declaratory judgment win!!!

here is a snippet of the order dismissing my proposed declaratory judgment , the federal judge " The petitioner is apparently seeking a declaration that he has the right to travel upon the highways of Georgia without possessing a valid Georgia drivers license. The petitioner is correct that the Georgia legislature may not condition his ability to travel upon his obtaining a drivers license. However, the state may condition his ability to drive upon obtaining a valid drivers license. Although the plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that the ability to travel is a right, not a privilage subject to regulation by the state, thoses cases do not support his position. For example, Thompson v Smith, 154 S.E. 579 (Va.1930) quoted by the petitioner, specifically holds, "The exercise of such a common right the city, may under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare.......154 S.E. at 377. Furthermore, the us supreme court has specifically recognized that states may require drivers to possess valid licenses before being permitted to use the highways of the state. See e.g. bell v burson 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971), Ex Parte Poresky , 290 U.S. 30, 54 S.Ct.3 (1933). i will never again give a judge discretion to decide a case, im gonna do what winston strout recommends, f... this law stuff. if i come back and say im not a drivers, then they will come back with some more crap. here is what i found under bell vs burson, what the hell it got to do with the right to travel, its referring to due process of law with suspended or revoked licenses:

¶7 If, in fact, licensee's driver's license had been effectively revoked or she had been effectively deprived of her driving privileges, we might have to consider the effect of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed. 90 (1971), in connection with the constitutionality of our implied consent laws. In Bell, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the administrative and judicial proceedings under Georgia's motor vehicle safety responsibility statute, which provided for the suspension of driving privileges when a licensee became involved in an accident and failed to post security to cover the damages. The Court held, inter alia, that any state action to terminate an entitlement, whether denominated a "right" or a "privilege", must conform to the minimal requirements of due process. The essential due process requirements discussed in the Bell decision include the operative considerations in this case. Those are, in the words of the Supreme Court.



"* * *, it is fundamental that except in emergency situations * * * due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford `notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." (citations omitted).

and this from another case:

See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (a person cannot be deprived of his driver's license without being afforded a modicum of procedural due process). The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of mistakenly taking the driver's license of an innocent person requires application of at least the preponderance of proof standard, which is significantly higher than the probable cause standard. I have grave concern whether the preponderance standard was met in this case.

FINALLY SNIPPET FROM THE PORESKY CASE



U.S. Supreme Court

EX PARTE PORESKY, 290 U.S. 30 (1933)

290 U.S. 30



Ex parte PORESKY.



No. --, Original.

Decided Nov. 6, 1933.







Mr. Joseph Poresky, pro se.





PER CURIAM.



Leave is asked to file a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring District Judge Elisha H. Brewster, or other competent judge, to call to his assistance two other judges for the purpose of hearing and determining petitioner's application for an interlocutory injunction, as directed by statute. Jud. Code 266, 28 U.S.C. 380 (28 USCA 380).



Petitioner brought suit in the District Court of the United States against Joseph E. Ely, Governor, Joseph E. Warner, Attorney General, and Morgan T. Ryan, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, of Massachusetts, to enjoin the enforcement of chapter 90, 34A et seq., of the General Laws (Ter. Ed .) of Massa [290 U.S. 30, 31] chusetts relating to 'compulsory automobile liability insurance,' upon the ground that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Petitioner alleged in his complaint that he is a citizen of Massachusetts; that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles had refused registration and number plates for his car unless he complied with the statute, under which he 'must first post either bond or cash of $5,000, or procure insurance'; that the statute 'is only applicable to cars owned and operated within the State and does not include cars in interstate traffic'; that he cannot comply with the statute; that to disregard it would bring him fine and imprisonment; that he has no adequate remedy at law; and that his inability to comply with the statute 'is the Registrar's only reason for refusing him registration and number plates.'



The District Judge dismissed the complaint as to Governor Ely and Attorney General Warner upon the ground that they were improperly joined as parties, and later he dismissed the complaint as to the defendant Ryan, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, for the want of jurisdiction, as there was no diversity of citizenship and no substantial federal question.

[TheBlackTruth]

<font size=3>hmmm. .as to the PORESKY case looks like he had a defective complaint.



As to the opinion on the declatory judgement, I don't think it's quite as bad as it seems.

