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Originally Posted by Ownmaster
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769)
Sir William Blackstone, Book 1, Chapter 1
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Natural persons are such as the god of nature formed us.
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There is made a clear distinction between "a man" and "his person," and men, and "the persons of men," IS THERE NOT?
If there were no distinction, why would not Blackstone have said:
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or they are, fecondly, fuch [Rights] as a man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with A MAN, which are ftiled jura rerum or the rights of things.
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Instead Blackstone draws a clear distinction between "
a man" and "
his person," DOES HE NOT?
Is "
his person" not, obviously, the POSSESSION of "
a man?"
How, precisely could it be otherwise?
"His" is a third person singular possessive pronoun, [signifying "a man"] and attaching (POSSESSING) a noun, "person?"
[The prefix pro means for. A
pronoun is a substitute for a noun.]
If "
his person" is THE POSSESSION of "
a man," would "
his person" be of the class of "external objects," or would "
his person" be of the class of "things unconnected with "
his perfon?"
And as what, as well as, where, when, and how, precisely, does Blackstone substantively define the term "
person" with specific particularity?
Why does Blackstone state:
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RIGHTS...which...are annexed to the perfons of men,
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rather than
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Rights...which...are annexed to MEN?
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Why are those "Rights" "...then called jura perfonarum or the
rights of perfons,
rather than Rights of
MEN?
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PERSONS alfo are divided by the law into either natural perfons, or artificial.
Natural perfons are fuch as the God of nature formed us: artificial are fuch as created and devifed by human laws for the purpofes of fociety and government; which are called corporations or bodies politic.
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How, precisely, and with specific particularity, can there be definition of "natural
person," and "artificial
person," WITHOUT FIRST their being a solid, indisputable definition of "
PERSON?"
Did Blackstone define "person" as "man" or did he
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "person" and "man?"
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RIGHTS are however liable to another fubdivifion;
being either, firft, thofe which concern, and are annexed to
the perfons
of men,
and are then called jura perfonarum or the rights of perfons;
or they are, fecondly, fuch as
a man
may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with
his perfon,
which are ftiled jura rerum or the rights of things.
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Quote:
PERSONS alfo are divided by the law into either natural perfons, or artificial.
Natural perfons are fuch as the God of nature formed us:
artificial are fuch as created and devifed by human laws for the purpofes of fociety and government;
which are called corporations or bodies politic.
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Where , precisely, is the specific, particular term
MAN mentioned?
What, precisely, is "
the law" which divides "persons?"
When, where, and how are the precise operational mechanics, and ultimate source of this "
law" by which "persons" are "divided," identified, described, illustrated, verified, validated, etc.?
Where, when, and how, precisely, is it specifically, and with particularity stated that the source by which "PERSONS alfo are
divided by the law into either natural perfons, or artificial," is, in fact, "the God of nature?"
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Natural perfons
are fuch as
the God of nature
formed us
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Quote:
Natural perfons
are fuch
as the God
of nature formed us
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Quote:
Natural perfons
are
fuch as
the God of nature formed
us
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Natural perfons
are fuch [PERSONS] as
the God
of nature
formed
us [PERSONS]
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That is so vague, speculative, arguable, and subject to interpretation.
Howso is the precise DISTINCTION BETWEEN "
a man," and "
his person?"
Why does NOT Blackstone distinguish between "the rights of persons," and the rights of MEN?
Is Blackstone speaking to the Rights of Persons, or to the Rights of MEN?
The Title of the Book is:
viz:
Where precisely, and with specific particularity is addressed the RIGHTS OF MAN?
Are you MAN or are you PERSON?
Given subscription to the distinctions Blackstone (and it was YOU, yourself, who quoted Blackstone in Points and Authorities), makes between "a man" and
HIS person, how, precisely, and with specific particularity can you BE both?
What then is the precise distinction between "a man" and "his person" and between "a man" and a "natural person" which being of a "person" is distinct,
per Blackstone, to "a man?"
Are YOU a MAN or are YOU a PERSON?
Does "a man" possess "his person" whether it be "his" "natural" "person," or whether it be "his" "artificial," or whether it be possession of "external objects, or things unconnected with
his perfon?"
Certainly "his person" cannot possess "a man," can it?
If so, can "his person" BE that man?
Does a "natural person" encompass
all the facets of a "person" as Blackstone distinguishes?
If not, how could there BE a "natural" "person?"
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