Right to Travel Excerpts from Invisible Contracts by George Mercer

[heyday]

"Citizens are members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in the associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a Government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual, as well as their collective rights. In the formation of a Government, the people may confer upon it such powers as they choose. The Government, when so formed, may, and when called upon should, exercise all the powers it has for the protection of the rights of its Citizens and the people within its jurisdiction; but it can exercise no other. The duty of a Government to afford protection is limited always by the power it possesses for that purpose." - United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) http://laws.findlaw.com/US/92/524.html


the contents of the Code of Federal Regulations (like it's father, the Federal Register) are required to be judicially noticed. 44 United States Code 1507. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/44/1507.html


And the Code of Federal Regulations is also Prima Facie Evidence of the text of the original documents. 44 United States Code 1510

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/44/1510.html


Other state monopolies like Driver's Licenses and motor vehicle registrations are very much used by the IRS in many ways to assist them in tax collections; and state tax collectors also use these records for their own statute enforcement and state treasury enrichment conquests as well. When those Driver's License records are collected by the state, they are also forwarded to Washington, and then redistributed to foreign persons and foreign political jurisdictions under numerous executive agreements, diplomatic and military treaties, and bureaucratic cordialities.

Yet, even though you entered into those state licenses merely to avoid your incarceration as an unlicensed driver, the uncontested preparation of a state created juristic personality, such through a Driver's License, to the Supreme Court would be prospectively sufficient for that Court to attach in personam liability to Title 26 as a Person accepting special state created benefits

"Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon condition that a fee be paid in return for the privilege. And such a fee may be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to adjust competitive or economic inequalities. Taxation may be made the implement of the exercise of the state's police powers." - Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company vs. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, at 426 (1936)

http://laws.findlaw.com/US/301/412.html#426


It is also reasonable to infer that a Driver's License is evidence of Residency, and of the acceptance of a wide-ranging array of state benefits tailored to Residents. Remember that your use of those highways is your acceptance of a benefit that Government created, and since reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect: Invisible and automatic.


Judges often have a difficult time ruling on the question as to whether or not an assumed name was fraudulently used to deceive other people. The reason why this difficulty is inherent with assumed names is due to the Common Law right of anyone to assume any name they feel like, how and when they feel like it, and without any petition to Government for such an assumption of a nom de plume. See United States vs. Cox, 593 F.2nd 46 (1979), and United States vs. Wasman, 484 F.Supp. 54 (1979), for Cases where Federal Judges wrestled quite a bit with this question.


However, other folks are not able to so quickly terminate the Driver's License due to the fundamental importance of the thing and either their present inability to successfully handle a criminal prosecution or their reluctance to assign something deleterious to it; and so at a minimum, an Objection and a Declaratory Judgment to Quiet Status originated in Federal District Court is in order. The Declaratory Judgment, ruling that the Driver's License was a Compelled License, existing as a coerced instrument signed by you to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver, and is not to be used by the IRS or anyone else for the expansive purposes of evidence of either Residency or of Domiciliary, nor as evidence of entrance into Commerce, or of the taxable acceptance of federal or state created benefits, or of consent to be bound by any statute, other than those state motor vehicle statutes. The objective of our pursuit of a Declaratory Judgment is: That since the license was compelled out of us when some de minimis tension is in effect with a Substantive Right (the Right to Travel), and since the avowed purpose of the license itself is to adduce Evidence of Competency, then the extraneous collateral expectations of reciprocity in any area outside of those Motor Vehicle Statutes it would otherwise create when left unchallenged, is now terminated.


[12] The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel is slightly different from Collateral Estoppel in that Equitable Estoppel precludes a litigant who wrongfully induced another to adversely change his position from asserting a right or defense, which is what happens when IRS termites start chopping away at the off-point benefits derived from a State License acquired solely to avoid penal consequences, under tension with a Substantive Right:

"... the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy." - J. Pomeroy in 3 Equity Jurisprudence, Section 804 95th Edition (1941)].

Traditionally, Courts have been reluctant to hold the operation of this Doctrine against the Government. [See generally Estoppel Against State, County, and City in 23 Washington Law Review 51 (1948)]. Consequently, since Government is let off the responsibility hook, people with claims against the Government have often suffered wrongs unnecessarily that Courts would not have tolerated had both litigants been non-juristic parties; yet things have been loosening up a bit since the Oil Shale Cases [see Emergence of an Equitable Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government -- The Oil Shale Cases in 46 University of Colorado Law Review 433 (1975)]. In 1981, the Supreme Court seemed willing to entertain the use of this Equitable Estoppel Doctrine against the Government in Schweiker vs. Hansen [see Equitable Estoppel Against the Government by Deborah Eisen, in 67 Cornell Law Review 609 (1982)].


If you are going to Object to, and have new narrow contours now defined on your Driver's License in order to restrain its use by other Government agencies as the high-powered King's Equity attachment instrument that it is, then the Objection should generally follow the model pattern set forth above in the discussion of Federal Reserve Notes. This Objection should refer to the exact state penal statute that you are applying for the license under Objection and protest, merely to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver. Contracts entered into where arrest was threatened are coercive, and are wide open to attack. Read the story of the finding of the sunken lost Spanish Galleon ship, the Atocha, and the subsequent muscle threats by the State of Florida to arrest the underwater treasure hunters if they didn't agree to turn over a percentage of their treasure finds to the Florida Prince, in the State of Florida vs. Treasure Salvors, Inc. [458 U.S. 670(1980)].

http://laws.findlaw.com/US/458/670.html

Footnote number 4 refers to the Federal District Court in Florida that ruled that those contracts so signed were coercive. [If the treasure hunters were smart, they would have filed a Rejection of Police Power Benefits with the State of Florida, and then present the Judiciary with an entirely different factual setting to rule on. Maybe the Treasure Hunters wanted the protectorate benefits of the guns and cages offered by the State; if so, then they should have tendered the reciprocity so expected.]


