My Answer to Debt Collection Letter

[KITCHIE]

Any time I receive a debt collection letter I write to the General Counsel of that Company.

I started this becasue of Sherman Financial. I received a letter from Mercantile one of the companies that is a part of that group. I sent a VOD and that company would go away.

About six weeks after that, I got another letter from FIRST PERFORMANCE RECOVERY CORP. another one of their co. I sent in VOD and I received another letter from ALEGIS GROUP L.P (one of their companies) which contained an affidavit of debt, signed by someone purporting to be Allison Moon power of attorney in fact.

So I said to myself, self you need to take care of this once and for all. That's what prompted me to start writing to their (Sherman) General Counsel.

After Scott Silver received my Actual and Constructive Notice of Misrepresentation all was quiet.

Then, after about 5 weeks, I started receiving calls from the pond scum attorneys that were the debt collectors right after a judgment ws filed against me.

One day I answered the phone and it was the LV attorneys Kravits Schnitzer and Sloane telling me that they got the account back from Sherman Group, and that I would have to make payments to them.

Right after the female told me they had the account back I said (in an off the cuff tone) "Oh, you're a third party debt collector and I don't do any business over the phone so put what ever you want to convey to me in writing." And she said"We're not debt collectors, we're attorneys!"

I said "yea debt collector attorneys" and hung up.

All is quiet and it not on the credit report.

Kitchie

[KITCHIE]

Via U.S.P.S. Certified mail no. 7004 1160 003 3219 4616
June 28, 2005

Scott Silver, Corporate Counsel
Sherman Financial Group, LLC
335 Madison Avenue 19th Floor
New York NY 10017

Re Your Alegis Group L.P. Account No. 9085028

ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF MISREPRESENTATION
THIS NOTICE IS BINDING UPON EVERY PRINCIPAL AND AGENT RE
THE SUBJECT MATTER SET FORTH HEREIN
I am just now in receipt of your letter from ALEGIS GROUP L.P., dated May 26, 2005, which purports to be your response to my April 11, 2005, letter. Your letter addressed to “SNEDIGAR, KATHERINE” and Affidavit of Debt, dated May 26, 2005, signed by someone purporting to be ”Allison Moon”, Attorney In Fact, as a claimed presentation of the validation of debt is insufficient. The FDCPA allows you 30 days to respond to my request and your failure to respond within 30 days has put you in default.

ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE DEFINED
"Actual Notice has been defined as notice expressly and actually given, and brought home to the party directly.” Jordan v. Pollock, 14 Ga. 145; McCray v. Clar, 82 Pa. 457; Morey v.Milliken, 86 Me. 464, 30 A. 102. The term 'actual notice,' however, is generally given a wider meaning as embracing two classes, express and implied; the former includes all knowledge of a degree above that which depends upon collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party the further duty of inquiry; the latter imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of having the means of knowledge. In this sense actual notice is such notice as is positively proved to have been given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry. Picklesimer v. Smith, 164 Ga. 600, 139 S.E. 72, 74; White v. Fisher, 77 Ind. 65, 40 Am.Rep. 287." Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 210
“Constructive notice” is a presumption of law, making it impossible for one to deny the matter concerning which notice is given. 'Implied notice' is a presumption of fact relating to what one can learn by reasonable inquiry and arises from actual notice of circumstances, and not from constructive notice. Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corporation,C.C.A.Okl., 282 F. 983, 988. Or, as otherwise defined, implied notice may be said to exist where the fact in question lies open to the knowledge of the party, so that the exercise of reasonable observation and watchfulness would not

