tell ya I like him/her. Really knows how to stick it to 'em over there. Not to be confused with the Truth4all on suijuris. Take a look.

Originally Posted by Truth4all on Quatloos

I haven't found any thoughts they expressed on ME, but I did find some on SCAMS

Ouotes by M. Rothbard :

But most commercial banking is "deposit banking" based on a gigantic scam:

The nineteenth-century English economist Thomas Tooke correctly stated that "free trade in banking is tantamount to free trade in swindling

Here's how the counterfeiting process works in today's world.
Where does the Fed get the $10,000,000 to pay Shearson, Lehman? It creates the money out of thin air.

The very idea of "deposit insurance" is a swindle; how does one insure an institution (fractional reserve banking) that is inherently insolvent, and which will fall apart whenever the public finally understands the swindle?


(Today, Greenspan describes himself as an “eclectic, free-market forecaster,” who “generally agrees with Austrian economics.”)

Originally Posted by Truth4all on Quatloos

P.S. Stopped by my bank today to find out for myself.
I don't pay attention to "rumors"

She told me that it is INDEED a fact that should one lose their money in any bank that is FDIC insured, one IS insured for up to $100,000.00 per account
AND they have 99 years in which to repay you.

Now isn't THAT a comforting thought.

I found the following on Versuslaw:

09/05/69 JEROME DALY
[1] SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
[2] No. 42174
[3] 1969.MN.243 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 171 N.W.2d 818, 284 Minn. 567
[4] September 5, 1969
[5] IN RE JEROME DALY
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Contempt -- constructive contempt -- attorney advising justice of peace to disregard order of supreme court.
[8] Order to show cause why Jerome Daly should not be held in constructive contempt of this court. Adjudged guilty of contempt, suspended from practice of law, and investigation ordered.
[9] Faegre & Benson, Peter Kitchak, and Gordon G. Bus****er, for relator.
[10] Jerome Daly, pro se, for respondent.
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[12] On July 11, 1969, Mr. Justice C. Donald Peterson, acting for the Minnesota Supreme Court, directed Martin V. Mahoney, justice of the peace of Credit River Township, Scott County, Minnesota, and Jerome Daly, counsel for plaintiff in an action brought by one Leo Zurn against one Roger D. Derrick and the Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, to show cause why they should not be permanently restrained from further proceedings in the justice court. In addition, Justice Peterson ordered a stay of all further proceedings before the justice of the peace pending final determination of the questions raised by Northwestern National Bank's petition for writ of prohibition.[13] Although the stay order of Justice Peterson was served on the justice of the peace and Mr. Daly on July 11, 1969, they intentionally and deliberately disregarded it in this way: On July 14, 1969, the justice of the peace, upon motion of Mr. Daly, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment in favor of Zurn. In response to our order of August 12, 1969, directing the justice of the peace and Mr. Daly to show cause why they should not be held in constructive contempt of the Supreme Court of Minnesota for this conduct, Mr. Daly appeared personally in his own behalf before this court on August 21. He advised the court that he had been authorized to represent the justice of the peace in the proceedings. After noting that he was making a special appearance, Mr. Daly, an attorney at law admitted to practice in this state, acknowledged that both he and the justice of the peace intentionally violated the order of Justice Peterson because in their opinion neither this court nor Justice Peterson had jurisdiction to issue it.
[14] Although the death of the justice of the peace on August 22, 1969, has rendered the proceedings as against him moot, it is our judgment that the conduct of Jerome Daly was contumacious. It is the order of this court that he be temporarily suspended from the practice of law in the courts of this state effective October 1, 1969.
