Equity / Common Law

Here it is in a nutshell (??) In Florida the General Laws of Florida are the law, not the Florida Statutes. Other jurisdictions may be diferent in the way they enact the laws...

John

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter has been held to be essential, necessary, indispensable and an elementary prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power. 21 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Courts", ' 18 p. 25. "Further, subject?matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent." Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Mobil Oil Corp., 455 So.2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), 1984, approved in part, quashed in part on other grounds, 492 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1986), 1986 Fla.S.Ct 4238, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S. Ct. 950, 93 L.Ed.2d 999 (1987); Ringling Bros. ? Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA), 1974, cert. denied, 303 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1974).

It is well established that prohibition is the proper vehicle to consider a contention that an inferior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Atlantic Foundation v. Gurlacz, 582 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 592 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1991). Prohibition is the appropriate writ to prevent a court from acting without jurisdiction. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Prohibition is a proper vehicle to test a lower tribunal‘s rejection of a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1977); DeGroot v. Scheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957). In any event, under the “all writs“ jurisdiction this court has authority to treat the petition as if the correct remedy had been sought. Article V, § 2(a), 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. Quo Warranto is a common law writ designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally entitled to do so and is addressed to the preventing of a continued exercise of authority unlawfully asserted.

The law is well settled that the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Bohlinger v. Higginbotham, 70 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1954); City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Jared v. Jackson, 483 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1984); Swebilius v. Florida Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd., 365 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 284 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1973); Walton v. Walton, 181 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Mendez v. Ortega, 134 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Pittman v. Roberts, 122 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); Florio v. State, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); In Re Coleman‘s Estate, 103 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. discharged, 106 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1958); In Re Weiss’ Estate, 102 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(2).

Because this petition alleges a total absence of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court may not treat the pleading as a petition for writ of certiorari. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c); English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1977). This instant case and brief herein proves clear evidence of the facts regarding an absolute and clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction by the lower Court. Since the present case involves a question of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court shall determine it is appropriate to consider the case pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission, 448 So. 2d 18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1984). Also, an incorrect decision on subject matter jurisdiction, or a facial challenge to a statute's constitutional validity, is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1970). It constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, sufficient to justify invocation of this court’s jurisdiction. See Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Thomasville, 100 Fla. 748, 130 So. 7 (Fla.1930); Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1982); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1982); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1970); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 18 Fla. Law W. S55, (Fla. 1993). For the record, the issue respecting subject matter jurisdiction, the validity of the statutes as law and fundamental error, was raised, with competent substantial evidence, called to the attention of, argued and briefed in the trial court in this instant action. The Relator submits that the lower court rendered an incorrect decision on the motion to dismiss and on the facial challenge to the statutes The Relator submits that the lower court committed fundamental error and departed from the essential requirements of law.

A. Criminal Cases
The face of the accusatory pleading filed invokes subject-matter jurisdiction in a criminal case. State v. Vazquez, 450 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1984), 1984 Fla.S.Ct 2027; Winburn v. State, 28 Fla. 339, 9 So. 694 (1891); McLean v. State, 23 Fla. 281, 2 So. 5 (1887); Brehm v. State, 427 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Without a valid indictment or information any judgement or sentence is rendered "void ab initio". "The general rule, then, is that jurisdiction is to be determined from the face of an indictment or information and any conviction based on an information which does not properly allege jurisdiction is void." Zanger v. State, 548 So.2d 746.
Habeas corpus may be invoked to secure release of a person from imprisonment if the act of which he stands convicted is not in law a crime. A Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, if the charge were merely defective in its allegations; it must wholly fail to state any offense under the laws of the State. Ex Parte Hays, 25 Fla. 279, 6 So. 64; Ex Parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552; Lewis v. Nelson, 62 Fla. 71, 56 So. 436; Foxworth v. Law, 77 Fla. 596, 82 So. 55. But, where the indictment or information wholly fails to charge any offense under the law, the Petitioner will be entitled to discharge on habeas corpus, even though he may have voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the charge. Though a plea of guilty is a confession of guilt of the highest order and authorizes the imposition of the sentence prescribed by law as upon a verdict of guilty, such plea admits only the acts charged, and does not preclude the defendant from claiming that such facts charged do not constitute a crime. 2 Bish. New Crim. Proc. Sec. 795; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed. p. 975, Sec. 587; 14 Am Jur. 952, Criminal Law Sec. 272; 22 C.J.S. 655?658, Criminal Law Sec. 424; State v. Schrup, 229 Ia. 909, 295 N.W. 427; People v. Maffei, 237 Ill. App. 325; People v. Bandy, 239 Ill. App. 273; State v. Small, 313 Mo. 66, 280 S.W. 1033. Moreover, a judgment founded upon such a void charge is without legal foundation and is insufficient upon which to base a valid commitment for imprisonment. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2nd 458; Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586, 15 So. 2nd 293, 148 A.L.R. 1240.

