[color=black][b]I would appreciate it if we could keep this thread limited to Judicial Oaths or topics CLOSELY RELATED to it.
This is what happens when there is no oath on file or being produced
I copied this from lawwork. This is from Clyde Hyde Himself:
<blockquote>Take your letter with copies to a notary public, and have the notary certify the copies are true and correct copies of the origional letter.Â* Use these as your evidence for the court files.Â* Give the AG a chance to bring Quo Warranto, as the constitution makes it a requirement for all state judges to take and subscribe an oath.Â* State law makes a secondary requirement for the same and any judge who has no oath is impersonating an officer of the state and therefore committing a crime, usually a gross misdeamenor. Â* Give the AG a limited amount of time to bring suit, let him know if he doesn't you will, then you are free to file suit.
Be aware that de facto official acts are usually accepted as being valid however, they will likely leave you alone after that.Â* Word gets around quick.Â* I would still plead the acts are void because no one can have a criminal for a judge.Â* How could you get a fair trial by a criminal?
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"The doctrine is, however, inapplicable when the alleged defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court's appellate jurisdiction.Â* Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132 (three-judge court); United States v. Emholt, 105 U.S. 414 (certificate of divided opinion).
Glidden, 370 U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion).Â* Additionally, when the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business, this Court has treated the alleged defect as "jurisdictional" and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the earliest practicable opportunity. Id. at 535-536.
Â*This is the case here -- § 636(c) "embodies a strong policy" of ensuring that litigants waive their rights to an Article III judge knowingly and voluntarily.Â* The requirement of consent is not a mere "technicality."Â* Sections 636(c)(1), 636(c)(2), and 636(c)(3) reference consent explicitly and require it as a precondition for the exercise of a magistrate judge's authority and of a court of appeals' review of the magistrate judge's judgment.Â* The foregoing indicates the importance of consent as a touchstone of this statutory scheme.Â* Thus, absence of consent is a jurisdictional defect and a court of appeals must raise such defects sua sponte."Â* Thomas dissent, Roell v. Withrow, Argued February 26, 2003, Decided April 29, 2003, # 2002044
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"The distinction referred to in those cases between "constitutional" and "legislative" courts has been productive of much confusion and controversy.Â* Because of the highly theoretical nature of the problem in its present context, we would be well advised to decide these cases on narrower grounds if any are fairly available.Â* But, for reasons that follow, we find ourselves unable to do so.
Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* Â*Â*Â* I
Â*No challenge to the authority of the judges was filed in the course of the proceedings before them in either case.Â* The Solicitor General, who submitted briefs and arguments for the United States, has seized upon this circumstance to suggest that the petitioners should be precluded by the so-called de facto doctrine from questioning the validity of these designations for the first time on appeal.
Â*Whatever may be the rule when a judge's authority is challenged at the earliest practicable moment, as it was in United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, in other circumstances involving judicial authority, this Court has described it as well settled
that, where there is an office to be filled and one acting under color of authority fills the office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer de facto, and binding upon the public.
McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 602.Â* The rule is founded upon an obviously sound policy of preventing litigants from abiding the outcome of a lawsuit and then overturning it if adverse upon a technicality of which they were previously aware.Â* Although a United States Attorney may be permitted on behalf of the public to upset an order issued upon defective authority, Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312, a private litigant ordinarily may not.Â* Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 128-129.
Â*The rule does not obtain, of course, when the alleged defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court's appellate jurisdiction.Â* Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132 (three-judge court); United States v. Emholt, 105 U.S. 414 (certificate of divided opinion).Â* In other circumstances as well, when the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical,Â*but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business, this Court has treated the alleged defect as "jurisdictional" and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the earliest practicable opportunity.Â* E.g., American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. R. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 387-388.
Â*A fortiori is this so when the challenge is based upon nonfrivolous constitutional grounds.Â* In McDowell v. United States itself, supra, at 598-599, the Court, while holding that any defect in statutory authorization for a particular intra-circuit assignment was immunized from examination by the de facto doctrine, specifically passed upon and upheld the constitutional authority of Congress to provide for such an assignment.Â* And in Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 117-118, the claim that an intercircuit assignment violated the criminal venue restrictions of the Sixth Amendment and usurped the presidential appointing power under Art. II, § 2, was heard here and determined upon its merits, despite the fact that it had not been raised in the District Court or in the Court of Appeals or even in this Court until the filing of a supplemental brief upon a second request for review.
Â*The alleged defect of authority here relates to basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants.Â*Â* See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532-534.Â* It should be examinable at least on direct review, where its consideration encounters none of the objections associated with the principle of res judicata, that there be an end to litigation.Â* At the most is weighed in opposition the disruption to sound appellate process entailed by entertaining objections not raised below, and that is plainly insufficient to overcome the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of powers.Â* So this Court has concludedÂ*on an analogous balance struck to protect against intruding federal jurisdiction into the area constitutionally reserved to the States:Â* whether diversity of citizenship exists may be questioned on direct review for the first time in this Court.Â* Mansfield, C. & L.M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382; City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 277 U.S. 54, 59.Â* We hold that it is similarly open to these petitioners to challenge the constitutional authority of the judges below."Â* Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, (1962).
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"This Court follows the decisions of the highest court of a state in construing the constitution and laws of the state unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some principle of the federal Constitution or of a federal statute or a rule of commercial or general law.
Â*The decisions of state courts on questions relating to the existence of its subordinate tribunals and the eligibility and election or appointment of their officers and the passage of its laws are conclusive upon federal courts.Â*
Â*Following the decision of the highest court of the Tennessee in Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heiskell 691, and other cases, this Court holds that the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, organized under the Act of March 9, 1867, had no lawful existence; that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members were usurpers of the functions and powers of the justices of peace of the county; that their action in holding a county court was void, and that their acts in subscribing to the stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company and issuing bonds in payment therefor were void.
Â*While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing are often held to be binding from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person assuming to fill and perform the duties of an office which does not exist de jure can have no validity whatever in law.
Â*An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed."Â* Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 426.
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However, be prepared for a de facto officer doctrineÂ*defense:
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"The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to office is deficient.Â* Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886).
The de facto doctrine springs from the fear of the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by insuring the orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to office.
63A Am.Jur.2d Public OfficersÂ*and Employees §Â* 578, pp. 1080-1081 (1984) (footnote omitted).Â* The doctrine has been relied upon by this Court in several cases involving challenges by criminal defendants to the authority of a judge who participated in some part of the proceedings leading to their conviction and sentence."Â* Ryder v U.S. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
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The fact it is a universal Constitutional requirement might be enough to overcome the de facto officer doctrine, however be prepared for a fight.Â* If nothing else, you will bring the matter to public attention and will embarrass the judges, possibly getting them fired as unfit.Â* The more public attention directed to it, the better chance you have.
