Reconciling Methods

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HB & I chat quite a bit & something that comes up in our conversations is "How do you incorporate all of these methods?"

I tell ya, right outtta the gate we discussed Reconciling Cornforth's 4 legs of Jurisdiction W/ Marc Steven's Bear Trap Questions.

So far, the only people I know(off the top of my head) of who may be versed in both of these methods are HB, KAOS, AKIRA, ICE, SJ, and KITCHIE.

So Here's Cornforths Four Legs of the Jurisdiction Table(with the help of Jim. Jim, where you at, man? We miss you.) :

• 1. Party 1 with standing before the court.(Do they have a legitimate pleading?)
  
  2. Party 2 with standing before the court.
  
  3. Some breach of a law(tort), contract or duty.(That's what makes a legitimate pleading referred to in leg 1.)
  
  4. Evidence submitted by a competent witness.(That's How the court will know whether or not there has been a breach or law broken

Before we get all Marc Stevensed out, Let's really understand Leg 1.

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For a good overview, go to

Article III Section 2. Judicial Power and Jurisdiction
Here's some SC cites regarding Standing[list]
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S.Ct. 564
U.S.,2004
Doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to have a federal court resolve his grievance; this inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
The standing requirement is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
Standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution's case or controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
For purposes of Article III standing, the plaintiff must show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an injury in fact that a favorable judgment will redress. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
Prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.



Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
U.S.,2004
It is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff's claimed standing.



McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n, 124 S.Ct. 619
U.S.D.C.,2003
To establish standing to assert claim, plaintiff must: (1) demonstrate injury in fact, which is concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent; (2) establish causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and (3) show substantial likelihood that requested relief will remedy alleged injury in fact. (Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for a majority of the court).



McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n, 124 S.Ct. 619
U.S.D.C.,2003
To have standing to assert claim, plaintiff's alleged injury must be invasion of concrete and particularized legally protected interest. (Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for a majority of the court).



Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 120 S.Ct. 1858
U.S.Vt.,2000
In order to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "injury in fact," a harm that is both concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, causation, a fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant, and he must demonstrate redressability, a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 120 S.Ct. 1858
U.S.Vt.,2000
An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing; the interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 120 S.Ct. 1858
U.S.Vt.,2000
An interest that is merely a "byproduct" of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693
U.S.S.C.,2000
To satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693
U.S.S.C.,2000
A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.



Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693
U.S.S.C.,2000
In a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish standing by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant's allegedly wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury is certainly impending.



Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693
U.S.S.C.,2000
There are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in or resume harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.



Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693
U.S.S.C.,2000
If a plaintiff lacks standing at the time the action commences, the fact that the dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review will not entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.



Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295
U.S.Tex.,1999
Federal court may properly treat issue of statutory standing of plaintiffs to bring suit before addressing issue of Article III standing.



Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 119 S.Ct. 765
U.S.D.C.,1999
To establish Article III standing, plaintiff must allege personal injury which is fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091
U.S.Dist.Col.,1998
Article III confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual "Cases" and "Controversies," and doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091
U.S.Dist.Col.,1998
Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing--regardless of whether there are others who would also have standing to sue.



Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 118 S.Ct. 1777
U.S.Dist.Col.,1998
The word "aggrieved" is historically associated with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly--beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which "prudential" standing traditionally rested.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.



Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 118 S.Ct. 1777
U.S.Dist.Col.,1998
Prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff arguably falls within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in question.



Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 118 S.Ct. 1777
U.S.Dist.Col.,1998
The fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely shared, while counseling against interpreting a statute as conferring standing, does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for purposes of Article III standing; such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an "injury in fact." U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

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Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003
U.S.Ill.,1998
Standing to sue is part of common understanding of what it takes to make justiciable case. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003
U.S.Ill.,1998
Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence, though it may sometimes have impact on presidential powers, derives from Article III, not Article II. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 2, § 3; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003
U.S.Ill.,1998
Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three requirements: first and foremost, there must be alleged, and ultimately proven, an "injury in fact"--a harm suffered by plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; second, there must be "causation"--a fairly traceable connection between plaintiff's injury and complained-of conduct of defendant; third, there must be "redressability"--a likelihood that requested relief will redress alleged injury. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.



Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003
U.S.Ill.,1998
Presumption of future injury when defendant has voluntarily ceased its illegal activity in response to litigation is not substitute for allegation of present or threatened injury upon which initial standing must be based. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312
U.S.Dist.Col.,1997
Article III standing inquiry focuses on whether plaintiff is proper party to bring suit, although that inquiry often turns on nature and source of claim asserted. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312
U.S.Dist.Col.,1997
To meet standing requirements of Article III, plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by requested relief; plaintiff's complaint must establish that he or she has "personal stake" in alleged dispute, and that alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him or her. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312
U.S.Dist.Col.,1997
To satisfy Article III standing requirements, alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable, which requires, among other things, that plaintiff have suffered invasion of legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, and that dispute is traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through judicial process. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.


Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154
U.S.Or.,1997
Prudential standing principles are judicially self-imposed limits on exercise of federal jurisdiction requiring that plaintiff's grievance arguably fall within zone of interests protected or regulated by statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in suit, but, unlike constitutional standing requirements, prudential standing principles can be modified or abrogated by Congress.



Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154
U.S.Or.,1997
Breadth of zone-of-interests test of prudential standing varies according to provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within zone of interests of statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under generous review provisions of Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may not do so for other purposes. 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 et seq.



Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154
U.S.Or.,1997
Congress legislates against background of prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.



Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154
U.S.Or.,1997
Case or controversy provision of Article III, establishing irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, requires: that plaintiff have suffered injury in fact arising from invasion of judicially cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; that there be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of so that injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party not before court; and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. 1055
U.S.Ariz.,1997
To qualify as party with standing to litigate, person must show, first and foremost, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent." U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.



Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174
U.S.Ariz.,1996
It is role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not role of courts, but that of political branches, to shape institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.



Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174
U.S.Ariz.,1996
Standing is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver.



Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174
U.S.Ariz.,1996
"Doctrine of standing" is a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to political branches.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.



U.S. v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431
U.S.La.,1995
Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: (1) plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097
U.S.Colo.,1995
Fact of past injury, while presumably affording plaintiff standing to claim damages, does nothing to establish real and immediate threat that plaintiff would again suffer similar injury in the future. (Per opinion of Justice O'Connor, with three Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in part and concurring in judgment.) U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. 798
U.S.Ill.,1994
Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of litigation.



Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130
U.S.Minn.,1992
Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130
U.S.Minn.,1992
Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires that plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; that there be a causal connection between the injury and conduct complained of so that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party who is not before the court; and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.



Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130
U.S.Minn.,1992
In order for injury to be "particularized," it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.



Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130
U.S.Minn.,1992
At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant's conduct may suffice to establish standing; in response to summary judgment motion, plaintiff can no longer rest on mere allegations but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence the specific facts which will be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment; at the final stage, those facts, if controverted, must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(e), 28 U.S.C.A.



Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130
U.S.Minn.,1992
Imminence of injury is demanded for standing even when the alleged harm does not depend upon affirmative actions of third parties which are beyond the plaintiff's control.



Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2298
U.S.Dist.Col.,1991
To establish standing, party must allege personal injury fairly traceable to defendant's alleged unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by requested relief.



Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S.Ct. 2173
U.S.N.Y.,1991
Plaintiff must maintain a personal stake in the outcome in the litigation through its course. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 111 S.Ct. 1700
U.S.La.,1991
"Standing" does not refer simply to party's capacity to appear in court; rather standing is gauged by specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that party presents. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

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International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 111 S.Ct. 1700
U.S.La.,1991
Party may challenge violation of federal statute in federal court if it has suffered injury that fairly can be traced to challenged action and that is likely to be redressed by requested relief. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661
U.S.Cal.,1991
At the core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.



U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S.Ct. 1428
U.S.W.Va.,1990
Ordinarily, litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on legal rights or interests of third parties, even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects litigant also affects third party.



Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558
U.S.Dist.Col.,1989
Public interest groups had standing to bring suit against United States Department of Justice seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with Department's consultation with professional legal organization's standing committee on federal judiciary regarding qualifications of nominees for federal judgeships; refusal to permit those groups to scrutinize committee's activities to extent allowed by Federal Advisory Committee Act constituted sufficiently distinct injury which fact that other groups or citizens might make the same complaint did not lessen, and ruling in groups' favor would provide genuine relief notwithstanding statutory disclosure exemptions. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 2, § 1 et seq.; Federal Advisory Committee Act, § 1 et seq., 5 U.S.C.A.App.



Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S.Ct. 750
U.S.Dist.Col.,1987
Trade association representing securities brokers, underwriters, and investment bankers had standing to challenge Comptroller of Currency's approval of bank's application to offer discount brokerage services at locations inside and outside of its home state; interest asserted by association had plausible relationship to National Bank Act's policy of keeping national banks from gaining monopoly control over credit and money through unlimited branching. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 36, 81.



Diamond v. Charles, 106 S.Ct. 1697
U.S.Ill.,1986
Presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet standing requirements. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S.Ct. 2965
U.S.Kan.,1985
Standing to sue in any Article III court is federal question which does not depend on party's prior standing in state court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S.Ct. 2965
U.S.Kan.,1985
Generally stated, federal standing requires allegation of present or immediate injury in fact, where party requesting standing has alleged such personal stake in outcome of controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues; there must be some causal connection between asserted injury and challenged action, and injury must be of the type likely to be redressed by favorable decision.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Constitutional doctrine requiring a litigant to have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of the doctrines clustering around the Article III "case or controversy" requirement of federal judicial power. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Standing requirement has a core component derived directly from the Constitution in that a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Like the prudential component of federal judicial power, the constitutional component of the standing doctrine incorporates concepts not susceptible of precise definition and the injury alleged must be, for example, distinct and palpable and not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical and the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action and relief from the injury must be likely to follow from a favorable decision, and those terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Absence of precise definitions of standing terminology does not leave courts at sea in applying the law of standing as, like most legal notions, the standing concepts have gained considerable definition from developing case law and in many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Article III standing is built on a single basic idea, the idea of separation of powers. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Questions relevant to standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Article III notion that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Asserted right to have the government act in accordance with law is not sufficient of itself to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
Separation-of-powers concept underlies the standing doctrine. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315
U.S.D.C.,1984
When transported into the Article III context, principle of separation of powers counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.

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Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S.Ct. 1387
U.S.Ala.,1984
In order to establish standing for purposes of constitutional "case or controversy" requirement, plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putative illegal conduct of defendant, and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable decision.



Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S.Ct. 2777
U.S.N.Y.,1982
Judicial power may not be exercised unless plaintiff shows that he personally has suffered from actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant and it is not enough that conduct of which plaintiff complains will injure someone; complaining party must also show that he is within class of persons who will be concretely affected. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Larson v. Valente, 102 S.Ct. 1673
U.S.Minn.,1982
"Personal stake" requirement for standing must consist of distinct and palpable injury to plaintiff and fairly traceable causal connection between claimed injury and challenged conduct. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Term "standing" as bearing upon right to judicial relief subsumes blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, but, at irreducible minimum, Article III requires party who invokes court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant and that injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.



Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Those who do not possess Article III standing may not litigate as suitors in courts of the United States. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Requirement of standing focuses on party seeking to get his complaint before federal court and not on issues he wishes to have adjudicated. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Standing is not measured by intensity of litigant's interest or fervor of his advocacy. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Neither Administrative Procedure Act nor any other congressional enactment can lower threshold requirements of standing under Article III. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702; U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.


Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752
U.S.Pa.,1982
Assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not reason to find standing. U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S.Ct. 1601
U.S.Ill.,1979
Constitutional limits on standing eliminate claims in which plaintiff has failed to make out case or controversy between himself and defendant, and, in order to satisfy judicial article of Constitution, plaintiff must show that he personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.



Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S.Ct. 1601
U.S.Ill.,1979
Even when case falls within constitutional boundaries, plaintiff may still lack standing under prudential principles by which judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated, and to limit access to federal courts to those litigants best suited to certain particular claim, and, e. g., litigant normally must assert injury peculiar to himself or to distinct group of which he is part, rather than one shared in substantially equal measure by all or large class of citizens, and plaintiff must also assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S.Ct. 1601
U.S.Ill.,1979
Congress by legislation may expand standing to full extent permitted by judicial article of Constitution, thus permitting litigation by one who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules, but in no event may Congress abrogate judicial article minima, and plaintiff must always have suffered distinct and palpable injury to himself that is likely to be redressed if requested relief is granted. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2620
U.S.N.C.,1978
Essence of standing inquiry is whether parties seeking to invoke court's jurisdiction have alleged such personal stake in outcome of controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues upon which court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions; "personal stake" requires not only distinct and palpable injury to plaintiff, but also fairly traceable causal connection between claimed injury and challenged conduct.