This statement, "<font color=red>The petitioner is correct that the Georgia legislature may not condition his ability to travel upon his obtaining a drivers license," is important, but it should've included the phrase . . ."travel upon public right of ways"



I also think the Judge makes the specific point between the term travel and drive. Perhaps if the petition was refined to make such designations. ..?[/color][/color]

yes, as i read the case law he submitted, i think he hopes i go away because the defects are obvious. none of the case law he submits refers to having to have a license. i will file a motion for reconsideration and distingish myself as a traveler and NOT A DRIVER, and see what happens. any more suggestions? one more thing, he said my complaint was frivilous according to 28 u.s.c. 1915 (a) (21) (b) , i think i got the code he submitted right. anyway it says the court can dismiss if the complaint is frivilous, malicous or doesnt state a claim for which relief can be granted. see what happens when i modify my paperwork.

[TheBlackTruth]

Did you file a complaint? Looks to me like you filed a petition. A complaint needs an injured party (corpus delecti, i think it is).

dont bring in a issue thats not there. this is strictly civil in nature.

[TheBlackTruth]

What I meant was:



in your post you mentioned "<font color=red>one more thing, he said my complaint was frivilous according to 28 u.s.c. 1915 (a) (21) (b) " and that confused me because as far as i could tell, you didn't even file a complaint.[/color]

damn, good looking out truth, it IS A PETITION, not a complaint. let me check something out in that regards. ok, ok, without adding a new post, what the judge was saying is he wants either a filing fee or a affidavit of poverty, i submitted mine using hjr 192 and some other stuff and he let himself off the issues with that. i got remedy for that. the petition ITSELF isnt frivilous, its the NOT having the affidavit is what he is referring to. he tried to say i was going indigent because i was using hjr 192 to get out of the filing fee, just another thing to try to sidestep the issues. ok, we have solved the frivilous part of it, we have solved the regulation part ( they can put up stop signs and lights, chicago motor company vs chicago) and the same thompson vs smith, the last equation, the two case sites he submitted to rebut, bell and the poresky case, i need help rebutting those two, neither has anything to do with licensure. ok, my mind is working now, he used the bell case because i said my license was suspended, so, is he saying that with the drivers license "contract", they can suspend the license by citing the bell case? if so, then would my remedy be to rescind my license in writing before i resubmit my motion for reconsideration or should that be a non issue since the contract was fraud from the inception? how can i rebut that case he submitted? as far as the poresky case, i may need to submit murdock vs penn ( no charge for the enjoyment of rights and other case law pertaining to government not restriciting rights?) the petitioner in the perosky case used some lame reasons evidently to get out of the insurance.

[TheBlackTruth]

HJR 192, in essense should be all anyone needs to prove inability to "pay" You may have to also include a statement to some effect that you are unable to pay because THERE IS NO LAWFUL MONEY IN CIRCULATION. You may even be so kind as to state that if they give you an invoice, you'll be happy to pay them as soon as lawful money becomes available (Promisory Note) *smile*

i told them there was no lawful money in circulation, but , hey thats a issue that waaay removed from the issue here and im not gonna waste my time with that part of it.

[Akira]

Hey Guys...



I have an OAS coming up soon also... and have some rough preliminary notes / arguements written...



I found a brief about license contracts... not sure where I got it... or who from... so if I fail to give credit due... sorry... I have also added what I believe are relevant editions to it... so READ IT CRITICLY if you are going to use it... but here it is... hope it helps





CONTRACT, WHAT CONTRACT?



"When governments enter the world of commerce, they are subject to the same burdens as any private firm or corporation."

United States vs Burr 309 U.S. 242



Specific performance is a term used to designate an action in equity in which a party to a contract asks the court to order the other party to carry out the contract which he has failed or refused to perform. Thus, if specific performance is expected, a contract must exist. The question then becomes:



What are the terms of the contract and when was it executed and by whom?



Since specific performance seems expected of every user of a vehicle on the streets or highways in Maine, the user of a vehicle seems one of the parties to the supposed contract. And since the State seems the party demanding specific performance, the State is the other party to the contract. So the supposed contract exists between the user of a vehicle and the State of Maine.



When was this contract executed and what are its' terms?



Some contend that when a user of a vehicle avails himself of the "privilege" of driving on public thoroughfares that he enters a contract with the State that requires him to abide with all the laws in the Maine General Statutes. Others contend that the contract is executed when a driver's license is obtained. We need now to figure out what is a contract.



