Federal vs. State Laws/Rights

[Sharing Lights]

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 46 > SUBCHAPTER VIII > § 3789d

§ 3789d. Prohibition of Federal control over State and local criminal justice agencies; prohibition of discrimination




(a) General rule
Nothing in this chapter or any other Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over any police force or any other criminal justice agency of any State or any political subdivision thereof.
(b) Racial imbalance requirement restriction
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to authorize the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, or the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration—
(1) to require, or condition the availability or amount of a grant upon the adoption by an applicant or grantee under this chapter of a percentage ratio, quota system, or other program to achieve racial balance in any criminal justice agency; or
(2) to deny or discontinue a grant because of the refusal of an applicant or grantee under this chapter to adopt such a ratio, system, or other program.
(c) Discrimination prohibited; notice of non-compliance; suspension and restoration of payments; hearing; civil action by Attorney General; private action, attorney fees, intervention by Attorney General
(1) No person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.
(2)
(A) Whenever there has been—
(i) receipt of notice of a finding, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, by a Federal court (other than in an action brought by the Attorney General) or State court, or by a Federal or State administrative agency, to the effect that there has been a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of paragraph (1); or
(ii) a determination after an investigation by the Office of Justice Programs (prior to a hearing under subparagraph (F) but including an opportunity for the State government or unit of local government to make a documentary submission regarding the allegation of discrimination with respect to such program or activity, with funds made available under this chapter) that a State government or unit of local government is not in compliance with paragraph (1);
the Office of Justice Programs shall, within ten days after such occurrence, notify the chief executive of the affected State, or the State in which the affected unit of local government is located, and the chief executive of such unit of local government, that such program or activity has been so found or determined not to be in compliance with paragraph (1), and shall request each chief executive, notified under this subparagraph with respect to such violation, to secure compliance. For purposes of clause (i) a finding by a Federal or State administrative agency shall be deemed rendered after notice and opportunity for a hearing if it is rendered pursuant to procedures consistent with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.
(B) In the event the chief executive secures compliance after notice pursuant to subparagraph (A), the terms and conditions with which the affected State government or unit of local government agrees to comply shall be set forth in writing and signed by the chief executive of the State, by the chief executive of such unit (in the event of a violation by a unit of local government), and by the Office of Justice Programs. On or prior to the effective date of the agreement, the Office of Justice Programs shall send a copy of the agreement to each complainant, if any, with respect to such violation. The chief executive of the State, or the chief executive of the unit (in the event of a violation by a unit of local government) shall file semiannual reports with the Office of Justice Programs detailing the steps taken to comply with the agreement. These reports shall cease to be filed upon the determination of the Office of Justice Programs that compliance has been secured, or upon the determination by a Federal or State court that such State government or local governmental unit is in compliance with this section. Within fifteen days of receipt of such reports, the Office of Justice Programs shall send a copy thereof to each such complainant.
(C) If, at the conclusion of ninety days after notification under subparagraph (A)—
(i) compliance has not been secured by the chief executive of that State or the chief executive of that unit of local government; and
(ii) an administrative law judge has not made a determination under subparagraph (F) that it is likely the State government or unit of local government will prevail on the merits; the Office of Justice Programs shall notify the Attorney General that compliance has not been secured and caused to have suspended further payment of any funds under this chapter to that program or activity. Such suspension shall be limited to the specific program or activity cited by the Office of Justice Programs in the notice under subparagraph (A). Such suspension shall be effective for a period of not more than one hundred and twenty days, or, if there is a hearing under subparagraph (G), not more than thirty days after the conclusion of such hearing, unless there has been an express finding by the Office of Justice Programs, after notice and opportunity for such a hearing, that the recipient is not in compliance with paragraph (1).
(D) Payment of the suspended funds shall resume only if—
(i) such State government or unit of local government enters into a compliance agreement approved by the Office of Justice Programs and the Attorney General in accordance with subparagraph (B);
(ii) such State government or unit of local government complies fully with the final order or judgment of a Federal or State court, or by a Federal or State administrative agency if that order or judgment covers all the matters raised by the Office of Justice Programs in the notice pursuant to subparagraph (A), or is found to be in compliance with paragraph (1) by such court; or
(iii) after a hearing the Office of Justice Programs pursuant to subparagraph (F) finds that noncompliance has not been demonstrated.

