Cracked windshield-MOTION TO QUASH ARREST

[heyday]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY, SITTING WITHIN AND FOR THE 22nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF OKLAHOMA

STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Vs..........................Case No.CM-2008-578
JOHN QUENTIN ELLIS

MOTION TO QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

John C. Ellis, the defendant in the above - numbered cause, here now before the honorable court by properly verified pro se motion and appearance, does now move the court to order a date and time certain set for hearing so that I can show proof that my initial warrantless arrest for the herein criminal cause was unlawful and that therefore the arrest should be quashed, any resultant evidence suppressed, and the above - numbered criminal case be dismissed against me.

BEING NOW PROPERLY DEPOSED AND SWORN under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, I, John C. Ellis, swear that the following facts are true:

1. On the afternoon of May 30th, 2008 I was parked in the alley just north of the Pontotoc County Courthouse when Officer Keith Teal, Badge # 792, of the Oklahoma State Highway Patrol drove up in a patrol car and ordered me to get into said patrol car.
2. After I obeyed and removed myself to Officer Teal’s patrol car Teal proceeded to write out a purported “CONTACT REPORT # F4669874.”
3. The said purported instrument advises that it is a warning that my windshield is defective.
4. Officer Teal has verified under oath to three separate instruments that the reason for the initial detention of myself at the above-stated time was for the reason of a so called “defective windshield” to wit:

• • One verified citation for “Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants;
• • One civil affidavit verified under 12 O.S. 426;
• • One verified criminal affidavit of probable cause for my warrantless arrest for the alleged offense of “Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants” in the above - numbered criminal case.

5. However, the windshield in question has now and had then only two small cracks, neither of which can now be or could have been held then to obstruct the driver’s (my) vision in any way.
6. Said windshield has now and had then one crack located on the driver’s side of the windshield, and has now and had then one crack located on the passenger side of the windshield
7. Prior to the time I knew I was arrested as described herein Officer Teal made what I believe was a “fishing expedition” in that he did then and there, immediately after issuing the purported “warning” or “CONTACT REPORT,” ask me if I would be willing to take a blood test, i.e., subject myself to a needle for the purpose of conducting a chemical test.
8. I refused said test by advising Officer Teal that I didn’t “[H]ave time for no stinking blood test.”
9. Whereupon such time I realized that I was arrested for the purported offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants.
10. I was not under the influence of any intoxicating substance at the time of the herein described warrantless arrest.
11. I am now before the court by properly verified Motion to Quash the Arrest and Suppress Evidence, such appearance and motion being made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, so that I may be afforded a hearing where I will provide evidence and produce witnesses and show proof that the facts given herein are true.

WHEREUPON THE ABOVE FACTS I DO NOW MAKE THE FOLLOWING LEGAL CLAIMS:


12. That this prosecution is contrary to the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, and is in contravention of the statutory scheme of the STATE OF OKLAHOMA.
13. That under Oklahoma law Officer Teal was not authorized to give me a citation for a defective windshield on the date of May 30th, 2008 due to the fact that my windshield was not defective in any such manner as prohibited by 47 O.S. 12-404, i.e., the windshield only had then and only has now one crack in the “critical area” of the windshield cleaned by the normal scope of the driver’s side windshield wiper.
14. That the said windshield did not then, and does not now, pose any unsafe conditon as proscribed by 47 O.S. 12-101.
15. That under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, 22 O.S. 186, my warrantless arrest began when I was unlawfully detained by Officer Teal in Officer Teal’s patrol car for the alleged purpose of him writing and issuing to me a fictitious and wholly void “CONTACT REPORT” as a pretended “warning” upon the facts as attested to herein, wherein the said windshield is not now, and was not then defective under Oklahoma law.
16. That said warrantless arrest was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
17. That said warrantless arrest was an unlawful seizure under similar provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution.
18. That said warrantless arrest was not permitted under 22 O.S. 196
19. That said warrantless arrest was not proper to confer upon Officer Teal any legal grounds upon which to advise me of the Oklahoma Implied Consent Laws and ask me to submit to a chemical test:

Smith v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, Okla. Civil 680 P.2d 365, 367 (valid arrest necessary to invoke statutory provisions giving a police officer the right to request a driver to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol).

