Need help with seat belt ticket in california

[redeemed2]

I have been tasked with helping a friend of mine dispute a seat belt ticket. He requested trial by written declaration. I agreed to help him write his declaration.

He was pulled over specifically for the seat belt. Officer gave the ticket and sent him on his way. Simply trying to fill his quota. My friend was at a stoplight and cop was next to him. Looked over and pulled him over for not having the belt on.

Got 10 days to submit this form. Any ideas????

[Livefire]

Might try to abate or motion to dismiss due to a financial conflict of interest on the part of the judge. I've posted the pertinent part of the California Code which states the retirement fund is a recipent of traffic fines. Search the site to find it.

[Codee]

SUPERIOR COURT
IN NEVADA COUNTY
AT NEVADA CITY CALIFORNIA
201 Church St.
95959

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Vs.
CASE DOCKET# 159148
Cody James Roberts

Appearing specially
Motion to reconsider demand for court reporter


NOTICE
The court upon receipt of this document, will be deemed noticed of Cody James Roberts’s re-demand of a court reporter or reconsideration of denying such court reporter.

DEMAND/REQUEST
I hereby demand that a court reporter be present during all times of dealings with this court. Further I request that this court reconsider its denial of a state/public/county paid for court reporter based on the information contained herein.

NATURE OF DEMAND/REQUEST
Misdemeanor defendants are entitled to a verbatim transcript of sufficient completeness, recorded by shorthand. Infraction defendants should also, therefore, be entitled to a verbatim transcript of sufficient completeness, recorded by shorthand, due in part to Penal Code 19.7 [Fn-10]
It is the policy of the Nevada County Courts not to provide court reporters to defendants in infraction cases unless they be indigent and submit themselves to an indigency hearing, or fill in a jurat application to proceed in forma pauperis [Fn-11.] This rule of court, and court policy, exceed the statutory authority and jurisdiction of this court. This statutory court of limited jurisdiction cannot make a rule of court that is contradictory to non-overturned statutes of the legislature and known case law of higher courts. To do so is a breach of jurisdictional limitations [Fn-12][Fn-13.]
Official reporters shall [Fn-1] at the request of either party take down in shorthand [Fn-5] all the testimony, the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in criminal cases [Fn-2] and in Nevada County, report all criminal proceedings [Fn-4.] The reporter must also within reasonable time write out the same and certify the same as being correctly reported and transcribed [Fn-2.]
Furthermore, in the light that infractions are not criminal charges [People v. Battle 50 Cal App. 3rd supp. 1] the state must still provide a court reporter [Fn-2.] A misdemeanor defendant, upon his request, is constitutionally entitled to a verbatim record of sufficient completeness [Fn-7.] It is also well settled that not withstanding any other provision of law infractions are to be afforded all rules of law/procedure relating to misdemeanors. [Fn -10] Therefore as to the extent that court reporting is a provision of law that relates to misdemeanors, it must also apply to infractions.
Nevada County Rules of Court imply that the proper charge for court reporter fees lies sometimes with the defendant, and sometimes with the court [Fn-11.] Neither of these parties, the court nor the defendant, are the proper charging parties as the charge of these reporting obligations is a proper charge for “the county” or “the public.” [Fn-4 (county charge)] [Fn-7 (public charge)]
Since the court is attempting to deny a court reported record, it is the court’s burden to show what compelling reasons it has since the court is attempting to circumvent the safeguards against corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism [Fn-8.] These compelling reasons do not exist in the local rules of court for Nevada County.
By conducting itself in accord with its own rules the instant court has violated the defendant’s 14th amendment protections of the U.S. Constitution and the due process clause of both California’s, and the United States’, Constitutions [Fn-7.]
Not only do misdemeanor and infraction charged defendants enjoy the right to court reporters in their cases at the state’s expense, they in fact enjoy the right to be told, unsolicited, of this right during arraignment. Any judge that does not so, without solicitation, instruct that such a right exists, and is available to such defendants, places his or her own occupation of office in jeopardy [Fn-9D.] The case of Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance [Fn-9D] clearly states this principal and provides remedies for the failure to so instruct concerning the defendants right to a reporter. The author strongly invites one to read the complete text of Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance [Fn9D.]



