George Gordon and Common Law

[Lawdog]

Originally Posted by netwrkranger

I generally trust George Gordon. I dig deeper when necessary. From the knowledge that I currently have, most of that information there is correct, in my opinion. If there are any errors, I'm sure the sharp members of Sui Juris will point them out.

The shame, shame comment I take under advisement. But I have to say, that no shame is felt on my part =D.

As far as the Romans go, didn't they codify their law into Corpus Juris Civilus?

You should find someone better to put your trust in. The guy has no education in the law. He could not even be certified as a paralegal. The two cases he appealed in Idaho when he was living there, he got crushed. All three judges voted against him, both times.

So he claims to be a "common law freeman." So what? It didn't help him on appeal. It won't help you if your goal is to be exempt from laws you don't like. Society doesn't work that way. There's plenty of laws I don't like. But I accept that if I break them, there could be unpleasant consequences. That's because I have the attitude of a mature adult, not that of a petulant 5 year old who says, "You can't make me! I don't wanna!"

Anyway, now I will post (separately) the cases from the Idaho Court of Appeals where Gordon got his butt kicked.

[Lawdog]

First, the criminal case, wherein several of the typical moron arguments get shot down. My favorite moron argument is "I don't need a driver's license, insurance or a vehicle tag if I'm not in commerce."

108 Idaho 178; Gordon v. State; 697 P.2d 1192

George K. GORDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. George GORDON, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 15092, 15197.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 20, 1985.

Review Denied May 29, 1985.

Motorist was convicted in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Deborah A. Bail, J., of failure to produce vehicle registration and failure to exhibit proof of liability insurance. Defendant also brought declaratory judgment action seeking an injunction to prevent further citation by police authorities and declaration of his rights as a "freeman." The District Court, Ada County, Robert Newhouse, J., denied requested injunctions, and defendant appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) constitutional right to travel did not exempt defendant from license or financial responsibility laws, and (2) facts that motorist owe nothing on vehicle and was not engaged in commercial travel did not raise him to a constitutional status exempt from legitimate exercise of police power.

Affirmed.

[Page 179]

George Gordon, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., D. Marc Haws, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated appeals present identical issues. Case number 15197 is an appeal from Gordon's convictions of failure to produce a vehicle registration, I.C. § 49-112, and of failure to exhibit proof of liability insurance, I.C. § 49-245. Case number 15092 is an appeal from the district court's denial of Gordon's request for declaratory relief. In both appeals Gordon argues that state laws requiring a vehicle operator to be licensed, to register his vehicle, and to carry insurance coverage are unconstitutional as applied to him. We affirm the judgments of conviction and the order denying declaratory relief.

Gordon was cited several times during 1981-83 for driving without a license, for operating an unregistered vehicle, and for failing to carry proof of vehicle liability insurance. Following a jury trial in February, 1983, Gordon was convicted of failing to produce a vehicle registration and of failing to exhibit proof of insurance. He was sentenced to thirty-five days in jail and fined $200 on the two convictions; the fines were suspended. On April 13, 1983, Gordon appealed to the district court, which affirmed the convictions on August 8. Gordon filed a petition for declaratory relief on May 28, 1983, seeking an injunction to prevent further citation by police authorities and a declaration of his rights as a "freeman." The district court in all respects denied relief to Gordon on his petition.

Gordon argues that the license, registration and insurance requirements impermissibly impede his constitutional right to travel and that other constitutional rights are infringed when these requirements are applied to an individual who owes nothing on his vehicle and who is not using the vehicle for commercial purposes. We are not persuaded.

[1, 2] It is well settled that the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to travel, although it is not always clear which constitutional provision affords the protection. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1858). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a particular mode of transportation-the operation of a motor vehicle upon public streets and highways-is also a right protected by the federal and state constitutions. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966). Other jurisdictions considering the issue have declared the right to travel on public highways to be a privilege, not a constitutional right. E.g., Standish v. Department of Revenue, M.V.D., 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984); Crocker v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo.1982). Whether it is termed a right or a privilege, an individual's ability to travel on public highways is "subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho at 101, 416 P.2d at 48. See Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 589 P.2d 483 (1979); Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991 (1973).

[3] The Idaho Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (MVSRA), I.C. § 49-1501 to -1540, requires vehicle operators to insure their vehicles "to protect the public using highways against hardship which may result from use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho at 101, 416 P.2d at 48. We have already determined the insurance requirement of the MVSRA to be a permissible exercise of the state's police power. State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 62, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984). Gordon argues not that his conviction for failing to exhibit proof of insurance is unconstitutional, but that requiring him to insure his

[Page 180]

automobile is unconstitutional. This issue was settled in Reed.