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, I do now request the honorable court to set a date and time certain for hearing upon this matter so that I may produce evidence and call upon witnesses showing proof that this prosecution is arisen from the tainted fruit of an unlawful and illegal warrantless arrest which must ultimately be quashed against the information herein, so that this criminal cause be dismissed.

I swear that I know the above stated facts are true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO THIS ______day of July, 2008

John C. Ellis

by


______________________
Court Clerk
(Seal)

[heyday]

I am going to go ahead and work on my brief here, at sui juris.

This could prove to be a very interesting case, as you will soon see, and I believe could be very educational to us all.

The cites so far are:

Smith v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety [LINK]

22 O.S. 186 Definition of Arrest
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a public offense.

22 O.S. 196 Arrest Without Warrant by Officer
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

1. For a public offense, committed or attempted in the officer's presence;

2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officer's presence;

3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested to have committed it;

4. On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested;

5. When the officer has probable cause to believe that the party was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle involved in an accident upon the public highways, streets or turnpikes and was under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating liquor or who was under the influence of any substance included in the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, Sections 2-101 et seq. of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes;

6. Anywhere, including a place of residence of the person, if the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person within the preceding seventy-two (72) hours has committed an act of domestic abuse as defined by Section 60.1 of this title, although the assault did not take place in the presence of the peace officer. A peace officer may not arrest a person pursuant to this section without first observing a recent physical injury to, or an impairment of the physical condition of, the alleged victim;

7. When a peace officer, in accordance with the provisions of Section 60.9 of this title, is acting on a violation of a protective order offense; or

8. When the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has threatened another person as defined in subsection B of Section 14 of this act.

OSCN dot net is returning error codes at the moment, so I will have to provide the relevant vehicle code later.

[heyday]

HEY CODEE!

The Affidavit of probable cause for Johnny Ellis sworn to by Keith Teal is styled as STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. John Clint Ellis, with the case number as shown. However, the information, filed the same day, converted the case to STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. JOHN QUENTIN ELLIS.

Imagine that!

(Johnny's full name is John Clint Quentin Ellis)

[heyday]

Ok, my research so far tells me the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, which would be relied upon by the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety in Johnny's upcoming driver's license revocation administrative hearing, is in conflict with Oklahoma criminal law as interpreted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.

Let's see why.

[heyday]

TRIPP, JR. v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 2005 OK CIV APP 47, 117 P.3d 266 [LINK]

Defendant/Appellant State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Department of Public Safety (DPS), seeks review of the trial court's order setting aside DPS' order revoking the driver's license of Plaintiff/Appellee Ronald B. Tripp, Jr. (Plaintiff) for lack of a valid stop. In this appeal, DPS asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law when it: construed 47 O.S. §§11-309 and 11-604 in conflict; held the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to stop Plaintiff; and, for lack of a valid stop and arrest, set aside the order revoking Plaintiff's driver's license.

2 The arresting officer testified that she observed the vehicle operated by Plaintiff leave an establishment serving alcoholic beverages at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, but observed no erratic or illegal driving as Plaintiff drove away. The officer then observed Plaintiff's vehicle to safely change lanes (there being no other traffic in the area), but without signaling the lane change. The officer stopped Plaintiff's vehicle, and upon contact with Plaintiff, allegedly observed indicia of Plaintiff's intoxication. The officer subsequently placed Plaintiff under arrest for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance, and DPS issued an order revoking Plaintiff's driver's license.