[Sharing Lights]

(E) Whenever the Attorney General files a civil action alleging a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex in any program or activity of a State government or unit of local government which State government or unit of local government receives funds made available under this chapter, and the conduct allegedly violates the provisions of this section and neither party within forty-five days after such filing has been granted such preliminary relief with regard to the suspension or payment of funds as may be otherwise available by law, the Office of Justice Programs shall cause to have suspended further payment of any funds under this chapter to that specific program or activity alleged by the Attorney General to be in violation of the provisions of this subsection until such time as the court orders resumption of payment.
(F) Prior to the suspension of funds under subparagraph (C), but within the ninety-day period after notification under subparagraph (C), the State government or unit of local government may request an expedited preliminary hearing on the record in accordance with section 554 of title 5, in order to determine whether it is likely that the State government or unit of local government would, at a full hearing under subparagraph (G), prevail on the merits on the issue of the alleged noncompliance. A finding under this subparagraph by the administrative law judge in favor of the State government or unit of local government shall defer the suspension of funds under subparagraph (C) pending a finding of noncompliance at the conclusion of the hearing on the merits under subparagraph (G).
(G)
(i) At any time after notification under subparagraph (A), but before the conclusion of the one-hundred-and-twenty-day period referred to in subparagraph (C), a State government or unit of local government may request a hearing on the record in accordance with section 554 of title 5, which the Office of Justice Programs shall initiate within sixty days of such request.
(ii) Within thirty days after the conclusion of the hearing, or, in the absence of a hearing, at the conclusion of the one-hundred-and-twenty-day period referred to in subparagraph (C), the Office of Justice Programs shall make a finding of compliance or noncompliance. If the Office of Justice Programs makes a finding of noncompliance, the Office of Justice Programs shall notify the Attorney General in order that the Attorney General may institute a civil action under paragraph (3), cause to have terminated the payment of funds under this chapter, and, if appropriate, seek repayment of such funds.
(iii) If the Office of Justice Programs makes a finding of compliance, payment of the suspended funds shall resume as provided in subparagraph (D).
(H) Any State government or unit of local government aggrieved by a final determination of the Office of Justice Programs under subparagraph (G) may appeal such determination as provided in section 3785 of this title.
(3) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that a State government or unit of local government has engaged in or is engaging in a pattern or practice in violation of the provisions of this section, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district court. Such court may grant as relief any temporary restraining order, preliminary or permanent injunction, or other order, as necessary or appropriate to insure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section, including the suspension, termination, or repayment of such funds made available under this chapter as the court may deem appropriate, or placing any further such funds in escrow pending the outcome of the litigation.
(4)
(A) Whenever a State government or unit of local government, or any officer or employee thereof acting in an official capacity, has engaged or is engaging in any act or practice prohibited by this subsection, a civil action may be instituted after exhaustion of administrative remedies by the person aggrieved in an appropriate United States district court or in a State court of general jurisdiction. Administrative remedies shall be deemed to be exhausted upon the expiration of sixty days after the date the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of Justice Programs or any other administrative enforcement agency, unless within such period there has been a determination by the Office of Justice Programs or the agency on the merits of the complaint, in which case such remedies shall be deemed exhausted at the time the determination becomes final.
(B) In any civil action brought by a private person to enforce compliance with any provision of this subsection, the court may grant to a prevailing plaintiff reasonable attorney fees, unless the court determines that the lawsuit is frivolous, vexatious, brought for harassment purposes, or brought principally for the purpose of gaining attorney fees.
(C) In any action instituted under this section to enforce compliance with paragraph (1), the Attorney General, or a specially designated assistant for or in the name of the United States, may intervene upon timely application if he certifies that the action is of general public importance. In such action the United States shall be entitled to the same relief as if it had instituted the action.

...............................

[Sharing Lights]

Link to the Case Preview: http://supreme.justia.com/us/318/47/

Link to the Full Text of Case: http://supreme.justia.com/us/318/47/case.html

U.S. Supreme Court
MANDEVILLE v. CANTERBURY, 318 U.S. 47 (1943)
318 U.S. 47

MANDEVILLE et al.
v.
CANTERBURY.
No. 422.

Argued Jan. 13, 1943.
Decided Feb. 1, 1943.



Miss Corinne L. Rice, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.

