Do Cornforth's Methods Work?

I have been reading Richard Cornforth's materials and have been feeling that I have found a 'ray of light'. However, I seem to be encountering quite a few people who are saying that his methods don't work in practical application in court - especially if you are pro se without an attorney.



I'd like to hear opinions and experiences from others before I invest more of my time (and hope) studying this material. Are his methods legally sound, but simply the judges are acting outside the proper law and going around them anyway, or are do his methods have legal flaws?



Also, he claims that a corporation that doesn't have 'minimum contact' in your state, or which is not charted in your state cannot sue you in your state because they don't have 'standing'. Is this true? I would assume if it is true it would mean that they must sue you in a Federal Court?



Thanks, Steve

I think that some observations should be noted when dealing with any of these corporations.



1. They are Foreign Corporations.



2. They are Foreign Corporations.



ect., ect. and ect........

[KaosTheory]

I would recommend you study Cornforth's material as much as possible. It is true that the courts are corrupt but they do what they do because of our ignorance. Knowledge is power and I regard Cornforth's material as such. Have you watched his video yet? I think it speaks for itself really.

[leatherlips]

I believe Richard has a sound basis for success, but I haven't been allowed into court with it. I filed a law suit against an attorny and Countrywide home loans for a void judgement and collateral attack. While I followed all the rules, the court dismissed the case with prejudice before I ever got a chance. I think it was because it exposed the first judge's bad actions, and this judge didn't want this kind of stuff presented in front of a jury. The whole system would have been exposed for what it is and so I think this is the way they deal with you when you seem to know how it all works.

svanos,



I still have yet to read any of Cornforth's materials, so I do not know precisely what his methods are, although from what I have read of others who speak of him, his methods seem to be grounded in law, which is a good thing. However, what you say in your last paragraph regarding 'minimum contacts' is a purely jurisdictional issue. The corporate charter is irrelevant b/c usually a corporation is chartered in only one state. That charter does not limit where they can conduct business; that is simply where their headquarters are located and shows the state which gave them a license to exist and the laws they are created under.



Regarding mimimum contacts, that refers to where THEY can be sued, not where they can sue you. If they do business with you in your state, the jurisdictional issue is about YOU (& the subject matter, but that is not an issue in your post), not the corporation. This same reasoning applies to why a foreigner, say from Japan, can sue someone in a US Court, when they were here for one single business deal. Wouldn't that suck if the you were the person from Japan who can't sue b/c you were there for only one day and made one sale and got screwed b/c of fraud by the defendant? Then where is your remedy?!?! That would be a license to screw over persons who do not normally do business in that area. So, to make a long story short, a corporation does not need minimum contacts to sue you, but it does matter on where they can be sued.



But, if that corporation does consistent business in that state, they better have a license to do business there, otherwise they will have no standing b/c the state is not getting their cut by taxing the corporation.



A corporation can sue in Federal Court primarily only if there is a Federal Issue involved or if the claim is over $75,000 and the parties are from different states. That is another discussion.



Pay closer attention to what Cornforth said about this matter. You may have misunderstood what he actually said.



-squirrels

[seeker]

squirrels;



since you brought it up, I have a point for clarification -- banks that operate nation-wide -- are still chartered in some state -- Discover, for example, lists itself as a "Delaware Banking Corporation -- in my undestanding, this determines the rules for the corporation,, but they are still a national bank b/c they operate nationwide ... is my thinking correct, or not? Some banks, Citibank, for example, list N.A. after their name to proclaim they are National -- any enlightenment on this issue? Since under 12 USC ch24 it states, NATIONAL banks cannot lend credit --



thanks



Seeker

seeker,



Banks are different than other corporations b/c of Congressional Legislation. The various Secretary of State have nothing to do with chartering of Banks. There is a dual-banking system whereas a charter can exist under a state or under the federal gov. and the regulations and laws can overlap. But there is so much change that occurs in the banmking industry that banks now seem free to move from one state to the next for whatever regulations will apply due to interstate branching through their various subsidiaries.