fail to apprise him of it, although no one has told him of it in so many words. See City of Philadelphia v. Smith, Pa., 16 A. 493." Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1211
Memorandum of law
Violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) deprives the alleged debtor of due process rights and deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Act applies to third party debt collectors.
A third party debt collector includes lawyers and law firms who are attempting to collect any alleged debt. George W. Heintz v. Darlene Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489.
When a third party debt collector contacts an alleged debtor, the collector must, in the first communication or within five (5) days thereafter, furnish the alleged debtor with a “dunning letter.” The dunning letter must inform the alleged debtor that the collector is attempting to collect a debt and inform the alleged debtor that they have thirty (30) days to dispute the debt. 15 USC 1692g, 1692g(a)(3). The alleged debtor has thirty (30) days to dispute the debt requiring the collectors to furnish validation of the debt.
15 USC 1692g(b) Debt collection activity must cease if the debt is disputed. Failure to notice the alleged debtor of their due process rights or failure to cease collection activity until timely validation voids any legal proceedings.
The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTIONS PRACTICES ACT
The Act does not apply to the original makers of a loan. The Act applies to third party debt collectors. Third party debt collectors includes lawyers and law firms who are attempting to collect any alleged debt including mortgage foreclosures. George W. Heintz v. Darlene Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489. When a third party debt collector contacts an alleged debtor, the collector must in the first communication or within five (5) days thereafter furnish the alleged debtor with a “dunning letter.” The dunning letter must inform the alleged debtor that the collector is attempting to collect a debt and inform the alleged debtor that they have thirty (30) days to dispute the debt. 15 USC 1692g, 1692g(a)(3). The alleged debtor has thirty (30) days to dispute the debt requiring the collectors to furnish validation of the debt. 15 USC 1692G(b). Validation of the debt can either be a signed judgment order or an accounting which is signed and dated by the person responsible for maintaining the account general ledger. See Spears v. Brennan, Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill. Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987). Debt collection activity must cease if the debt is disputed. Failure to notice the alleged debtor of their due process rights subjects the collector to suit for violation of the Act and any action to collect without informing the alleged debtor of their due process rights or failure to cease collection activity until timely validation subjects the collector to suit for damages under the Act and voids any legal proceedings including mortgage foreclosures. The Act also allows damages when the collector makes false statements regarding the character or amount of the alleged debt. An aggrieved party has one year from the violation of the Act to sue or one year from the taking of property by the collector. An aggrieved party under the Act is entitled to one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in statutory damages plus unlimited damages for intentional infliction of emotional anguish. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267, 833 P.2d 545 (1992), and Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, 23 Cal.3d 442, 451, 591 P.2d 51 (1979). In addition, without time limitation, judgments including judgments which have been collected and mortgage foreclosures are void by reason of deprivation of due process rights deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. It is possible to recover full damages under both strategies or double recovery. Award of statutory damages does not require proof of actual damages, Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., D.Conn.1990, 783 F.Supp. 724. Consumer need not produce evidence of actual damages, Crawford v. Credit Collection Services D.S.D. 1995, 898 F.Supp.699. Actual damages not capped at $1,000 Smith v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, D.Del.1991, 124 B.R. 182. Court may consider sum necessary to amend bad behavior. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267, 10 Cal Rptr. 2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (1992) and Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, 23 Ca.3d 442, 451, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51 (1979). Debtor need not show intentional conduct on part of collector. Russell v. Equifax A.R.S. 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2nd Cir. 1996), Bently v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 63 (2nd Cir. 1993). The FDCPA allows recovery for costs. If a debtor notifies a debt collector within 30 days after receiving notice of an alleged debt, that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection activity until the debt collector obtains and sends verification of the debt to the debtor. 15 USC 1692g(b). A copy of the consumer credit contract is not sufficient to validate the debt. Validation requires presentment of the account and general ledger statement signed and dated by the party responsible for maintaining the account. Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). and Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill. Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987). The debt collector must actually review the file. 15 USC 1692e(g). Claims under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act adhere to the unsophisticated consumer standard. See Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 27 F.3d 1254, on remand 162 F.R.D. 313.
Most rights under contracts are assignable. 2 R.C.L. 598. The exception is where rights are coupled with liabilities, with contracts for personal services or with contracts involving personal confidence. Fire insurance contracts are within the class last mentioned, and are held not to be assignable because of the confidence reposed by the insurer in the owner of the property. Thus, the owner may not sell the property and transfer the policy to the purchaser along with the title; for the insurer has not agreed to insure the property in the hands of the purchaser nor to assume the hazard involved in his ownership and possession. On the other hand, an assignment, not of the policy itself with its obligations, but of the owner's rights thereunder by way of pledge or otherwise as security for a debt, is held valid, in the absence of express restriction to the contrary; and the reason for this distinction is that such pledge or assignment does not affect the personal relationship, i.e., the ownership of the property by the insured, upon the faith of which the policy has been