References and Footnotes
*Fn 1
West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2002), § 69956, reads (in part):
“The official reporter shall perform the duties required of him by law....”
*Fn 2
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. (2001), § 274c, reads (in part, emphasis added):
Official reporters shall at the request of either party or of the court in a limited civil case, or on order of the court in a misdemeanor or infraction case, take down in shorthand all the testimony, the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in criminal cases, the arguments of the prosecuting attorney to the jury, and all statements and remarks made and oral instructions given by the judge; and if directed by the court, or requested by either party, must, within such reasonable time after the trial of the case as the court may designate, write out the same ... and certify the same as being correctly reported and transcribed, and when directed by the court, file the same with the clerk of the court.



*Fn 3
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. (2002), § 269, reads (in part, emphasis added):
“(a) The official reporter of a superior court, or any of them, where there are two or more, shall, at the request of either party, or of the court in a civil case other than a limited civil case, and on the order of the court, the district attorney, or the attorney for the defendant in a felony case, take down in shorthand all testimony, objections made, rulings of the court, exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas, and sentences of defendants in felony cases, arguments of the prosecuting attorney to the jury, and all statements and remarks made and oral instructions given by the judge. If directed by the court, or requested by either party, the official reporter shall, within such reasonable time after the trial of the case as the court may designate, write the transcripts out, or the specific portions thereof as may be requested, in plain and legible longhand, or by typewriter, or other printing machine, and certify that the transcripts were correctly reported and transcribed, and when directed by the court, file the transcripts with the clerk of the court.
(b) In any case where a defendant is convicted of a felony, after a trial on the merits, the record on appeal shall be prepared immediately after the verdict or finding of guilt is announced unless the court determines that it is likely that no appeal from the decision will be made....”
*Fn 4
West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2002), § 70045.75 (which follows § 70045.7 in West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code, is "more specific" to Nevada County than the foregoing general statutes and reads (in part, emphasis added):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law including, but not limited to, Sections 70040, 70041, 70042, and 70045, the following provisions shall be applicable to the full-time official court reporters, if any, in Nevada County:
(a) The regular full-time official court reporters shall perform the following duties:
(1) Report all criminal proceedings.
...
(5) Report all civil jury trials.
...
(8) Report any other court proceedings when a party requests a court reporter in accordance with rules of the court.
(9) Report the preliminary examination of those accused of crimes before magistrates within Nevada County.
...
(c) When the regular full-time official court reporters are occupied in the performance of their duties and services pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (a), the judge or judges of the superior court may appoint as many additional official court reporters, who shall be known as official reporters pro tempore, as the business of the courts may require in order that the judicial business of the court in such county may be carried on without delay.
They shall be paid in accordance with the per diem, transcription, and other fee provisions of Article 9 (commencing with Section 69941) of this chapter. Such per diem, traveling and other expenses, and the fees chargeable to the county under the terms of these provisions shall be a proper county charge.

[Codee]