If you are just too busy to go down to the law library and find out the exact wording of that penal statute, I have no sympathy for any rebuffment that you will experience later on as some appellate forum rules adversely against you, on the grounds that your state of mind was not clarified substantively or timely. Also included should be a brief recap of the Right to Travel Cases in the United States Supreme Court


Such as:

*

Edwards vs. California, 314 U.S. 160
*

Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
*

Williams vs. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, at 274
*

Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, at 43-44
*

The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard 287, at 492
*

U.S. vs. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, at 757-758 (1966)
*

Griffin vs. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, at 105-106 (1971)
*

Califano vs. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, at 4, note 6
*

Shapiro vs. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
*

Califano vs. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, at 176 (1978)

[heyday]

All of which were cited in Alexander Haig vs. CIA Agent Philip Agee, 435 U.S. 280, at 306 (1980), which reaffirmed the Right to Travel within the United States, and then distinguished that Right from the lessor administrative "freedom" to travel outside the terra firma of the United States as being discretionary, within reasonable limits, by the King over his Subjects, as all "Citizens" are operating under the administrative jurisdiction of contractual King's Equity. See also a separate but parallel Freedom of Movement Doctrine; and United States vs. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1966); and The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem by Louis Jaffee in 35 Foreign Affairs, at 17 (October, 1956) which discusses, at a light level, the national interest implications involved when the Right to Travel is under tension with statutes.


Patriots and Highway Protesters are reaching incorrect conclusions when they cite the Right to Travel Cases as being sufficiently substantive to annul state statutes requiring highway operator's licenses. Those Right to Travel Cases only offer a line of reasoning parallel with your objectives. Only in loose dicta does the reasoning found in the Right to Travel Cases support your position; so they offer a mitigating source of relief against state statutes, but not a necessarily vitiating source of relief. Nowhere did our Founding Fathers restrain the states from requiring licenses to operate motor vehicles or anything else on public highways, and the words Right to Travel do not even appear anywhere in the Constitution.


Remember the word public, as used by Judges, generally means Government. When appellate judges use the words affects a public interest to justify some further state intervention somewhere, what they mean is that a Government interest is affected. As applied to Highway law, partial justification for the state judicial affirmance of the requirement to hold an operator's license is the fact that the regulatory jurisdiction the State Legislature is asserting over those highways does, in fact, "affect a Governmental interest," as it is the state that spends the money to acquire the land, build the highway, and then spends incredible amounts of more money, year in and year out without any let up, to maintain those roads. If that does not affect a Governmental interest, then would someone explain just what would?


And although the words Right to Travel do not appear anywhere in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has, through their Opinions, given that right Constitutional status cognizance.


"...[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any even, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. ... The constitutional right to travel from one State to another... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized." - United States vs. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, at 757 et seq. (1966) [Sentences were quoted out of order].

Although that statement is correct, it only applies to interstate travelling. Protesting Patriots suggesting that fraudulent factual averments of interstate travelling be adduced as defensive instruments in local traffic prosecution arguments, as I have heard, are improvident -- the selective incorporation of deception into your modus operandi will only postpone the day of arrival for that silver bullet which Highway Contract Protesters are searching for, a bullet which lies within yourselves.

But whatever de minimis protective penumbra the Right to Travel Cases offers, you are now invoking to abate both your regional Prince and the King's Tax Collectors who use Department of Motor Vehicle information and legal assumptions that information infers for their own enrichment purposes. In this circumstantial context of submitting a carefully pre-planned and prepared written Objection, where time is not of the essence, failure to cite your authorities (failure to explain your justifications) timely could be fatal. You are up against high-powered adversaries, and lightly drafting papers, as if you were on a picnic, is fatal. Judges do not owe you Justice aligned with your philosophy; those are adversary court proceedings you are in, where mere preponderance wins, and an insubstantive Objection is open to attack. (And remember that a Right to Travel also lies outside of, and beyond the reach of, the King's Charter (the Constitution)


Does the following restrainment on Government appear any place in the Constitution?...

"The streets belong to the public in the ordinary way. Their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper." - Packard vs. Barton, 264 U.S. 140, at 144 (1923).

Some judicial forms from another era have applied the Liberty Clause in the Fifth Amendment to restrain the interference by the Federal Government in the Right to Travel area (but keep in mind that those Cases were ruled upon in an era when automobiles and other high-powered technology did not exist in the United States, and highway contracts with States did not exist then, as well).


"The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the Citizen cannot be deprived of, without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment... Freedom of movement across frontiers... and inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage..." - Kent vs. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, at 125 (1958).


So your objective in having the contours of the Driver's License restrained to now apply only to Highway Contract grievances, the Right to Travel being claimed is both of a Constitutional origin, as well as of a Natural origin, ex-Constitutional.