[4] We believe that driver's license and vehicle registration requirements also constitute a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. See Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915) (a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles and, to that end, it may require the registration of vehicles and the licensing of drivers). Licensing drivers is a means of determining that vehicle operators have acquired a minimal standard of competence. Requiring driver competence is a public purpose within the police power of the state, and the licensing procedure is a reasonable attempt to accomplish that purpose. The vehicle registration requirement also reasonably furthers protection of public health, safety and welfare and, as such, is a proper exercise of the state's police power. Id.; Pawnee County Excise Board v. Kurn, 187 Okl. 110, 101 P.2d 614 (1940).

[5, 6] As previously noted, Gordon does not contend the license, registration and insurance requirements are unconstitutional in all circumstances. Gordon believes the state should issue, without charge to him, a "certificate of competence" instead of a driver's license; that the state should also issue to him license plates free of charge; and that he is not responsible for insuring against loss that might result from his accidents. Gordon is constitutionally entitled to this special status, he argues, because he owes nothing on his vehicle and he is not engaged in commercial travel. He principally relies upon quotations from Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906) and Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930) to support his position. The Supreme Court held in Hale that a corporation does not enjoy the same rights granted to an individual by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, because a corporation is a creature of statute and it is vested with special privileges and franchises, it may not refuse to divulge information, based on the constitutional right to remain silent rather than make incriminating statements, in a criminal proceeding. In some circumstances an individual may enjoy greater protections under the constitution than does a corporation. But Hale in no way grants to individuals the absolute freedom from state regulation that Gordon insists upon. Nor does Thompson v. Smith, supra, support Gordon's position. Although the Thompson court declared the right to travel public highways to be an individual's "common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty ...," the court also stated that "[t]he exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare ...." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. at 583. The city driver's license revocation ordinance at issue in Thompson was upheld except to the extent it granted broad discretion to the city's chief of police to revoke licenses. "The issuance and revocation of such [driving] permits by a city is merely a means of exercising the police power of the state delegated to the city to regulate the use of the public highways in the interest of the public safety and welfare." Id. Only by lifting statements from context and by ignoring difficult language does Gordon make Thompson, Hale, and other cases support his position. Providing similar examples from other cases cited by Gordon would only unnecessarily lengthen this opinion.

[7] Although removing the lien placed on a mortgaged vehicle arguably elevates one to a new level of freedom, we do not believe the state or federal constitution exempts the "freeman" from the regulations imposed here through the state's legitimate use of its police power. The constitutional right to travel does not "destroy the independent power of each State under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its residents." Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4-5, 98 S.Ct. 906, 908, 55 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). See also Salibra v. [Page 181]
Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.1984).

The judgments of conviction are affirmed, as is the order denying declaratory relief. No costs or attorney fees on appeal in either case.

[Lawdog]

Now the civil case. Gordon sued as plaintiff and lost, then appealed and lost again. Ouch! Note that he asserts once more that he is "exempt" from statutes passed by the legislature. The court disagrees, with a one line zinger.

109 Idaho 1048; Gordon v. Noble; 712 P.2d 749

George GORDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard NOBLE, Mike Quintieri and Keith Schultz, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 15412.


Court of Appeals of Idaho.
January 2, 1986.

[Headnote omitted due to space limitations]

[Page 1049]

George Gordon, pro se.

Michael E. Ramsden of Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise for defendant-respondent, Noble.

J. Patrick Riceci, Boise, for defendants-respondents, Quintieri and Schultz.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

George Gordon was twice arrested by Boise Police Officer Richard Noble for operating unlicensed or unregistered motor vehicles. Gordon sued Noble and two other defendants, Mike Quintieri and Keith Schultz for damages because Noble directed Quintieri and Schultz, operators of private towing companies, to pick up and impound the vehicles. Gordon's complaint was styled as a trover action. This appeal comes to us after the trial court entered a directed verdict for defendants Quintieri and Schultz, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Noble. Gordon, appearing pro se throughout these proceedings, appealed the decision to the district court which affirmed the magistrate's judgment. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Gordon seeks either the return of the vehicles or money damages for their conversion by the defendants. He raises essentially two questions; first, was Officer Noble authorized to impound the vehicles; and second, were the private towing companies authorized to keep the vehicles after Gordon requested their return. Gordon alleges that his property was taken without due process of law and held for ransom. He also asserts that it was error for the court to treat his common law trover action as governed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA).

[1, 2] We first address the liability of Officer Noble. The jury was given instructions based on the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.C. § 6-901 to -928. As noted, Gordon did not sue under the ITCA, but sued instead in trover, preferring to claim his rights under common law instead of statutory law. Gordon's position is not only that the ITCA is inapplicable but that he is "exempt" from such statutory law. Gordon cites to the law of conversion to support his trover action. Conversion is the dominion over chattels by a person not the owner, which is inconsistent with the rights of the owner. Schlieff v. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353, 15 P.2d 726 (1932). It is essentially a tortious act. Id. Since conversion is a tortious act, and in this case allegedly committed by a governmental employee acting within the course or scope of his employment, Gordon's claim against Officer Noble is within the purview of the ITCA. In an earlier case we addressed similar contentions by Gordon that he was exempt from statutory law. See Gordon v. State, 108 Idaho 178, 697 P.2d 1192 (Ct.App.1985). We remain unconvinced that his contention has merit.

