Signs Must Be Properly Postedn To Be Valid

[DAYWALKER]

A federal law, 23 USC § 101(a), controls traffic enforcement on all federal and
federally-funded highways. Pursuant to that law, there is a federal Manual for Uniform
Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The MUTCD sets conditions precedent for traffic control.
It bans the old politically-manipulated speed-limit setting system. Now engineering studies
are required. The federal law requires states and local authorities to identify pre-existing
problems, do valid engineering studies, and only impose that minimal amount of traffic
control as solves the pre-identified problem, without causing any new problem nor safety
impairment. To date, no traffic control on freeways is known to have been imposed pursuant
to these MUTCD conditions precedent requirements.

Look in your state law for a law requiring compliance. Some states requires local jurisdictions to
comply with the MUTCD, but many (or all) jurisdictions do not comply. The MUTCD
guidance emphasizes the duty of law to be "fact-based." As in the civil rights era of the
1960's, some states are obeying the Constitutional due process requirement voluntarily. With
others, a court order is needed. Such a court order would enjoin (ban) enforcement of the
illegal Traffic Control Devices, e.g., speed limits, stop signs, etc., installed without first
obtaining an engineer's warrant. That can only be issued after a proper study has been done.

[Codee]

The USC code section seemed to be a list of definitions.

[DAYWALKER]

Well I'll be damned! Good eyes, mine are tired. Here is where you will find it, I'm to tired to try to find it again lol. Clearly, I'm to tired to point someone in the right direction.

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/index.html

I think this explains it in more detail:

"Section 1049 of Pub. L. 102–240 directed Secretary to conduct a survey to identify current State standards relating to geometric design, traffic control devices, roadside safety, safety appurtenance design, uniform traffic control devices, and sign legibility and directional clarity for all Federal-aid highways and, not later than 2 years after Dec. 18, 1991, to transmit to Congress a report on the results of the survey and the crashworthiness of traffic lights, traffic signs, guardrails, impact attenuators, concrete barrier treatments, and breakaway utility poles for bridges and roadways currently used by States.

Now, if you have the MUTDC, and find your states law, there you will have it lol. I would put more effort in, but a little too tired right now. Hope this helps though, and the link. I had to really dig to find it, and am a little sore I wrote the USC down wrong!!!!

[DAYWALKER]

In other words, it means joe-blow can't just go throw a sign up when ever he wants.

An example would be if the state posted a speed limit sign 100 feet off the side of the road, it don't me jack ****. They have to comply with the MUTCD. The MUTCD was created to stop such dirty tactics. Hiding signs behind tree's and getting you for speeding, reducing the speed on a federally funded highway without justification just to write tickets.

I am only talking about FERERAL FUNDED highways not county roads(unless the county somehow got federal funds).

The state does not dictate the signs on these roads. Now, I bet, if a study was done, EVERY state is in violation of the MUTCD. A quick test would be to get a copy of the MUTCD, read up on say stops signs, or what ever signs you pass by most often. See if it complies.(DON'T RUN A STOP SIGN AND START ARGUEING THIS!) Then, if you find your state law requiring them to follow the MUTCD, you could, if one were so inclined, raise holy hell over it and make them do it right. (Or let it go, and if you got in trouble for it, fight it. I'm sure if they have it wrong, your case is going to go away in a hurry. THE DON NOT WANT TO LOSE FEDERAL FUNDS!)

[DAYWALKER]

The below case was filed October 16, 2006

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, AT KNOXVILLE

JUDY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

vs. No.: 3:06cv400

REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS INC., JURY DEMAND

CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE,

BILL HASLAM as MAYOR OF THE

CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE,

KNOXVILLE CITY COUNCIL,

REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS INC., d/b/a

WWW.PHOTONOTICE.COM, MICHAEL L. SULLIVAN, and UNKNOWN,

Defendants.


COMPLAINT



COMES now Plaintiff to hereby sue the above parties as a result of the unlawfully deprives or hinders her access to the courts, a civil right, on August 8, 2006, when she was sent a City of Knoxville, Tennessee, Red Light Photo Enforcement Program Notice of Violation/Citation, although innocent.