The Supreme Court once ruled that the Right to Travel interstate overruled State arguments of social or economic consequences:

"The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance, and the Court's decision, therefore, did not require an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of that right." - San Antonio School District vs. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, at 32 (1973).

[heyday]

But important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your Declaration therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of that State together with correlative supporting averments of Benefit Rejections ( Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in effect, and contracts have to be attacked for substantive reasons, such as Failure of Consideration, and do not roll over and die by your mere unilateral declarations of their nonexistence. )regardless of any statute that facially appears to force Residency Status on persons physically inhabited in that state for an extended period of time. In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal difference between a Domiciliary and a Resident. In Hammerstein vs. Lynee [200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court ruled that the word reside in the 14th Amendment's State Citizenship Clause also meant Domiciliary. One of the characteristics of the English Language is the lack of identity of some of the words that comprise its structure; many words have found multiple homes in different locations, and therefore meanings must be abated pending consideration of an enlarged context of the surrounding words. Residence and Domicile are two such words in Law that, on some occasions, are interchangeable, and on other occasions, are not interchangeable. The recurring semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly responsible for since they continuously refuse to define explicit meanings] to be inherently difficult broncos to tie down, was noted once by a Federal Court, when dealing with a Domiciliary question:

"The theoretical domicile which is equivalent to State Citizenship is always one which exists animo revertendi [meaning with intention to revert back]. The theoretical domicile which clings to a homeless wanderer, who never intends to return, has its uses in deciding rights of succession to property, in respect to taxation and to the administration of pauper laws, but is not, I think, equivalent to Citizenship in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the Judiciary Act. While domicile, in some sense, may not be lost by mere departure with intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost. In other words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home, where absence from domicile is amino revertendi, domicile may be equivalent to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists merely by legal fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent never to return to the state of domicile, the word is not synonymous with Citizenship." - Pannil vs. Roanoke Times Company, 252 Federal 910, at 915 (1918).

Therefore, correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the purely voluntary nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that you are an Inhabitant of that State without juristic benefits, and neither a Resident nor a Domiciliary Benefit Acceptant; but your self-proclaimed status as an inhabitant means nothing until you first reject all state constitutional benefits, and the benefits of Residency, and the police protectorate powers, in particular.

But if your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge generally will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated reciprocity terms of a Commercial contract (which Driver's Licenses can be applied to operate as a Commercial Enfranchisement Instrument under some limited circumstances) against a person, in a setting other than the originally specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that contract under compelled circumstances in order to avoid incarceration merely to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the Right to Travel), and without experiencing any Commercial benefit therefrom. State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme Court on grounds relating to Right to Travel. In Shapiro vs. Thompson [394 U.S. 618 (1969)], the Supreme Court ruled that the interstate right to travel overruled and annulled state residency statutes [where welfare grants offered by States restricted to persons living in that kingdom for at least one year, where annulled. This is a unique case in the sense that its reasoning will never surface anywhere else, as the claimed "chilling effect" the state residency statutes generated on the Interstate Right to Travel represented one of philosophical justification. Substitute the same "chilling effect" Right to Travel reasoning on any other Patriot state residency Protester case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.


That is the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to hear. The documentation and proof that the Supreme Court would want to see is a copy of the application for the Driver's License where it says you signed it under protest; proof of service of your Objection on state officials, the Objection itself, and a 30-day invitation to those state officials to let them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if the application of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed mandatory on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials to come out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to you they might not want you to know). Under your Declaratory Judgment, the Driver's License will be construed to act exclusively as Evidence of Competency under Motor Vehicle statutes only.


"Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle." - Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).


[...]


One of the evolving stages in the life of what are now contemporary penal Motor Vehicle Statutes had, as one of their previous stages, the purpose of assigning legal rights and liabilities to Motor Vehicle operators so that civil litigants can have fault and damages assessed against them in a courtroom.

For example, in Massachusetts, it originally was known as the Trespasser on the Highway Doctrine;( In 1692 the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts enacted a little slice of lex, called the Lord's Day Act, that said:

"... no traveller... shall travel on that day..."

In 1876, a negligent Defendant successfully invoked this statute to bar the recovery by a Plaintiff who was injured while walking on a Sunday [Smith vs. Boston and Maine R.R., 120 Mass. 490 (1876)]. To the Supreme Judicial Court, the Plaintiff was "... unlawfully traveling upon the highway" [id., at 492]. In 1877, the Massachusetts Legislature removed the civil liabilities that permeated the Lord's Day Act.and later evolved into a regulatory jurisdiction when Massachusetts enacted a comprehensive Motor Vehicle Act after automobiles made their highway appearance. )"... all automobiles... shall be registered" and "... no automobile... shall be operated... unless registered." - Massachusetts Acts, c.473, Section I,3 (1903).

Six years later, in Dudley vs. Northhampton Street Railway [202 Mass. 443 (1909)], the court denied an owner of an unregistered car recovery against a negligent Defendant on the ground that the former was a "trespasser on the highway." Although the Defendant pressed the analogy of the Lord's Day Cases, the court was able to find additional support for its ruling, by attributing to the statute a purpose of facilitating identification of motor travelers by requiring registration of vehicles. By also forbidding the operation an unregistered automobile, the court found it logical to charge the motor vehicle owner and operator of an unregistered motor vehicle with liability for damages caused to others, regardless of any mitigating negligence elements present in the factual setting. In Fairbanks vs. Kemp, 226 Mass. 75 (1917), the owner of an unregistered automobile, although exercising due care and caution, was held liable because of a statutory violation]. See, generally,

*

Huddy in I Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, Section 249 (1932); Fifth Edition;
*

Editor's Note in Trespasser on the Highway Doctrine, 46 Harvard Law Review (1946).