The ITCA authorizes tort claims against governmental entities and employees for their negligence or wrongful acts or omissions when engaged in activities for which an individual could be held liable. However,
[Page 1050]
I.C. § 6-904 provides exceptions to this liability:


[Definition omitted due to space limitations]

The jury in the present case was also given an instruction based upon I.C. § 49-692 which authorizes police officers to remove vehicles under certain conditions. This statute provides in part:


Officers authorized to remove vehicles.-

....

(3) Any police officer is hereby authorized to remove or cause to be removed to the nearest garage or other place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway when:

....

(b) The person or persons in charge of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody or removal,....
[3] Thus, the jury could have concluded that Officer Noble was authorized by I.C. § 49-692 to impound the vehicle, or that in any event, the ITCA provided him immunity from liability for a wrongful impounding. In regard to the lawfulness of Officer Noble's actions, we note that under enumerated circumstances I.C. § 49-692 authorizes the removal of a vehicle "found upon a highway." Here, the vehicles were located in parking lots when impounded. Also, Gordon protested the taking of the vehicles, and on both occasions he requested that the vehicles be turned over to his "agent" who accompanied him. Gordon argues that Officer Noble had no authority to have the vehicles impounded and removed from private property without Gordon's consent when he, Gordon, was able to provide for their custody. It is possible that Gordon could have obtained the proper registration and license plates, returned later, attached the plates and taken the vehicles lawfully away. These facts do not put this case squarely into the language of I.C. § 49-692.

On the other hand, Officer Noble was faced with an unusual situation. The first traffic stop occurred when Officer Noble observed a motorcycle with an expired plate and a loud muffler. The driver, later identified as Gordon, refused to identify himself or produce a driver's license. Officer Noble discovered that the motorcycle was registered to an Emmett, Idaho resident, while the license plate had been issued for a different motorcycle. Gordon refused to explain the discrepancies, and was taken into custody. The second incident involved a car. On that occasion Gordon was driving without license plates. Officer Noble recognized Gordon, who again refused to produce a driver's license. Noble called in the vehicle identification number and found the car to be registered to someone other than Gordon. Again, Gordon refused to explain and was taken into custody, and again, a towing company was called to impound the vehicle. Had Gordon been able to show proof of ownership to Officer Noble before the vehicles were impounded against his will, and with an "agent" present to take them, we would have a much different case.

Gordon maintains that his status as a "free and natural citizen" places him be-

[Page 1051]

yond the regulatory statutes contained in the motor vehicle code. We have already decided against Gordon on that contention, in another case. See Gordon v. State, supra.

[Paragraph omitted due to space limitations]

[4] The next question is whether the retention of the vehicles by Quintieri and Schultz was authorized. We believe that in this case it was. Officer Noble instructed the two operators to remove the vehicles and to release them only upon a proper showing of ownership. Gordon sought the return of the vehicles but never provided documented proof of ownership. [Material omitted due to space limitations]
Gordon has not shown that the vehicles were tortiously withheld from him as security for payment of the towing and storage fees. We affirm the directed verdict of the trover action in favor of Quintieri and Schultz.

Quintieri and Schultz were granted judgment on their counterclaim for towing and storage charges. In an order preceding

[Page 1052]

the judgment, the magistrate concluded that, because the towing operators had been authorized by Officer Noble to impound and hold the cars until proof of ownership was furnished, the operators were "entitled to storage charges for the time the vehicles have been in the custody of the defendants." The trial court did not explain upon what legal theory Gordon, rather than the City of Boise, should be liable for the towing and storage costs. The order authorized Quintieri and Schultz to release the vehicles to Gordon without any further proof of ownership upon Gordon's payment of the charges contained in the judgment.

[5] Gordon now argues that forcing him to pay the charges is punishment for failure to comply with the vehicle registration statutes. He also now asserts that the magistrate erred in awarding judgment against him for the operators' charges. There may be some merit to his assertions. However, the record shows that Gordon did not raise this issue in his appeal from the magistrate division to the district court. Nor was the issue considered and decided in the district court on its merits. The district court in this case functioned as an intermediate appellate court. "It is well settled that when a second appeal is taken, the appellants may not raise issues in the higher court different from those presented in the intermediate court." Centers v. Yehezkely, 109 Idaho 216, 217, 706 P.2d 105, 106 (Ct.App.1985). Therefore, we will not determine the merits of this issue here.