1. In an effort to obtain more funds for the coffers, the City of Knoxville is attempting to create a utopian society which uses quasi criminal citations, with trappings of civil procedure, to enforce ordinances which attempt to avoid their criminal root and foundation, all while recreating a poll tax. As Joe Bailey has stated in public, as an elected member of the City Council of the City of Knoxville he would like to see the Red Light Photo Enforcement Program expanded into speeding enforcement. The only step left to reach the Orwellian, utopian, society of the movie "Demolition Man" is the voice activated citation system to control cursing, today a technical possibility. The Knoxville Red Light Photo Enforcement Program intentionally trashes the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Tennessee due process right to free access to the courts to defend one¿s self against the State. The City of Knoxville has instituted an illegal and offensive demand that cited parties pay court processing fees in the amount of $67.50 to merely schedule a hearing to contest the judgment of a Knoxville Police Officer, who, as a "Star Chamber," acts as an agent of Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., all intended to obtain without due process the appearance of appropriate quasi-criminal fines. Knoxville Code §17-210 does, as implemented, deprive persons of the Constitutional presumption of innocence. Access to the Court to dispute the claim by a governmental entity intending to confiscate property or to assert innocence are fundamental to our society which, like the right to vote, can not be legislated away as if a hindrance to collection. The City of Knoxville requirement of assessing an administrative charge for a defendant to respond to a citation (whether civil or criminal) is unique in the United States as no other program expressly assesses an administrative fee in advance of a hearing, whether administrative or judicial on a criminal citation. The offensive assessment of a charge to access the Constitutional right to confront an accuser, here the City of Knoxville, is as offensive as charging a person a sum for the right to vote, a poll tax. The Knoxville Red Light Photo Enforcement Program is designed to entrap citizens at certain selected intersections, such entrapment includes the marking of roads in violation of 23 CFR 655, the Manuel on Uniform Traffic Control Devises, and the Tennessee Traffic Design Manuel. Such entrapment by illegal road markings is compounded by the other forms of contractual agreement or implementation of the provisions of the contract. This complaint is about maintaining the Constitutional protections available under the United States Constitution and the State of Tennessee Constitution, and to halt the slide toward a system of laws intentionally designed to avoid Constitutional protections.

2. The City of Knoxville, contracted with Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.,(hereinafter "Redflex") a private company with an economic interest in the prosecution of citizens of Knoxville. Defendant Redflex is in the business of inducing governments into contracting with Redflex for automated citation systems for economic benefit of Reflex. Defendant City intentionally surrendered the protections to citizens found within the Constitutions of the United States, and Tennessee, which are also incorporated within Code of Ordinances, City of Knoxville, Tennessee, (hereinafter "Knoxville City Code"), to obtain money. Further, by participating in the City of Knoxville¿s illegal stop line marking, in violation of 23 CFR 655, the Manuel on Uniform Traffic Control Devises, and the Tennessee Traffic Design Manuel, it appears that both Defendants share in liability, under the Tennessee comparative fault allocation, for every automobile accident which occurs in the intersection. The Defendants, along with Defendant Photonotice, have additionally conspired to prevent the public from accessing public records by contract to avoid the "Open Records Act" in violation of Tennessee statute.

3. Defendant City, Mayor, and Council did enact a law intentionally designed to surrender the protections to citizens found within the Constitutions of the United States, and Tennessee, and within Code of Ordinances, City of Knoxville, Tennessee, (hereinafter "Knoxville City Code") Sec. 19-33 where the citation process is set forth in detail, all violated by Knoxville City Code Sec. 17-210. While public officials may choose any rational for enacting a law, including false or logically inconsistent statements, such suspect enactment is not a basis for reversal or finding of unconstitutionality, however, when the effect of the law is to deprive due process under the law, the statue may be struck. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (where the $1.50 annual poll tax was found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution). Further, the attempt to decriminalize a statute of the State of Tennessee enacted to protect the public is an illegal grab of power by the City in violation of the laws of the State of Tennessee.

4. Officer Sullivan is sued for the issuance of a citation where he did not observe the Plaintiff or any other person violate any statute or ordinance, was not present at any violation, and was acting as an agent for the City of Knoxville, while assigned to affirm the decisions of Redflex, in furtherance of violation of Constitutional rights.

5. Unknown persons, all expected to be officers of the Police Department of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, also signed Notice of Violation/Citations where the Unknown Defendants did not observe Plaintiff or any other person violate any statute or ordinance, was not present at any violation, and was acting as an agent for the City of Knoxville in furtherance of violation of Constitutional rights. Additional unknown persons, knew or should have known that the existing road markings in Knoxville, Tennessee, violate federal road marking standards.

6. The governmental entities are sued under the theory of respondent superior, negligent/grossly negligent supervision, negligent/grossly negligent training, and vicarious liability under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.



PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

7. Plaintiff Judy Williams is a resident of Knox County, Tennessee.

8. Redflex Traffic Systems Inc., is a Delaware corporation, whose parent is found in Australia, found in Scottsdale, Arizona, available for service of process through it¿s registered Agent, National Registered Agents Inc., 1900 Church Street, Ste. 400, Nashville, Tennessee, 37203.