3 Upon administrative review, a hearing officer affirmed the revocation. Plaintiff petitioned for review in the trial court, and upon consideration of the testimony and evidence, the trial court set aside the revocation. DPS filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, holding:

The sole issue before this court is the legality of the initial law enforcement contact with the plaintiff. Plaintiff stipulates to all other issues being determined.

On January 27, 2004, the date of the arrest precipitating the instant case, the arresting officer observed Plaintiff drive from a shopping center, [where] one of the businesses is a restaurant that serves alcoholic beverages, at approximately 2:00 a.m. The officer observed no erratic or illegal behavior as the vehicle left the parking lot and drove away. At about 1500 N.W. 36th Avenue in Norman, Oklahoma, the officer then observed the plaintiff to safely change lanes from the marked left lane into the right lane without other traffic in the area. Because the plaintiff did not signal his intention to change lanes, the officer believed the plaintiff had violated a traffic ordinance. The failure to signal was the sole reason the officer stopped the plaintiff to make initial contact with him.

The court finds 47 O.S. §11-604 and the concurrent city ordinance control a driver's responsibilities when moving right or left in the roadway. Neither requires a driver to signal when moving right or left in the roadway, but only upon turning. The court finds §11-309 is in conflict with §11-604 and the city ordinance. Because the plaintiff may have relied upon the less restrictive provisions, the officer did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to impede a driver's progress. Therefore, the initial contact with plaintiff was not justified and the revocation/suspension of Plaintiff's driver's license should be set aside.

DPS appeals.1

¶4 DPS first asserts that, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, §11-309 can be read in harmony with §11-604, and that §11-604, being the more specific statute, controls. In its second proposition, DPS asserts that, even if she was wrong in her construction of §11-604, the arresting officer reasonably believed she had witnessed the commission of a traffic offense by Plaintiff as to justify the initial stop.

¶5 Oklahoma law requires a valid arrest as necessary to invoke a police officer's right under statute to request submission to chemical tests for blood alcohol. 47 O.S. §751(A); Appeal of Dungan, 1984 OK 21, 681 P.2d 750; Smith v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1984 OK 16, 680 P.2d 365; White v. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety, 1980 OK 21, 606 P.2d 1131. A valid arrest requires a valid stop, and "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). So:

An officer may stop a moving vehicle not only when he directly observes a violation of the law, but also when specific articulable facts indicate probable cause to believe a violation of the law is present. If, after properly stopping the vehicle, the officer observes a misdemeanor, the subsequent arrest is lawful.

Smith, 680 P.2d at 368; White, , 606 P.2d at 1132.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the arresting officer never observed Plaintiff's operation of his vehicle other than safely, and the only reason the arresting officer stopped Plaintiff was because Plaintiff failed to signal his intention to change lanes, an act which the arresting officer believed to constitute a violation of Oklahoma law or local ordinance. Whether Plaintiff's failure to signal his intent to change lanes violated Oklahoma law, or whether the arresting officer reasonably believed she had witnessed a violation of Oklahoma law, thus determines the validity of the stop and subsequent arrest, because even if the observed act did not violate the law, the stop was permissible so long as the officer had an objective, reasonable suspicion to believe a crime was occurring. See, United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. (Kan.) 2001)(Footnote 2); United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. (Wis.) 2000).(Footnote 3)

We can stop right there, after examining the footnotes:

Footnote 2:

Officer Voigt asserts that he had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for violating two separate regulations: (1) driving with a cracked windshield; and (2) failing to signal while turning. Kansas law provides: 'No person shall drive any motor vehicle with a damaged front windshield or side or rear windows which substantially obstructs the driver's clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway.' Streeter's windshield had a crack about 12 inches across and 6 inches high, large enough that Officer Voigt could view it from behind the car. This gave Officer Voigt reasonable articulable suspicion - 'a particularized and objective basis' - to believe that the crack substantially obstructed Streeter's view of the street. It is irrelevant whether the observed crack was, in fact, large enough to constitute a violation of the law. The traffic stop was therefore justified, and the district court did not err in denying Callarman's motion to suppress." (Citations omitted.)

