How You Get Deprived Of 6th Amendment Rights / The True Nature of Traffic Court

[Ownmaster]

COURT AUTHORITY/LACK THEREOF

WARNING: ONLY FOR SERIOUS LAW RESEARCHERS' ENTERTAINMENT IN RESEARCHING POSSIBLE REMEDY! DO NOT ATTEMPT TO READ IF ONE CANNOT UNDERSTAND BASIC LEGAL WRITING!!!

The following will:

a)depict and layout how state level courts operate in most situations such as Infraction / traffic court / administrative violations. (Having traffic court with no jury trials)

b) The authority for the state to do so in such situations, and when the state has over stepped its authority to do so.

c) The abuse of the authority when the state acts the way it normally does (False arrest)

d) The difference between "A Crime" and "A Criminal Offense". (The obfuscation)

e) How and which courts heard "Offenses" that were not criminal. (The obfuscation continues)

f) Reveal one of the most important and least known SCOTUS decisions on this subject. (SCHICK v. U S, 195 U.S. 65 (1904))

g) Show that modern California Traffic Courts operate under the powers formerly belonging to The Court of Exchequer

It is time to do some legal wranglin'!!!

To someone facing court one of the first and foremost things needed to defend oneself is to know the nature of the attack. ("One if by land, and two if by sea").

This is guarantied to citizens by the 6th amendment operating through the 6th amendment.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

This is a sixth amendment right. However there is also an article 3 section 2 clause that relates to the process of court. Remember that the constitution originally "defined the government" as its main goal. The bill of rights main goal was to restrain the government that had been created. So while the sixth amendment gives the rights to "the accused" the article 3 section 2 clause is defining how government must function, not how it may not against a person. Notice how there is no mention of "rights" or even the "Accused" in this article. The subject is the "state", the subject is not "You and your rights" as it is in the sixth amendment. None the less even if there were a claim that article 3 section 2 was to be extended to all through the 14th the argument still fails for petty offenses. Here is article 3 section 2:

Originally Posted by US CONSTITUTION SIXTH AMENDMENT (Emphasis added)

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

[Ownmaster]

The above is the fundamental ground work that any right to a jury trial must be grounded in, in order to invoke a jury trial under the US constitutional authority. Below we find the authority for US courts to not provide jury trials for "Criminal" prosecutions.

U.S. Supreme Court

SCHICK v. U S, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)

195 U.S. 65

FREDERICK J. SCHICK, Plff. in Err.,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 222.

WILLIAM BROADWELL, Plff. in Err.,
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 223.

Nos. 222, 223.
Argued December 2, 1903.
Decided May 31, 1904.

In such a case there is no constitutional requirement of a jury. In the 3d clause of 2, article 3, of the Constitution, it is provided that 'the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;' and in article 6 of the Amendments, that 'in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.' If there be any conflict between these two provisions, the one found in the Amendments must control, under the well-understood rule that the last _expression of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier

Page 195 U.S. 65, 69

one. But that in the body of the Constitution does not include a petty offense like the present. It must be read in the light of the common law. 'That,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, in Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274, 23 S. L. ed. 346, 347, referring to the common law, 'is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law.' Again, in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, 31 S. L. ed. 508, 512, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 809, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, 569, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: 'The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.' In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654, 42 S. L. ed. 890, 892, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 459, Mr. Justice Gray used this language:

'In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422, 29 S. L. ed. 89, 91, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 625 S., 29 L. ed. 746, 748, 749, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564.' See also Kepner v. United States, 194 U. S. --, ante, 797, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797; 1 Kent Com. 336.

Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it. In this treatise, vol. 4, p. 5. is given a definition of the word 'crimes:'

'A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms; though in common usage the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious

Page 195 U.S. 65, 70

dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of 'misdemeanors' only.'

In the light of this definition we can appreciate the action of the convention which framed the Constitution. In the draft of that instrument, as reported by the committee of five, the language was 'the trial of all criminal offenses . . . shall be by jury,' but by unanimous vote it was amended so as to read 'the trial of all crimes.' The significance of this change cannot be misunderstood. If the language had remained 'criminal offenses,' it might have been contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature, petty as well as serious; but when the change was made from 'criminal offenses' to 'crimes,' and made in the light of the popular understanding of the meaning of the word 'crimes,' as stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was to exclude from the constitutional requirement of a jury the trial of petty criminal offenses. But we need not go beyond the express rulings of this court. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 32 L. ed. 223, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1301, reference was made to many decisions of state courts, holding that the trial of petty offenses was not within any constitutional provision requiring a jury in the trial of crimes, and on page 557, L. ed. p. 228, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 1307, it was said:

'Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guaranty of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority, of the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offense charged.'