So b/c a bank is organized under, say, Delaware law, this does not necessarily govern ALL law that applies to them. DE law will apply for DE taxation, and whatever rights and responsibilities they have that matter in THAT state. But other state law can appply depending on where their branching subsidiaries may be located.



Banking Regulation is a different animal.



Hope that helps, but when it comes to Banking Law, I have a lot to learn, which makes me have to ask:



Where is 12 USC 24 does it state that banks cannot lend credit?



-squirrels

Well, I don’t know if Cornforth’s docs work yet but I am getting close to finding out. Recent history: I filed a petition to vacate. The judge gave the plaintiff 10 days to file an opposition. They didn’t. The judge scheduled a hearing. I filed this:



Prof. Jim



STATE OF INDIANA COUNTY OF RUSH

) SS:

)

)

IN THE RUSH SUPERIOR COURT

CAUSE N0.70D01-0301-MF-3



Plaintiff

vs.





Defendant.





A CHALLENGE OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HOLD THE HEARING IN THE NATURE OF A NOTICE TO MINISTER



JURISDICTION



Petitioner, James Lee Nowak, sui juris, aggrieved party, hereinafter “Petitioner”, comes by special appearance and hereby invokes the powers and protections of:

1. The United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution. These powers and protections in particular include but are not limited to the equal protection clauses and supremacy clause.

2. Construing plaintiff’s complaint under the liberal standard afforded pro se submissions; see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519.

3. (holding that district court should have explained pleading defect to pro se plaintiff rather than simply dismissing improperly plead complaint). Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991)

All definitions are taken from Black’s Law Dictionary, Forth Edition (Black’s). Emphasis may be added to some definitions.



Reference



This notice is in reference to VERIFIED PETITION IN THE NATURE OF A PETITION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK UNDER AUTHORITY TR 60(b)(6), hereinafter “The Petition” filed in the RUSH SUPERIOR COURT by Petitioner August 12, 2004. All case cites and codes cited in The Petition are included within this document by reference.



CHALLENGE



Petitioner conditionally accepts the holding of the hearing currently scheduled for MONDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2004 AT 10:00A.M. in the RUSH SUPERIOR COURT Re: CAUSE N0.70D01-0301-MF-3 on the condition DAVID E. NORTHAM provide proof of subject matter jurisdiction to hold said hearing to Petitioner prior to said hearing. It is mandatory that the proof of subject matter jurisdiction include lawful rebuttal of the following specific challenges.



Subject matter jurisdiction is hereby challenged, without dishonor, for the following reasons:





CHALLENGE 1

Subject matter jurisdiction is strictly a problem of the court. The Petition cites the parties cannot waive that subject matter jurisdiction. If the parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction then the parties have nothing to say about subject matter jurisdiction. If the parties have nothing to say then the parties cannot be heard. If the parties cannot be heard it would seem quite illogical to hold a hearing!



Because subject matter jurisdiction is strictly a problem of the court this Petitioner questions even the need to send The Petition to the plaintiff.



CHALLENGE 2

HEARING. Proceeding of relative formality, generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which parties proceeded against have right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial… Black’s

The term is broad enough to include judicial examination of issue between the parties whether of law or of fact. Black’s

“Judicial examination” ends with a judicial act.

JUDICIAL ACT An act which involves exercise of discretion… Black’s



The Petition cites that the vacating of a void judgment is non-discretionary. Because a hearing is specifically for the use of discretion by the judge to come to a judgment or order then a hearing cannot possibly be a forum for vacating a void judgment, which is non-discretionary.



Further, a hearing is for “examination of issue between the parties”. If the parties have no say about subject matter jurisdiction then obviously there is no issue between the parties. If there is no issue between the parties then the parties have no business attending a hearing and the court has no authority to hold a hearing.