[KITCHIE]

issued. Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 2, pp. 1768, 1769; Ellis v. Kreutzinger, 27 Mo. 311, 72 Am.Dec. 270; True v. Manhattan Fire Ins. Co. (C.C.) 26 F. 83; Stokes v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 130 S.C. 521, 126 S.E. 649. Such rights could only have arisen in Deutsche from a direct guaranty made by the Mauricios to Deutsche, or by assignment from someone to whom a guaranty had been made that was legally assignable. There is no claim of a direct guaranty to Deutsche, so any rights it had could only have arisen from a legally valid assignment by Centron or Security Marine of the Mauricios' guaranties to them. The district court concluded that such rights had been validly assigned. We disagree. Under Maryland law, neither of the assignments made by Centron to Deutsche in respect of Chesapeake's indebtednesses was effective to assign any guaranty rights against the Mauricios respecting the note secured by the fifty-foot yacht. Whether a particular assignment is effective to assign a guaranty respecting a particular debt depends on two things: (1) whether the assignment in terms covers the guaranty, and (2) whether the guaranty is a legally assignable one. Deutsche relies on two assignments as the source of its right to recover from the Mauricios as guarantors of the note securing the fifty-foot yacht: (1) Centron's July 31, 1990 assignment to Deutsche and (2) Centron's October 1, 1990 assignment to Deutsche simultaneously with Security Marine's assignment to Centron, of their respective "rights, titles, and interests" in Chesapeake's indebtednesses. Looking first to Centron's July 31, 1990 assignment, we conclude that, even if it could be interpreted as intended to include the Mauricio guaranty to Centron, the guaranty was not legally assignable. While, as indicated in Part II.A., an assignment of debt carries with it an assignment of any guaranty of that debt, this does not mean that a guaranty may be assigned independently of any underlying debt. The general rule is, in fact, to the contrary where the guaranty is "special," i.e., made only to particular potential lender or lenders. As expressed in black-letter form: If a guaranty covers future credit which is to be extended by a specific individual, it may not be transferred to another person so as to enable him to become the creditor who is secured by the guaranty. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 35. The Centron guaranty is such an instrument. It specifies that it is made "to induce . . . Centron Financial Services, Inc. to make loans and in consideration of loans heretofore and hereafter made by [Centron] to Chesapeake." JA 36. Further, it promises "prompt and punctual payment . . . of any and all present and future indebtedness . . . of [Chesapeake] to you," i.e. Centron. Id. (emphasis added). The guaranty does contemplate that once Centron extended credit to Chesapeake, Centron might assign the debt, for the guaranty was for payment to Centron, "its successors and assigns." Id. The guaranty nowhere includes, however, a promise to pay debts arising between Chesapeake and anyone other than Centron. Under the general rule, therefore, the Centron guaranty, covering only credit extended by Centron, could not be assigned by Centron so as to enable Deutsche to become a creditor secured by the guaranty. We are satisfied that Maryland courts would so hold, though on a basis more explanatory of the actual reason for non-assignability of guaranties independently of consummated debt. Maryland law properly treats guaranties of future debt as simply a species of "continuing" or "standing" offers to make a series of individual, unilateral contracts. See Weil v. Free State Oil Co., 200 Md. 62, 87 A.2d 826, 830 (Md. 1956). Under general contract law principles, such offers are accepted by the extension of credit by the offeree. See id. ("to be accepted from time to time by [credit extension]"). See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 31, cmt. b (1981) ("continuing guaranty" constitutes a "standard example of a divisible offer to make a series of contracts"). And, until such a continuing offer is accepted, it remains only an offer of contract which, as with contract offers in general, is not assignable. See Routzahn v. Cromer, 220 Md. 65, 150 A.2d 912, 915 (Md. 1959) ("an offer made to one person cannot be accepted by another"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 52 ("an offer can be accepted only by a person whom it invites to furnish consideration"); 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 35 ("offer of guaranty is, in and of itself, not assignable").

Unsupported contentions of material fact are not sufficient, but rather, material facts must be supported by affidavits and other testimony and documents that would be admissible in evidence at trial. Cinco Enterprises, Inc. V. Benso, Okla., 890 P.2d 866 (1994).

To prove up claim of damages, foreclosing party must enter evidence incorporating records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid promissory note. The person responsible for preparing and maintaining the account and general ledger must provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to and dated by the person who maintained the ledger. See Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Il.

Without proof of damages, there are no damages: i.e. American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarks, 257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001).

Definition of Fraud
Fraud contracts, torts. Any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce another to fall into an error, or to detain him in it, so that he may make an agreement contrary to his best interest. The fraud may consist either, first, in misrepresentation, or, secondly, in the concealment of a material fact. Fraud force and vexation are odious in law. Booth, Real Action, 250. Fraud gives no action, however, without damage; 3 T. R. 56; and in
matters of contract it is merely a defense; it cannot in any case constitute a new contract.
7 Vez. 211; 2 Miles’Rep. 229. It is essentially ad hominem. 4 T, R, 337-8 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 6th edition.