*Fn 5
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. (2002), § 269, has been upheld in California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1997), 59 Cal.App.4th 959 and in California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1995), 39 Cal.App.4th 15:
We quote from our earlier decision: "The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic recording in some contexts suggests strongly that--unless the existing statutory scheme providing for the official record to be taken down in shorthand is amended--the Legislature does not intend that electronic recording of superior court proceedings be the method of creating an official record. Although the statutes do not expressly prohibit electronic recording of superior court proceedings, they nevertheless lead to one conclusion--that the Legislature intended that such proceedings be stenographically recorded by official shorthand reporters. [Citations.]" (CCRA I, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 31, italics added, fn. omitted.) Given this clear ruling, we are at a loss to determine why the Judicial Council continues to dispute the obvious implications of it."
(emphasis added.) California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1997), 59 Cal.App.4th 959, 964.
*Fn 6
The Legislative enactment, Stats.1998, c. 931, § 507, passed subsequent to California Court Reporters Assn. (1997), reads:
Nothing in this act is intended to change the extent to which court reporter services or electronic reporting may be used in the courts. It is the intent of this act to provide for court reporter services and electronic reporting in a county in which there is no municipal court to the same extent as otherwise provided by law in a county in which there is a municipal court.
*Fn 7
Another California appellate court has held:
“On the habeas corpus petition of Antonio Francois Armstrong we consider the constitutionality of a practice of some municipal courts not to record verbatim, although requested by the defendant, the testimony and other oral proceedings of criminal misdemeanor cases by a phonographic reporter, or electronic recording device, or otherwise....
The right of "equal access" to the courts rests upon the "'constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection....'" (March v. Municipal Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 422, 427, italics added; and see Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 83-84 [10 Cal.Rptr. 301]; Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 [100 L.Ed 891, 898, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055].)
"The courts have been particularly careful to inspect classifications relating to the criminal process,..." (United States v. Thompson (D.C.Cir. 1971) 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 [cert.den. 405 U.S. 998 (31 L.Ed.2d 467, 92 S.Ct. 1251)].) And where one's "personal liberty is at stake," a statutory scheme "requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. Accordingly, the state must establish both that it has a "compelling interest" which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the procedure are necessary to further that interest." (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 465 [149 Cal Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097].)
"Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Charta: 'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice.... No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or desseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.' ... Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system--all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court'" Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 [100 L.Ed 891, 897-898; fn. omitted.)
Today, the former distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has been abandoned. Insofar as the right of a convicted defendant to an adequate record on appeal is concerned, a "distinction between felony and nonfelony offenses" will no longer "satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment...." (Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189, 195-196 [30 L.Ed.2d 372, 378-379, 92 S.Ct. 410].)...
For these several reasons we hold that the complained of practice of the municipal courts of Alameda County is violative of the "due process" and "equal protection of the laws" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of this state's Constitution, article I, section 7....
We have, by our instant decision, held that, upon request therefore, there is a constitutional right that a verbatim record be provided at public expense for all defendants in misdemeanor matters. ...
... We hold only that a misdemeanor defendant, upon his request, is constitutionally entitled to a verbatim "record of sufficient completeness" permitting proper consideration of an appeal which might thereafter be taken....
... we declare that, except as to Armstrong, the holding we have made shall operate prospectively only, and as to misdemeanor trials and proceedings commenced after this opinion shall become final.
(emphasis added) In Re Armstrong (1981), 126 Cal.App.3d 565, 178 Cal.Rptr. 902.
*Fn 8
Another California appellate court decision explains part of the reason why a stenographic reporter is required to create a verbatim record of court proceedings.
"[i]t is a first principle that the people have the right to know what is done in their courts." (In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 530... .) The public has a legitimate interest in access to court documents because "[i]f public court business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism." (Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 784... .)
..."A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property. ... There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from the other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire [in] proceedings before it." (Craig v. Harney (1947) 331 U.S. 367, 374... .) ...
The burden rests on the party seeking to deny public access to court records to establish compelling reasons why and to what extent the records should be made private. (Estate of Hearst, supra, ... 785.).
(emphasis added) Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998), 63 Cal.App.4th 367, 373-374.
*Fn 9
In these California Supreme Court cases, the named former-judges were removed from office, wholely or in part, for failing to provide the services of a stenographic reporter:
(A) Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995), 11 Cal.4th 294, 311-312);
(B) Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1990), 50 Cal.3d 297, 313-314;
(C) Kloepfer v. Commission (1989), 49 Cal.3d 826, 842-843, 865-866;
(D) Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988), 45 Cal.3d 518, 541-542.
*Fn 10
California Penal Code at §19.7 reads “Except as otherwise provided by law, all provisions relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions including but not limited to, powers of peace officers, jurisdiction of courts, periods for commencing action and for bring a case to trial and burden of proof.”

*Fn 11
West’s NORTHERN CALIFORNIA LOCAL COURT RULES, “LOCAL RULES FOR NEVADA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT” at p. 634 reads in part: “Court reporters are not available at the expense of the court on infraction criminal proceedings when the defendant(s) is not indigent.” Please also notice the name of our court as it appears here (Nevada County Superior Court).