9. Redflex Traffic Systems Inc., d/b/a www.photonotice.com, is a Delaware corporation, whose parent is found in Australia, found in Scottsdale, Arizona, available for service of process through it¿s registered Agent, National Registered Agents Inc., 1900 Church Street, Ste. 400, Nashville, Tennessee, 37203. Ownership of the web site www.photonotice.com has not been determined and the nature of the relationship, and form of control or ownership by Redflex Traffic Systems Inc., of www.photonotice.com, is unknown.

[DAYWALKER]

10. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee, may be served through it¿s Mayor, Bill Haslam, City County Building, Knoxville, Tennessee.

11. Bill Haslam, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Knoxville, may be served at City County Building, Knoxville, Tennessee.

12. Knoxville City Council, is the governing body of the City of Knoxville, and may be served through Mayor, Bill Haslam, presiding officer of the Counsel, at City County Building, Knoxville, Tennessee.

13. Michael L. Sullivan, a police officer in the City of Knoxville Police Department may be served at his employment, City of Knoxville Police Department, Knoxville, Tennessee.

14. Plaintiff claims include claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this District Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332(d)(1). Supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of the Plaintiffs and the Class is granted by 28 U.S.C. Section 1367.



FACTS

15. On information and belief, Plaintiff Williams received a "Notice of Violation/Citation" number KR00009126 on or after August 8, 2006, which alleged that the Plaintiff violated "Knoxville City Ordinance Section 17-210(c)(1)" and that "I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Tennessee the foregoing is true and correct" all signed by Michael L. Sullivan, Knoxville Police Badge Number 1300. Exhibit A, at 1.

16. By signing the affidavit, Defendant Sullivan, intended to enter an equivalent to a judgment of conviction. The burden of proof is not on the officer to prove that the event occurred and that the person cited is legally responsible for the act, the burden is placed on the cited individual, all an intentional component of Knoxville City Ordinance Section 17-210, and the contract between Defendant City and Defendant Redflex.

17. Defendant Sullivan intended that Plaintiff Williams be deprived of $50.00 and that if she wished to dispute his judgment, that she would need to appeal to Knoxville City Court, all in accord with the contract between Defendant City and Defendant Redflex.

18. Plaintiff Williams was noticed of her right to a hearing and that if she scheduled a hearing to dispute the allegation, she "will be assessed $67.50 in court processing fees." Exhibit A, at 4.

19. Plaintiff Williams, according to the citation "Must Select One of the Following Options:" A - pay a $50.00 fine; B - sign an affidavit that the vehicle wassold or stolen, or Identify another Driver, and C - pay the assessed $67.50 in court processing fees to schedule the hearing. Exhibit A, at 4.

20. On information and belief, the assessment of a $67.50 court processing fee to schedule a hearing deprives or hinders Plaintiff her access to the court to dispute the citation, under the color of law.

21. Defendants provided an "Options" page with the citation, a "Payment Coupon," an "Affidavit" where the Plaintiff would be required to provide evidence against a third party, or a "Hearing Request" which informs Plaintiff, "To schedule a hearing you will be assessed a court processing fee of $67.50." Exhibit A, at 2.

22. On information and belief, Defendant Redflex, intentionally reduces the frames captured rate at intersections for later review, but not available to download, on the web site where a red light enforcement citation may be found at www.photonotice.com to less than standard frame rate, which reduces the information available to Plaintiff to assert any defense, although the first second of the "violation" is at a standard frame rate.

23. On information and belief, Redflex Traffic Systems Inc., d/b/a www.photonotice.com, (hereinafter "Photonotice") is owned or controlled by Defendant Redflex a foreign company which is controlling the information obtained by Defendant Redflex and such retained government documents, with privacy information is subject to intercept on the internet, and such information is maintained in a manner in violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq., personally identifiable financial information protected by the act, and Redflex or Photonotice is failing .

24. On information and belief, the Notice of Violation/Citation language supports the Plaintiffs¿ position that Defendants presume alleged violators guilty, all without trial or opportunity to be heard, with the Knoxville Police Officer detailed to Defendant Redflex being the star chamber judge.

25. Knoxville Code § 17-73 provides: "[a]ll fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon the forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be paid into the city treasury and deposited in the general fund and be expendable as provided by the city charter." Exhibit B (collective cited sections from the Knoxville Code).

26. Knoxville Code § 17-210(d)(1) provides: "[a]ny violation of subsection (c) of this section shall subject the responsible person or entity to a civil penalty of $50, without assessment of court costs or fees. Failure to pay the civil penalty or appear in court to contest the citation on the designated date shall subject the responsible person or entity to assessment of court costs and fees as set forth in this chapter and chapter 8 of the Code of Ordinances."