By 563, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 455) the district courts are given jurisdiction 'of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas, the punishment of which is not capital.' There is no act of Congress requiring that

Page 195 U.S. 65, 71

the trial of all offenses shall be by jury, and a court is fully organized and competent for the transaction of business without the presence of a jury. There is no public policy which forbids the waiver of a jury in the trial of petty offenses. On the contrary, by 44 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia, Congress provided, in respect to the police court, that--

'In all prosecutions within the jurisdiction of said court, in which, according to the Constitution of the United States, the accused would be entitled to a jury trial, the trial shall be by jury, unless the accused shall, in open court, expressly waive such trial by jury, and request to be tried by the judge, in which case the trial shall be by such judge, and the judgment and sentence shall have the same force and effect in all respects as if the same had been entered and pronounced upon the verdict of a jury. In all cases where the accused would not, by force of the Constitution of the United States, be entitled to trial by jury, the trial shall be by the court without a jury, unless in such of said last-named cases wherein the fine or penalty may be $50 or more, or imprisonment as punishment for the offense may be thirty days or more, the accused shall demand a trial by jury, in which case the trial shall be by jury.'

And it is a well-known fact that in many territories organized by act of Congress the legislature has authorized the prosecution of petty offenses in the police courts of cities, without a jury.

But if there be no constitutional or statutory provision or public policy requiring a jury in the trial of petty offenses, upon what ground can it be contended that a defendant therein may not voluntarily waive a jury? Can it be that a defendant can plead guilty of the most serious, even a capital, offense, and thus dispense with all inquiry by a jury, and cannot, when informed against for a petty offense, waive a trial by jury? Article 6 of the Amendments, as we have seen, gives the accused a right to a trial by jury. But the same article gives him the further right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . and to have the assistance of counsel.' Is it possible that an accused cannot admit, and be bound by the admission, that a witness not present would testify to certain facts? Can it be that if he does not wish the assistance of counsel, and waives it, the trial is invalid? It seems only necessary to ask these questions to answer them. When there is no constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy. Authorities in the state courts are in harmony with this thought. In Com. v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80,

So above the court has talked about waiving a right protected by the 6th amendment. It this amendment which creates the right to a jury trial that is passed through the 14th amendment. Below is also from the same case...

[Ownmaster]

(Emphasis added)

In each case the parties in writing waived a jury, and agreed to submit the issues to the court. Judgments were entered in favor of the United States, and their collection ordered by only the civil process of execution. That the defendants had failed to comply with the section was proved. Indeed, it was not seriously disputed; the defense resting only on the alleged unconstitutionality of the act. The waiver of a jury was not assigned as error, nor referred to by counsel at the hearing before us, either in brief or argument. The question of its effect upon the judgment was suggested by this court, and briefs were called for from the respective parties. Such briefs have been filed, and both agree that the waiver of a jury did not invalidate the proceedings. Notwithstanding this, the fact of the waiver appears in the record.

Going back now to the "According to common law" quote up there. Let's now take a look at the history of common law and the courts that held these "no-jury trials of "offenses", shall we? I will show with my home of California.

In California there exists a conflict of some lower level case law. One case however in this conflict is "People Vs. Battle 50 Cal App. 3rd Supp1." This case claims that the legislature mistakenly listed an infraction as a crime. Lets take a look at the case and then we will look again to the case analysis.

Originally Posted by PEOPLE VS BATTLE

The court in In re Hayes (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604, 605 [75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430] held that section 654 of the Penal Code applied to acts or omissions not only interdicted by the Penal Code but which also "embrace[s] penal provisions in other codes as well, including those found in the Vehicle Code"

This is important because the penal code is given the the authority of the procedure for the violation of "crimes." The procedure for the violation of crimes in court is afforded to "Criminal" defendants in order to protect them from processes that are penal in nature. The reality is however that administrative violations, that carry penal type punishments are not prosecuted as "crimes". They are instead prosecuted as "Public Offenses". Essentially there are big crimes, Felonies, and small crimes, misdemeanors. There are also big offenses, public, and small offenses, petty.

Crime involves a moral wrong in the action. Thus there is no way to make the violation of many of the laws which forbid something to be done, in to "crimes". Thus it is stated in our modern codes that "crimes and public offenses" include felonies and misdemeanors. They are trying to confuse the the person into thinking that every prosecution as a misdemeanor is the prosecution of a misdemeanor-crime when it is many times the prosecution of a misdemeanor-public-offense.

With the "In re Hays" decision, you can bet that the process for crimes and criminal offenses are going to look and feel similar.

[Ownmaster]

THE INFRACTION

California enacted a whole bunch of laws in one session awhile back and created something known in California law as the infraction. The Legislature attempted to list "infractions" as being that which constitutes "Crimes and public Offenses".