The talk from Patriots and Highway Contract Protesters that I hear constantly, about how the old Common Law says this and that about my rights to use Government Highways anyway that I feel like it, ( "Highways are public roads, which every Citizen has a right to use." - 3 Kent Commentaries 32.

See also; several English authorities:

*

Sutcliffe vs. Greenwood, 8 Price 535;
*

Rex vs. Camberworth, 3 B. & Adol. 108.

And for other English commentators, see:

*

Shelford on Highways;
*

Woolrych on Ways.

For American authorities, a point of beginning is:

*

Makepeace vs. Worthen, 1 N.H. 16;
*

Peck vs. Smith, 1 Connecticut 103;
*

Robins vs. Borman, 1 Pick. 122;
*

Jackson vs. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 477;
*

Stackpole vs. Healy, 16 Massachusetts 33, and the many Case citations therein )is actually not relevant today in the United States.

[heyday]

For a detailed presentation of what our Father's simple Highway Common Law was like in that serene and tranquil era, before automotive technology contamination steamrolled our Common Law into the ground by way of an overriding contract, see: Treatise on the Law of Highways, by Joseph Angell [Little, Brown & Company (1868)], and its Second Edition, published in 1886; and Law of Roads and Streets, by Byron Elliott [Brown Merrill & Company (1890)] and its Second Edition published in 1900. Both books have thousands and thousands of Case citations. The Fourth Edition has two volumes and was co-authored by Byron and William Elliott [Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis (1926)]



Reasons: First, the factual setting that our Father's Common Law on free ingress and egress developed out on the King's Highways is not replicated today in the United States, since technology has changed the factual setting that our Father's Common Law used to operate on.



What technology has done to our Law on a factual setting of Government highways is the same that technology has done to the Law of Patent Property Rights:

"I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an opinion, that the vast transforming forces of technology have reduced obsolete much of our patent law." - Felix Frankfurter in Marconi Wireless vs. United States, 320 U.S. 1, at 63 (1942).

And just as technology rolled up its sleeves and went to work to convert our once quiescent highways over into a setting of high-powered vehicles, so too has technology gone to work on running our Patent Law into the ground; and now also privacy itself has also fallen by the wayside, as technological innovations make their appearance on the scene:

"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protections of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right `to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that `what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops [footnotes deleted]." - Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, at 195 (1890).

Constitutions can very much be written to organically self-enlarge with the passage of time to be made to apply to factual settings then unknown at the time that Constitution was being written; but our Founding Fathers in 1787 did not do that.

Contemporary technology has very much changed the quiescent horse & buggy era and pedestrian highway factual setting our Father's Common Law grew up on. For a recent presentation of what technology will do to trigger the appearance of Highway regulatory lex where there had been none before, a view of Pitcairn Island in the South Pacific is revealing. Pitcairn Island is steeped in the allure of intrigue, as it was colonized by Fletcher Christian and his fellow mutineers from the HMS Bounty in 1790. It is a British Colony two square miles in area and is administered by an Island Council under the British High Commissioner Governor in New Zealand. For all of Pitcairn's history up until recent days, only pedestrians and wheelbarrows were even seen on its highways, but in 1965, things changed. A heavy Bristol crawler tractor made its appearance on the Island [see the Pitcairn Miscellany (the Island newspaper) for January 31, 1965]; and soon that tractor was followed by a second tractor [id., August 31, 1965]. Within a few months after the first tractor had arrived, a large number of imported bicycles were making their appearances, and so now the appearance of some lex was imminent for Pitcairn Island:

"With so many bikes here, traffic rules will be the next new thing to be introduced here." - Editorial, Pitcairn Miscellany, August 31, 1965.

Sure enough, the road lex soon followed in November, 1965 [id., November 30, 1965] by vote of the Island Council.

In the old horse and buggy days of England, highways were largely dirt paths acquired from the easement forfeiture from adjoining landowners. Here in the United States up until the 1940s or so, there was an extensive network of privately owned toll roads -- Government was just not "into" highways that much. In old England, the King never spent any money on those dirt paths called highways, as there was nothing to maintain; so when foul weather, even adverse weather lasting across an entire season made its appearance, then the roads simply ground to a standstill, and noting moved. Back in the old days, when highways became impassable, things drew to a standstill -- and society literally stopped and occasionally starved as well:

"Roads were so bad, and the chain of home trade so feeble, that there was often scarcity of grain in one part, and plenty in another part of the kingdom." - Encyclopedia Britannica under "Corn Laws" [Cambridge, England (1910)] 11th Edition.

But today, Government is spending incredible amounts of money, year in and year out, to build and maintain highways, so Right to Travel argument parallels that folks draw that try to disable the contemporary ability of the King to even ask for reciprocity back in return for benefits offered are incorrect -- since in the old days, the King was not offering a special benefit to begin with (except in some London streets constructed with cobblestone), and so to say that the King was once disabled back then from asking for reciprocity when the King never initially provided any benefits, is an incorrect parallel built upon disparate factual settings.

