Definition of Income

[Lawdog]

Different cases, different juries, different facts.

An acquittal in a tax case does NOT prove "there is no law," as tax deniers have deluded themselves into believing. Even a fool doesn't think that O.J.'s acquittal means there is no law against murder in California. What it means is, the jurors did not believe that the prosecution proved every single element of their case beyond a reasonable doubt. And when charges require proof of specific intent to commit the crime, as tax cases often do, that's a very tough standard to meet.

The prosecutors in the Cryer case, by some accounts, did a poor job of presenting the state's case.

In any event, you need to remember that jury verdicts do NOT establish any kind of legal precedent. If you're ever charged with murdering your ex-wife, even in California, you can't assert "O.J. was acquitted" as any kind of defense.

[farmer_giles_of_ham]

In any event, you need to remember that jury verdicts do NOT establish any kind of legal precedent. If you're ever charged with murdering your ex-wife, even in California, you can't assert "O.J. was acquitted" as any kind of defense.

I certainly can assert the elements on which that acquittal was based- tainted evidence, police bias, for example.

Same goes for the elements that helped to acquit in these tax cases.

The question is, are there any attorneys willing to assert this interest: after all these tend to be so dis-interested, to the point I almost think they might be representing another interest altogether.

[BOBT12]

Originally Posted by farmer_giles_of_ham

I certainly can assert the elements on which that acquittal was based- tainted evidence, police bias, for example.

Same goes for the elements that helped to acquit in these tax cases.

The question is, are there any attorneys willing to assert this interest: after all these tend to be so dis-interested, to the point I almost think they might be representing another interest altogether.

I certainly agree.

Moreover, the jury are to review the "facts" and the "law". Otherwise, the trial is unfair:

"If a juror accepts as the law that which the judge states then that juror has accepted the exercise of absolute authority of a government employee and has surrendered a power and right that once was the citizen's safeguard of liberty." (1788) (2 Elliots Debates, 94, Bancroft, History of the Constitution, 267)

As Lysander Spooner pointed out regarding the questioning of jurors to eliminate those who would bring in a verdict according to conscience (a practice effectively accomplished today through the jurors' oaths) "The only principal upon which these questions are asked, is this -- that no man shall be allowed to serve as juror unless he be ready to enforce any enactment of the government, however cruel or tyrannical it may be.... A jury like that is palpably nothing but a mere tool of oppression in the hands of the government."

Supposedly, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. Irvin v. Dowd, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642 (1961).

United States v. Wilson, 629 F. 2d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 1980), in an opinion which I wrote for a unanimous panel we stated:
In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no sympathy for the government's position. It has a general veto power, and this power should not be attenuated by requiring the jury to answer in writing a detailed list of questions or explain its reasons. The jury's veto power was settled in Throckmorton's case in 1544 according to Professor Plucknett:

”The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which is to be decided.” –Harlan F. Stone, 12th Chief Justice, U. S. supreme Court, 1941

”It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made be men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is today can guess what it will be tomorrow.” –James Madison, Federalist no. 62, 1788

Emphsis added.

”The Only sensible reason for entering into political society is to protect natural rights. [L] Cato’s Letters, #62

Why should anyone be forced to waive their forth and fifth Amendment protection by filling out a confession form for strictly personal business? Why shouldn't these protections stand above other taxing concerns, being that the Bill of Rights were from the people, and the provisions of the Constitution from their representatives.

The Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. -Hamilton, Federalist No. 78

”No provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority.” -- Thomas Jefferson, Speech to New London Methodists, 1809

"What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established." --VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 2 Dall. 304 (1795)

"The problem with mankind is that too many of them learn that more can be stolen by law than against it." --Durant, i, 839

[indago]

Lawdog has posted:

An acquittal in a tax case does NOT prove "there is no law," as tax deniers have deluded themselves into believing.

Is the lawyer, then, a "tax denier"?

[Notorial dissent]

What everyone seems to be intentionally skipping merrily around, is that the Cryer case did not prove there was no law, and that was not the issue on trial, despite his publicity blurbs. He was charged with and acquitted of “willful failure to file”, but the outstanding tax demands still stand. He is still going to have to cough up everything that he owes for the previous years, and he may yet wind up in jail for other things. In other words, his defense was that he was so stupid that even as a trained legal professional with many years of schooling he was still unaware of his obligation to file. It is called the dumbern’ a rock defense, and the only place it will, maybe, get you off is in tax court. Try it in real criminal court and you will be looking at serious jail time.

[BOBT12]

Originally Posted by Notorial dissent

It is called the dumbern’ a rock defense, and the only place it will, maybe, get you off is in tax court. Try it in real criminal court and you will be looking at serious jail time.