Footnote 3:

The propriety of the traffic stop does not depend . . . on whether Cashman was actually guilty of committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle with an excessively cracked windshield. The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for Trooper Spetz to believe that the windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree."

[heyday]

I don't care what SCROTUS said in Whren, in Oklahoma a warrantless arrest may not be had upon probable cause of a misdemeanor except in a few clearly defined exceptions by the legislature!

Looks like the Oklahoma DPS has slipped that by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, or, did the Oklahoma Court of Appeals slip that by the citizen's of the State of Oklahoma?

Whatever, I want to back them down in administrative venue if I can, so therefore, I am going to write them a letter making the following legal claims:

1.) The "reasonableness" standard prescribed by the Supreme Court for warrantless misdemeanor arrests does not apply in Oklahoma, and;

2.) Even if the reasonableness standard did apply, the initial stop was still invalid under the Fourth Amendment.

Then, I will incorporate that research into a brief supporting the Motion to Quash the Arrest.

[heyday]

The following Utah case is instructive, as it provides some cites regarding cracked windshields and the reasonableness test:

STATE v. GALVAN[LINK]

Other jurisdictions have upheld stops based on officer observations of windshield cracks, emphasizing the size of the crack and whether it would be in violation of the law. See, e.g., United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding finding of probable cause based on windshield violation when officer saw crack between 7 and 10 inches long and state regulation prohibited windshields cracked "excessively"); United States v. Smith, No. 00-3043, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 32488, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (upholding trial court's finding that officer's glimpse of a windshield crack that ran vertically from bottom to middle of windshield created reasonable suspicion that vehicle was in violation of city ordinance that prohibited cracks that obstructed operator's vision); State v. Vera, 996 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), review denied Mar. 9, 2000 (upholding trial court's conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop when windshield crack extended from driver's side to passenger's side and state statute required "adequate" windshield); Darby v. State, 521 S.E.2d 438, 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding investigative stop when officer saw a crack over a foot in length in windshield); State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding extensive windshield cracks created reasonable suspicion that vehicle was in violation of unsafe vehicle statute); State v. Goins, No. 95CA2106, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2192, at *6-*8 (Ohio Ct. App. May 17, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (affirming denial of motion to suppress when officer stopped vehicle based on observation of a crack "all along the top portion" of windshield because observation created reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation).

¶14 At least one court has found that when the crack did not appear to be in violation of law, the stop was not justified. In People v. Cerda, 819 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1991), the court upheld a trial court's order granting a motion to suppress evidence based on a windshield stop. The state statute prohibited driving a vehicle "'upon any highway unless the driver's vision through any required glass equipment is normal and unobstructed.'" Id. at 503 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-201(4) (1984 & Supp. 1991)). The trial court had granted the defendant's motion to suppress, finding there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop, concluding "it was 'very nebulous and unclear as to the type of crack [and] the location of the crack.'" Id. (alteration in original). "The [trial] court found that although the officer observed a crack in [the defendant's] windshield, the officer conceded that it did not warrant a ticket. The court stated there was no testimony that the crack obscured the driver's vision." Id. This ruling was affirmed on appeal. See id.; see also State v. Munoz, 965 P.2d 349, 353-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (remanding to trial court the question of whether officer's observation of windshield "provided reasonable grounds to believe that the crack in the windshield made the vehicle unsafe to drive").

¶15 Reviewing the above cases, we conclude that an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that any windshield crack observed is in violation of the law before a stop is justified.

The propriety of the traffic stop does not depend ... on whether [the defendant] was actually guilty of committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle with an excessively cracked windshield. The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the trooper] to believe that the windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree.
Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587 (emphasis added).

[heyday]

U.S. v. CALLARMAN, 2001 10CIR 1347, 273 F.3d 1284 [LINK]

The Standard for Routine Traffic Stops
¶6 We begin by examining the appropriate legal standard for traffic stops. We review questions of law de novo. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).