"Because reporting a debt to a credit reporting agency can be seen as a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, the reporting of such a debt in violation of the provisions of § 1692e(8) can subject a debt collector to liability under the FDCPA." Sullivan v. Equifax, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7884 (E.D. Pa. 4/19/2002)

I clearly requested VALIDATION of the alleged debt, not VERIFICATION.

NOTICE AND DEMAND

You are hereby noticed your response is totally irrelevant and non-responsive. To further clarify this so you cannot claim not to understand. It is hereby demanded you provide on-point definitive responses to the following:
1. Provide proof, for the record, that SHERMAN is allowed to conduct unlicensed third party collections in the State of Nevada. According to Laura, at the Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division, as of 10:23 a.m. on the 21st day of June 2005, Sherman was not licensed to conduct any business in the State of Nevada much less being authorized to conduct third party collections as demanded under NRS Chapter 649.

2. Provide proof, for the record, that SHERMAN was not barred by the statutes of limitation on the collection of any debt claimed owed by Snedigar to SHERMAN as per NRS 11.190(1)(b) or NRS 147.090.

3. Provide proof, for the record, that SHERMAN has records required under NRS 97A.160.

4. Provide proof, for the record, that Sherman has a collection agency license as required under NRS 649.315.

5. Provide proof, for the record, that there is an assignment between SEARS and SHERMAN as required under NRS 649.3345.

6. Provide proof, for the record, of a copy of the original promissory note, redacting KATHERINE SNEDIGAR’s social security number to prevent identify theft, and state under penalty of perjury that your client (SEARS) is the holder in due course of the promissory note/contract and will produce the original for KATHERINE SNEDIGAR’s own and a judge’s inspection should there be a trial to contest these matters.

[KITCHIE]

7. Produce, for the record, the account and general ledger statement showing the full accounting of the alleged obligation which you are now attempting to collect. Please note neither a database printout nor a billing account statement are what is being asked for.

8. Identify, for the record, by name and address all persons, corporations, associations or any other parties having an interest in legal proceedings regarding the alleged debt.

9. Verify, for the record, under penalty of perjury, that, as a debt collector, you have not purchased evidence of debt and are proceeding with collection activity in the name of the original maker of the note.

10. Verify, for the record, under penalty of perjury, that you know and understand that certain clauses in a contract of adhesion, such as a so called forum selection clause, are unenforceable unless the party to whom the contract is extended could have rejected the clause without impunity.

11. Verify, for the record, under penalty of perjury, that you know and understand that credit card contracts are a series of continuing offers to contract and as such are non-transferable.

12. Provide proof, for the record, under penalty of perjury, verification from the stated creditor (SEARS) that you are authorized to act for them.

13. Verify, for the record, under penalty of perjury, that you know and understand that contacting me again after receipt of this notice without providing procedurally proper validation of the debt constitutes the use of interstate communications in a scheme of fraud by advancing a writing that you know is false with the intention that others rely on the written communication to their detriment.
14. Should you choose to disregard and ignore the seriousness of my Actual and Constructive Notice and my Notice and Demand, I will accept your failure to respond, your continued silence and your failure to comply with my previous letters and the demands stated herein, as tacit and factual agreement that SHERMAN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC and every affiliate connected to SHERMAN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC has knowingly, willingly and intentionally injured me and I will

exercise my remedies against SHERMAN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC its principals, agents and assignees to recover said damages for the injuries incurred.

Disputing the “debt” KATHERINE SNEDIGAR
__________________________________________ By: Katherine-Elizabeth: Snedigar
Creditor-Secured Party, Authorized Representative UCC 3-402 (b)(1)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Katherine-Elizabeth; Snedigar, the above signed, who is personally known by me a
Notary Public, is appearing before me this day and signing the within instrument in
my presence and for the purpose therein stated.

Signed this ______ day, of June at, Washoe County, Nevada,

____________________________
Notary Public Signature
SEAL
_____________________
My commission expires on:

Attachments:
December 19, 2004 Letter to MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, LLC
April 11, 2005 Letter to FIRST PERFORMANCE RECOVERY CORP., LLC
May 26, 2005 Letter and Affidavit from ALEGIS GROUP L.P.