CHALLENGE 3

That which marks a judge as a judge is the use of discretion. (See “JUDGE” in Black’s) If whoever is sitting at the bench is not using discretion then he is not a judge. Options other than a judge might include: imposter, usurper or minister. While the Petitioner fears the first options are a possibility, holding the belief that the court is indeed “honorable”, the Petitioner will only address the later at this point in time. As such a definition of “minister” would be appropriate.



MINISTER An officer of justice… Black’s

MINISTERIAL That which is done under the authority of a superior; opposed to judicial; that which involves obedience to instruction, but demands no special discretion, judgment, or skill. Black’s

MINISTERIAL ACT one which a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done. Black’s

MINISTERIAL DUTY One regarding which nothing is left to discretion—a simple and definite duty, imposed by law, and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist. Black’s



Obviously the non-discretionary duty to vacate a void judgment is a non-discretionary ministerial duty of which DAVID E. NORTHAM only has to follow instructions of his superior, which in this case is the real law of Indiana- case law.



CHALLENGE 4

Reading again the definition of MINISTERIAL DUTY, that duty is found to arise “under conditions admitted or proved to exist.” So the question of proof of the WRONG COURT in The Petition is easily answered:



Was the case in superior court? Look at documents in the case file. The answer is a resounding yes.



Does IC 32-30-10-3 exist? Look in the state statutes. Again the answer is yes.



Putting the above two questions and answers together conclude wrong court, void judgment and non-discretionary, ministerial duty to vacate.



CHALLENGE 5

In the ORDER GRANTING TIME FOR OBJECTION signed by the senior judge of the Rush Superior Court and filed August 16, 2004, the plaintiff was “ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED” that the plaintiff has Ten (10) days to file an objection to The Petition. Those Ten (10) days have long since passed with no objection filed. Note that the docket sheet verifies no objection was filed.



The plaintiff is judgment nihil dicit regarding The Petition.



NIHIL DICIT He says nothing. This is the name of the judgment which may be taken as of course against a defendant who omits to plead or answer the plaintiff’s declaration or complaint within the time limited. Black’s



Petitioner hereby takes that “judgment nihil dicit”.



The definition of MINISTERIAL DUTY covered: conditions admitted or proved to exist. By judgment nihil dicit the plaintiff “admitted” all the conditions contained in The Petition and The Petition’s accompanying Affidavit and Judicial Notices exist. An admission always trumps evidence. That admission removes any issues between the parties. If there are no issues between the parties there can be no subject matter jurisdiction to hold a hearing, no discretion, no court, and no judge.



ESTOPPEL A man’s own act or acceptance stops or closes his mouth to allege or plead the truth. Black’s



This then brings the issue back to about half of CHALLENGE 1. By the doctrine of estoppel the plaintiff’s mouth is closed. Why order a hearing to hear the plaintiff when the plaintiff cannot say anything?



The above clearly confirms the section in The Petition headed NO EVIDENCE by admission.



The statements in The Petition and accompanying documentation regarding the fact that the other defendants have waived any and all claims to the property have also been admitted.



CONCLUSION

While a judge does have some cloak of immunity, a minister has none. It would seem wise, as a minister, to rapidly do one’s ministerial duty, act on The Petition and vacate the void judgment and all derivative judgments in all courts while at least some small respect for the honor of the office is still present within this Petitioner. One would hope that cloak were not completely thrown to the wind such as was done by the Indiana Appellate Court judges when they violated case law by not checking subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, per Gonnan v. Northeastern REMC, App. 3 Dist.1992, 594 N.E.2d 843, decision clarified on denial of rehearing 597 N.E.2d 366, when the Appellate Court was reviewing this case.



Petitioner hereby claims David E. Northam should immediately execute his ministerial duty thus eliminating any hearing.



Respectfully submitted,



____________________________, All right reserved

James Lee Nowak

PO Box 832

Morristown, Indiana 46161



cc: Indiana Appellate Court

Looks like some of the caption didn't copy correctly but you get the idea.

Prof. Jim

can't wait to see the response...



jon