Mr. Herbert R. Tews, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent.


PER CURIAM.

Respondent, said to be a citizen of California who claims an interest in a trust estate created under a will probated in Illinois, brought this suit in the District Court for Northern Illinois for construction of the will, joining as defendants the trustees and other interested parties, all alleged to be citizens of Illinois. The relief prayed is that the court, after construing the will, render a decree determining respondent's rights in the trust property and directing the trustee to account and to turn over to respondent his share in the trust property. Included in the

Page 318 U.S. 47, 48

trust property are tracts of land located in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Illinois.

After respondent began the present suit, petitioners brought suit in a Minnesota state court against respondent and unknown heirs, devisees and legatees of decedent and unknown beneficiaries under the will, seeking a construction of so much of the will as relates to the Minnesota land, and an adjudication of their rights in the land. Shortly afterwards petitioners also brought suit in a Wisconsin state court against the same defendants, seeking like relief with respect to the Wisconsin land. On motion of respondent the district court granted a temporary injunction restraining the prosecution of the pending suits in Minnesota and Wisconsin. It also enjoined further prosecution of a probate proceeding brought by petitioner Richard Centerbury Mandeville in the County Court of Rock County, Wisconsin, which sought a construction of the will and a determination of the rights of the parties under it, but with the proviso that the injunction should not restrain the probate of the will or a determination of inheritance taxes due to the state. On appeal from the injunction order the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 130 F.2d 208, and we granted certiorari. 317 U.S. 616, 63 S.Ct. 158, 87 L. Ed. --.



Section 265 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 379, 28 U.S.C.A. 379, provides that except as authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy 'the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State'.

To this sweeping command there is a long recognized exception that if two suits pending, one in a state and the other in a federal court, are in rem or quasi in rem, so that the court or its officer must have possession or control of the property which is the subject matter of the suits in order to proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the court first acquiring jurisdiction or assuming control of such property
is entitled to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.

In such cases this Court has uniformly held that a federal court may protect its jurisdiction thus acquired by restraining the parties from prosecuting a like suit in a state court notwithstanding the prohibition of 265. This exception to the prohibition has been regarded as one of necessity to prevent unseemly conflicts between the federal and state courts and to prevent the impasse which would arise if the federal court were unable to maintain its possession and control of the property, which are indispensable to the exercise of the jurisdiction it has assumed.

But where the judgment sought is strictly in personam for the recovery of money or for an injunction compelling or restraining action by the defendant, both a state court and a federal court having concurrent jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation at least until judgment is obtained in one court, which may be set up as res judicata in the other.


These principles were recognized and the authorities sustaining them collected

The present suit, so far as it relates to the subject matter of the suits pending in Minnesota and Wisconsin, is a suit in personam brought against the trustees and other claimants, actual or potential, to the land located in those states. Maintenance of the suit in the district court does not require possession of the property by that court or require it to assume supervisory or administrative control of it even though exercise of its control over the trustees, at least until it has determined that respondent has some interest in the property, nor has the court undertaken to exercise such control. While jurisdiction assumed by a state court over a pending proceeding for an accounting by testamentary trustees, involving problems of administration and restoration of the corpus of the
trust, has been deemed exclusive of the jurisdiction of a federal court over a later suit there for the same relief,

here the federal court has not attempted to assume such jurisdiction with respect to an asserted but contested interest in land located in another state. So far as the suits in either the federal or the state courts seek an adjudication of the interests of the parties in the land, it cannot be said that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction.

In any case, exercise by the state courts of their jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' rights to land located in those states involves no interference with or impairment of the jurisdiction of the federal court in Illinois, and affords no ground for the injunction restraining prosecutions of the suits in the state courts. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, supra. The case does not come within any exception to the prohibition of 265 of the Judicial Code.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals will be reversed with directions to the district court to vacate the injunction order.

Reversed.

[Sharing Lights]

Federal Judge: "No injunction"


U.S. District Judge James Whittemore has turned down the request for an injunction to force an operation to re-insert feeding and hydration tubes in Terri Schiavo's body.

The full text of the four13-page rulingorder is below the jump. {Edit2: Abstract Appeal has posted a lengthier version of the ruling, which runs to 13 pages, here
at:

http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/fedctorder032205.pdf


Expect an appeal today and a decision from the 11th Circuit Court in Atlanta within a day or two after that.