And today, high-powered technology routinely causes wholesale death and destruction when an operator does no more than momentarily lose absolute mental concentration on driving -- and in such a factual setting, an honest assessment by Highway Contract Protesters of the underlying legitimacy of the requirement that there be Evidence of Competency, would necessarily result in the conclusion that a Driver's License, so called, really isn't all that unreasonable, and is in fact, very reasonable.

"We agree that the States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed." - Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).


So it is technology that is responsible for the Prince's Highway lex, and not the traffic density congestion that is created from the mere existence of other people in Society. In ancient times, metropolitan cities were frequently heavily congested with traffic. Long before the City of Paris leveled entire neighborhoods to widen some streets in the 1700s, in the First Century B.C., Julius Caesar banned wheeled traffic (not pedestrians) from the streets of Rome during peak daylight hours. The result was that to some extent the wheeled traffic waited until dusk to use the streets; pedestrians were free to use the streets during the daylight hours, causing wheeled vehicles to shift their street congestion into late night hours [see C.A.J. Skeel in Travel in the First Century After Christ, With Special Reference to Asia Minor, at 65; Cambridge University Press (1901)].

[heyday]

An interesting and very strong argument can be made by your adversaries, arguing that it would be the failure of the states to preemptively regulate the highways by licensing that interferes with your Right to Travel, since having physiologically incompetent drivers out on the highways obstructs and interferes with the Right to Travel of those other drivers who are competent. "... it has always been recognized as one of the powers and duties of a Government to remove obstructions from the highways under its control." - In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, at 586 (1894).


"Laws requiring that drivers be licensed and that applicants be subjected to thorough examination apparently are a more effective means of reducing accidents." - Note, Development of Standards in Speed Legislation, 46 Harvard Law Review 838, at 842 (1942).

In footnotes 31, 32 and 33, the Traveller's Insurance Company is found disseminating information on highway traffic accidents back in the 1920s and 1930s; having achieved their important objectives of filling the Motor Vehicle Statute books full of penal codes, the insurance companies largely faded away from the scene.

Do you see what a difficult corner clever insurance companies have worked judges into? Their arguments are logical, and coming up from a factual setting steeped in the presence of juristic contracts, great weight will be given to their arguments, no matter how self-serving, twisted, or vicious they may be. Special Interest looters, Tory Aristocrats, and Gremlins, reigning supreme up and down the corridors of American legislatures, have been going to work on the meat there since the founding of the Republic:

"That corruption should find its way into the Governments of our infant republic, and contaminate the very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to the passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most deeply to be deplored." - Fletcher vs. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, at 130 (1810).

Here in 1985, the only persons who would actually try and dispute the presence of looters in American legislatures are those folks who live most distant from reality, of which there are quite a few, and collectively they write many books which in turn propagates their error, which is sometimes intentional.

Whenever anyone, regardless of your relational Status off the highways, uses those Government highways, an invisible contract is in effect right then and there; it is not necessary for your regional Prince, the State, to adduce written evidence of your consent -- just like it is not necessary to get a contract in writing to get the contract enforced judicially. If I am a roofing contractor, and we agree to have me repair your roof, I don't need any written contract on you at all to throw Mechanic's Liens on your property, perfect an in rem Judgment against your house, and then sell at Foreclosure your own house right out from underneath you -- without anything having been placed "in writing;" I do not need your "consent" to get my money out of your house, if you default on the contract. A Highway Contract Protester would argue that since nothing was signed, the contract does not exist; but your arguments are defective, and you Protesters don't know what you are talking about.


When Protesters get up in the morning, get out the old car, and drive into the street, they are literally driving themselves into a contract -- as the Protester then and there accepted benefits conditionally offered by the State -- no where in your State Constitution does it require the Prince to build and maintain those Highways of his, so his building and offering those Highways for your consideration and possible use is purely discretionary on his part; nor is your Prince restrained from possessing any expectation of reciprocity from persons accepting the benefits derived from the use of those Government Highways.

Today, regional Princes are calling the shots on Highway regulatory matters -- tomorrow, the King intends to grab for himself those Highways. Executive Order 11921 ["Adjusting Emergency Preparedness Assignments..."], largely for use in a post-war scenario, claims jurisdiction to recover from National Emergencies [See 41 Federal Register 24293 for June 15th, 1976]. Sections 804(4)(b) ["Construction, use and management of highways, streets, and appurtenant structures..."] to justify this impending Federal grab, as soon as some emergency can be manufactured. This Executive Order 11921 superseded in art, and complemented in part, an earlier Executive Order 11940 from the Nixon era [October 28, 1969], that was designed to justify Federal pre-war seizure of everything.


So our Father's old Common Law isn't being contaminated at all by Star Chamber Traffic Court judges ignoring the fact that no Tort damages were caused by the criminal defendant, as they go about their work prosecuting technical infractions to Highway Contracts: Because neither of the twin Tort indicia of either mens rea or corpus delecti deficiency arguments sounding in the sugar sweet liability vitiating music of Tort Law that Highway Contract Protesters love to throw at Traffic Court judges, are not even relevant whenever contracts are up for review and enforcement -- they never have been, and they never will be...In some States, criminal procedure statutes were written in such a way that criminal intent was required to be adduced by prosecuting attorneys under circumstances where contracts are actually in effect. Patriots who know how to weasel out of traffic prosecutions in those few States where this legislative rule is in effect, by citing those criminal intent requirement statutes on no driver's license prosecutions, are not correct in associating any prevailing significance to the existence of those statutes, other than the fact that, yes, some clown in their legislature once messed up -- just like legislatures have messed up elsewhere in criminal procedure statutes in other states. Those State statutes were written by intelligentsia lawyers -- and so now the degenerate commingling of Tort indicia into contract infractions by a few states, together with the willful withholding of the identification of the creation of invisible contracts when special juristic benefits were quietly accepted out in the practical setting (benefits carrying regulatory hooks of lingering reciprocity expectations along with them) by many other States, is not to be construed as overruling the authenticity of the information presented herein. Errors and other enactments representative of improvident reasoning by legislatures are actually quite frequent in American legal history; and always remember that legislatures do not create Nature -- they never have and they never will.