Copy to:
Alegis Group L.P.
PO Box 10497
Greenville, SC 29603

Consumer Response Center
Federal Trade Commission
Washington, D.C. 20580

So... that's what they all get from me. I do think I will add somewhere that the recomendation by ICE to let them know that failure to answer is tacit agreement I do not owe nor have a contract with them.

Kitchie

[idknow]

Originally Posted by KITCHIE

Any time I receive a debt collection letter I write to the General Counsel of that Company.

I started this becasue of Sherman Financial. I received a letter from Mercantile one of the companies that is a part of that group. I sent a VOD and that company would go away.

About six weeks after that, I got another letter from FIRST PERFORMANCE RECOVERY CORP. another one of their co. I sent in VOD and I received another letter from ALEGIS GROUP L.P (one of their companies) which contained an affidavit of debt, signed by someone purporting to be Allison Moon power of attorney in fact.

So I said to myself, self you need to take care of this once and for all. That's what prompted me to start writing to their (Sherman) General Counsel.

After Scott Silver received my Actual and Constructive Notice of Misrepresentation all was quiet.

Then, after about 5 weeks, I started receiving calls from the pond scum attorneys that were the debt collectors right after a judgment ws filed against me.

One day I answered the phone and it was the LV attorneys Kravits Schnitzer and Sloane telling me that they got the account back from Sherman Group, and that I would have to make payments to them.

Right after the female told me they had the account back I said (in an off the cuff tone) "Oh, you're a third party debt collector and I don't do any business over the phone so put what ever you want to convey to me in writing." And she said"We're not debt collectors, we're attorneys!"

I said "yea debt collector attorneys" and hung up.

All is quiet and it not on the credit report.

Kitchie

--
yea, and how many people do each of us know who would have agreed during a telephonic conversation to any ol' thing the nice lady said?

wow, mommy was right - dont talk to strangers!

[masterduke]

Kitchie, did you happen to see in the appellte court section concerning Comacho V. Bridgeport Finanical? What a concept, sue the debt collector first, just for falsly instructing you that you must reply to their collection claim letter or it will be asumed to be a valid debt. The alleged debt was a whooping $42 bucks!! The best part.... bridgeport lost. Yayyy!

[dadmoonbunny]

Originally Posted by masterduke

Kitchie, did you happen to see in the appellte court section concerning Comacho V. Bridgeport Finanical? What a concept, sue the debt collector first, just for falsly instructing you that you must reply to their collection claim letter or it will be asumed to be a valid debt. The alleged debt was a whooping $42 bucks!! The best part.... bridgeport lost. Yayyy!

I am in posession of a presentment that has much the same wording. I wonder (out loud, in print) if I could or should bring suit agaisnt this company (out of state) before they can file first, or should I just go ahead and send them the standard VOD?

I am open to suggestions. I lost the last fight because I did grant the court jurisdiction, by my own stupidity, and then did not follow up on the judges recommendation that I refile my answer to the original affidavit the opposing side sent me.

By the way, Somewhere, I was taught to pour honey on their heads when I was wronged. I sent the opposing attorney a thank you letter for helping me to learn more about the law and civil procedure.

Originally Posted by dadmoonbunny

I am in posession of a presentment that has much the same wording. I wonder (out loud, in print) if I could or should bring suit agaisnt this company (out of state) before they can file first, or should I just go ahead and send them the standard VOD?

I am open to suggestions. I lost the last fight because I did grant the court jurisdiction, by my own stupidity, and then did not follow up on the judges recommendation that I refile my answer to the original affidavit the opposing side sent me.

By the way, Somewhere, I was taught to pour honey on their heads when I was wronged. I sent the opposing attorney a thank you letter for helping me to learn more about the law and civil procedure.

I presume it depends on the amount of the alleged debt. I just received a letter from a CA about a $63 bill. I'm not wasting my time on this one since it doesn't even show on the credit bureaus.

[masterduke]

Daddymoon, That case cite I listed was handled by an attorney firm and hence they would know(or should) the procedures for going forward with the suit. I just thought it clever that they attacked the demand for a reply "in writing" as their means of tangling up the bridgeports attorneys. That shows that the "assumed" parts of the collection demand may prove to be their weakest link. If you have the time and money maybe going on the offensive could be the way to go. Somthing to think about

[charlene]

Kitchie,
Nice letter. I ran across something that might be of interest to you.

Collector may reassign the Account back to the Creditor, in this case, the creditor can no longer enforce the Collection because it has previously
"Repudiated" the account. It has no more standing than any other third party collector at this point.
Charlene