Edit1 The interesting thing is that the opinion makes no reference whatsoever to the "Schiavo Relief Act."The ruling addresses the Schaivo relief Act. The order does not.

1. Order
From the Middle District of Florida web site:

[Footnote 1] The caption of Petitioners’ Emergency Petition for Temporary Injunction incorrectly
identities Robert and Mary Schindler as “Robert and Mary Schiavo.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
THERESA MARIE SCHINDLER SCHIAVO, Incapacitated ex rel,
ROBERT and MARY SCHIAVO, her Parents & Next Friends,
Petitioners,
v.
THE HONORABLE GEORGE W. GREER,
Circuit Court Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit of
the State of Florida, in his official capacity,
and as Surrogate Health Care Decision-Maker
for Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, Incapacitated; MICHAEL SCHIAVO, as Guardian of the Person of Teresa Marie
Schindler Schiavo, Incapacitated; and
THE HONORABLE CHARLIE CRIST,
Attorney General of the State of Florida,
Respondents.
_____________________________________/
ORDER

THIS CAUSE come before the Court upon Petitioners’ Emergency Petition for Temporary Injunction and Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1). Robert and Mary Schindler,[1] on behalf of their incapacitated daughter Theresa Marie Schiavo, have petitioned
the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and temporary restraining order enjoining the withholding of food and fluids from Ms. Schiavo. Petitioners allege that Respondents have

Page 2 of 4

violated Ms. Schiavo’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The Court, having given the Petition the utmost consideration, finds that it should be denied.

This Court concurs with Judge Lazzara’s previous decisions holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to review Petitioners’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Robert Schindler v. State of Florida, 8:01-cv-784-T-26EAJ, Dkt. # 12; Robert and Mary
Schindler v. Michael Schiavo et al., 8:03-cv-T-26EAJ, Dkt. # 58; see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “a party losing in state
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1005-06 (1994). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine not only bars review of issues that were adjudicated by the state court, but it also prohibits federal courts from reviewing issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment. See Goodman ex rel.
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001).

Petitioners have previously litigated their claims in state court and now, in effect, seek a review of various state courts’ decisions involving Mrs. Schiavo. See generally In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 2D05-968, 2005 WL 600377 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 16, 2005)(outlining this matter’s extensive state court legal history). But this Court is not an appellate court for state courts’ decisions. Moreover, Petitioners cannot escape the fact that their

Page 3 of 4

claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the numerous state courts’ decisions involving Mrs. Schiavo. As Judge Altenbernd observed, “[n]ot only has Mrs. Schiavo’s case been given due process [in state court], but few, if any, similar cases have ever been afforded this
heightened level of process.” In re Schiavo, 2005 WL 600377 at * 3. The fact that Petitioners have exhausted their state court appellate options without success does not provide this Court with jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore, the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus is denied.

Additionally, Petitioners have failed to satisfy the elements for a temporary restraining order. A party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits; (2) the moving party
will suffer irreparable injury if the temporary restraining order is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the threatened harm the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest. See Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 734 F.2d 774, 781 (11th Cir.1984).

Having reviewed the Petition, the Court finds that there is not a substantial likelihood that Petitioners will prevail on their federal constitutional claims. Accordingly, Petitioners’ Emergency Petition for Temporary Injunction is denied.

It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Petitioners’ Emergency Petition for Temporary Injunction and Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1) is DENIED.
2. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

Page 4 of 4

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on March 18, 2005.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

[Sharing Lights]

TITLE 28 > PART VI > CHAPTER 155 > § 2283

§ 2283. Stay of State court proceedings

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

[Sharing Lights]

TITLE 28 > PART IV > CHAPTER 85 > § 1337

§ 1337. Commerce and antitrust regulations; amount in controversy, costs




(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies: Provided, however, That the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of an action brought under section 11706 or 14706 of title 49, only if the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill of lading exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where a plaintiff who files the case under section 11706 or 14706 of title 49, originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of any interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
(c) The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under chapter 95 of this title.

[Sharing Lights]

U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
VIGIL v MARKSON



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS



FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT






-----------------------------------------------------------
MICHELE A. VIGIL and RUSSELL |
E. VIGIL, |
|
Plaintiffs- |
Appellants, |

No. 97-1256
| (D.C. No. 96-D-2565)
v. | (D. Colo.)
|
PAUL MARKSON, JR., Denver |
District Court Judge, |
|
Defendant-Appellee. |
-----------------------------------------------------------






ORDER AND JUDGMENT




1







Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.