Many folks out there are searching for a silver bullet; I hear references to that perennial search constantly. They are searching for some legal procedure, some great air-tight line of reasoning, some great legal brief that just ties it all together, to throw at the IRS and Traffic Court judges. These folks are missing the boat, so to speak, all together: Because the origin to their frustration lies in invisible contracts, and you become a party to those invisible contracts because you accepted some benefit someone else was conditionally offering.


"Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes, turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name." - William Morris in A Dream of John Ball ["The Commonweal Magazine" (November 13, 1886); reprinted by Longmans Green and Company, London (1924)].


And for some philosophically uncomfortable reasons, the reciprocity on your part that the contract calls for is never forthcoming. Even walking into a shopping center could be a contract -- if the management so much as posts a notice giving some conditional or qualified use to persons entering therein and accepting the benefits the management is offering (such as requiring shoes and shirts, and so are the arguments of unfairness -- that those reciprocal terms of wearing shirts and shoes just don't apply to you because you traveled from just so far away -- as some shopping center security guard throws you out of the place -- is just whimpering). It is actually the continued refusal by Protesters to first see, and then honor, invisible contracts that creates the friction that irritates Protesters so much, and the silver bullet you Protesters are looking for actually lies within yourself.

Remember that your use of those Government highways is your acceptance of a special benefit that Government created and offers, and since reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect: Automatic and invisible. And one of the ways out of a contract altogether is to prove Failure of Consideration (meaning that you did not accept any benefit the other party offered).


Another way out is through the preemptive intervention of International Law for those persons having Diplomatic Status through institutions recognized as such by the President of the United States. Another way to get out of a State asserted contract is to be a Federal Employee and start using those highways while engaged in Federal work. In an Opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court once ruled that it is not Constitutionally permissible for a State to throw a slice of regulatory lex at a Federal Employee driving a motor vehicle on State highways while on Federal business. While touching on the broader recurring question of just what are those frequently overlapping contours of Federal/State legislative jurisdiction, the Supreme Court said that:

[heyday]

"Of course an Employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from State Law while acting in the course of his Employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice Washington in United States vs. Hart [Pet. C.C. 390; 5 Opinions of the Attorney General, at 554]. It very well may be that, when the United States has not spoken [here is the Ratification Doctrine surfacing again: That silence is sometimes very significant], the subjection to local law would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the Employment -- as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets. Commonwealth vs. Closson, 229 Massachusetts 329. This might stand on much the same footing as liability under the Common Law of a State to a Person injured by the driver's negligence. But even the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a Marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the Laws of the United States. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1." - Johnson vs. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, at 56 (1920).

Here in Johnson, a Federal Employee was prosecuted for not having a driver's permit, and the Supreme Court annulled the application of that State statute to this Federal Employee. Yes, working for the King does have some peripheral benefits. And as for State statutes not controlling the conduct of the United States Marshal, boy I can just hear some sophomoric Tax Protester, having won perhaps the Governorship of a state, announcing to the world that Residents of that State won't need to concern themselves with the IRS anymore; boy does the King have a few surprises up his sleeve for that clown.

Just how does a person prove Failure of Consideration when he was caught accepting a benefit by driving down a state highway? The Right to Travel Cases really don't support the position of you Protesters very well; however, there is some merit in your harmless expression of political dissent, even if the dissent is technically improper (addressing the argument specifically). There is simply no statement anywhere in the Right to Travel Cases that bluntly restrains the States:

"No state shall require licensing as a condition of use of public thoroughfares."

And since our Founding Fathers never restrained the States in this area, then snickering at judges today who are writing on a record that does not restrain expectations of reciprocity is improvident: That somewhat tranquil era of horse and buggies no longer dominates the highways, where in its place today lies the high-powered automotive technology making its appearance; and also gone from the scene is our Father's old Common Law on basic Property Rights [the right to clean air uncontaminated by automotive exhaust], which has also taken the back seat.

Federal Judge David Bazelon once write a piece touching on an aspect of Technology and of its effect on our Law [Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 Cornell Law Review 817 (1977)]; despite Judge Bazelon's elevated sensitivity to the big environmental picture with the long-term declension seminally originating with Technology, he misses the boat in not defining solutions along re-establishing clean Property Rights lines that our Fathers once possessed.


[...]


But... remember that the question of damages or no damages is a Tort Law factual setting question and it not relevant when you are out on those state highways: Because a contract is in effect whenever you use those highways, by your acceptance of benefits offered for your use conditionally. When you operate a motor vehicle over those state highways, you have accepted special benefits created and offered by the state, and so when accepting juristic benefits, in the context of reciprocity being expected back in return, then there lies a contract -- quietly, invisible, automatic, and rather strong. The relational non-Commercial, non-Resident, and non-Citizen status of the operator off of the highway is irrelevant in attaching contract liability by accepting the use of the benefit of Government highways. A specific, on-point adjudication on this Driver's License Question is going to involve this question:

Whether the States have the standing jurisdiction required to force, under penal statutes, a regulatory jurisdiction such a contract creates, when tension is in effect between the existence of that contract, and the substantive Right to Travel interests discussed in appellate rulings.