B. Civil Cases
A fundamental error may be raised for the first time at any point. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 585 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Johnson v. State, 460 So.2d 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), approved, 483 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1986). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction has been held to constitute such a fundamental error. See, e.g., Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Clem v. State, 462 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Consent of a party is in all other instances wholly insufficient to create subject matter jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238 (recognizing that immunity may be waived). Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on a court by the state constitution and applicable laws. See Lovett, 112 So. 775 (Id). Article V, section 6(b) of the Florida Constitution provides that county and circuit courts shall “exercise the jurisdiction prescribed by general law." not statues.

Subject matter jurisdiction or the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Stel-Den of Am., Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1984). Further, jurisdictional matters may be raised for the first time on appeal. Florida Auto. Dealers Indust. Benefit Trust v. Small, 592 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error that an appellant may raise at any time. Dicaprio v. State, 352 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). See also Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1994); J.A.B. Enters. v. Gibbons, 596 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Parker v. Parker, 553 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). This Court should initially note that whether or not the parties effectively raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised as a defense at any time, including on appeal. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b) & (h)(2).

Subject matter jurisdiction is so vital to a court‘s power to adjudicate that its absence can be raised at anytime. Furthermore, if raised, the trial court shall conduct the type of evidentiary inquiry required by Trammell, (Id) with the appellees/respondents bearing the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Florida stated in Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (Fla. 1927): "Jurisdiction of the subject- . . . matter is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power . . . But before this potential jurisdiction of the subject-matter -- this power to hear and determine -- can be exercised, it must be lawfully invoked and called into action; the parties and the subject matter of the particular case must be brought before the court in such a way that it acquires the jurisdiction and the power to act.",112 So. at 775 (citations omitted). State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Schreiber, 561 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon court by constitution or statute; it cannot be created by waiver, acquiescence or agreement of parties, or by error or inadvertence of the parties or their counsel, or by the exercise of power by the court; it is a power that arises solely by virtue of law. Rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991); 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), see also City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat’l Bank, 478 So.2d 82, 86 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Stel-Den of America, Inc., v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1984); In Re Paton‘s Estate, 173 So.2d 168, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 326, 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); State of Florida, Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Schreiber, 561 So.2d 1236, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) citations omitted, review denied, 581 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991); Cates v. Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422, 18 So.2d 11 (1944); Steckel v. Blafas, 549 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Williams v. Starnes, 522 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The law is clear that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, failure to object, and it may not be conferred by stipulation or waiver by the parties or by mere mutual agreement between parties. Pacesetter Builders-Joint Venture, Inc. v. Coral Springs Property Services, Inc., 531 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954); Rodriquez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983), rev. den. 451 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984); Department of Military Affairs v. Griffin, 530 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Williams v. Starnes, 522 So.2d 469, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). It is also well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel. Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982). Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954).

As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Siegel v. Siegel, 575 So. 2d 1267, 16 Fla. Law W. S, 140 (S. Ct. 1991), "Under Florida law, however, a party cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement if there is no legal basis for jurisdiction. Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1954) (“Judicial power or jurisdiction cannot be conferred or given to the Court by mutual consent or stipulation.“); State ex rel. Caraker v. Amidon, 68 So.2d 403, 405 (Fla. 1953) (“Jurisdiction is conferred upon a court by the Constitution or a statute and not by agreement between the parties.“); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Luke, 156 Fla. 638, 641, 24 So.2d 310, 312 (1945) (“jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent or failure to object“.); Cates v. Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422, 431, 18 So.2d 11, 16 (1944) (“it is well settled that the parties to a cause cannot by consent confer upon a court jurisdiction of the subject matter“); Brooks v. Brooks, 546 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (When applying the UCCJA, the question of “whether a parent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court is irrelevant to the proper determination of which state should assume jurisdiction in a custody dispute.“); Williams v. Starnes, 522 So.2d 469, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (in custody dispute, “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred upon a court by consent or agreement of the parties“); accord Gomez v. Gomez, 86 A.D.2d 594, 595, 446 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (App. Div.) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable“ in custody dispute under UCCJA), aff‘d, 56 N.Y.2d 746, 452 N.Y.S.2d 13, 437 N.E.2d 272 (1982)." Subject matter jurisdiction may not be altered by agreement, and may be raised at any time. Brautigam v.MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954); State ex rel. Caraker v. Amidon, 68 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1954); Oyer v. Boyer, 383 So.2d 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Florida Nat. Bank v. Kassewitz, 156 Fla. 761, 25 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1946), Tamiami Trail Tours v. Wooten, 47 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1950). See also In Re A.W., 230 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), Williams v. Starnes, 522 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), Rodriquez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and cases cited therein. Before a court can exercise its powers, statutory predicates for jurisdiction must be met. In this instant case at bar, evidence was not ever presented by either party on the issue of jurisdiction nor was a Trammellevidentiary hearing conducted. The fact that the trial court entered the judgment of dissolution, in and of itself, does not provide a basis for jurisdiction.