A contract may be defined as an agreement enforceable in court between two or more parties, for a sufficient consideration to do or not to do some specified thing or things. Thus, a contract has four essential features:



It must be an agreement.

There must be at least two parties to the contract.

There must be a consideration.

There must be an obligation or thing to be done.



Several types of contracts exist but all must contain the essential features listed. Contracts can be classified under three principal categories:



Express

Implied

Quasi



Quasi contracts, while being called contracts are not really contracts, and will not be considered in this discussion of contracts but will be considered in a separation section later.



UNILATERAL & BILATERAL CONTRACTS



There can also be unilateral and bilateral contracts that is presumed can exist under some or all the above headings. Let us examine each above types of contracts to see if the license obtained by this Sovereign falls under any of the categories of contract.



An express contract is one in which the agreement of the parties is fully stated in words, and it may be either written or oral, or partly written and partly oral.

See: Bergh Business Law 30.



A true implied contract is an agreement of the parties arrived at from their acts and conduct viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, and not from their words either spoken or written. Like an express contract, it grows out of the intention of the parties to the transaction and there must be a meeting of the minds.

See: McKevitt et al v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 126 P.2d 1077 (1942).



License -- Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business, in its nature lawful but prohibited statute, except with the permission of the civil authority or which would otherwise be unlawful.

See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856)



With these definitions in mind, let us examine a driver's license to see if it is a contract. The driver's license itself is a small plastic card approximately 55 millimeters by 86 millimeters in size. It contains the words Maine Driver's license; the name, address, signature, and physical description of the user; an identifying number; a photograph; and the signature of the Secretary of State. Obviously, this cannot be an express agreement because there are no statements to constitute an agreement. Are there two parties to the "contract?" There is a signature but it is a copy, thus invalidating the "contract" so there are no parties to the "contract." Is there a consideration? What has the State given this Sovereign in return for this Sovereign's obligation? Some may suggest that the State has given this Sovereign the privilege of driving on the streets or highways in Maine. But this Sovereign already has the "RIGHT" to drive on the streets or highways in Maine, and the State cannot require this Sovereign to give up a "RIGHT" to obtain a privilege.



An Iowa statute that requires that every foreign corporation named in it shall as a condition for obtaining a permit to transact business in Iowa, stipulate that it will not remove into the federal court certain suits that it would by the laws of the United States have a "RIGHT" to a permit dependant upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Barron v. Burnside 121 U.S. 186.



The full significance of the clause law of the land is said by Ruffin, C. J. to be that statutes that would deprive a Citizen of the "RIGHTS" of person or property without a regular trial according to the course and usage of the common law would not be the law of the land. (Emphasis added).

See: Bouvier's Law Dict. quoting Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 15, 25 AM Dec 677.



It would be foolish for this Sovereign to exchange a "RIGHT" for a privilege since it would mean giving up valuable property in exchange for something having less value. Is it possible for this Sovereign to do such a thing?



Consent -- In criminal Law. No act shall be deemed a crime if done with the consent of the party injured, unless it be committed in public, and is likely to provoke a breach of the peace, or tends to the injury of a third party; provided no consent can be given which will deprive the consenter of any unalienable "RIGHT." (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.



Thus, even if this Sovereign wanted to do so, he could not give up his "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in Maine or exchange it for the privilege of having a driver's license. Thus, in exchange for the supposed obligation of this Sovereign, the State has given nothing. Thus, there is no consideration.



It may be contended that the seal on the driver's license is sufficient consideration by the State. It is true that under the common law, the question of consideration could not be raised concerning a contract under seal. The seal provided conclusive presumption of a consideration. Still, Maine has abolished by statute the common law presumption of consideration and this statute is binding upon all officers and employees of the State. So, though a seal may be present, it is not evidence of consideration in Maine. Of course, the document in question is a contrived and copied document and lacks validity in any case as a contract.



As to an obligation, since the license contains no statement of agreement, since there are no parties to any agreement, and since there is no consideration, there can be no obligation. The driver's license thus is not a contract since it fails to contain any of the four essential features of a

contract.



Can the driver's license be an implied contract? The same elements must exist in an implied contract as exist in an express contract. The only difference is that an implied contract is not written or spoken and the elements of the contract are shown by the acts and conduct of the parties involved. With respect to this Sovereign, there was certainly no meeting of the minds else this brief would not result. It was never the intention of this Sovereign to give up constitutional "RIGHTS" to accept a privilege from the State. Such an action would be ridiculous. This could only be done in a socialistic state.