After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiffs Michele A. and Russell E. Vigil appeal the district court's order dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Following consideration of the parties' arguments and review of the record on appeal, we affirm.

In 1995, plaintiffs borrowed $115,000.00 from N. K. Sharma, securing the loan by transferring title to their residence and two adjoining units to Sharma. When plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Sharma initiated a forcible entry and detainer action in Colorado state court asserting that he was the legal owner of the property and that plaintiffs were tenants holding over beyond their term of tenancy.

Following a trial on September 17, 1996, the state trial court found in favor of Sharma, ordering plaintiffs to vacate their property and pay $6,666.00 in damages and past due rent. In addition, the state court ordered plaintiffs to post a $50,000 bond in order to obtain a stay of execution of judgment pending requests for post-judgment relief or appeal.

Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 complaint in federal district court against appellee Judge Paul Markson, Jr., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in connection with the state court F.E.D. judgment. In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that Judge Markson's bond order violated their equal protection and due process rights and denied them access to the courts. Plaintiffs sought an injunction enjoining the state court from enforcing the bond and an order allowing them forty-five days after grant of relief to file a notice of appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals. In addition, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring part of Colorado's F.E.D. statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-117(3), unconstitutional. 1

Judge Markson filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the action was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the state court judgment, and plaintiffs failed to join an indispensable party, namely Sharma, the plaintiff in the state court action. Relying on this court's decisions in Facio v. Jones , 929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991), and Anderson v. Colorado , 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986), the district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it did not need to reach the Eleventh Amendment or joinder issues because it agreed with appellee that the federal court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs' claims.
On appeal, plaintiffs assert that "they are seeking access to the Colorado Court of Appeals in order there to obtain substantive appellate review of Judge Markson's substantive decision regarding the eviction." Appellants' Opening Br. at 2. Plaintiffs allege that they are not seeking appellate review of the state court's judgment, but only "procedural relief in the form of an injunction." Id. The essence of plaintiffs' argument is that Judge Markson's bond requirement is unconstitutional.

We review de novo the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Painter v. Shalala , 97 F.3d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 1996). It is well established that federal district courts generally do not have jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state-court decision. See District of Columbia Ct. App. v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars "a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. DeGrandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Under this rule, jurisdiction to review state-court decisions lies exclusively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See Facio , 929 F.2d at 543. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars consideration not only of issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, but also bars consideration of constitutional claims that are "`inextricably intertwined' with" issues ruled upon by a state court. See id. at 543 (quoting Feldman , 460 U.S. at 483 -84).

Here, plaintiffs were parties to a state court action where they suffered an adverse judgment. The $50,000 bond was entered as part of that judgment. Despite plaintiffs' argument that the bond requirement prevented them from appealing the F.E.D. decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals, the record is devoid of any evidence that plaintiffs attempted to appeal the state-court decision to the Colorado appellate court, obtain a stay of execution of the judgment pending appeal, or obtain relief from the appeal bond order. 2 See Anderson , 793 F.2d at 263 ("Where a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal by the state appellate courts, a litigant may not seek to reverse or modify the state court judgment by bringing a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").

In order for the federal district court to grant plaintiffs the injunctive relief they seek under § 1983, it must determine that the state court's order imposing the bond was wrong. This would be an impermissible interference with the state court's right and ability to consider challenges to its own judgments.

Therefore, we conclude that the relief plaintiffs request here is precluded by the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs' course, if still available, is to exhaust their post-judgment relief and appellate processes in the Colorado courts, and if still dissatisfied, to petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. See Anderson , 793 F.2d at 264.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.


Entered for the Court



Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge


FOOTNOTES

--------------
[1]

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

--------------
[1]

It appears that on appeal, plaintiffs have abandoned their claim that section 13-40-117(3) is facially unconstitutional.

--------------
[2]

Following the decision by the state trial court, plaintiffs did file a petition for writ of prohibition in the Colorado Supreme Court seeking an order prohibiting execution of the state court eviction order and requiring appellee to show cause why the bond should not be stricken. The petition was summarily denied. Plaintiffs failed to seek any relief from the United States Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to review a decision of the highest state court. See Facio , 929 F.2d at 543.