The high courts have rejected the argument that the participation of the parties and involvement of the court, which followed filing of petitions for modification or dissolution, created subject matter jurisdiction. See Snider v. Snider, 686 So.2d 802 (4th DCA 1997).
Indeed, subject matter jurisdiction is so vital to a court‘s power to adjudicate the rights of individuals, that its absence can be questioned at anytime, even after the entry of a final judgment or for the first time on appeal. E.g., Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1984). Moreover, the fact that the lack of such jurisdiction is never presented to a trial court does not preclude an appellate court from considering the issue. E.g., Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Accordingly, this court is obligated to consider 84 Lumber’s (Id) contention that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction in this case to enter the order under review. Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

To have subject matter jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding, a court must have both the jurisdictional authorities to adjudicate the class of cases to which the case belongs and jurisdictional authority over the property, which is the subject matter of the controversy. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Mobil Oil Corp., 455 So.2d 412, 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), approved in part, quashed in part sub nom. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S. Ct. 950, 93 L. Ed. 2d 999 (1987); see also Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768, 775 (1927); Alternative Development, Inc. v. St. Lucie Club and Apartment Homes Condominium Ass’n., 608 So.2d 822, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); State Dept. of Natural Resources v. Antioch University, 533 So.2d 869, 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Although the trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned for the first time on appeal, the high Courts have declined to consider those issues that have not first been ruled upon by the trial court. Glades Oil Co. v. R.A.I. Management, Inc., 510 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
Subject matter jurisdiction “concerns the power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs.“ Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994). “It is the power lawfully conferred to deal with the general subject involved in the action. It does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff, in the particular case before the court.“ Id. (quoting Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 725, 109 So. 677, 683 (1926))
A decree entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void and that issue can be raised at any time. Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So.2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 654 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Cf. Plummer v. Hoover, 519 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); International Harvester Co. v. Mann, 460 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Dimino v. Farina, 572 So.2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Kennedy v. Reed, 533 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

Because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its awards of visitation and custody are void, and must be reversed. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 654 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Quinones v. Quinones, 569 So.2d 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Brown v. Tan, 395 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Fedan v. Reina, 695 So. 2d. 1282 3rd DCA 1997, a judgment entered where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is a nullity. Generally, a court may not order affirmative relief after it has found that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a cause. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Schreiber, 561 So.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
The courts have held, however, in the context of evaluating factual matters asserted in a memorandum of law appearing in the record on appeal, that “unproven utterances documented only by an attorney are not facts that a trial court or this court can acknowledge.“ Schneider v. Currey, 584 So.2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Accord Blimpie Capital Venture, Inc. v. Palms Plaza Partners, Ltd., 636 So.2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The only possible basis in the record for the trial court’s conclusion in this cause regarding subject matter jurisdiction is the respondent's version of the facts as stated by her attorney, documented in the record regarding the Relator's Motions to Dismiss accompanying this petition.

Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a) does not provide for review of a non-final order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter (as opposed to personal) jurisdiction. Instead, such orders are reviewable by petition for a writ of prohibition. See Walker v. Garrison, 610 So.2d 716, 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); School Board of Marion County v. Angel, 404 So.2d 359, 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957); King v. Roda, 405 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

In addition, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) enumerates seven defenses, which can be raised by motion, including jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person. Under the rule, "any ground not stated shall be deemed to be waived except any ground showing that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any time." The high courts have ruled and acknowledged that the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists, see, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927), and that the defense of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(2). See also Nathanson vs. Nathanson, 693 So.2d 1061, 22 Fla. Law W. D 1223. While jurisdiction over the person may be conferred on a court by contract or consent (see, e.g., Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1986)) subject matter jurisdiction has its origin only in laws or constitutions. It may neither be created nor waived by the litigants. See Weinstein, Introduction to Civil Litigation 23 (1986); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). The only defense that appears to be absolute and unwaivable is the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(h). Agudo, Pineiro & Kates, P.A. v. Harbert Construction Co., 476 So. 2d 1311, 10 Fla. Law W. 2183 (Dist. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 1985).

In Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga. App. 134, 270 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), a Georgia appellate court was "confronted with a question of whether a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject matter when suit was filed can obtain jurisdiction by rendering a judgment which is within such court‘s jurisdiction." In a persuasive analysis of the problem, the court answered the question in the negative. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power lawfully conferred to deal with the general subject involved in the action. "It does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff, in the particular case before the court." (Quoting Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 725, 109 So. 677, 683 (1926)).

In State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 175 (1939), our supreme court recognized the authority of a court to hear and determine the question of its jurisdiction both as to parties and as to subject matter. Consistent with that authority, it held:
"When at any time or in any manner it is in good faith represented to the court by a party that it has not jurisdiction, the court will examine the grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further. The Court may receive testimony on a preliminary question to determine its jurisdiction, and is not bound to dismiss the suit on a mere allegation of lack of jurisdiction, but may inquire into the correctness of the averment."
In Trammell (Id), 140 Fla. at 503, 192 So. at 176 "The questions presented here are to such a large extent questions of fact (alleged but not yet proven), as well as of law, that lack of jurisdiction is not made conclusively to appear."