[15] We reserve jurisdiction of this matter to permit further proceedings, the object of which will be to determine whether this contumacious conduct of Jerome Daly is or is not an isolated instance of impropriety. Final determination of the disciplinary measures to be invoked will be made after such hearing has been conducted. Reasonable notice of any charges of misconduct and a full opportunity to be heard shall be afforded in these contemplated hearings.
[16] The rationale of our determination is as follows:
[17] (1) The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota by the terms of our Constitution has power to issue writs of prohibition restraining a court of limited jurisdiction from exceeding its power. Minn. Const. art. 6, § 2, provides that the Supreme Court "shall have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed by law." By the terms of Minn. St. 480.04, the legislature has provided:
[18] "The court shall have power to issue to all courts of inferior jurisdiction and to all corporations and individuals, writs of error, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and all other writs and processes, whether especially provided for by statute or not, that are necessary to the execution of the laws and the furtherance of justice. It shall be always open for the issuance and return of such writs and processes and for the hearing and determination of all matters involved therein and for the entry in its minutes of such orders as may from time to time be necessary to carry out the power and authority conferred upon it by law, subject to such regulations as it may prescribe. Any justice of the court, either in vacation or in term, may order the writ or process to issue and prescribe as to its service and return."
[19] (2) In Minnesota, the justice of the peace court is a court of inferior jurisdiction. *fn1 Since the constitutional amendment of the judicial article in 1956 justice of the peace courts exist in this state only to the extent permitted by the legislature. Minn. Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 8, and Schedule. The legislature has fixed narrow limits to the jurisdiction which may be exercised by justices of the peace in this state. (Minn. St. 530.01, 530.05, 530.06, 531.03, 531.04, 532.37.) Acts in excess thereof by such justices of the peace are a nullity and subject to control by a writ of prohibition. Smith v. Tuman, 262 Minn. 149, 114 N.W.2d 73.
[20] (3) The power to prohibit an improper exercise of jurisdiction embraces the power to issue ex parte an order designed to maintain the status quo pending a hearing upon an application for a writ of prohibition. See, Minn. St. 480.04. In the case of In re Lord, 255 Minn. 370, 378, 97 N.W.2d 287, 292, under similar cir***stances, we stated that --
[21] "* * * this court had full authority to issue a preliminary order to show cause why such peremptory writ should not issue, and, in order to maintain the status quo until both sides of the controversy could be heard, to issue a restraining order to prevent any further action from being taken, either affirmatively or by inaction such as we have here."
[22] See, also, 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 88, p. 136, and cases cited in note 13.
[23] (4) The order executed by Justice Peterson, acting in the name of this court, was a proper exercise of the court's authority. Any justice of the supreme court, either in vacation or in term, may execute orders in behalf of the court pursuant to § 480.04. See, 48 C.J.S., Judges, § 48, and particularly cases cited in note 94; 30A Am. Jur., Judges, § 35.
[24] We find no essential requirement that such orders be issued by or through the office of the clerk of this court. To impose such a requirement would unnecessarily curtail the capacity of this court to respond in emergency situations. It would be unreasonable to make the performance of a clerical act a necessary condition to the exercise of judicial authority which must be asserted promptly to be effective. The signature of a justice of this court is adequate assurance of the authenticity of any order to which such signature is affixed.