27. The contract between the City of Knoxville and Defendant Redflex expressly provides that the collection of fines for traffic violations will be conducted by Redflex. Exhibit "D" of the Redflex Contract states "Redflex will collect all payments on Citations and will deposit all payments into a lockbox account . . .." Exhibit C, Redflex Contract.

28. Knoxville City Code Sec. 17-181, "Required Position and Method of Turning at Intersections, states: "The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows: (1) Right turns. Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the righthand curb or edge of the roadway."

29. Knoxville Code Sec. 17-502, Manual and Specifications, states: "All traffic control signs, signals and devices shall conform to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices approved by the state department of transportation. All signs and signals required under this chapter for a particular purpose shall so far as practicable be uniform as to type and location throughout the city. All traffic control devices so erected and not inconsistent with the provisions of state law or this chapter shall be official traffic control devices."
30. Knoxville Code Sec. 17-504, Installation Requirements for Enforcement Purposes, states: "No provision of this chapter for which official traffic control devices are required shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person. Whenever a particular section does not state that official traffic control devices are required, such section shall be effective even though no devices are erected or in place." This is a similar provision to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-109(b).

31. The Tennessee Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, at paragraph 6.4, provides that the MUTCD (an apparent reference to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices cited in 23 C.F.R 655) shall guide the placement of road markings.

[DAYWALKER]

32. The Tennessee Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, at paragraph 6.4.2.3, provides that intersections with crosswalk stop lines must be a minimum of 4' from the crosswalk, and points to figure 6.3 for guidance. Found on Figure 6.3 is the guidance for 4' to 30' placement of stop line placement where no crosswalk exists, and fails to provide Tennessee guidance for placement beyond 4' from a crosswalk.

33. The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, incorporated into 23 CFR 655, paragraph 3B.16 states "If used, stop and yield lines should be placed a minimum of 1.2 m (4 ft) in advance of the nearest crosswalk line at controlled intersections, . . . . In the absence of a marked crosswalk, the stop line or yield line should be placed at the desired stopping or yielding point, but should be placed no more than 9 m (30 ft) nor less than 1.2 m (4 ft) from the nearest edge of the intersecting traveled way. Stop lines should be placed to allow sufficient sight distance to all other approaches to an intersection."
34. On information and belief, the Violation Data of the automated red light enforcement program are City of Knoxville records. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

35. On information and belief, Defendant Redflex retains possession, control, and access of the Violation Data of the automated red light enforcement program. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

36. On information and belief, persons convicted of any ordinance violation have no expectation of confidentiality of the conviction and/or the payment of fine.

37. The Redflex Contract provides that the violation data is the property of the City however, that Redflex "shall not disclose Violation Data or privately disclose or use the Violations Data for any purposes whatsoever except as specified in [the Redflex Contract] without the prior written consent of the City, except for information that: (1) is or becomes generally available to the public through no fault of Redflex personal; or (2) is required to be disclosed by law or by a court of competent jurisdiction." Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

38. Defendant Redflex selects the images which are relied upon by a City of Knoxville police officer, in this case Defendant Michael L. Sullivan, in the issuance of a Red Light Photo Enforcement Program Notice of Violation/Citation. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(2).

39. On information and belief, the only images relied upon, by the officer signing the citation, are the images which the officer declared under penalty of perjury were reviewed, namely the two images selected by Defendant Redflex for printing. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(6).

40. Defendant Reflex exercises oversight and training of the City of Knoxville police officers assigned to the Red Light Photo Enforcement Program. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(13).

41. Defendant Redflex provided training includes strategies for presenting "Violations Data" in court and judicial proceedings. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.15.

42. Defendant Redflex is contractually obligated to "interact with court and judicial personal" by developing the subpoena process, and controlling the coordination between Redflex, the City, and City Court personnel. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.16.

43. On information and belief, persons convicted of any ordinance violation have no expectation of confidentiality of the conviction and/or the payment of fine.

44. On information and belief, the effect of this delegation is to allow a private company, with an economic interest in enforcement, (payment is based on citations paid), to control the access of information to the court, and the presentation of that information to the court.

45. On information and belief, the stop line viewed in the photograph used by Officer Sullivan to issue the Notice of Violation/Citation, at the intersection of Western Ave. and Henley Street at the L&M Station prior to the parking lot entrance, is 80' from the edge of the crosswalk and is therefore is by 50' in violation of 23 C.F.R 655, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, and Tennessee Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

46. On information and belief, federal funds have been used in the construction, expansion, maintenance, modification, or otherwise, on either Western Ave., also known as a Tennessee Hwy. and Henley Street, also known as U.S. Hwy. 441, at the intersection of these roads and therefore Defendant City of Knoxville must apply the standard cited within 23 C.F.R 655, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

47. On information and belief, the City of Knoxville traffic engineering department routinely violates, 23 C.F.R 655, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, and Tennessee Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Examples exist such as the Weisgarber and Papermill intersection, and the obviously modified stop line placement for the benefit of Braden¿s Fine Furniture & Interiors at 1335 Western Ave., among others.