"Jurisdiction," in the strict meaning of the term, as applied to judicial officers and tribunals, means no more than the power lawfully existing to hear and determine a cause. It is the power lawfully conferred to deal with the general subject involved in the action. It does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff, in the particular case before the court. "It is the power to adjudge concerning the general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state of facts which may appear in a particular case." Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 725, 109 So. 677, 683 (1926) (citation omitted).

II. THE COMPLAINT
The Relator asserts that the statutes utilized against him and which the Court utilized to adjudicate him by, as set forth in the record, are not valid law, or do not constitutionally exist as they do not conform to certain mandatory constitutional prerequisites, and thus are no law at all, which prevents subject matter jurisdiction from being invoked by the lower Court.
The Florida Statutes are "codifications" of the Laws of Florida and are "prima facie evidence" of the law, not the law itself. The lower Court has adjudicated the Relator under and by Florida Statutes, which are not valid law, as they have no constitutionally required "enacting clause" as, mandated by Art III, '6, Florida Constitution.

The "Preface" to the Florida State Statutes notices the Relator that the "Division of Statutory Revision Committee" has broad authority over the arrangement and grammatical structure of the Florida Statutes. It states that the division's "work product constitutes "prima facie evidence of the law" (not the law) and that the enrolled act stands as the best evidence of the law and will prevail in the event of conflict." The Florida Statutes offer the Relator "Notice and Grace" that the "Statutes" are but "prima facie evidence of the law". It is hereby rebutted that statutes are valid laws. Therefore the Complaint and adjudication(s) must be dismissed and rendered void, as insufficient on its face, because they do not charge or adjudicate the Relator with any violation of or under the general Laws of Florida, nor was subject matter jurisdiction properly alleged or proven in the complaint.

We see that there are many valid sources of a law. It is fact that true and lawful authority is not derived from force, power or wealth, but from a legal relationship between the parties involved. When laws exist because of force or power, it is despotism or tyranny, not authoritative law. The authority that is needed for one to obey a law or be subject to a law from a particular source depends upon one's relationship to that source. If there is no legal or legally sufficient relationship, as such in this instant case, there can be no authority for a law.

Relator asserts the lack of a legally sufficient nexus and relationship between himself, the court and the statutes, based upon criteria not met under Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in regards to the licensing of the marriage and the subsequent dissolution. (Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, but also must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences Brady). It is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

III. THE ENACTING CLAUSE
All written Constitutions prescribe the mode and process of making laws. The Constitutions also regulate the form and style in which laws are to be enacted to make them laws of the State. The form and style are regarded as essential parts of the law and thus must be included at all times with the law to make it a valid law.

The enacting clause gives a statute its "constitutional authenticity", which makes its use essential since the constitution is the source of the Legislatures authority for enacting laws. A law cannot be regarded as coming from a constitutionally authorized source if it does not have an enacting clause. The enacting clause provides evidence that the law, which follows, is of the proper legislative source or jurisdiction. Law in the sense in which the courts speak of it today, does not exist without some definite authority behind it. Black and White Taxi Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927); Joiner v. State, 155 S.E. 2d 8, 10, 223 Ga. 367 (1967); Pierce v. Vittum, 61 N.E. 1116, 1117, 193 Ill. 192 (1901).

The enacting clause acts as a sign or seal of constitutional authority of law. The almost unbroken custom of centuries has been to preface laws with a statement in some form declaring the enacting authority. The purpose of an enacting clause of a statute is to identify it as an act of legislation by expressing on its face the authority behind the act. 73 American Jurisprudence 2d, "Statutes," Sect. 93. If any law is to have authority behind it, it must have an enacting clause preceding it, as required by the constitution and fundamental law. Art. III, Sec. 6 Florida Constitution.
By Article III, '1, Florida Constitution, all lawmaking authority, legislative power and legislative jurisdiction for the State of Florida is vested in the Legislature of Florida, to wit:
SECTION 1. Composition. -The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a Legislature of the State of Florida, consisting of a senate composed of one senator elected from each senatorial district and a house of representatives composed of one member elected from each representative district.

By Constitutional Mandate, all laws must have an Enacting Clause. One of the required forms that all the laws of the State of Florida must adhere to and are mandated by the Florida Constitution is that they contain an enacting clause. This is provided for under Article III, '6, Laws, To wit:
Florida Constitution, Article III, '6 Laws;
"The enacting clause of every law shall read: 'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:'"

Neither the common law nor a state statute can supersede a provision of the federal or state constitutions. Dept. of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994). Moreover, the Florida Constitution is the supreme law of Florida, and, as such, it takes precedence over any contrary provisions of the common law or statutes. Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769 (1914); Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994). If a constitutional amendment is a higher authority than a state statute, it stands to reason that it is entitled to an even greater degree of deference from the courts.