[Codee]

*Fn 12
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court , 57 Cal.2d 450 [S. F. No. 20843. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1962.] Reads in part (Emphasis added in bold):
“[1] Under these facts, whether or not the Kroiss case was decided correctly, the appellate department of the superior court exceeded its "jurisdiction," as that term is used in connection with the writ of certiorari, in refusing to follow a rule established by a court of superior jurisdiction.
[2] Certiorari, like prohibition, is, of course, a "juristdictional" writ. While it cannot be used to attack an error of a lower tribunal committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, it is available when that tribunal has acted in excess of its "jurisdiction." (Simmons v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 373 [341 P.2d 13]; Portnoy v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 375 [125 P.2d 487].) [3] The meaning of "jurisdiction" for [57 Cal.2d 455] the purposes of certiorari and prohibition is different and broader than the meaning of the same term when used in connection with "jurisdiction" over the person and subject matter. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 , 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715]; Goldberg, The Extraordinary Writs and The Review of Inferior Court Judgments (1948) 36 Cal.L.Rev. 558, 576.) [4] In commenting on the meaning of "jurisdiction" in a prohibition case, it was said in Abelleira that, "Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari." (17 Cal.2d at p. 291.)”

*Fn 13
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.3d 759, 104 Cal Rptr 921.
"”... it seems well settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct such excess.'" (Also see: Rodman v. Superior Court (1939) 13 Cal.2d 262 , 269-271 [89 P.2d 109]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1068, 1222.)”“

*Fn-14
After diligent searching I cannot find anywhere in the rules of court or in the California Code that says I must have an indigence hearing.

I SWEAR THAT THE FORGOING INFORMATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOLEDGE.




Cody James Roberts

[Codee]

SUPERIOR COURT
IN ______ COUNTY
AT ________ CITY CALIFORNIA
Zip

By: Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx (not represented)

In the Case of

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

V

CASE DOCKET# __________

XXXXXX X. XXXXXXX

Appearing specially
Motion to Dismiss due to lack of Jurisdiction

NOTICE

1) The court upon receipt of this document, will be deemed noticed of Xxxxxx Xxxxxx’s motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT
It is hereby argued by the accused that the immediate court and the prosecuting party lack both subject matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction.
The immediate court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The code of civil procedure explicitly states that there are but two types of remedies, special proceedings and actions [Fn-1.] These two types of actions are civil and criminal [Fn-3.] This ought to mean that if an action is “non-criminal” then it is civil. The right to prosecute one type of action is not merged with the other a when person’s conduct violates both civil and criminal elements of the law [Fn-6.] The code of civil procedure states that the penal code proscribes the procedure for prosecuting criminal actions [Fn-5.] [Fn-2] [Fn-4]
The accused has been subject to criminal procedure for a civil action [Fn-7.] Accused has been kept in court-to-court arrest and enjoys liberty only upon signing a bail or recognizance. This is a display of criminal jurisdiction in a civil matter.
The accused had a plea entered by the court of not guilty. The court then held accused on a recognizance. The accused was never shown a formal complaint, which is required to be filed, so as to retaining jurisdiction. Holding of the accused by way of recognizance is within jurisdictional limitations for crimes with a formal complaint on record. Without such a complaint jurisdiction does not exist to hold. A court without jurisdiction has no power to hold, continue or otherwise proceed [Fn-13] [Fn-14] [Fn-15.]
Further, this court exceeded and continues to exceed its proscribed statutory jurisdiction by conducting affairs outside of the limitations allowed by statute by refusing to supply a court reporter upon demand by the accused [Fn-9] [Fn-10.]
Accused also contends that in personam jurisdiction was lost when the accused was placed under civil arrest by officer Wagner. Civil arrest, which is highly criticized and historically used only in post judgement, to secure the payment of such judgment, was improperly used. As a result accused was pulled into this court action involuntarily. By exceeding his jurisdiction in arresting the accused, Officer Wagner forfeited in personam jurisdiction in this case. It is further alleged by the accused that Officer Wagner did not have probable cause to make an arrest for a public offense [Fn-8.]

Footnotes
*Fn-1
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 21. “These remedies are divided into two classes:
1. Actions; and,
2. Special proceedings.”

*Fn-2
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 22. “An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.”

