Title 18 Breakthrough

[ezrhythm]

ILS Services, Inc.
Austin Centre #1860
701 Brazos, Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 334-6144/329-646
PRISON LINE: (512) 899-3300
Fax: (512) 402-8425

Email: ilsservicesinc@yahoo.com

August 5, 2008

AUSTIN, TEXAS

ILS ANNOUNCES MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH ON TITLE 18

ILS Services, Inc., a leading legal research firm headquartered in Austin, Texas, announced that it has been advised that the first person has been released challenging the validity of Title 18.

ILS was advised that a win was issued in West Virginia for one prisoner.

Further research by ILS has also uncovered another significant error in the criminal code. The federal Title 18 criminal code was codified in 1909, again in 1940, and again in 1948. In 1909 and 1940 the jurisdictional section for federal courts only authorized prosecution under Title 18 crimes, not under drug crimes or IRS crimes. The 1940 statute, 18 USC § 546, we never repealed or amended. That statute, which is still valid, only authorized prosecution for 1909 Title 18 crimes, nothing for Title 21 or Title 26. Furthermore, under the Fair Warning Doctrine, to prosecute someone under a prior statute, a person must be given warning under that statute. Therefore, no possible prosecution exists under Title 21, Title 26, or under any Title 18 charge other than those listed in the 1909 act, but prior notice is required.

ILS intends to reopen cases by raising the additional error, which would deprive the court of jurisdiction over any criminal case.


Should you have any questions regarding your case please feel free to call us.

[Last Stand]

ezrhythm,

Thanks for update.Keep us posted.

Last Stand

[psholtz]

I know that insofar as drug cases go, one way the Feds get the jurisdiction they otherwise would not have is to sign treaties, these treaties essentially becoming the "law of the land".

Larry Becraft wrote a brief about it:

http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/FEDJurisdiction.html

[Godssun]

Originally Posted by psholtz

I know that insofar as drug cases go, one way the Feds get the jurisdiction they otherwise would not have is to sign treaties, these treaties essentially becoming the "law of the land".

Larry Becraft wrote a brief about it:

http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/FEDJurisdiction.html

They do not get it from treaties. They get jurisdiction from the interstate commerce clause.

Wasn't the intent of the Interstate Commerce Clause originally the regulation of business done between gov'ts of the several states?

I'm not a state, and as long as I rebut the presumption that I'm a citizen (officer) thereof, doing biz with a citizen of another, the ICC should give the feds no rightful jurisdiction over me. But, where might = right and I'm outgunned and outnumbered, I'm wrong, so say the strong.

[Godssun]

Originally Posted by ezrhythm

The 1940 statute, 18 USC § 546, we never repealed or amended. That statute, which is still valid, only authorized prosecution for 1909 Title 18 crimes...

Where does it do this?

Sec. 546. Smuggling goods into foreign countries


Any person owning in whole or in part any vessel of the United
States who employs, or participates in, or allows the employment
of, such vessel for the purpose of smuggling, or attempting to
smuggle, or assisting in smuggling, any merchandise into the
territory of any foreign government in violation of the laws there
in force, if under the laws of such foreign government any penalty
or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United
States respecting the customs revenue, and any citizen of, or
person domiciled in, or any corporation incorporated in, the United
States, controlling or substantially participating in the control
of any such vessel, directly or indirectly, whether through
ownership of corporate shares or otherwise, and allowing the
employment of said vessel for any such purpose, and any person
found, or discovered to have been, on board of any such vessel so
employed and participating or assisting in any such purpose, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
It shall constitute an offense under this section to hire out or
charter a vessel if the lessor or charterer has knowledge or
reasonable grounds for belief that the lessee or person chartering
the vessel intends to employ such vessel for any of the purposes
described in this section and if such vessel is, during the time
such lease or charter is in effect, employed for any such purpose.

[Godssun]

Originally Posted by slofu

Wasn't the intent of the Interstate Commerce Clause originally the regulation of business done between gov'ts of the several states?

Nope. It was meant to regulate any business done between states or persons in the states.

What the intent of the amendment was has already been decided by the SCOTUS and they stated that anything that even AFFECTS interstate commerce is part of interstate commerce even if the activity is done intrastate.

[psholtz]

Originally Posted by Godssun

What the intent of the amendment was has already been decided by the SCOTUS and they stated that anything that even AFFECTS interstate commerce is part of interstate commerce even if the activity is done intrastate.

I'm not doubting you, but do you have a SCOTUS cite for that?

[Godssun]

Originally Posted by psholtz

I'm not doubting you, but do you have a SCOTUS cite for that?

You should doubt me if you feel uncomfortable. You have doubted me, and that is good. You have not called me a liar, which would be not good, but you have doubted me, which is good. A good researcher should ask when doubting and should feel proud that he chooses to.

The below is not opinion. It is "Held" law.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. RAICH et al.

545 U.S. 1

Held: Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. Pp. 6—31.

(a) For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a comprehensive statute, providing meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and strengthening law enforcement tools against international and interstate drug trafficking, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, §812, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body, §§811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, §812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment, §812(b)(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal offense. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). Pp. 6—11.

(b) Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce is firmly established. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151. If Congress decides that the “ ‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See, e.g., id., at 154—155. Of particular relevance here is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127—128, where, in rejecting the appellee farmer’s contention that Congress’ admitted power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for the appellee’s own consumption, the Court established that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” i.e., not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. In assessing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the Court need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557. Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U.S.C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, the Court has no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Pp. 12—20.

Here is the dissenting opinion.

What is the relevant conduct subject to Commerce Clause analysis in this case? The Court takes its cues from Congress, applying the above considerations to the activity regulated by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in general. The Court’s decision rests on two facts about the CSA: (1) Congress chose to enact a single statute providing a comprehensive prohibition on the production, distribution, and possession of all controlled substances, and (2) Congress did not distinguish between various forms of intrastate noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 844(a). Today’s decision suggests that the federal regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce Clause challenge because Congress chose to act with an ambitious, all-encompassing statute, rather than piecemeal. In my view, allowing Congress to set the terms of the constitutional debate in this way, i.e., by packaging regulation of local activity in broader schemes, is tantamount to removing meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause.

[Lawdog]

And if you believe this, I have some lovely beachfront property in Arizona to sell you.