48. On information and belief, upon placement of the camera system at the intersection of Western Ave./W. Summit Hill & Henley St., Defendant Redflex knew or should have known of the violation of the aforementioned traffic manuals.

49. On information and belief, Defendant Redflex accepted the violation as a benefit for the Defendant corporation in that the trigger for the camera operation would be the crossing of the improperly placed stop line.

50. On information and belief, Plaintiff¿s vehicle was photographed crossing the illegally or improperly placed stop line when the traffic light for the intersection was red. The Plaintiff is clearly stopped in the second photograph prior to the crosswalk. The second photograph clearly shows a stopped vehicle, but cites that the stopped vehicle speed is 31 MPH.

51. It is proper for a vehicle to stop prior to a crosswalk when making a right turn at a red light. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-149, and Knoxville Code Sec. 17-178.

52. Other non-criminal citations, such as a parking citation, Knoxville Code Sec. 17-331, Overtime Parking, provides for citing the vehicle owner, but such is accomplished by physically placing the citation on the vehicle, and provides for a date to appear and contest the citation.

53. On information and belief, more than 10,000 Photo Enforcement Program Notice of Violation/Citation have been issued.

54. On information and belief, all except one of the more than 10,000 Photo Enforcement Program Notice of Violation/Citation have paid a $50.00 fine or have been assessed the $50.00 fine and court costs of $67.50, whether paid or not paid. Further, that all such sums have been obtained with the color of law and a depravation of property such that the parties who have benefitted from the confiscations should be required to forfeit the money and such money be returned to lawful owner, and any unpaid sum be expunged.

55. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states in part, " . . .nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, . . . ." Additional protections found within the Constitution include: Sixth Amendment "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The Fourteenth Amendment states at Section 1, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

56. On information and belief, Knoxville Code Section 17-210 does, as implemented, deprive persons of the right to confront witnesses, right to speedy trial, and obtain counsel without prepaying a tax to the City when attempting to schedule a hearing, all without due process of law.

57. On information and belief, Knoxville Code Section 17-210 does, as implemented, deprive persons of property without due process of law, and denies equal protection of the law.

58. On information and belief, Knoxville Code Section 17-210 does, as implemented, deprive persons of property without due process of law, and by placing the burden of proof on the car owner, deprives the car owner of the Constitutional presumption of innocence.

59. On information and belief, Defendant City of Knoxville failed to monitor, train, control, or otherwise take appropriate steps to supervise Defendant Sullivan, and others assigned similarly.

60. On information and belief, Defendant City of Knoxville, did intentionally assign Defendant Sullivan, and others, to a duty intended to deprive citizens there right of access to the court without prepayment.

61. On information and belief, the City of Knoxville, retains fines obtained from paid citations, which are required to be returned to the general fund of the State of Tennessee.

[DAYWALKER]

CLAIMS

SECTION 1983 and 1988

(An Act Under Color of Law to Deprive Access to the Court)

62. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

63. Plaintiff is a member of the class the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was enacted to protect.

64. Defendants, Knoxville and/or Defendant Redflex , in agreement, started or caused someone else to start the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff.

65. Defendants acted under the color of law to harm Plaintiff, and the public.

66. Defendants, Knoxville and/or Defendant Redflex knew or should have known that Defendant Knoxville was in violation of 23 C.F.R 655, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices in the marking of roads selected for inclusion in the Photo Enforcement Program.

67. Defendants caused or directed Defendant Sullivan to issue a citation to deprive Plaintiff of money and which will subject her to further harm if unpaid, all under the color of law, intentionally depriving Plaintiff of her access to the Courts under the due process, confrontation, and taking clauses of the Constitution, without necessity of paying a $67.50 de facto tax prior to any finding of guilt.

68. Plaintiff suffered damages for harm to reputation in the community, humiliation, fright, shame, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, and worry.

69. Plaintiff claims damages for the denial of proper access to the Court to defend herself, in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trail, and her attorney fees, available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.




SECTION 1983 and 1988

(Decriminalization of State Statute)

70. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

71. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "it is uniformly held that a municipality may not pass an ordinance which conflicts with a statute, or indeed with a legislative policy, of the state." City of Memphis v. Southern Ry. Co., 67 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn. 1934.); see also Katzenberger v. Lawo, 16 S.W. 611 (Tenn. 1891) (where the City of Memphis attempted to suspend, alter, or change a general statute and the Court ruled the effort a nullity).