¶7 A traffic stop, however brief, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore only constitutional if it is "reasonable." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). In United States v. Botero-Ospina we set forth the standard governing the reasonableness of traffic stops: "[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("We have consistently applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio to routine traffic stops." (citation omitted)). Reasonable suspicion is "a particularized and objective basis" for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). When determining whether an officer possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion, the subjective motivations of an arresting officer are irrelevant. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (adopting an objective approach).

¶8 Callarman argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren overturned Botero-Ospina and requires probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. In Whren, the Court stated that, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." 517 U.S. at 810. Other recent Supreme Court cases have also referred to a probable cause standard. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, ___, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000).

¶9 While these cases indicate that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a stop, none of them indicates that it is necessary for a stop. Other Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases have held that reasonable articulable suspicion is also sufficient grounds to justify a stop. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that a traffic stop was supportable under a "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard). In Knowles v. Iowa, for example, the Court noted that a routine traffic stop "is a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest." 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)). The Knowles Court also made clear that a routine traffic stop justifies other incidents of a Terry search, such as a "patdown" of the driver and a brief search of the car. Id. at 118. Similarly, in Brignoni-Ponce the Court stated: "[W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." 422 U.S. at 881.

¶10 There is no inconsistency between these two lines of cases. While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary. We decline Callarman's request to overturn our decision in Botero-Ospina, and we rely on the legal test it articulated: "Our sole inquiry [in traffic stop cases] is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction." 71 F.3d at 787 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).

B. The Alleged Traffic Violations

¶11 In applying this standard, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and considering the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Gutierrez-Daniez, 131 F.3d 939, 940-41 (10th Cir. 1997). We review de novo whether those facts provided sufficient justification for a detention. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996).

¶12 Officer Voigt asserts that he had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for violating two separate regulations: (1) driving with a cracked windshield; and (2) failing to signal while turning. Kansas law provides: "No person shall drive any motor vehicle with a damaged front windshield or side or rear windows which substantially obstructs the driver's clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1741(b). Streeter's windshield had a crack about 12 inches across and 6 inches high, large enough that Officer Voigt could view it from behind the car. This gave Officer Voigt reasonable articulable suspicion – "a particularized and objective basis" – to believe that the crack substantially obstructed Streeter's view of the street. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18. It is irrelevant whether the observed crack was, in fact, large enough to constitute a violation of the law. United States v. Cushman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a cracked windshield provided probable cause for a stop even if the crack was not actually large enough to violate the law). The traffic stop was therefore justified, and the district court did not err in denying Callarman's motion to suppress.

¶13 Because we find that Officer Voigt had reasonable suspicion that Streeter violated one regulation, we need not address Voigt's second justification – Streeter's failure to signal when turning from a private parking lot onto a public highway.

III. Conclusion

¶14 Traffic stops may properly be based on reasonable articulable suspicion rather than probable cause. The cracked windshield gave Officer Voigt a reasonable suspicion to believe that Streeter had broken the law. The district court's denial of Callarman's motion to suppress is therefore AFFIRMED

[heyday]

It wasn't that long ago that the courts consistently held that suspicion is not enough to warrant a traffic stop...go figure.

[heyday]

Callarman argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren overturned Botero-Ospina and requires probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. In Whren, the Court stated that, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." 517 U.S. at 810. Other recent Supreme Court cases have also referred to a probable cause standard. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, ___, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000).

9 While these cases indicate that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a stop, none of them indicates that it is necessary for a stop. Other Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases have held that reasonable articulable suspicion is also sufficient grounds to justify a stop. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975

It should be easy enough to find a post-1975 Oklahoma case holding that no amount of suspicion of a misdemeanor offense justifys a stop!

Anyway, thanks to those scoundrels in the federal courts, LE can almost stop at whim,in violation of the "pre-textual traffic stop doctrine.

That's a serious erosion of rights, as I see it.