Secrets of the Legal Industry

[ezrhythm]

Taken from; http://voidjudgements.net/

Most judgments are not merely voidable, but are in fact VOID JUDGMENTS. They can be vacated; made to go away (Although, it is an up hill battle). Rarely has any authenticated evidence, competent fact witness, or even a claim been put before a court and on the record. Defective affidavits, hearsay as evidence and no stated damages are but a few elements that rob the court of subject matter jurisdiction (at last count there are 22 elements that deprive the court of SMJ). Some of the elements are: denial of due process, denial of access to court, fraud upon the court, and fraud upon the court by the court.
(Although these pages are aimed primarily towards debt, credit card debt, the principals set forth herein apply to virtually all civil and criminal cases.)
Common pleas such as "open account" or "account stated" are often used in place of, and sometimes in conjunction with, breach of contract. To file under breach a contract would require that they bring in the signed contract, agreement, or note. They don't bring in a contract, they bring in the "terms of agreement" which has no signature or persons name on it, a template that could apply to anyone.
These are just some of the tools used by debt collectors (credit card debt collectors in particular) and their counsel to perpetrate a fraud upon the court, with or without the courts cooperation or complicity.
At the same time, courts, almost as a rule, openly display a bitter and venomous hatred of pro se / pro per litigants. So don't expect the courts to just roll over and give you what you demand without a battle. It doesn't matter to them that you are right, it matters only that you are pro se; an inferior, low life being, and the courts have a position and the income of their brotherhood to protect.
These are the four secrets:
1. Courts of general, limited, or inferior jurisdiction have no inherent judicial power.*

• Courts of general, limited, or inferior jurisdiction get their jurisdiction from one source and one source only: SUFFICIENT PLEADINGS.
• Someone before the court must tell the court what its jurisdiction is.
• Without pleadings sufficient to empower the court to act, that court cannot have judicial capacity.
• No judge has the power to determine whether he has jurisdiction. He does have the duty to tell when he does not.

....What this means to you is that no court can declare that it has the legal power to hear or decide cases, i.e. jurisdiction. Jurisdiction must be proved and on the record. Without sufficient pleadings, without jurisdiction, no court can issue a judgment that isn’t void ab initio, void from the beginning, void on its face, a nullity, without force and effect.
2. We have a common law system.

• No statute, no rule, or no law means what it says as it is written.
• Only the holding tells you what it means.
• The statute means what the highest court of competent jurisdiction has ruled and determined that the statute means in their most recent ruling.

....What this means to you is that courts are governed/ruled by case law, what has been determined before, what the highest court of competent jurisdiction has said the law is, means. It is called the Doctrine of Precedent. This doctrine is so powerful that it can kill and has. A family in Florida has become quite familiar with this doctrine when they tried for 15 years to prevent feeding tubes from being removed from their daughter who was in a vegetative state. 3. Attorneys CANNOT testify.

• Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are never facts before the court.

....What this means to you is that no attorney can state a fact before the court. This was more than adequately pointed out in 2000 when thousands of Florida ballots were taken before the U.S. Supreme Court, without even so much as one competent fact witness. Without a witness the court could not see the ballots, the ballots were not before the court, and the ballots could not be introduced as evidence. 4. Before any determination, there must be a court of complete or competent jurisdiction.

• There must be two parties with capacity to be there.
• There must be subject matter jurisdiction.
• Appearance or testimony of a competent fact witness.

....What this means to you is that without jurisdiction, complete jurisdiction, no court can issue a judgment that isn’t void, a nullity, without force or effect, on its face and in fact. *"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.

[mrg]

Originally Posted by rodman652

http://iamfacingforeclosure.com/file...ng20071115.pdf

This case seems to fit nicely with your post.

[Lawdog]

This particular brand of crapola sounds a lot like that peddled by Richard Cornforth. A typical nut, he has no verifiable victories, and at least one loss memorialized in the case reporters:

1996 OK CIV APP 159
940 P.2d 1208
68 OBJ 1469
Case Number: 86415
Decided: 04/17/1997

WESTLAKE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, INC., an Oklahoma corporation, Appellee,
v.
Richard L. CORNFORTH, Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; Honorable Thornton Wright, Jr., Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Mark E. Bialick, Regena K. McNeill, Durbin, Larimore & Bialick, Oklahoma City, for Appellee.
Richard L. Cornforth, Bethany, pro se Appellant.