72. The State of Tennessee did criminalize failure to obey traffic control devise, the red light, at Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-109.

73. In order to protect the public the Tennessee Department of Safety has established a system of administrative suspension of a driver licence in order to protect the public from habitual offenders. Tenn. R. & Reg. 1340-1-4.01.

74. Tennessee Department of Safety has assigned a point value of 4-points to any violation of a traffic control device statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-109, Tenn. R. & Reg. 1340-1-4.03.

75. That upon the accumulation of sufficient points within a one year period, twelve (12), the Department of Safety shall issue a Notice of Proposed Suspension. Tenn. R. & Reg. 1340-1-4.04.

76. That the City of Knoxville, for non-automated citations, does require obedience of traffic control device, Knoxville Code § 17-503, and such violation is a misdemeanor reported to the Tennessee Department of Safety, Knoxville Code § 17-47, for assignment of points and other Tennessee Department of Safety purposes.

77. The City of Knoxville, has decriminalized, and ceased reporting, failure to obey traffic control devise at automated enforcement intersections. Knoxville Code § 17-210.

78. The intentional effort by the City of Knoxville to avoid the reporting requirement mandated by Tennessee law, is in conflict with the statute and legislative intent to protect the public through the Tennessee Department of Safety driver license improvement program, an unconstitutional grab of State power by the City. See City of Bartlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn. 1978) (where a municipality, by ordinance, may not contravene the established statutes of the state and there can be no direct conflict between a provision of an ordinance and an act of the general assembly).

79. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the act of the City of Knoxville, void, and therefore any liability of the Plaintiff under the void ordinance, Knoxville Code § 17-210, a nullity, and that such enactment was a violation of the Plaintiffs Constitutional rights.

80. Plaintiff claims damages for the denial of proper access to the Court to defend herself, in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trail, and her attorney fees, available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

81. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants must disgorge themselves of the obtained funds and return the money to the parties from whom Defendants using unconstitutional practices did seize the money from, and that her attorneys be compensated in accord with the common fund doctrine for the benefit accruing to the beneficiaries of the litigation.

[DAYWALKER]

SECTION 1983 and 1988

(Contract to Deprive Civil Rights)

82. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

83. Tennessee Courts have held that "[n]o governmental entity can by contract deprive itself of inherent powers necessary to the performance of its functions or of power or duty imposed upon it by prior express statutory or constitutional provision." Batson v. Pleasant View Utility Dist., 592 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)(citations omitted); see also Broyles v. State, 341 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tenn. 1960).

84. The United States Supreme Court has held that the powers exercised by municipalities "must be granted in express words, or necessarily to be implied [from the express words]." Detroit Citizens¿ St. Ry. Co. v. Detroit Ry., 171 U.S. 48, 54 (U.S. 1898).

85. The Tennessee Supreme Court has historically held that "[t]he delegation of sovereign power is, in itself, an act of sovereignty, and can only be made by the constituent body in whom the original power resides, or by its express authority." State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. [634, 655 (1856)]. See also Op. Tenn. Att¿y Gen. No. 06-150 (Oct. 2, 2006).

86. The Attorney General of the State of Tennessee has opined that a contract between a municipality and a third party that involves "the issuance of citations to such violators . . . ." by that third party violates the principle that a state¿s sovereign powers may not be delegated to third parties. Op. Tenn. Att¿y Gen. No. 06-150 (Oct. 2, 2006). Such a contract "is effectively delegating to the private company . . . the manner of enforcement and the enforcement itself of the city¿s traffic ordinances." Op. Tenn. Att¿y Gen. No. 06-150 (Oct. 2, 2006).

87. The Attorney General of the State of Tennessee has opined that a contract between a municipality and a third party that involves "the collection of fines" by that third party violates the principle that a state¿s sovereign powers may not be delegated to third parties. Op. Tenn. Att¿y Gen. No. 06-150 (Oct. 2, 2006). Such a contract "is effectively delegating to the private company . . . the manner of enforcement and the enforcement itself of the city¿s traffic ordinances." Op. Tenn. Att¿y Gen. No. 06-150 (Oct. 2, 2006).

88. Knoxville Code § 17-73 provides: "[a]ll fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon the forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be paid into the city treasury and deposited in the general fund and be expendable as provided by the city charter."

89. Knoxville Code § 17-210(d)(1) provides: "[a]ny violation of subsection (c) of this section shall subject the responsible person or entity to a civil penalty of $50, without assessment of court costs or fees. Failure to pay the civil penalty or appear in court to contest the citation on the designated date shall subject the responsible person or entity to assessment of court costs and fees as set forth in this chapter and chapter 8 of the Code of Ordinances."