There has been no implied agreement in a free society. It is possible that there were two parties to the supposed contract, the State and this Sovereign. There was no consideration in the implied contract for the same reasons that there was no consideration in the express contract. An obligation is the thing to be done. It may be to pay money, to do work, or to deliver goods; or it may be to refrain from doing something that the person contracting had a "RIGHT" to do. Some may say that the State was obligated to allow this Sovereign to drive on the streets or highways in Maine and that this Sovereign was obligated to obey all the statutes contained in the Maine General Statutes. It would be just as easy to say that the State could not be obligated to allow this Sovereign to travel on the streets or highways in Maine because they did not have the "RIGHT" or the power to prevent him from doing so. If the State cannot prevent this Sovereign from traveling on the streets or highways in Maine, they do not have any discretion in the matter and do not have the choice of whether to obligate themselves or not. Thus, the obligation of the State cannot be to grant this Sovereign the privilege of traveling on the streets or highways in Maine. The obligation of the State cannot be to refrain from prohibiting this Sovereign from traveling on the streets or highways in Maine since the State did not have the "RIGHT" to do this at first.



It is the contention of this Sovereign that the only obligation that this Sovereign incurs when using a vehicle upon the streets or highways in Maine is the Common Law obligation to refrain from any act that causes another person to lose life, liberty, or property. In complying with this obligation, this Sovereign does comply with many statutes in the Maine General Statutes since they are, for the most part, only common sense rules by which this Sovereign avoids doing damage to others.



Still, this acquiescence to some statutes of The Maine General Statutes should not be construed as evidence of a contractual obligation by this Sovereign. Neither should it be construed as acquiescence to all the statutes of the Maine General Statutes or to any of them always.



Instead, it is merely evidence of a want of this Sovereign to travel safely and to do harm to no one.



Thus, the actions of this Sovereign do not supply unambiguous evidence of a contract with the State. Instead, the actions can, with equal weight, be said to be evidence of the fact that this Sovereign was complying with Common Law requirement that he does harm to no one. The driver's license is not an implied contract because there is no consideration, there may be possibly be two parties, but there is no consideration, and there is not clear evidence of an obligation. Three of the four elements necessary for a contract are missing.



The question now becomes whether the driver's license application is a contract. In completing this document, the applicant makes several statements and signs the paper upon which these statements are written under oath. The statements concern the identity, physical description, address, ability and experience in driving a vehicle, and one statement on the physical condition of the applicant. None of the statements are as an agreement.



The application form contains the signature of the applicant and the signature of the person taking the oath of the applicant. The reverse side of the application contains the results of a vision test and rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving test. These results are signed by the examiner and not by the applicant.



Thus the application takes the form of an affidavit instead of a contract. But let us see if the elements of a contract are present in the application.



There is no agreement.

There are not two parties.

There is no consideration.

There is no obligation.



Since none of the necessary elements of a contract are present, the application does not constitute a contract.



The only other document involved in obtaining a driver's license is the document, part of which is copied to make the actual driver's license. It contains, besides the information that is used in making the driver's license, the results of a vision test conducted by the driver's license examiner.



The applicant places his signature upon this form that is then copied by some photographic process. Other material is added including a photograph, signature of the Secretary of State and the driver's license is made of this composite.



Thus the license itself cannot be a contract because it is a contrived document. The form from which the driver's license is made cannot be a contract because, again, none of the elements of a contract are present. So if none of the documents executed by the driver when obtaining a license is a contract, then no contract can exist between the driver and the State as a result of obtaining a driver's license.



But the idea that the driver's license is a contract with the State is pervasive. It is a belief that is strongly held even by people in high places.



So let us examine the driver's license as if it were a contract and see if it can withstand scrutiny. Not every offer made by one party and accepted by the other creates a valid contract. The outward form of a contract, either oral or written may exist, and yet the circumstances may be such that no contract was in reality created. Some circumstances that will cause an apparently valid

contract to be void are:



MISTAKE EITHER MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL

Mistake either mutual or unilateral.

Fraud.

Duress.

Alteration.

This Sovereign obtained a driver's license upon the representation by the State that traveling upon the streets or highways of the United States of America was a privilege. This Sovereign accepted this representation as true and did obtain a driver's license.