*Fn-3
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 24. “Actions are of two kinds:
1. Civil; and,
2. Criminal.”

*Fn-4
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 25. “A civil action arises out of:
1. An obligation;
2. An injury.”

*Fn-5
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 31. THE PENAL CODE defines and provides for the prosecution of a criminal action.

*Fn-6
Code of Civil Procedure sec. 32. When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the
other.

*Fn-7
People vs. Battle 50 Cal app. 3rd supp.1 AND People v. Sava 190 Cal App. 3rd 935 state that infractions are non-criminal

*Fn-8
Freedom Riders (F.I.G.H.T.) v. Hannigan (commissioner of CHP) (exact cite unknown at this time) This 9th circuit federal appellate court ruling states that in California traffic stops are arrests for which probable cause is needed.


*Fn-9
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court , 57 Cal.2d 450 [S. F. No. 20843. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1962.] Reads in part (Emphasis added in bold):
“[1] Under these facts, whether or not the Kroiss case was decided correctly, the appellate department of the superior court exceeded its "jurisdiction," as that term is used in connection with the writ of certiorari, in refusing to follow a rule established by a court of superior jurisdiction.
[2] Certiorari, like prohibition, is, of course, a "juristdictional" writ. While it cannot be used to attack an error of a lower tribunal committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, it is available when that tribunal has acted in excess of its "jurisdiction." (Simmons v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 373 [341 P.2d 13]; Portnoy v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 375 [125 P.2d 487].) [3] The meaning of "jurisdiction" for [57 Cal.2d 455] the purposes of certiorari and prohibition is different and broader than the meaning of the same term when used in connection with "jurisdiction" over the person and subject matter. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 , 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715]; Goldberg, The Extraordinary Writs and The Review of Inferior Court Judgments (1948) 36 Cal.L.Rev. 558, 576.) [4] In commenting on the meaning of "jurisdiction" in a prohibition case, it was said in Abelleira that, "Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari." (17 Cal.2d at p. 291.)”

*Fn-10
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.3d 759, 104 Cal Rptr 921.
"”... it seems well settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct such excess.'" (Also see: Rodman v. Superior Court (1939) 13 Cal.2d 262 , 269-271 [89 P.2d 109]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1068, 1222.)”“

*Fn-12
Ralph v Police Court of El Cerrito (1948) 84 Cal App.2d 257, 190 P2d 632.
“Where defendant charged in a police court with violation of § 505(b) pleaded not guilty and did not waive the filing of a complaint, such filing was mandatory.”

*Fn-13
People v Agnew (1952, App Dep't Super Ct) 110 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 242 P2d 4 10.

“Jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles to try a defendant for a traffic:violation and enter judgment depends upon the existence of a formal complaint.”

*Fn-14
Rupley v Johnson (1953) 120 Cal App 2d 548, 261 P2d 318.

“On a plea other than guilty to traffic violations and in the absence of a waiver, a complaint must be filed before the court has jurisdiction.”

*Fn-15
Gavin v Municipal Court of San Diego Judicial Dist. (1960, 4th Dist) 184 Cal App 2d 712, 7 Cal Rptr 732.

“Defendant cited for and charged with violating section of Vehicle Code who pleads not guilty and does not waive filing of misdemeanor complaint, is not brought within jurisdiction of municipal, or other inferior, court, until verified complaint charging him with offense in question has been filed.”

I SWEAR THAT THE FORGOING INFORMATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOLEDGE.



By: __________________
Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx DATE___________

[Codee]

Good Luck To All Ya.

[redeemed2]

thank you for your response. Passing this on to my friend and we'll see what happens. Thanks again.

[redeemed2]

Thanks to Codee. My friend used your response almost verbatim, and he received the results back that the case was dismissed and his fine is being refunded.

Thanks again.

[Codee]

Way to go guys. Chalk another up to SMJ. I encourage every one to study the nature of the courts and learn to fight SMJ. SMJ is the best and I can pretty much prove is often the ONLY defense (and some cousins like mistake and fraud and mabey Personam). "not guilty" yeah right that right there means you can only argue jurisdiction and excuses at law because you just admitted the facts.

SMJ SMJ SMJ SMJ SMJ