(continued next post)

Continued from above:

[25] Although the verification of statements of fact submitted to this court in ex parte matters is to be preferred, there is no jurisdictional requirement that a petition for temporary relief or for a writ of prohibition be verified. See, Dean v. First Nat. Bank, 217 Ore. 340, 341 P. (2d) 512; 73 C.J.S., Prohibition, § 26. In the matter before us it was evident from an examination of the summons and complaint in the proceedings sought to be restrained that Justice of the Peace Mahoney was undertaking to act in a matter with respect to which he had no jurisdiction. The representation of an attorney at law authorized to practice before this court that a copy of this summons and complaint attached to the petition seeking the writ of prohibition was a true and correct copy of the process served on his client formed in itself an adequate factual basis for the issuance of the temporary order directed to Justice of the Peace Mahoney and Jerome Daly.
[26] (5) The refusal of the justice of the peace to respect the July 11 order of this court was not justified. The justice of the peace would be bound to obey our intermediary order regardless of whether the actions restrained by our order were in excess of his jurisdiction. In re Lord, (supra) . Apart from this principle, it is clear that the proceedings restrained were beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in a number of respects, including these:
[27] (a) The summons, being returnable at 7 p.m. rather than between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. as specified by Minn. St. 531.03, was a nullity.
[28] (b) The summons did not contain a statement of the amount claimed by plaintiff as required by § 531.03.
[29] (c) Contrary to the provisions of § 531.04, the summons was personally served upon Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis in the city of Minneapolis, a city having a population in excess of 200,000.
[30] (d) This service was performed outside of the county of issuance, Scott County, in violation of the provision of § 531.04 that such service must satisfy the requirements of Minn. St. 532.29. One of the requirements of Minn. St. 532.29 is a continuance of proceedings for a period not exceeding 20 days, and no such continuance was provided in this case.
[31] (e) The amount in controversy exceeded the $100 jurisdictional limitation of the justice of the peace courts under § 530.05.
[32] (f) The relief sought, a declaratory judgment, was not within the granted powers of a justice of the peace. See, § 530.05. It has been the law ever since the 1861 case of Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 350 (503), that a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction over equitable proceedings. See, Smith v. Tuman, (supra) .
[33] (6) We are satisfied from the record that the justice of the peace acted upon the advice and at the instance of attorney Jerome Daly. Mr. Mahoney was not admitted to practice as a lawyer. An attorney who intentionally and deliberately advises and encourages a justice of the peace or any other person to disregard an order of the Minnesota Supreme Court is guilty of contempt. See, Minn. St. 588.01, subd. 3(1, 2, 3, 7); In re Lord, (supra) ; State v. Leftwich, 41 Minn. 42, 42 N.W. 598; In re Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175 N.E. (2d) 59. The fact that such advice is prompted by fanciful notions that justice of the peace courts have a constitutional status giving them immunity from the jurisdiction of the supreme court of this state cannot excuse or justify this conduct. This is especially the case in the present situation where the jurisdiction of this court to prohibit acts beyond the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace was clearly delineated by our decision in Smith v. Tuman, (supra) , published in 1962. See, also, State ex rel. Meister v. Stanway, 174 Minn. 608, 219 N.W. 452.
[34] (7) The supreme court has inherent power to discipline an attorney guilty of contempt. In re Contempt of Cary, 165 Minn. 203, 206 N.W. 402. In exercising this authority no attempt is made to impose the sanctions of the . A principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority is to assure respect for the orders of this court by attorneys, who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice in this state. In disciplinary proceedings the formal requisites of criminal procedure, including the right to a jury trial, have no application. In re Disbarrment of Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4; In re Application for Discipline of Rerat, 232 Minn. 1, 44 N.W.2d 273; In re Application for Discipline of Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 65 N.W.2d 581, certiorari denied sub nom. Joyce v. Dell, 348 U.S. 883, 75 S. Ct. 124, 99 L. ed. 694; In re Discipline of Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88, 267 N.W. 142.
[35] CASE RESOLUTION(S)
[36] Jerome Daly is adjudged to be guilty of contempt of this court. We are not prepared to determine with finality at this time the appropriate form of discipline to be prescribed. Final resolution of the matter must depend on whether the acts of this attorney are a part of a persistent and continuing effort to defy the authority of the courts and in part on whether there is any disposition to amend the contumacious behavior demonstrated.
[37] The Rules of the Supreme Court for Discipline and Reinstatement of Attorneys, adopted November 14, 1961 (260 Minn. x), which prescribe the procedure to be followed in cases where unproved complaints involving alleged unprofessional conduct are leveled against an attorney, was not intended to apply to situations where an attorney has been found in contempt of this court and an inquiry is needed to aid us in determining the kind of discipline to be imposed. To meet the problem posed by this case, we herewith refer further proceedings in this matter to the Honorable E. R. Selnes, Judge of the District Court of the State of Minnesota, who will act as a referee of the Minnesota Supreme Court in order to consider such evidence as may be presented to him bearing on the fitness and competence of Jerome Daly to serve as a practicing attorney in the courts of this state. The State Board of Law Examiners (see, In re Disbarrment of McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677, 284 N.W. 888) is hereby assigned the duty and responsibility of conducting a thorough investigation of the fitness and competency of Jerome Daly to continue as a member of the bar of this state. So far as applicable, proceedings shall be in conformity with the rules of this court promulgated November 14, 1961. Due notice of such charges of unfitness and incompetence as may be warranted by the evidence secured, together with due and proper notice of the time and place of such hearings as may be held with respect to such charges as may be filed, shall be afforded the said Jerome Daly. The Practice of Law Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Association is authorized to intervene and become a party to these proceedings if it so elects. Upon the evidence presented and received, together with such evidence as may be presented by the said Jerome Daly in his own behalf, the Honorable E. R. Selnes in his capacity as a referee of this court shall make findings of fact and conclusions and recommendations for disposition of this matter as shall be justified by the evidence. Such determination shall be conclusive subject to the right of any party aggrieved to secure a review of the referee's determination in the manner outlined in said rules of November 14, 1961.
[38] Because of the deliberate and aggravated nature of the contumacious conduct on the part of the said Jerome Daly and his failure or refusal to present any reasonable justification for his effort to frustrate the processes of the Minnesota Supreme Court, his privilege to practice law in the courts of this state is suspended effective October 1, 1969; provided, however, that this court will consider such application as the said Jerome Daly may make prior to October 1, 1969, for such limited exceptions to this order of temporary suspension as may be proved necessary in order to protect the interests of clients now represented by the said Jerome Daly and involved in litigation pending in the courts of this state.
[39] This matter is herewith referred to the Honorable E. R. Selnes, designated as referee herein, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, which proceedings shall be entitled "In re Jerome Daly."