It has been shown, still, that traveling is a "RIGHT" and not a privilege. Thus, a mutual mistake has been made, and the "contract" is void.

See: Deibel v. Kreiss, 50 N.E. 2d 1000 (1943).



But the General Assembly of the State who passed the statutes contained in the Maine General Statutes are knowledgeable persons, many of whom are lawyers, and they undoubtedly knew at the time the law was passed that traveling was a "RIGHT" and not a privilege. If this were the case, then the mistake would be unilateral. A unilateral mistake known to the other party is sufficient grounds to void a contract.



FRAUD



Fraud may consist in conduct, and may exist where there are no positive representations, Silence where honesty requires speech, may sometimes constitute fraud. The rule that a man may be silent and safe is by no means a universal one. Where one contracting party knows that the other is bargaining for one thing, he has no "RIGHT" by silence to deceive him and suffer him to take an altogether different thing, from that for which he bargains. (Emphasis added).

See: Parish v. Thurston 87 Ind. 437 (1882).



If the driver's license is a contract, a case can be made for the contention that it was an agreement obtained by the State by fraud.



Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get any advantage over another. No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, as it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and unfair ways by which another is deceived. (Emphasis added).

See: Wells v. Zenz, 236 P. 485.



With respect to contracts, the following statements can be made:



However, in the field of contracts, there are certain standard tests for a claim of fraud which make it possible to define fraud, in connection with a contract as any trick or artifice whereby a person by means of a material misrepresentation creates an erroneous impression of the subject matter of a

proposed transaction, and thereby induces another person to suffer damage computable in money. The misrepresentation may result from a false statement, a concealment, or a nondisclosure. The elements of a contractual fraud are the following:



A material misrepresentation, created by a statement, a concealment, or a nondisclosure.

An intention to defraud.

Reliance on the representation by the defrauded party.

Damage caused to the defrauded party as the result of his acting upon the representation.

See: Bergh Business Law p. 56



In view of the many decisions by high courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, that traveling is a "RIGHT" and not a privilege, it would be hard to defend the proposition that the General Assembly of the State of Maine was unaware of these decisions, particularly since many legislators are and were lawyers knowledgeable in such matters. In fact, when one considers the definition of streets or highways in Sections of the Maine General Statutes, the Evidence is conclusive that the legislature knew and knows that travelling is a "RIGHT."



Therefore, the statements in the Maine General Statutes that travelling is a privilege and that a driver's license is necessary before traveling constitutes a material misrepresentation of fact to this possessor of a driver's license. And since the legislature is and was aware of the fact that traveling was not a privilege, but a "RIGHT," the statement that traveling is a privilege, when applied to this Sovereign, constitutes a willful intention to deceive and, therefore, to defraud.



This Sovereign did rely upon the representations of the legislature that traveling was a privilege when he obtained his driver's license, else he would not have obtained one.



This Sovereign did suffer damage as a result of his acting upon the representation of the legislature at least to the extent of the license fee.



In as much as all the necessary elements of fraud are present if the driver's license is considered a contract, the "contract" is void.



DURESS



With respect to duress, Bergh supra supplies the following definition:



A party must consent to a contract of his own free will; free consent is an essential element of an agreement. Consequently, if he is coerced into signing a contract by fear induced by a threat to cause personal injury to himself or to some close relative, the contract will not be a real agreement and it will be voidable at his option. The threat of personal injury must be a threat to inflict immediate bodily injury or to institute a criminal prosecution against the person threatened or some close relative.



Since it was essential to this Sovereign in pursuing his occupation of common "RIGHT" to use a vehicle upon the streets or highways in Maine, and since the State of Maine threatens to and does prosecute persons in criminal actions for not possessing a driver's license, regardless of their status, this Sovereign did obtain a driver's license under duress. If then the driver's license is a contract, the contract is unenforceable and invalid because of this duress.



With respect to alterations, Bergh supra has the following comments:



Any material alteration in a written contract by one party without the consent of the other party gives this latter the option of treating the contract as discharged or enforcing it as it stood before the alteration.



If the driver's license is a contract, it is a written contract, at least to the extent that the statutes of the Maine General Statutes are written. Each time that the General Assembly amends or modifies or adds to any of the statutes of the Maine General Statutes, the terms of the contract are changed. Since this Sovereign then has the option of considering the contract as discharged, he then chooses to do so as of the first change in the Maine General Statutes following his application for a driver's license.