OPINION

BUETTNER, Judge

¶1 In 1992, Westlake Presbyterian Church sued Cornforth in small claims court to recover damages pursuant to 23 O.S.1991 s 10, which permits recovery of up to $2,500.00 from the parents of a minor living with his parents who commits any criminal or delinquent act resulting in injury to person or property. After trial, a judgment in the amount of $2,500.00 was entered in the Church's favor and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in case number 79,910. On April 28, 1995, after the appeal was final, the Church moved to require judgment debtor to answer as to assets. The hearing on assets was set for May 22, 1995.

¶2 On May 3, 1995 Cornforth filed a motion to vacate the judgment, claiming the judgment was void because the court did not have jurisdiction to decide whether a child had committed a crime or act of delinquency. In a letter to the Church, copied to the court and filed with the court May 18, 1995, Cornforth advised the Church's minister that in "regard to your church's judgment against me, SC 92-6910, please be advised that I am filing bankruptcy." Nonetheless, Cornforth filed a "restatement" of his motion to vacate May 31, 1995, restating his position that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a child had committed a criminal or delinquent act.

¶3 The Church filed an objection to the motion to vacate June 22, 1995 in which it asserted that the court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 23 O.S.1991 s 10, which permits the injured party to seek damages against the minor's parents in a civil action. The court was not called upon to determine whether the minor had committed criminal or delinquent acts. 1 The Church also pointed out that the civil court is not *1210 adjudicating a minor, but is entitled to entertain evidence of the alleged criminal or delinquent acts in order to determine whether the parent is liable for damages.

[Part omitted due to space limitations]

¶5 Upon being informed that the bankruptcy court's automatic stay had been lifted, the trial court rescinded its own stay and set the motions to vacate and ratify journal entry for hearing. Cornforth's proposed journal entry stated that because the Church failed to timely respond to his motion to vacate, his motion was deemed admitted. The trial court heard arguments and reviewed the briefs filed by the parties. It found it had jurisdiction over the matter and the parties. It further found that the judgment entered for $2,500.00 in favor of the Church, as affirmed on appeal, was not void and should not be vacated. It then denied Cornforth's motion to vacate and his restatement of the motion to vacate as well as Cornforth's request for ratification of journal entry.

[Part omitted due to space limitations]


¶7 The rationale of Pipes and Record is that District Court Rule 4 applies to pre-trial motions, and that motions for new trials are governed by District Court Rule 17. Inherent in that analysis is the fact that the authority to grant a new trial is limited by statutory grounds. 12 O.S.1991 s 651. In the same manner, motions to vacate are governed by District Court Rule 19 and 12 O.S.1991 s 1031.

¶8 The Legislature has determined that motions for new trial and to vacate a judgment must meet certain criteria. Notwithstanding the mandatory language of District Court Rule 4 ("motion shall be deemed confessed"), the trial court certainly has discretion to ensure that the motion arguably meets the minimum statutory criteria before granting the requested relief. In this case, the trial court did not err in refusing to deem confessed Cornforth's motion to vacate judgment

¶9 Further, a party may not invite error, then attempt to profit from the error. Middlebrook v. Imler, Tenny & Kugler, M.D.'s, Inc., 713 P.2d 572, 583 (Okla.1985). The Church could reasonably refrain from filing a response based on Cornforth's statement that he had filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws. Likewise, because of the bankruptcy filing, the trial court could reasonably allow the Church to respond to Cornforth's motion to vacate after the original response time had passed. Cornforth has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

¶10 Cornforth's second proposition, that the judgment should be stricken as void because 12 O.S.1991 s 2011 requires pleadings to be signed by at least one attorney with his bar number, is meritless, even if it were properly preserved for appeal. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal unless the error is fundamental. Steiger v. City National Bank of Tulsa, 424 P.2d 69 (Okla.1967) (syllabus by the Court).

¶11 Cornforth next asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to stay the Oklahoma case based on the federal bankruptcy case. Cornforth bases his contention on the fact that 11 U.S.C. s 362 stays attacks by creditors on debtors, not of debtors on creditors. The lawsuit in this case, however, was filed by the Church against Cornforth and the Church's judgment made it a judgment creditor and Cornforth a judgment debtor. Cornforth's motion to vacate was a postjudgment motion, but is not a separate action.