This has caused the many problems in the code and the result being that a superior court appellate court ruled that "Infractions" were not intended to be placed in the category of crimes and public offenses because to do so would create a conflict in laws.

The law in question and targeted in battle is California Penal Code section 16. There is another law that says that no person can be convicted of a public offense unless by jury. So this denying of a jury trial and making this non-crime a "Public offense" the legislature screwed up. A petty offense is not a crime however the legislature screwed up and made the court divulge quite a bit.

Section 16 is the code where "Infractions" were listed as either a crime, or a public offense, both of which are listed as being able to include felonies and misdemeanors.

Here is an excerpt from battle:

Originally Posted by People Vs Battle, 50 Cal. App3d Supp1

we must conclude that it was not the intent of the Legislature to enact inconsistent statutes and, further, that when it added the term "public offense" to section 16 it was not so categorizing infractions because if it did so, it would have caused inconsistency between sections 19c and 689 of the Penal Code. Support for this interpretation is found in the language of section 1042.5 which states that a defendant "charged with an infraction and with a public offense for which there is a right to jury trial" (italics added) may be accorded a jury trial. Had the Legislature intended that an infraction be treated as a public offense, it would have worded the statute differently, for example, "an infraction and with some other public offense.

So the court went pretty out of its way to pull infractions out of section 16. But hey did. Now the time comes to set the infraction outside of "crimes" and back into "petty offenses".

Originally Posted by People Vs. Battle

...
Furthermore, this court has previously held in People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4, 7, fn. 2 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795], that inasmuch as section 689 of the Penal Code was originally enacted in 1872 and last amended in 1951, and sections 19c and 1042.5 of the Penal Code were enacted in 1968, we must read all the sections together and, in case of conflict, give effect to the latest enacted sections -- sections 19c and 1042.5. We therefore have declared in People v. Oppenheimer, supra, that sections 19c and 1042.5 qualify section 689 insofar as infractions are concerned. Hence, even though we were to treat an infraction as a public offense under section 16, we must nevertheless excise infractions from section 689 in order to effect the objective of the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4.)

The court in People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795], declares that an infraction is a petty offense. A defendant was not historically accorded the right to a jury in trials of petty offenses. Whether an infraction is characterized as a petty offense or a noncriminal offense, an appellate court in the circumstances of the present case should not bar prosecution for manslaughter by reason of an earlier plea of nolo contendere to an infraction. To do otherwise would fly in the face of the legislative adjuration to construe statutory provisions "according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice."

Lets take a look at "People Vs Oppenheimer" and see what logic this case is based on.

Originally Posted by People Vs Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4

[3] Confining our inquiry then to the "purely historical question" posed by People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at page 287, and applying the English common law as it existed in 1850, it is clear that offenses of the same class as those now classified as infractions by the Vehicle Code were triable by courts sitting without juries. Under this approach sections 19c and 1042.5 of the Penal Code fully measure up to the constitutional mark.

The above is very interesting indeed. What is the class that these "offenses" are in? It is time to check further back to the source and uncover under what authority this being done. Lets find out what that approach was.

[Ownmaster]

The idea is that there was some sort of offense that amounted a petty offense at common law where no Jury trials were given. My question is do these common law cases involve the trial of "crimes" or even "criminal". Are they Admiralty claims? Are they Civil claims? What type of claims were being made at common at common law that admitted no trial? If there is no crime or criminal offense (Public offense), then there is no probable cause to arrest.

Originally Posted by People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at page 287

By the end of the thirteenth century there was a recognized distinction between the Exchequer of Account and Receipt, and the Court of Exchequer or 'Exchequer of Pleas.' (Radcliffe & Cross, The English Legal System, p. 54.) The proceedings of the Court of Exchequer were originally confined to bills by the Attorney General to recover money or property for the Crown. (Idem. 160.) It was originally, [37 Cal.2d 289] and continued to be, a common-law court. (Idem. 166; Plucknett, a Concise History of the Common Law, 4th ed., 152.) The Court of Exchequer was absorbed by the Supreme Court of Judicature in 1875. (Idem. 201.)

"Blackstone says: 'An information on behalf of the crown, filed in the exchequer by the king's attorney general, is a method of suit for recovering money or other chattels, ... It is grounded on no writ under seal, but merely on the intimation of the king's officer the attorney- general, who "gives the court to understand and be informed of" the matter in question: upon which the party is put to answer, and trial is had, as in suits between subject and subject. The most usual informations are those ... for any forfeiture due to the crown upon the breach of a penal statute.' (3 Bl.Com. (12th ed.) 261.) fn. 4

Good old Blackstone rearing his head again. We are probable as far back as we are going to get without loking at some old English statutes I simply do not have access to. So this is where "informations" and "Forfeitures" arise. First we look to the fat that the California Court in Oppenheimer relied on a forfeiture case to justify its treatment of a human being. Then the case relied on though spills the beans so to say on the nature of these offenses called infraction. The court does a perfect job of explaining the common law president of why infractions cannot be considered crimes or they will be subject to jury trials.