The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary, as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear, there is no room for construction, and no excuse for interpolation or addition.Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat 304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 419; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet 10; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1; Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628; The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655; (Justice) Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., Sec 451; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 2nd ed., p. 61, 70.

IV. UNDER CONSTITUTION REQUIRING AN ENACTING CLAUSE.
a.Doctrine that requirement is mandatory.
1. In General
Under a constitutional provision requiring an enacting clause, the majority of the courts held that an enacting clause is a necessity, the requirement of such a clause being regarded as mandatory. Failure to comply renders the statute void. Burritt v. State Contract Comrs. 120 Ill. 322, 11 N.E. 180; May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546; People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich. 595, 44 L.R.A. 164, 77 N.W. 450; Sjoberg v. Security Sav. & L. Asso., 73 Minn. 203, 72 Am. St. Rep. 616, 75 N.W. 1116; State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 21 Am. Rep. 738; State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 4 S.E. 350; State ex rel. Gouge v. Burrow, 119 Tenn. 376, 104 S.W. 526, 14 Ann. Cas. 809; Montgomery Amusement Co. V. Montgomery Traction Co. 139 Fed. 353, affirmed in 72 C.C.A. 682, 140 Fed. 988; City of Carlyle v. Nicolay, 165 N.E. 211, 215, 216 (Ill. 1929), aff'd. Liberty Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Metrick, 102 N.E. 2d 308, 310, 410 Ill. 429 (1951); Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 96 P.2d 420, 423, 424, 109 Mont. 52 (1939); State v. Burrow, 104 S.W. 526, 529, 119 Tenn. 376 (1907); Biggs v. Beeler, 173 S.W. 2d 144, 146 (Tenn. 1943); Dept. of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994); Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, "Statutes", Sec. 84, p. 836. It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137, 174 (1803).

In Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 45 S.E. 821, such a constitutional provision was held mandatory, but the Constitution itself contained a provision that its provisions should be taken, deemed and construed to be mandatory and prohibitory, and not merely directory, except where expressly made directory or permissory by its own terms.
The Court in Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, expresses itself as of the opinion that a constitutional requirement as to an enacting clause is essential and imperative, but concludes by holding that the requirement must at least be substantially complied with, and where there has been no compliance at all the statute is void. See also Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 273, 105 Ark. 380 (1912).

When the language of the constitution is positive and free of all ambiguity, all courts are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid the hardships of particular cases.We must accept the constitution as it reads when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign power.Cook vs. Iverson, 122, N.M. 251.

2. Entire omission of enacting clause.
Consequently, a statute, which has no enacting clause, is void. Walden v. Whigman, 120 Ga. 646, 48 S.E. 159; People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich, 595, 44 L.R.A. 164, 77 N.W. 450; Sjoberg v. Security Sav. & AL. Asso. 73 Minn. 203, 72 Am. St. Rep. 616, 75 N.W. 1116; State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 21 Am. Rep. 738; State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 4 S.E. 350; Smith v. Jennings, 45 S.E. 821, 67 S.C 324 (1903); May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 (1883); State v. Burlington & M. R.R. Co., 84 N.W. 254, 255, 60 Neb. 741 (1900).

A resolution containing no enacting clause, as required by the Constitution, was held invalid in Collier & C. Lithographing Co. V. Henderson, 18 Colo. 259, 32 Pac. 417, under a constitutional requirement that all laws shall be passed by bills; but there were other grounds upon which this resolution was held invalid, and the omission of the enacting clause is not specially discussed.
It is stated in Mathis v. State, 31 Fla 291, 12 So. 681, that every act must have the enacting clause provided by the Constitution as indicating its source and authority. The facts with reference to the enactment of the law involved in this case do not clearly appear. The court farther on in the opinion cites with approval Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466, 65 Am. Dec. 362, as to which see infra.

A joint resolution containing no enacting clause cannot be given the force and effect of law under a Constitutional provision that the enacting clause of every law shall be: "Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Florida." In Re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 43 Fla. 305, 31 So. 348. The resolution in question contained the words "resolved by the senate, the House of Representatives concurring." In short, the question submitted to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Governor of Florida, was whether or not the resolution effected, under the Florida Constitution, a legal appropriation of the sum of money therein mentioned, so as to authorize the governor, to countersign a warrant on the public treasury therefor. The Florida Supreme Court cited, inter alia, that the resolution failed to state constitutionally required provisions i.e., the Florida Constitution in Article 3, Section 6 provides that: "The enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: "Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Florida.'" The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the resolution under discussion lacked the essential requisites of an enacting clause to make it a law, and, in its judgement, was not effectual as a law to make the appropriation of money thereby attempted. It is essential to note that in reaching its decision the Florida Supreme Court cited the following: Section 6, Article 3, Const.; State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 21 Am.Rep. 738; May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546; State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 4 S.E. 350; People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich, 595, 44 L.R.A. 164, 77 N.W. 450; Sjoberg v. Security Sav. & AL. Asso. 73 Minn. 203, 72 Am. St. Rep. 616, 75 N.W. 1116.
In State v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, 12 Pac. 708, the court stated that a bill without an enacting clause could not be a law, but a single pen stroke through the words "be it enacted," which was doubtless made surreptitiously by some irresponsible party, and not by authority of the legislative assembly, would not have the effect to render the bill void.