In every recent state court ruling that I have examined (post 1930 era) where a Quo Warranto type of question was being addressed, ( Quo Warranto asks the question: By what Jurisdiction? )

all courts forced a regulatory jurisdiction over the operator of a motor vehicle, and pleas and cries for restrainments based on Right to Travel and Right to Work tensions and the like, have all universally fallen on deaf ears with state judges in this era, and also by Federal Judges when addressing questions of Civil Rights violations relief when Highway Contract Protesters throw vindictive Section 1983 actions at some traffic cop.

Yet despite this predominate skew towards contract priority in judicial Right to Travel doctrinal reasoning, annulment by the Supreme Court of criminal liability for the innocent use of public highways under circumstances where no collaborating damages were caused, would be appropriate; an honest assessment of the total factual picture by a sophisticated judge would result in the conclusion that merely driving a car down a street without a license does not ascend to the minimum threshold requirements that characterize legitimate criminal incarceration standards -- compelled contract or no compelled contract; those penal highway statutes exist by virtue of Special Interest Group sponsorship and pressure, and judges are diminishing their own stature and violate the restraining mandates inherent in the Republican Form of Government Clause, by letting clever and politically ambitious Special Interest Groups get away with whatever they can buy in Legislatures to damage innocent behavior under circumstances where unnecessary covenants within adhesive contracts are being asserted in tension with Substantive Natural Rights in the Locomotion area; other highway drivers have no assurance that another approaching car is not being driven by an unlicensed Citizen of France, who by virtue of his political status would not have an unlicensed motor vehicle operation penal statute thrown at him. Therefore, there is an inherent Assumption of Risk among all highway users that some drivers will necessarily have to be unlicensed,[48] since it is literally legally impossible, and also unattractive for Foreign Relations reasons not related to preventing vehicular accidents, to maintain a perfect expectation of motorist licensing compliance.



This is just another example of Government's modus operandi: If they can grab the tax and get away with it politically, they will -- while remaining silent on the exceptions. If Government can force a licensing environment over you, they will and if they cannot, they will not; and then they will remain silent on their legal and practical disabilities. Criminals too operate in similar ways: Imagine yourself being at a ski resort; there are 60 pairs of skis and poles leaning against a rack; and along comes a criminal casing the place over. Fifty pairs of the skis are locked down, and 10 of them are not. If you were a criminal, what would you do? Criminals take what they can take, and leave behind that which is relatively too difficult to grab and make off with.

"The only object we have here in view in presenting this [graduated income tax] amendment is to rake in where there is something to rake in, not to throw out the dragnet where there is nothing to catch." - Senator William Peffer, June 21, 1894 [as quoted by Frank Chodorov in The Income Tax, page 37 (Devin-Adair, 1954)].

These risk elements on using highways are judgment factors that all motorists evaluate and consider, even though this process is often invisible by operating in the psychological strata of the subconscious; the actual judgment process involved when a composite profile confluence of such risk elements are blended together and evaluated, is called risk assessment.

[heyday]

Everyone is in a constant state of making risk assessment, even though not all folks scientifically view their judgment thinking along these well defined lines; anytime an environment of risk is being entered, risk assessment judgment is actually being made, even if subconsciously. Gremlins, being the administratively well organized body of vermin workhorses that they are, also thoroughly immerse themselves in precise, well thought out risk assessment model scenarios. This process is normally used in such areas like probing for the probable subject reaction to one more turn of the screws, or in estimating the likelihood of actually achieving, and then getting away with, some desired damages somewhere -- some murder, some revolution, or some war, conquest, asset grab, or famine being manufactured someplace. From the Gremlin perspective, then, risk assessment has to be viewed as another tool in the decision making process to deflect the occurrence of adverse circumstances as what was once a great Gremlin enscrewment plan starts to fall apart for some unexpected reason. Gremlins have had a few words to say about structural risk analysis and assessment (I selected this discourse due to its Highway setting and the political overtones it brings to light):

"There is no such thing as a risk free society. There is no point in getting into a panic about the risks of life until you have [made comparisons]. ...puzzling is the apparently irrational attitude which people have towards environmental hazards... Some 7,000 people are killed and some 350,000 injured each year on the roads of Britain. Yet this perpetual carnage -- nearly 1,000 killed or injured every day -- generates no public outrage. ...you will find that politicians will be rather chary of imposing a maximum speed limit of 50 miles per hour on all roads where the limit is not already 30 or 40, though if they did, both energy and lives would be saved. Why then don't they do it? It would not really be difficult to enforce.

"...I shall put the answer politely: Their [risk assessment] judgment... tells them that people would not like it. And then all the other goodies they have in mind for you, less unemployment, less inflation, less taxation, and increasing standard of living, fair shares for all... you name it -- might be unrealizable; because, you might say, `Maybe we need a change of Government. I want to go faster than 50 miles per hour on all those marvelous motorways I paid for.'

"...The results of risk accounting are surprising..." - Baron Nathaniel Rothschild in the Wall Street Journal ["Coming to Grips with Risk"], page 22 (March 13, 1979).