It's called standing on what you believe defence. Cryer was tried in Tax Court? I don't think so.

[indio007]

Originally Posted by Notorial dissent

What everyone seems to be intentionally skipping merrily around, is that the Cryer case did not prove there was no law, and that was not the issue on trial, despite his publicity blurbs. He was charged with and acquitted of “willful failure to file”, but the outstanding tax demands still stand. He is still going to have to cough up everything that he owes for the previous years, and he may yet wind up in jail for other things. In other words, his defense was that he was so stupid that even as a trained legal professional with many years of schooling he was still unaware of his obligation to file. It is called the dumbern’ a rock defense, and the only place it will, maybe, get you off is in tax court. Try it in real criminal court and you will be looking at serious jail time.

There is not discernible difference in either tax court or modern criminal Court. The plaintiff is the legal fiction state claiming a debt owed to it by a legal fiction person.

The only question of fact the really matters is "did this living being standing before the court sign for the accommodation of the debt owed by the juristic person in this instant case?"

After that point, it is purely a administrative. This is why the juries today only decide facts. The judge instructs the jury on the applicable law. That law is contract law between the parties. The jury has no right to nullify it unless the terms are unlawful. Law Merchant Administrative justice/accounting by jury trial is the legal systems greatest achievement. What an ugly baby....

[rottweiler]

http://www.1215.org/schulz.htm

[Lawdog]

Originally Posted by indago

Lawdog has posted:

Is the lawyer, then, a "tax denier"?

In a word, yes. There is some evidence that Cryer, the Louisiana attorney, suffers from mental/emotional problems. This may explain why he has adopted a tax protester/tax denier point of view.

[Lawdog]

Tommy Cryer, the Louisiana attorney turned tax denier, has a history of mental/emotional problems going back about 25 years. Here's the proof, La. State Bar Ass'n v. Tommy K. Cryer, 441 So.2d 734 (1983), a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court:

No. 82-B-2937

441 So.2d 734; 1983.LA.0002496

November 28, 1983

LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. TOMMY K. CRYER PUBLIC DOMAIN CITE: LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N v. CRYER , 82-B-2937 (LA. 11/28/83); 441 So.2d 734

[6] SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 1983.LA.2496

[7] DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING.

[8] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE WATSON

[9] This is a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Louisiana State Bar Association through its Committee on Professional Responsibility against a member of the bar, Tommy K. Cryer.

[10] The Committee on Professional Responsibility*fn1 held an investigatory hearing on August 23, 1982, to consider the allegation that Cryer had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Following that hearing, a petition for disciplinary action was filed by the LSBA and Commissioner Stuart D. Lunn was appointed to conduct a fact-finding hearing.

[11] Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church of Shreveport, Louisiana, was referred to attorney Cryer by People's Mortgage and Loan, Inc., in connection with the church's purchase of three lots in Shreveport. Cryer was paid a fee of eight hundred to a thousand dollars to incorporate the church, search the title of the three lots, handle the purchase, and close the loan. The articles of incorporation of the church were filed in the office of the Louisiana Secretary of State on November 7, 1977. The deed to the three lots, dated October 26, 1977, was not recorded until December 9, 1981. As a result of Cryer's neglect, the church was required to pay ad valorem taxes or $1,215.14 for 1978 through 1981. Had the deed been timely recorded, the church would have been exempt from ad valorem taxes during that period.

[12] Cryer was first contacted by members of the church about his failure to record the deed in October of 1979, but he took no corrective action for two years. Shortly after the petition for disciplinary action was filed, Cryer reimbursed the church for its loss by a check dated January 3, 1983.

[13] The commissioner concluded that Cryer had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-1022 and 6-101(a)(3)3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Association, by failing to timely record the deed and make good the church's loss at an earlier date.

[14] Attorney Cryer was born in September of 1949, and had just had his twenty-eighth birthday when he handled the transaction for the Mount Sinai Church. He graduated from L.S.U. Law School with honors as a member of Order of the Coif, took a job with a Shreveport firm, and then opened his own office. He lost his father on October 7, 1979, approximately the time he was first advised of his oversight in not recording the church's deed. In the interim period, from October of 1979 through December of 1981, he was on the brink of an emotional breakdown and also in severe financial straits.