A joint resolution, which conflicts with a constitutional provision, requiring the style of a legislative act to be: "Be it enacted by the legislature of West Virginia." is void. Boyers v. Crane, 1 W.Va. 176. Apparently, it was urged here that the thing, which was sought to be done in this case, could not be done by a joint resolution.
In holding that a resolution did not have the force and effect of law, the court considered the fact that an enacting clause, as required by the Constitution, was omitted. State ex rel. Peyton v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 197, 103 Pac. 497 , 18 Ann. Cas. 705.

Some decisions in which the enacting clause is absent go merely to the extent of holding that at least a substantial compliance is necessary, and there being none the statute is void. Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, Supra.
The purpose of an enacting clause in legislation is to express on the face of the legislation itself the authority behind the act and identify it as an act of legislation. Preckel v. Byrne, 243 N.W. 823, 826, 62 N.D. 356 (1932). That published laws are to have an enacting clause is made clear by the statement commonly used by legal authorities that an enacting clause of a law is to be "on its face". To be "on its face" means to be in the same plain view. Cunningham v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 66 S.W. 2d 765, 773 (Tex. Civ. App); In re Stoneman, 146 N.Y.S. 172, 174. Therefore, the Florida statutes must be declared facially unconstitutional. Dept. of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994).

Thus, a statute book without the enacting clause is not a valid publication of laws. State of Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 120, 261 (1875); cited with approval in: People v. Dettenthaler, 77 N.W. 450, 452, 118 Mich. 595 (1989); Kefauver v. Spurling, 290 S.W. 14, 15, 154 Tenn. 613 (1926); Vinsant, Adm'x v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, 284, 285 (1871). The common mode by which a law is "promulgated" is by it being printed and published in some authorized public statute book. Thus that mode of promulgation must show the enacting clause of each law therein on its face, that is, on the face of the law as it is printed in the statute book. This is the only way that the "courts of justice and the public are to judge of its authenticity and validity." The fact that a law is published without the enacting clause is sufficient to render it void or invalid. Thus, a publication of an act or law omitting the enacting clause is not a valid publication of the act or law, and the law is void. In re Swartz, 27 Pac. 839, 840, 47 Kan. 157 (1891); Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, "Statutes" Sec. 133, p. 884; citing L.R.A. 1915B, p. 1065; Commonwealth v. Illinois Central R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 175, 160 Ky. 745 (1914); Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So.2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 654 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Cf. Plummer v. Hoover, 519 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); International Harvester Co. v. Mann, 460 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Dimino v. Farina, 572 So.2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Kennedy v. Reed, 533 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). If the required statement of authority is not on the face of the law, it is not a law that has any force and effect. Such a published law cannot be used to adjudicate, indict or used on complaints to charge or adjudicate persons. State v. Kearns, 623 P. 2d 507, 509, 229 Kan. 207 (1981). Thus whatever is published without an enacting clause is void, as it lacks the constitutionally required legal evidence or legal statement of authority. Dept. of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994). Such a law or statute lacks proof that it came from the legally authorized source as specifically spelled out in the constitution, and thus is not a valid publication to which the public is obligated to give any credence. Disobedience or evasion of a constitutional mandate may not be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public. Slote v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660. In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370.

3. Failure to comply exactly with constitutional requirements
Where there is an enacting clause which does not comply in every particular with the constitutional requirements, the view is taken by some courts that a substantial compliance is all that is required. Consequently, if there is a substantial compliance, the statue is valid. In the instant case at bar, being adjudicated under Florida statute, there is no compliance whatsoever.
The view is expressed in Ferrell v. Kell, 105 Ark. 380, 151 S.W. 269, that an enacting clause in the style: "Be it enacted by the people of the state of Arkansas," is a substantial compliance with a constitutional requirement that the style shall be: "Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Arkansas:" and this view is approved in King v. McDowell, 107 Ark. 381, 155 S.W. 501.