¶12 For his fourth contention, Cornforth again states that his motion to vacate should have been granted and his proposed journal entry ratified because of the Church's failure to timely respond. This time, Cornforth relies on the local rules for Oklahoma-Canadian Counties entitled Rule 16, "Judgment-Default." A motion to vacate a judgment, however, is not a motion for default judgment. Local Rule 16 does not apply to these facts.

¶13 The fifth allegation of error has a fallacious foundation and fails for that reason. Cornforth states that the trial court lacked authority to sua sponte set the matter for a "second" hearing. Cornforth then asserts that "there is absolutely no authority extant that empowers a court to act on its own initiative to reinstate a judgment in default justly requires the trial court's October 2, 1995 [order] be declared void." The court has authority and there was no default judgment.

¶14 Next Cornforth claims that the order overruling his motion to vacate should be declared void because the trial court did not require the Church to show by authority that the trial court had jurisdiction. We have read the transcript of the trial as well as Church's objection to the motion to vacate. The Church established through fact and law that the matter was properly heard in the District Court, Small Claims Division.

¶15 For his seventh proposition of error, Cornforth argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine that Cornforth's son had committed a criminal or delinquent act. The Small Claims Division of the District Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a minor as a criminal or delinquent. This case is not about adjudication of a minor, however. The Small Claims Division has authority to consider evidence of the minor's actions to see if they are in the nature of criminal or delinquent acts. If, in addition, the plaintiff proves the other elements of 23 O.S.1991 s 10, that is, that the defendant is a parent of the minor, the minor lives with the parent, and the plaintiff has suffered damages because of the minor's criminal or delinquent acts, then the court may render judgment against the parent for money damages. Section 10 damages are limited to the criminal or delinquent acts of the child. Glidden v. Higgs, 839 P.2d 680, 681 (Okla.App.1992). The original 1957 version of s 10 provided for recovery based on a minor's willful or malicious destruction of property. In 1977, the basis for liability was changed to criminal or delinquent acts resulting in personal injury or property damages. There has been no suggestion that the 1977 amendment changed the statutory scheme so as to require the minor to be found criminally liable or delinquent before a parent could be held liable under s 10. In the absence of some evidence of legislative intent, we will not create such a prerequisite.

¶16 Finally, Cornforth makes an unsubstantiated allegation accusing the appellate court, the trial court and the Oklahoma County Special Judges of having "set aside all procedures and all rules for the convenience and advantage of the Church and the Church's counsel" so as to require ruling that the trial courts acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction to abrogate his substantive and procedural rights." We do not address unsupported allegations of error. Cavett v. Peterson, 688 P.2d 52, 59 (Okla.1984).

¶17 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's order denying Appellant's motions to vacate and to ratify journal entry.

¶18 Appellee's motion for appeal-related costs and attorney fees is granted. We find this action is one for recovery of negligent or willful injury to property. 12 O.S.1991 s 940. We remand the case to the trial court for a determination of appeal-related attorney fees.

¶19 Appellant's motion for sanctions is denied.

¶20 Appellee's motion for sanctions is denied.

¶21 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

¶22 HANSEN, P.J., and JOPLIN, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES:

1. During trial, Cornforth admitted that his son entered an agreed plea to second degree burglary and was ordered to perform 65 hours of community service.

[palani]

Originally Posted by Lawdog

This particular brand of crapola sounds a lot like that peddled by Richard Cornforth.

To test this posters' comments I passed them through a Crapola Translator to obtain the following:

Originally Posted by Lawdog (in UltraLeet)

Tĥī§ þąŗťīçų1ąŗ bŗąÑď ðƒ çŗąþð1ą §ðųÑď§ ą 1ðť 1īĶĕ ťĥąť þĕďď1ĕď bŷ ®īçĥąŗď Ċðŗуðŗťĥ. Ă ťŷþīçą1 Ñųť, ĥĕ ĥą§ Ñð Vĕŗīƒīąb1ĕ Vīçťðŗīĕ§, ąÑď ąť 1ĕą§ť ðÑĕ 1𧧠MĕMðŗīą1īżĕď īÑ ťĥĕ 繧ĕ ŗĕþðŗťĕŗ§:

http://www.degraeve.com/translator.php