[15] According to Cryer, he had an exaggerated emotional reaction to the sudden, unexpected loss of his father at a young age and "associated this particular piece of embarrassment with that, and I believe that that is the only reason that that file was singled out. When I picked it up, I had to put it right back down, and like I said, I picked the file up totally, not less than two hundred times." (Tr., Investigatory Hearing, p. 38) Each time, Cryer thought:

[16] "I'll take it next time, and basically, it was a failure on my part to confront a piece of embarrassment that I associated with a problem, a serious problem." (Tr., Investigatory Hearing, p. 35)

[17] Cryer's failure to pay the church's damages at an earlier date was attributed to insolvency. He had entered into the private practice of law without adequate funds or business. Neglecting to record the deed after notice of his initial failure was the result of a "chemical imbalance" and "depression" (Tr., Commissioner's Hearing, p. 37). That delay, an isolated act of misconduct, was admittedly irrational. After medical treatment for his depressive state in December of 1982 and January of 1983, Mr. Cryer had a complete change in attitude and ability to function.

[18] According to Cryer's testimony he has been denied a promising job opportunity, suffered remorse and lost public reputation and esteem because of these proceedings.

[19] The commissioner stated that Cryer did not benefit from his course of action, but recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months. Because the commissioner noted some further legal work which was needed in connection with the church's purchase, Cryer recorded three corrective documents the following day.

[20] The Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility, concurs in the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law, but recommends a period of suspension of at least six months. The Committee contends that Cryer's testimony about his emotional problems was unsubstantiated by his physician, who did not appear at either hearing. While this is correct, Cryer's sworn testimony is also unrebutted. According to the commissioner's factual findings, it was "apparent that Respondent was suffering from emotional problems characterized by him as depression during the period. His actions were not reasonable actions." (Commissioner's Report, p. 9)

[21] Since Cryer's neglect involved such a simple act, and he realized no benefit from his nonfeasance, his behavior is inexplicable on any rational ground. The commissioner correctly found that it must have resulted from some emotional problem. Although not timely made available to the committee, a report by psychiatrist Charles W. Armistead corroborates Cryer's testimony and sheds some light on his otherwise inexplicable behavior:4

[22] "It is my opinion that prior to his treatment in December 1982, Mr. Cryer unknowingly suffered from a depressive illness dating back at least to 1979 and very likely further.

[23] "Depressive illness is now regarded by psychiatrists as most often a biological imbalance treated primarily with anti-depressant medications and an illness with protean manifestations often unrecognized by family, friends or the individual himself. It is therefore a primary cause of behavioral problems rather than secondary to environmental causes as was formerly believed. When depression is lifted by appropriate treatment, the negative behavioral aspects disappear as well.

[24] "Mr. Cryer's failure to record the deed after it came to his notice and the continuing failure to record the deed when it obviously had nothing but negative consequences is explainable as a typical aspect of depressive behavior. Mr. Cryer's description during his testimony at the investigative hearing of picking up the file and putting it back down, resolving each time to record the deed the next time is typical of a depressive condition and consistent with the diagnoses. Likewise his description of himself after treatment, noted in the Commissioner's Hearing, is equally consistent with recovery from this condition." (Respondent's Brief, Exhibit B, pp. 1-2)

[25] Dr. Armistead concluded that: recurrence of the depressive condition is unlikely; Cryer functioned unusually well considering the duration and depth of his depressive condition; Cryer has demonstrated remorse for his conduct; and no benefit could be realized from additional punitive action.

[Portions omitted due to space limitations]


[28] Because the problems which caused attorney Cryer's single act of client neglect have now been cured, his suspension would serve no purpose. It would not have a salutary effect on other members of the bar or the integrity of the courts. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Kramer, 420 So.2d 1110 (La., 1982); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwards, 387 So.2d 1137 (La., 1980); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mundy, 423 So.2d 1126 (La., 1982).

[29] In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Rivette, 368 So.2d 1045 (La., 1979) an attorney was reprimanded for intentionally failing to perform services for which he had been paid. Cryer's inaction was not intentional; it resulted from illness. Thus, it is doubtful that willful violation of a disciplinary rule reflecting upon Cryer's moral fitness to practice law has been established. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Causey, Docket No. 82-B-2024, So.2d (La., 1983). The only appropriate sanction is a public reprimand for Cryer's violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mundy, supra.

[30] DECREE

[31] For the reasons assigned, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Tommy K. Cryer be publicly reprimanded.

[32] *fn1 Roland J. Achee, member of the Committee, has recused himself in this matter.

[33] *fn2 Rule 1-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

[34] "A.A lawyer shall not:

[35] "(6) Engage in any... conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

[36] *fn3 Rule 6-101(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

[37] "A lawyer shall not:

[38] "(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."

[39] *fn4 Dr. Armistead is a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association and also a well known, board certified psychiatrist. The Committee on Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Association, does not oppose consideration of his report.