Where a joint resolution is a proper method of action by the legislature upon certain matters, an enacting clause to such a resolution using the word "resolved," instead of the word "enacted," in the clause, as required by the Constitution, does not render the joint resolution void, since it is a substantial compliance with the constitution requirement. Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 45 S.E. 821.
Most "law" today exists by way of various codes or revised statutes, which fail to use the constitutionally required and mandated enacting clause or authority. This makes these statutory works invalid as a law which citizens are subject to. Due to this, all criminal prosecutions, and adjudication's under "statute" are groundless, and the Courts are without jurisdiction to render any judgment. Also, any judgment obtained is void. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 495 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Laney v. Laney, 487 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Cf. Kimbrough v. Rowe, 479 So.2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A void judgment obtained without personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction may be set aside at any time. See Palmer v. Palmer, 479 So.2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment must be set aside. West v. West, 534 So2d 893, Fla. Law W 2656, (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it.See 16 Ma. Jur. 2d, 177, 178; State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147,65 NW 262, 30 L.R.A. 630 Am. St. 459. Up to now, courts have only made "errors" in judgment, which cannot be attacked. The facts related herein forces the Court to either dismiss the action or commit "usurpation", which can serve as legal justification for revolution. In Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789, and reiterated in Ex parte Lewis, 101 Fla. 624, 135 So. 147, and Stewart v. Stone, Fla., 130 So.2d 577, 1961 Fla.S.Ct. 973, "the Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law". The values of the Framers of the Constitution must be applied in any case construing the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969). To disregard such a deliberate choice of words and their natural meaning, would be a departure from the first principle of constitutional interpretation. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
If therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful of constitutional rights against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 635.

4. Florida Statutes Ch. XX et seq. and Florida Statutes in General
The Florida Statutes are not laws in the State of Florida. They are, as stated in the "PREFACE" of the book called the "Florida Statutes", a product of the "Division of Statutory Revision" and are only "prima facie evidence of the law", not the law itself. Pursuant to the "PREFACE" of the "Florida Statutes" they are simply an authoritative statement of the General Laws of Florida for use by "interested persons." The General Laws in the State of Florida are enacted by the Florida Legislature and published in a set of volumes known as the "Laws of Florida". For some unknown reason the "Florida Statutes" are being wrongfully used by Florida Courts to prosecute and/or adjudicate persons for alleged violations thereof or subjects therein. When, as a matter of fact, the "Florida Statutes" are but the "official menu" of the "Laws of Florida". One need only to reference the "PREFACE" at the beginning of the "Florida Statutes" to get a clear understanding of their intent and use, not as law, but as evidence of the law.
Citing to the "PREFACE" (See Appendix, Exhibit "B", page 2) of the Florida Statutes, Relator contends that the "PREFACE" gives notice and grace, that the statutes are only prima facie evidence of the "General Laws of Florida", and has been given to all, as it relates to the use of the "Statutes". On page "vi" thereof (Florida Statutes, PREFACE, 1997) and referring to the paragraph under the heading of "THE CONTINUOUS REVISION SYSTEM", it states in pertinent part the use and intent of the Florida Statues, to wit:
"Currently, the general law is revised and published biennially as the Florida Statutes... It provides an up-to-date, authoritative statement of the general law for use by practitioners, judges, legislators, and other interested persons."(Emphasis added)

Under the sub-heading of "Consequences." the "PREFACE" discloses and disclaims:
"The portions carried forward from the preceding regular edition by operation of the adoption act are the official law of the state and, therefore, the best evidence of the law. The portions enacted in subsequent sessions... are only prima facie evidence of the law. Of course, during the period that a provision is characterized as prima facie evidence, the enrolled act stands as the best evidence of the law and will prevail in the event of conflict."
...A researcher seeking the current enacted general law needs to examine the latest edition of the Florida Statutes...@ (Emphasis added)
The Florida Statutes are not subject to challenge under Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution, because they are not law, they are non-constitutional laws. However, the challenge Relator makes here is that no subject matter jurisdiction exists when Florida Statutes are used to criminally charge a defendant or to adjudicate a party. The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated "It is difficult to understand how a statute can be constitutional." Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136, 17 Fla. Law W. D, 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992). This point is made in Santos v. State, 380 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 1980), 1980 Fla.S.Ct 7081, 1370, where the Florida Supreme Court stated that Statutes are not subject to an Article III, Section 6, challenge for single subject and matter. See also State v. Combs, 388 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1980); Loxahatchee River Environmental Control District v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 515 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1987); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1993); ("Once re-enacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a statute is no longer subject to challenge on the ground that it violates the single subject requirement of s. 6, Art. III of the State Constitution.")
In Santos v. State, 380 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 1980), 1980 Fla.S.Ct 1370, the high court held that "Article III, Section 6, does not require sections of the Florida Statutes to conform to the single subject requirement. The requirement applies to 'laws' in the sense of acts of the legislature." (Id. at 1285). Article III, Section 6 of our Constitution applied only to the "Laws of Florida", and only so long as it remained a "law." Once re-enacted as a portion of the "Florida Statutes" it was not subject to challenge under article III, section 6. How could this be? Are not all laws in the State of Florida subject to constitutional mandates of the Florida Constitution? The answer is unequivocally in the affirmative. Are the Florida Statutes above the Florida and United States Constitutions? The answer is unequivocally in the negative. The answer then to these questions is very simple. Since the Florida Statutes are only prima facie evidence of the law and not the law itself, Article III, Section 6, does not apply, because it only applies to "laws", not "non laws", "non-constitutional laws" or "statutes". Note that nothing has ever been said or raised about the constitutionality of such a measure in our courts, regarding the requirement under Art. III, Sec. 6, other than the "single subject" issue, which is not applicable here in this action nor has the issue of "single subject" ever been raised by the Relator.
Today the legislature enacts no laws, and instead enacts a change in the wording of a Florida Statute, i.e., "Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Florida: Florida Statute ???.??? is amended to read ???.???. This process enacts no law per se. It simply makes a law changing the wording of a Statute. To enact a valid law takes much more than that. How could a non-law be required to meet constitutional standards and requirements? It cannot. At the very most, the Florida Statutes are "special laws" and not "general laws". Special laws can only apply to a certain class. General laws apply to all.
The requirement that laws originate only from the Legislature is supported within the rule first enunciated in Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789, and reiterated in Ex parte Lewis, 101 Fla. 624, 135 So. 147, and Stewart v. Stone, Fla., 130 So.2d 577, 1961 Fla.S.Ct. 973, that "the Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact a law designed to accomplish a general public purpose."
Judge X was sworn in as a Circuit Court judge in and for the 11th Judicial Circuit of Miami-Dade County. Judge X executed an oath of office entitled "Judicial Offices Loyalty Oath", which includes a sworn statement to support, protect and defend the Constitution of the united States and the Constitution of the State of Florida. The Constitution of the State of Florida explicitly states in Article V, Section 1, that:
"No other courts may be established by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality." Art. V, Sec. 1, Fla. Const.
Further, Article V, Section 5(b), Fla. Const., states that:
"(b) Jurisdiction.-The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction ...when provided by general law." and "They shall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general law." Art. V, Sec. 5(b), Fla. Const. (Emphasis added)
Nowhere in the Florida Constitution or in the general Laws of Florida, is it stated that the Florida Statutes have the same force and effect of the general Laws of Florida. Article V, Sec. 5(b) does not authorize jurisdiction or adjudication under the statutes, but only under general law.