The decision of the district court affirming the magistrate court's orders and judgment is affirmed. Costs to defendants Noble, Quintieri and Schultz. We decline to award attorney fees.

WALTERS, C.J., and BURNETT, J., concur.

_____________________
Footnotes:
[Omitted due to space limitations]

[mrg]

So what.

Your BAR brothels do not recognize freedom.

And you don't either.

Great.

Wonderful.

Make sure your papers are in order lawduck.

Ford's in his flivver, all's well with the world.

[indio007]

Gordon maintains that his status as a "free and natural citizen" places him be-

Claiming citizenship = doomed at common law.

[netwrkranger]

Thanks for the court cases, Lawdog. I'll be sure to look them over.

George Gordon continues to be credible to me, in my opinion. I don't accept (or believe) everything he says, but I have learned tons from him through listening to him coupled with doing my own research. He is putting up the good fight.

I at least know not to accept (or believe) everything an attorney tells me =D. You stand a good shot of losing 90+% of the time in court, particularly as a defendant.

With odds that great, you are better off learning to do for yourself.

[netwrkranger]

In the court case Gordon v. Noble, was perhaps Gordon in the wrong jurisdiction? How would he have faired in a court at law v. his case having been adjudicated in an equity court?

[psholtz]

George Gordon has won about 90% of this cases.

He's lost a few, but no one's perfect and a 90% batting average is quite commendable.

He's been in court probably 50 or 60 times or so.

I understand that he's argued before the U.S. Supreme Court as well.

[palani]

Originally Posted by Gordon v Noble

In an earlier case we addressed similar contentions by Gordon that he was exempt from statutory law. See Gordon v. State, 108 Idaho 178, 697 P.2d 1192 (Ct.App.1985). We remain unconvinced that his contention has merit.

A short study into the concepts of MERIT and JUSTICE follows.

Originally Posted by Bouvier

MERITS. This word is used principally in matters of defence.

2. A defence upon the merits, is one that rests upon the justice of the cause, and not upon technical grounds only; there is, therefore, a difference between a good defence, which may be technical or not, and a defence on the merits. 5 B. & Ald. 703 1 Ashm. R. 4; 5 John. R. 536; Id. 360; 3 John. R. 245 Id. 449; 6 John. R. 131; 4 John. R. 486; 2 Cowen, R. 281; 7 Cowen, R. 514; 6 Wend. R. 511; 6 Cowen, R. 895.

Originally Posted by Bouvier

JUSTICE. The constant and perpetual disposition to render every man his due.

Originally Posted by Bouvier

Distributive justice is that virtue whose object is to distribute rewards and punishments to each one according to his merits, observing a just proportion by comparing one person or fact with another, so that neither equal persons have unequal things, nor unequal persons things equal.

Originally Posted by Bouvier

Commutative justice is that virtue whose object it is to render to every one what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which governs contracts. To render commutative justice, the judge must make an equality between the parties, that no one may be a gainer by another's loss.

Gordon v. Harper, 1796

Judge Ashurst said that, "in order to maintain trover the plaintiff must have a right of property in the thing (ownership) and a right of possession, and unless both these rights concur, the action (of trover) will not lie." Trover was not a strictly proprietary remedy

I don't think the last quote above is the Gordon under discussion. It does suggest that the right of ownership and right of possession must coincide for there to be a successful action of trover. Since the items being sued over is autos the state might figure that they are the bona fide owner.

[Lawdog]

Originally Posted by psholtz

George Gordon has won about 90% of this cases.

Says whom? George Gordon? Don't be so gullible. In the only cases I've been able to find on him, he's 0 for 2.

An assertion that an attorney loses 90% of the time is ludicrous. In civil court, it's rare to have both parties appeal. That means one side was happy with the result.

Bottom line: George Gordon is a con artist. He will make whatever claims he can (huge success rate, never been to jail, etc.) in order to induce you to buy his worthless crap. Many of his claims are lies...the criminal case I posted says he was sentenced to 35 days in the county jail. Then, when his worthless crap doesn't work and you complain, he will claim "you didn't do it in exactly the right way."

That's all the nuts ever have...excuses. You can see it in the earlier post that said he lost because he said he was a citizen. Citizens have more rights than non-citizens, so this is a specious argument. But if he had NOT said he was a citizen, someone would have said THAT was the reason he lost.

You can never, ever bring yourselves to admit that your theories are just....plain....WRONG. You can't admit that to yourself because you've drank too much of the Kool-Aid, and have too much emotionally invested in nutball ideas. And if you've shelled out good money for worthless crap from uneducated idiots like George Gordon or Richard Cornforth, you're monetarily invested in moronic, loser arguments.

Those of you who only lose in civil court are relatively lucky. The real saps are those of you who end up in jail.