90. The contract between the City of Knoxville and Redflex expressly provides that the collection of fines for traffic violations will be conducted by Redflex. Exhibit "D" of the Redflex Contract states "Redflex will collect all payments on Citations and will deposit all payments into a lockbox account . . .." Exhibit C, Redflex Contract.

91. On information and belief, the Redflex Contract violates Knoxville Code § 17-73 and such deposit of funds is actually barred by existing ordinance and a contract is void contract when the provisions of the contract are in conflict with the laws which govern the contract. The Redflex Contract is void. See also Shavitz v. City of High Point, COA 05-571 (N. C. Ct. App. May 16, 2006) attached hereto at Exhibit D.

92. The assessed court processing fee of $67.50 which is assessed in order to schedule a hearing is initially paid to Redflex and then shared by the City of Knoxville in a split of 85% Redflex 15% City of Knoxville according to Exhibit "D" of the Redflex Contract. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract.

93. If the payment is received by the City of Knoxville, then the City must forward the entire payment to Redflex according to Exhibit "D" of the Redflex Contract , therefore the City of Knoxville never has control of the payments made to Redflex until after deposit, all such payments only subject to administrative accounting by Redflex after deposit.

94. Redflex is impermissibly exercising police power by controlling the images which are relied upon by a City of Knoxville police officer, in this case Defendant Michael L. Sullivan, in the issuance of a Red Light Photo Enforcement Program Notice of Violation/Citation. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(2).

95. On information and belief, the only images relied upon, by the officer signing the citation, are the images which the officer declared under penalty of perjury were reviewed, namely the two images selected by Defendant Redflex for printing. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(6).

96. Reflex is exercising oversight and self serving training of the City of Knoxville police officers assigned to the Red Light Photo Enforcement Program and such close continuous relationship is an element of a supervisory relationship which is an impermissible exercise of police power by a private company for profit. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(D)(13).

97. Defendant Redflex provided training includes strategies for presenting "Violations Data" in court and judicial proceedings, an impermissible intrusion into prosecutor functions, and an apparent effort to train officers to prosecute alleged offenders whom they did not personally observe violating any statute, and therefore a planned contractual effort to train non-attorneys to present hearsay as fact and to act as prosecutors. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.15.

98. Defendant Redflex is contractually obligated to "interact with court and judicial personal" in an impermissible exercise of police power by developing the subpoena process, and controlling the coordination between Defendant Redflex, the City, and City Court personnel all of which is an impermissible exercise of police power by Defendant Redflex and an unconstitutional delegation of governmental authority. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.16. The effect of this delegation is to allow a private company, with an economic interest in enforcement, (payment is based on citations paid), to control the access of information to the court, and the presentation of that information to the court.

99. Defendant Redflex is granted ownership of evidence which is to be used in a court proceeding which is an impermissible transfer of governmental right and power to a private company, and a violation of Constitutional protection provided to defendants.

100. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the act of the City of Knoxville, void, and therefore any liability of the Plaintiff under the void ordinance, Knoxville Code § 17-210, a nullity, and that such enactment was a violation of the Plaintiff¿s Constitutional rights.

101. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the contract between the City of Knoxville and Defendant Redflex, void and therefore any effort by Defendant Redflex to collect any claimed sum derived from the contract or any liability of the Plaintiff under the void ordinance, Knoxville Code § 17-210, a nullity, and that such contract is a violation of the Plaintiff¿s Constitutional rights.

102. Plaintiff claims damages for the denial of proper access to the Court to defend herself, in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trail, and her attorney fees, available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

103. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants must disgorge themselves of the obtained funds and return the money to the parties from whom Defendants using unconstitutional practices did seize the money from, and that her attorneys be compensated in accord with the common fund doctrine for the benefit accruing to the beneficiaries of the litigation.

[DAYWALKER]

SECTION 1983 and 1988

(Contract Revenue Sharing to Deprive Civil Rights)

104. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

105. The assessed court processing fee of $67.50 which is assessed in order to schedule a hearing is initially paid to Defendant Redflex and then shared by the City of Knoxville in a split of 85% Defendant Redflex 15% City of Knoxville. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract at Exhibit D.

106. If the payment is received by the City of Knoxville, then the City must forward the entire payment to Defendant Redflex according to Exhibit D of the Redflex Contract , therefore the City of Knoxville never has control of the payments made to Defendant Redflex until after deposit, all such payments only subject to administrative accounting by Defendant Redflex after deposit.

107. Knoxville Code § 17-73 provides: "[a]ll fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon the forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be paid into the city treasury and deposited in the general fund and be expendable as provided by the city charter."