At every appearance before the lower tribunal and this Court, Relator has substantially rebutted any presumption of jurisdiction to a special law compelling his specific performance and has demanded strict proof that the statutes involved in this instant action apply to him. It is a matter of record that Relator has no nexus between those Florida Statutes and the Relator. The Relator continues to appear specially, not generally.
Relator has learned just recently, on the 20th day of November, 1997, a defendant, Michael Von Wezyk, received a dismissal from County Court Judge Diaz in the 17th Judicial Circuit in Broward County, Florida, Case number 92-20464MM10A, after a five and one half (5 1/2) year ongoing case, where he was also charged with a criminal violation of the Florida Statutes. Judge Diaz’s dismissal was based on the very same argument submitted to this Court. Upon the defendant's recent acquisition of the knowledge that there is an absence of enacting clauses upon Florida Statutes, defendant filed for dismissal in that case based upon the absence of the enacting clause upon the Statute and alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Court. Judge Diaz acknowledged his understanding of defendant's Demand to Dismiss for Lack of subject Matter Jurisdiction and subsequently he dismissed the action on that point. This Relator acknowledges that County Court Rulings have no binding effect upon the this Court, however, Relator makes this point, not in an attempt to sway this Court, but to show the validity of his argument to the Judiciary considering such an argument would have wide ranging public ramifications.
By way of reference only, Relator attaches a copy of the demand, order and transcripts of the hearing in front of Judge Diaz.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this instant case before the lower tribunal must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. States v. Siviglia, 686 Fed. 2d 832, 835 (1981). The Florida Statutes upon which the lower Court's adjudication’s are based are not laws in the State of Florida and Relator cannot be bound thereby. If the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional provision, the frequent repetition of the wrong will not create a right.Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619. Consequently, the lower tribunal's position is fundamentally and fatally defective and therefore the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction to try or adjudicate the Relator. Therefore, the lower tribunal's orders are void and unenforceable. Without valid statutes containing an enacting clause, there is no subject matter jurisdiction and therefore any decisions by the lower court is rendered void. Hooker v. Boles, 346 Fed. 2d 285, 286 (1965); Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D. 1983); People v. McKinnon, 362 N.W. 2d 809, 812 (Mich. App. 1985); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4). Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Court's judgment is void. Kutner v. Kutner, 159 Fla. 870, 33 So.2d 42 (1947); see also Falkner v. Amerifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n, 489 So.2d 758, 759-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The Relator is not bound if the judgment being attacked is void because the court rendering the judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Corbin Well Pump & Supply v. James D. Koon, 482 So. 2d 525, 11 Fla. Law W. 295 (Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986). When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction it has no power to decide the case and any judgment entered is absolutely null and void, can be set aside and stricken from the record on motion at any time and may be collaterally attacked. Young v. State, 439 So2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677 (1926). For all practical purposes the “final judgment“ serves no legal function and is null and void as beyond the judicial power as well as being beyond the invoked subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court in this particular case.