If it is contended that the driver's license is an implied contract, the Statute of Frauds comes into play. Maine has enacted a Statute of Frauds.



In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum of it, be in writing andsubscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:



An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. . .



Since the term of the driver's license contract is so many years and the contract is not written, the Statute of Frauds does apply and the contract is unenforceable.



The discussion up to this point has been concerned with bilateral contracts in which each party promises something to the other party. Is it possible that the driver's license is a unilateral contract?



A unilateral contract is described as:



A unilateral contract is a one-sided contract in the sense that only one side makes a promise, and the other side performs an act for which the promise was given.

See: Bergh supra.



Since the act expected by the State is obedience to the statutes of the Maine General Statutes, what promise has the State offered in exchange for this act? The only promise that the State could make this Sovereign is the promise to allow him to travel on the streets or highways in Maine.



Since this Sovereign already can do that as a matter of "RIGHT," the State can promise him nothing. Thus there is no consideration and a unilateral contract cannot exist.



Having shown that no contract exists between this Sovereign and the State, let us examine the proposition that a quasi-contract exists between this Sovereign and the State.



QUASI-CONTRACT



A quasi-contract is an obligation springing from voluntary and lawful acts of parties in the absence of any agreement.

See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.



In order to establish the existence of a quasi-contractual obligation it must be shown:



That the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff.

That the retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable.

See: Woodward Quasi Contracts 9.



Thus, if it is contended that this Sovereign must obey the statutes in the Maine General Statutes because of a quasi-contract, it must be shown that this Sovereign has received a benefit from the State. But traveling on the streets or highways of the State is not a benefit received from the State.



It was a "RIGHT" that attached to this Sovereign at the moment of his birth and cannot be removed by the State. In this respect, no benefit has been received from the State, and thus a quasi-contractual obligation cannot exist with respect to this Sovereign.



It may be claimed that the statutes of the Maine General Statutes are made pursuant to the police powers of the State and that every person in the State is obligated to obey them.



The police power is a grant of authority from the people to their governmental agents for the protection of the health, the safety, the comfort and the welfare of the public. In its nature it is broad and comprehensive. It is a necessary and salutary power, since without it, society would be at the mercy of individual interest and there would exist neither public order or security. While this is true it is only a power. It is not a "RIGHT?"



The powers of government, under our system, are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from the people, and are limited to their true purposes. The fundamental "RIGHTS" of the people are inherent and have not yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of governmental authority. They are subjects of individual authority. Constitutional powers can never transcend constitutional "RIGHTS." The police power is subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the Sovereign, those natural "RIGHTS" that are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection it was ordained by the people.



To secure their property was one of the great ends for which men entered into society. The "RIGHT" to acquire and own property, and to deal with it and use it as the owner chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural "RIGHT." It does not owe its origin to constitutions. It existed before them. It is a part of the Citizen's natural liberty--an expression of his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate by every American Bill of "RIGHTS."



It is not a "RIGHT," therefore, over which the police power is paramount. Like every other fundamental liberty, it is a "RIGHT" to which the police power is subordinate.



It is a "RIGHT" which takes into account the equal "RIGHTS" of others, for it is qualified by the obligation that the use of the property shall not be to the prejudice of others. But if subject alone to that qualification the Citizen is not free to use his lands and his goods as he chooses, it is difficult to perceive wherein his "RIGHT" of property has any existence. (Emphasis added).

See: Spann supra.



Where inherent, unalienable, absolute "RIGHTS" are concerned, the police powers can have no effect. The "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways and the "RIGHT" to own and use property have been described as inherent, unalienable, and absolute. Thus the police power cannot regulate this Sovereign's "RIGHT" to use a vehicle on the streets or highways in Maine.



If the police power of the State is permitted to regulate the traveling of this Sovereign on the streets or highways in Maine and if through the action of these regulations or statutes, this Sovereign is denied access to the streets or highways in Maine, a fundamental "RIGHT" of this Sovereign has been abrogated.



Where "RIGHTS" secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate them. (Emphasis added).

See: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).



The abrogation of unalienable "RIGHTS" by legislation or rule making is unconstitutional.



If further proof is needed to show that this Sovereign need not be licensed to travel on the streets or highways in Maine, it is provided in the following decisions: A license fee is a tax.

See: Parish of Morehouse v. Brigham, 6 S. 257.