[Sharing Lights]

U.S. Supreme Court
PORTER v. ****EN, 328 U.S. 252 (1946)
328 U.S. 252

PORTER, Administrator, Office of Price Administrator,
v.
****EN et al.
No. 1118.

Argued and Submitted May 13, 1946.
Decided May 27, 1946.


[328 U.S. 252, 253] Mr. Robert L. Stern, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mary Jo ****en et al., pro sese.


Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case, like Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 , 66 S.Ct. 1096, this day decided, involves the jurisdiction of the federal District Court to grant an injunction, sought by the Price Administrator under Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 925(a), to restrain eviction of a tenant under an order of a state court where the Administrator alleges that eviction would violate the Act and valid regulations promulgated pursuant to it. Briefly stated the circumstances of the controversy are these: B. M. Murray, as executor of an estate, pursuant to authority granted him by the Probate Court of Franklin County, Ohio, sold a house located within the Columbus Defense Rental Area. A writ of possession directing the sheriff of the County to evict the tenant and to place the respondent purchasers in possession was obtained in the Probate Court. No certificate authorizing the eviction was sought or obtained from the Price Administrator as is required by Section 6 of the Rent Regulation for Housing. 10 F.R. 3436, 13528. Before the sheriff executed the writ the Price Administrator brought this action for an injunction in the federal District Court. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the complaint on the ground that Section 265 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 379, 28 U.S.C.A . 379, deprived the federal District Court of jurisdiction to stay the proceedings in the state court. [328 U.S. 252, 254] This section provides that: 'The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.' The District Court in dismissing the cause entered an order restraining respondents from evicting the tenant pending determination by the Circuit Court of Appeals for an application for an injunction prohibiting the eviction pending an appeal to that Court. The Administrator made this application in the Circuit Court of Appeals, but it was denied, thus removing all obstacles to eviction of the tenant. The Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard this case. In order to prevent eviction of the tenant the Administrator sought and obtained from Mr. Justice Reed an injunction pending final disposition of this case in this Court and applied for certiorari directly to this Court under Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 347(a), which authorizes us to grant certiorari 'either before or after the judgment r decree by such lower court.' We were prompted to bring the District Court's judgment directly to this Court for review by reason of the close relationship of the important question raised to the question presented in Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 , 66 S.Ct. 1096

The District Court was of the opinion that since Section 205(c) of the Act gave concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to grant relief by injunction, the policy of Section 265 against federal injunctions of state proceedings should not be considered impaired by the Emergency Price Control Act. The District Court's conclusion was that if the Administrator wanted an injunction to restrain eviction under state court procedure he should have gone into some state court that had jurisdiction of the cause. The District Court erred in holding that the policy of Section 265 of the Judicial Code should not be considered impaired by the Emergency Price Control Act. While we realize that Section 265 embodies a long-standing governmental policy to [328 U.S. 252, 255] prevent unnecessary friction between state and federal courts, Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118, 126 , 62 S.Ct. 139, 140, 137 A.L.R. 967, we still hold as we held in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 , 64 S.Ct. 641, that Section 205 of the Price Control Act which authorizes the Price Administrator to seek injunctive reliefs in appropriate courts, including federal district courts, is an implied legislative amendment to Section 265, creating an exception to its broad prohibition. 1 This is true, because Section 205 authorizes the Price Administrator to bring injunction proceedings to enforce the Act in either state or federal courts, and this authority is broad enough to justify an injunction to restrain state court evictions. But if Section 265 controls, as the District Court held, the Administrator here could not proceed in the federal court, since there is a proceeding pending in a state court. Since the provisions of the Price Control Act, enacted long after Section 265, do not compel the Administrator to go into the state courts but leave him free to seek relief in the federal courts, he was not barred by Section 265 from seeking an injunction to restrain an unlawful eviction. Cf. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 , 59 S.Ct. 526.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that Court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] An alternative reason given for the decision in the Willingham case was that since the state court there was attempting to enjoin the Administrator from performing his duties under the Act, the District Court had power both under 205(a) of the Act and Section 24(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 41(1), to protect the exclusive federal jurisdiction which Congress had granted. But our opinion did not, as the District Court thought, depend entirely on this alternative ground.