Opinion Footnotes

[40] *fn1 For a definition of the term "inferior courts" see 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 7, p. 21.
19690905

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And the following:

11/14/69 JEROME DALY v. SAVAGE STATE BANK AND
[1] SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
[2] No. 42157
[3] 1969.MN.271 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 171 N.W.2d 218, 285 Minn. 503
[4] November 14, 1969
[5] JEROME DALY
v.
SAVAGE STATE BANK AND ANOTHER
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Courts -- justice of peace court -- demand for removal -- effect.
[8] Fredrikson, Byron & Colborn, Ltd., James L. Baillie, and Keith Libbey, for petitioner.
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[10] Petition in this court for a writ of prohibition by Savage State Bank to compel Martin V. Mahoney, justice of the peace of Credit River Township, Scott County, to refrain from enforcing certain orders and from further proceedings in an action brought by one Jerome Daly against petitioner and Eugene T. Kearney, postmaster at Savage, Minnesota.
[11] AUTHOR: PER CURIAM
[12] Petition for a writ of prohibition in the above-entitled matter instituted before Martin V. Mahoney, Justice of the Peace of Credit River Township, Scott County, Minnesota.
[13] The death of Mr. Mahoney on August 22, 1969, makes these proceedings moot as to him.
[14] However, to avoid the necessity of further proceedings to vacate and set aside any action taken herein by Mr. Mahoney or by any successor in office (see, 42 Am. Jur., Prohibition, § 47), we declare all proceedings in this matter in the justice court subsequent to relator's demand for removal of August 15, 1969, a nullity. Minn. St. 531.115 provides for removal as a matter of right from a justice of the peace court to a court presided over by a salaried judge, and it requires the justice of the peace to transmit the file of such action "forthwith." See, Smith v. Tuman, 262 Minn. 149, 114 N.W.2d 73.
[15] The application for the writ of prohibition is dismissed.
19691114

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It appears that the original Credit River Minn case decision is officially a "nullity" in the eyes of the Minn Supreme Court because the State Supreme Court ruled that Justice of the Peace Mahoney acted outside of his authority as a Justice of the Peace, and had no jurisdiction.

IMHO, the only value of this case now lies in the actual recorded testimony of that bank president, Mr. Morgan, who described the money origination process... IF a transcript of that testimony actually exists and can be certified. Otherwise, it remains nothing but a paraphrased account of the bank president's testimony by a judge whose actions were declared a nullity by the Minn Supreme Court and cannot be cited as authority in any subsequent case(s). I think sworn testimony can be introduced, however, if found and verified.

Is there anyone out there living near this Credit River township in Minnesota and who would be willing to visit the courthouse, pull the original case file, see if the testimony is recorded, and if so, obtain a certified copy to share with the rest of us?