A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a "RIGHT" granted by the Federal Constitution. (Emphasis added).

See: Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105.



Since a fee is charged for a driver's license and since traveling on the streets or highways in Maine is a "RIGHT" guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and by the LAW OF NATURE, it is not constitutional for the State to require this Sovereign to be licensed to travel.



Even the application for Maine Driver's License form recognizes the "RIGHT" of some persons to travel without a license. Maine General Statutes recognizes categories of persons who are not required to be licensed in this State. Why is it then that the first demand made by the law enforcement personnel when making a traffic stop is: "Let's see your driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance," and not always politely, when the first question should be; "What is your status and are you required to have a driver's license?"



Can it be that there is a conspiracy afoot within the State to reduce all Sovereigns to a status of contract? Why else would a law enforcement person take a traveler to jail without even trying to discover if that person were exempt from the requirement of having a driver's license?



The question now becomes whether this Sovereign is required to obey any of the statutes in the Maine General Statutes. It has been shown that this Sovereign has a "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in Maine. So, any statute that describes driving on the streets or highways as a privilege cannot apply to this Sovereign. Since the "RIGHT" of this Sovereign to travel cannot be abrogated, any statute the operation of which would have the effect of denying access to the streets or highways to this Sovereign cannot apply to this Sovereign.



Since violation of any statue in the Maine General Statutes is classified as a misdemeanor that is punishable by a fine and six months in jail, and since putting this Sovereign in jail because of his use of the streets or highways that harms nobody would be an abrogation of his "RIGHT" to travel, none of the statutes of The Maine General Statutes apply to this Sovereign. These contentions are supported by the Supreme Court of United States.



An Iowa statute that requires that every foreign corporation named in it shall as a condition for obtaining a permit to transact business in Iowa, stipulate that it will not remove into the federal court certain suits that it would by the laws of the United States have a "RIGHT" to remove, is void because it makes the "RIGHT" to a permit dependent upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the constitution and laws of the United States. (Emphasis added).

See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186.



This decision is consistent with that in Miranda, supra in which it was stated that where "RIGHTS" are concerned, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate them. It is also consistent with the discussion in the following case. This case is a tax case but the discussion on "RIGHTS" that it contains is appropriate.



INDIVIDUAL AND A CORPORATION



There is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no "RIGHT" to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional "RIGHTS" as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His "RIGHTS" are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his "RIGHTS" are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their "RIGHTS." (Emphasis added.)

See: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43.



The Emphasized statement is also consistent with Maine statute. In the statute reads: Common law in force. The common law of England, as far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts in this state. Since the statutes of the Maine General Statutes cannot apply to this Sovereign, he becomes subject to the Common Law that maintains that he owes nothing to the public while he does not trespass upon their "RIGHTS."



Is it the contention of this Sovereign that because the statutes contained in the Maine General Statutes do not apply to him that the statutes are unconstitutional? Absolutely not. There is a class of persons in Maine to whom these statutes apply without reservation. Members of this class include corporations and those who do the corporation business on the streets or highways in Maine. A corporation is the creation of the State.



A corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds them, subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its "RIGHTS" to act as a corporation are only preserved to it while it obeys the laws of its creation. (Emphasis added).

See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 p. 684



It is a person in the eyes of the law but it lacks character, no morals, no conscience. It's every activity must be directed and supervised by the State.



Under the definition of Due Process of Law, Bouvier's Law Dictionary states in part:



The liberty guaranteed is that of a natural person and not of artificial persons; Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 where it was said "a corporation cannot be deemed a Citizen within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution of the United States which protects the privileges and mmunities of Citizens of the United States against being abridged or impaired by the law of a state." (See also 203 U.S. 243).



The statutes in the Maine General Statutes are designed to direct the activities of the class of persons of which a corporation is a member.



Corporations are absolutely bound by these statutes. It is imperative that a conscienceless entity not be allowed to roam the streets or highways in Maine and jeopardize the Sovereigns. It is for this purpose that the statutes of the Maine General Statutes were enacted and not for the control of a Free and Natural Sovereign.



CONCLUSION

There is no Court in This Land that could Lawfully execute an Order that would or could cause, or work to compel, One to become a servant or slave of any city, county or state without a conviction and with full due process of law, and for any city, county or state to pretend otherwise is an absurdity.





For HIS Glory,

Akira