108. Knoxville Code § 17-210(d)(1) provides: "[a]ny violation of subsection (c) of this section shall subject the responsible person or entity to a civil penalty of $50, without assessment of court costs or fees. Failure to pay the civil penalty or appear in court to contest the citation on the designated date shall subject the responsible person or entity to assessment of court costs and fees as set forth in this chapter and chapter 8 of the Code of Ordinances."

109. The contract between the City of Knoxville and Defendant Redflex expressly provides that the collection of fines for traffic violations will be conducted by Defendant Redflex. Exhibit "D" of the Redflex Contract states "Redflex will collect all payments on Citations and will deposit all payments into a lockbox account . . .." Exhibit C, Redflex Contract at Exhibit D.

110. On information and belief, the Redflex Contract violates Knoxville Code § 17-73 and such deposit of funds is actually barred by existing ordinance.

111. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the Contract between the City of Knoxville and Defendant Redflex, void and therefore any liability of the Plaintiff under the void ordinance, Knoxville Code § 17-210, a nullity, and that such enactment was a violation of the Plaintiffs Constitutional rights.

112. Plaintiff claims damages for the denial of proper access to the Court to defend herself, in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trail, and her attorney fees, available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

113. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants must disgorge themselves of the obtained funds and return the money to the parties from whom Defendants using unconstitutional practices did seize the money from, and that her attorneys be compensated in accord with the common fund doctrine for the benefit accruing to the beneficiaries of the litigation.



SECTION 1983 and 1988

(Injunction)

114. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

115. The injury to the Plaintiff is capable of repeating and therefore an injunction to order Defendants to cease acting in a manner which violates Constitutional guarantees of due process is necessary.

116. Plaintiff seeks temporary and permanent injunctions to suspend enforcement of Knoxville Code § 17-210.

OPEN RECORDS ACT

117. Plaintiff adopts and restates the previous paragraphs.

118. On information and belief, the records of the City of Knoxville are records which are available for public inspection, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 10-7-503.

119. On information and belief, Defendant Redflex, is a quasi-governmental agency within the meaning of Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tenn. 2002).1

1 "Under Tennessee Public Records Act, the public should have access to the records of every private entity which provides any specific, contracted-for services to governmental agencies, and while a private business does not open its records to public scrutiny merely by doing business with, or performing services on behalf of, state or municipal government, when an entity assumes responsibility for providing public functions to such an extent that it becomes the functional equivalent of a governmental agency, the Tennessee Public Records Act guarantees that the entity is held accountable to the public for its performance of those functions." Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tenn. 2002).

120. On information and belief, the Violation Data of the automated red light enforcement program are City of Knoxville records. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

121. On information and belief, Defendant Redflex retains possession, control, and access of the Violation Data of the automated red light enforcement program. Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

122. The Redflex Contract provides that the violation data is the property of the City however, that Defendant Redflex "shall not disclose Violation Data or privately disclose or use the Violations Data for any purposes whatsoever except as specified in [the Redflex Contract] without the prior written consent of the City, except for information that: (1) is or becomes generally available to the public through no fault of Redflex personal; or (2) is required to be disclosed by law or by a court of competent jurisdiction." Exhibit C, Redflex Contract para. 1.4(C).

123. Defendant Redflex has delegated, internally or contractually, response to Plaintiff request to view her images using the method, the only method, provided in the citation, to Defendant Photonotice and such set of images are a redacted set without a manner to copy or retain the images.

124. The City of Knoxville has violated the statutory intent of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 10-7-503 when the City entered a contract which limits public access to traffic enforcement records and requires that persons seeking access to Violation Data obtain written approval for such public review of the data.

125. The intentional violation of the Open Records Act is apparent as this provision appears to agree with the Knoxville Code requirement that no reporting of violations to the Tennessee Department of Safety shall occur. Knoxville Code § 17-210.

126. The safety of the public is adversely impacted by this violation of the Tennessee Open Records act as automobile insurance companies should be able to access the Violations Data to determine which drivers are operating vehicles in an inappropriate manner and adjust their insurance rate accordingly, all of which protects or furthers protection of the public.

127. Such contract is void as against the Tenn. Code. Ann. § 10-7-503, and the decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court which has held that private companies which assume governmental function are subject to the provisions of the act.

128. Plaintiff sought to review her records and such records have been redacted in an impermissible manner.

129. That redaction of the images is a violation of the Open Records Act.

130. That the intentional failure to provide a method to copy the images is a violation of the Open Records Act.

131. That the contractual provision to limit access to the citations is a violation of the Open Records Act.

132. Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring defendants from enforcement of the offensive contractual provision, and which directs Defendants to obey the law, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 10-7-503.

133. Plaintiff seeks her attorney fees, available under the statute.