Originally Posted by People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at page 287

At common law the trial of actions for forfeiture to the Crown of property used in violation of law was in the Court of Exchequer. 'The term "Common Law" often refers to those principles of English Law which were evolved in the Common Law Courts, as opposed to the principles which were applied in the Courts of Chancery and Admiralty and the Ecclesiastical Courts. The Courts of Common Law before the passing of the Judicature Acts, 1873-5, were the three Royal Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas or Common Bench, and Exchequer, which had emerged from the King's Council (Curia Regis) as separate Courts by the end of the thirteenth century.' (Phillips, The Principles of English Law and the Constitution, 70.) fn. 3 The Court of Exchequer was not a criminal court; and all suits for penalties, though for the King, were considered as civil.

[Ownmaster]

So above we have actual evidence that traffic court is sitting as a court of forfeiture for the state for noncriminal acts. The criminal element was not in that evidence. So I am guessing the precedent for a court trial for "criminal" cases was never found.

Originally Posted by People Vs. One Chevrolet

...that though penalty or forfeiture, generally speaking, is the consequences of some crime or guilt, yet neither penalty nor forfeiture necessarily imply the one or the other, though punishment always does.

Thus you are being civilly sued by the state OR a jury trial is required. Legal fictions abound in the history of The Court of Exchequer.

Originally Posted by Wikipedia

By 1190 the Exchequer exercised a judicial role, with judges, known as Barons, headed by the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. At first the business consisted of two parts: actions by the Crown itself, in respect of monies owed to it, and actions by private persons who had the right to sue in the Exchequer.

It seems that the judicial business of the Exchequer grew until, by 1290, it had become a regular common law court on a par with the courts of the King's Bench and the Common Pleas. A reaction set in whereby Magna Carta was interpreted as preventing common pleas being heard other than in the Court of the Common Pleas.

As a result most private business could only be brought in the Exchequer by use of a legal fiction. At first parties claimed to be servants of Exchequer officials, but eventually the Writ of Quominus became the normal way of bringing an action in the Exchequer. Quominus operating in a similar manner to the Bill of Middlesex in the King's Bench.

...

Reform

The court was absorbed into the new High Court by the Judicature Act 1873, s.31 and became the Exchequer Division, which in turn was abolished by an order in council, on 16 December 1880, becoming part of the Queen's Bench Division.[3]

So the court was around until 1880. It was definitely a part of California common law then.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

In England, the Writ of Quominus was a writ whereby the medieval court of Exchequer obtained a general jurisdiction over common pleas, and was a notable example of the use of a legal fiction.

The plaintiff who wished to sue was supposed to be a debtor to the Crown and by reason of inability to recover his debt or damages from the defendant was thereby less able (quo minus sufficiens existit) to satisfy the Crown.

The device was generally used from the fourteenth century but was only abolished in the nineteenth century.

I wonder if under the reorganization of the nation and the virtual bankruptcy if the state is claiming that it owes "The crown" money and as so is suing with power of 19th century Exchequer. The use of legal fictions was well around in these courts before the adoption of the American Constitution and may have existed at the adoption of California Constitution. This is part of the common law we adopted as well.

Next we will see that probable cause must exist for traffic stops. We will have to look at what probable cause is and then see if it exists to seize me for a civil suit service.

Originally Posted by U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
EASYRIDERS v HANNIGAN

No. 95-55946

CV-93-00807-NAJ

Under California law, a traffic citation is considered an "arrest," see Cal. Pen. Code S 853.5 (West Supp. 1996), for which an officer must have probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Parnell, 16 Cal. App. 4th 862, 875, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 302, 309 (1993).

[Extramural]

Originally Posted by Ownmaster

This is a sixth amendment right.

Code-e

Actually, all of my rights are God-given.

The "Constitution" grants no rights, to my knowledge, unless you have information proving otherwise.

[artificialsteve]

Hey, what the heck does this mean? I think maybe they are spilling the beans here-->”..but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. “

[Ownmaster]

Here I will explore the word "Use" versus "Enjoy". I will show that the vehicle code as originally enacted was a commerce regulating code.

I will show that when a word has acquired a peculiar meaning in commerce, that the commercial meaning is what is meant is commercial statutes.

[Ownmaster]

Originally Posted by Extramural

Code-e

Actually, all of my rights are God-given.

That is very good for you Henry.