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S.Ct. 1917
U.S.Dist.Col.,1976
The concept of standing is part of the constitutional limitation of federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S.Ct. 1917
U.S.Dist.Col.,1976
Doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S.Ct. 1917
U.S.Dist.Col.,1976
The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Article III requirement for standing, and a federal court cannot ignore this requirement without overstepping its assigned role of adjudicating only actual cases and controversies. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
Inquiry as to standing involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise; in both dimensions, it is founded in concern about the proper, and properly limited, role of the courts in a democratic society.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability--whether the plaintiff has made out a "case or controversy" between himself and the defendant within the meaning of art. III. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

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Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
A federal court's jurisdiction can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
The standing question bears close affinity to questions of ripeness-- whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention--and of mootness--whether the occasion for judicial intervention persists. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
Although standing in no way depends on the merits of plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
The actual or threatened injury required by art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
The source of plaintiff's claim to relief assumes critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of standing that, apart from art. III's minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes; essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197
U.S.N.Y.,1975
Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules, but art. III's requirement remains: the plaintiff must still allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.


Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 94 S.Ct. 2925
U.S.Dist.Col.,1974
Essence of standing to sue is not a question of motivation but the possession of the requisite interest that is or is threatened to be injured by the unconstitutional conduct.

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 94 S.Ct. 2925
U.S.Dist.Col.,1974
Assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue no one would have standing is not a reason to find standing to sue.

U. S. v. Richardson, 94 S.Ct. 2940
U.S.Pa.,1974
To invoke judicial power of the United States, claimant must have personal stake in outcome, direct injury or particular concrete injury, i.e., something more than generalized grievance. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

U. S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 93 S.Ct. 2405
U.S.D.C.,1973
Standing is not confined to those who show economic harm, since aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of quality of life in our society.

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 93 S.Ct. 1146
U.S.Tex.,1973
At least in absence of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 93 S.Ct. 1146
U.S.Tex.,1973
A plaintiff, to have standing to invoke federal judicial power, must show a logical nexus between status asserted and claim sought to be adjudicated.

So******t Labor Party v. Gilligan, 92 S.Ct. 1716
U.S.Ohio,1972
Federal courts do not decide abstract questions posed by parties who lack personal stake in outcome of controversy.


Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 90 S.Ct. 827
U.S.Minn.,1970
Question of standing in federal courts is to be considered in framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to cases and controversies; question is related only to whether dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in adversary context in form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 90 S.Ct. 827
U.S.Minn.,1970
Question of standing, unlike "legal interest" test, concerns, apart from "case" or "controversy" test, question whether interest sought to be protected by complainant is arguably within zone of interest to be protected or regulated by statute or constitutional guarantee in question.

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 90 S.Ct. 827
U.S.Minn.,1970
Interest conferring standing to sue may reflect aesthetic, conservational, recreational, or spiritual values as well as economic values.


Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 90 S.Ct. 827
U.S.Minn.,1970
Congress can resolve question of standing to sue save as requirements of Article III dictate otherwise. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq.

District Court Cites

Greener v. Cadle Co., 2003 WL 21940891
N.D.Tex.Dallas.Div.,2003
"Capacity" is party's legal authority to go into court to prosecute or defend suit, and differs from "standing," which is party's justiciable interest in the suit and is component of subject matter jurisdiction.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Thompson, 191 F.Supp.2d 48
D.D.C.,2002
"Cases" or "controversies" requirement of Article III reflects the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case; consequently, in order for a court to have jurisdiction over a case, each plaintiff must have standing to bring their claim. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.

U.S. v. Martonak, 2002 WL 193142
S.D.N.Y.,2002
Federal courts are not free to assume subject matter jurisdiction and decide the merits even if the jurisdictional issue is far more nettlesome than the merits, and even if the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied; rather, issue of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed, and standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.

Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 902 F.Supp. 492
D.N.J.,1995
In order to invoke jurisdiction of federal court, plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 2.

Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Essex Fells, 876 F.Supp. 641
D.N.J.,1995
In order to invoke jurisdiction of federal court, plaintiff must have personal stake in outcome of otherwise justiciable controversy. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 2.

Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 834 F.Supp. 1437
E.D.Pa.,1993
Federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear any matter that is not justiciable case and controversy under Constitution, and action is not justiciable if plaintiff does not have standing to sue. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.

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Washakie Co. School Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317-318
1) parties which have existing and genuine rights and interests, as opposed to hypothetical rights and interests;
2) a dispute in which a judgment of the court may effectively operate, and not a purely political, philosophical or academic debate;
3) a controversy in which a judicial ruling will have the force and effect of a final judgement; and
4) the proceedings must be genuinely adversarial in nature, and advanced by parties with sufficient interests to produce a thorough analysis of the issues involved.

Here's the first step, Constitutionally speaking.
Is there a real Case or controversy in the first place?
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/c...le03/09.html#4

Elements of Justiciability are standing, ripeness, mootness,adversity, and more:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/c...icle03/11.html

Here's a good explanation of the Constitutional Explanation of Standing:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/c...icle03/10.html

If you were to Pick 2 cases out of all those above, these would be it:

McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n, 124 S.Ct. 619
U.S.D.C.,2003
To establish standing to assert claim, plaintiff must: (1) demonstrate injury in fact, which is concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent; (2) establish causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and (3) show substantial likelihood that requested relief will remedy alleged injury in fact. (Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for a majority of the court).

Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154
U.S.Or.,1997
Case or controversy provision of Article III, establishing irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, requires: that plaintiff have suffered injury in fact arising from invasion of judicially cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; that there be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of so that injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party not before court; and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.

For futher research, type this in exactly on google:
site:findlaw.com "justiciable case" constitution injury "article III"

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If you haven't bought Adventures In Legalland yet and try this stuff in court, you will suffer.
Also, there are other set up questions that you have to do before these, so you need to buy the book to understand and also buy his scripts from him directly.

Marc challenges the appearance under Rule 9a of the attorney claiming to represent the so-called “state.” He uses the questions in regards to the complaining party becuase he wants the attorney to bring forth evidence of a complaining party. Without this evidence there is no case. The Attorney is to prove he represents someone other than himself who has standing to complain, i.e, a legal right was violated that resulted in damage.

Here's his set up questions for the judge, mainly but could be for the P.A.:

• Could this court proceed against me if the plaintiff lacked standing to complain against me? Yes or no.
  
  Would I have to enter a plea if the alleged plaintiff lacks standing to complain against me? Yes or no.
  
  Does this ticket present a justiciable case or controversy? Yes or no.
  
  Would I have to enter a plea if a justiciable case or controversy has not been presented? Yes or no.
  
  Do you agree with this United States Supreme Court ruling: “courts only adjudicate justiciable controversies.” United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949)?
  
  Does that apply to this court? Yes or no.
  
  Does a justiciable case or controversy require the violation of a legal right? Yes or no.
  
  What are the essential elements to a justiciable case or controversy? (breach of duty and damage, but don't tell them!! Just ask questions, don't take positions)

These should be for the cop or P.A.:

• Have I been accused of violating someone’s rights? Yes or no.
  
  If yes, can you identify the right I allegedly violated? [To clarify, was it some one’s right to life, liberty or property?] There will also be an inconsistency with the ticket where no victim is noted.
  
  Did I violate the court’s rights? Yes or no.
  
  Did I violate the police officer’s rights? Yes or no.
  
  Did I violate any of your rights? Yes or no.
  
  This civil action does not involve the alleged violation of a legal right? Yes or no.
  
  How does someone acquire standing in a civil case?
  
  Then please explain how the alleged plaintiff has standing to complain against me.

Study the threads previous to really comprehend these questions

If the Bureaucrats say anything other than yes or no, it is non-responsive.
At this point you object and move to strike.Marc has a line of questioning to get past even that.

I also believe we can add ICE's methods to the mix, too. Check out the attachments of 5 steps to object. You could then take it to an interlocutory appeal for them not answering your questions & informing you of the nature and cause

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There must be jurisdiction over party 2 (the defendant)
In order for party 2 to have standing before the court, there must be jurisdiction in personam over the defendant

Still under construction

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leg 4-construction