In a factual setting where an unlicensed driver creates damages out on the highway, then punitive incarceration is appropriate, and this requirement reconciles everyone's objections by accomplishing the same identical criminal recourse the incarcerationists yearn for so much in their vindictive cries for encagement glory.

Incidentally, by comparison in Canada, the Ontario Police only seeks a $53 civil fine for driving without a license, and the sky doesn't seem to be falling in on Canada without the existence of some precious little penal statute in existence to incarcerate an unlicensed drive; so Case hardened American judges who parrot the Insurance Company lobbyist line (that incarceration is the only medicine to deal with unlicensed drivers) are exercising flaky judgment that isn't very well thought out ("...da law says I gotta").

For a review of the numerous arguments on judicial competence limitations and calibre capacity as manifested by Case hardened Judges, see Thinking About Courts: Towards and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competency by Ralph Cavanaugh, et al., in 14 Law and Society Review 371 (1980).


Even prominent United States Supreme Court Judges can be found operating in this competency limitation strata, (Justice Felix Frankfurter very openly stated his observation that judicial competence is limited. In Marconi Wireless vs. United States, he stated that:

"It is an observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation. ...judges must overcome their scientific incompetence as best they can." - Marconi Wireless vs. United States, 320 U.S. 1, at 60 (1942).

Justice Frankfurter then went on with supporting quotations from Thomas Jefferson and Judge Learned Hand. And just as Federal Judges can be competency deficient in scientific knowledge, thus rendering their judgments in that area prone to error, so too can they be, and in fact are, competency deficient in other areas as well, generating similar erroneous judgment results.)as they live in a shell, isolated away from divergent opinions that may very well be built upon an enlarged basis of factual knowledge they do not possess, and as such, just might possibly have some merit to them. Consider Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist:

"No one questions that the State may require the licensing of those who drive on its highways and the registration of vehicles which are driven on those highways." - Rehnquist, dissenting, in Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, at 665 (1978).

Sorry, Mr. Rehnquist, but there are many people who are questioning such a licensing requirement, and they have more than sufficient minimum legal authority, based on several thousand State and Federal Court Opinions from a different era, as to warrant both a hearing and an extended Judicial response -- and not the snortations of a Judge who spent virtually his entire isolated life working for Government. [Notice how I said that Highway Contract Protesters are entitled to a Hearing and an Explanation. I did not say that they are entitled to prevail.]



This highway power play by Insurance Companies, to use penal statutes and the police powers to experience Commercial self-enrichment, raises a secondary "fairness" question on the propriety of using statutes operationally skewed to favor their sponsors; however, "fairness" is a Tort concept definable only along the infinite -- and in contrast to that, contracts are narrow, specific, and contain detailed positive mandates and negative restrainments in effect between the parties. Being that contracts are both specific and finite, and that special benefits were accepted synchronous with the contract's technical reciprocal contours being pre-defined; therefore, the inherently indeterminate nature of fairness is fundamentally out of harmony with contracts, and properly belongs in that free-wheeling world of Tort Law, where anything goes. Where the terms of contracts are not freely negotiated due to the dominate overbearing positional strength of one of the parties, the judicial allowance of a de minimis amount of corrective "fairness" is appropriate since there never was any mutual assent (For an illuminating article on the topic of Mutual Assent in contracts, see Samuel Williston in Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 Illinois Law Review 85. Under some conditions, the amount and nature of relief damages that can be awarded under contracts is sensitive to the status of the contracts falling under an objective meeting of the minds test [meaning some type of an Adhesion or quasi-contract (forced in whole or part on people) is in effect]; or in the alternative, a subjective meeting of the minds [meaning a purely negotiated contract is in effect]. See Implied-in-fact Contracts and Mutual Assent by George P. Costigan, 33 Harvard Law Review 376 (1919). )



-- and that already exists in American Jurisprudence and is now called the Adhesion Contract Doctrine.

In 1985, the California Supreme Court handed down four cases that I am aware of that touched to some extent on the Adhesion Contract Doctrine:

*

Victoria vs. Superior Court, 710 Pacific 2nd 833 (1985);
*

Perdue vs. Crocker National Bank, 702 Pacific 2nd 503 (1985);
*

E.s. Bills Ins. vs. Tzucanow, 700 Pacific 2nd 1280 (1985);
*

Searle vs. Allstate Life Insurance, 696 Pacific 2nd 1308 (1985).

For example, in Perdue vs. Crocker National Bank, bank account signature cards were deemed Adhesion Contracts; and Contracts of Adhesion are referred to as signifying standardized contracts which, when drafted and imposed by a party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the other subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract, or in the alternative, to reject it in toto [meaning rejected in the whole]. In Searle vs. Allstate Life Insurance, Justice Bird noted that insurance policies are Contracts of Adhesion, and that therefore, if there are any vague, evasive, and ambiguous statements in the contract, the party who drafted the contract (the insurance company) loses when a grievance turning on the vague clause comes before a Court. In both Cases, an underlying common denominator surfaces in that there really was not any mutual assent ("meeting of the minds") in effect by the parties at the time the contract was entered into.

[heyday]

But to otherwise allow a party to bring in claims of "fairness" from the outside, to now operate on the contract, would be to work a Tort on the other party that such "fairness" operates against. This is an important concept to understand with contracts. As a Principle of Nature, Judges are correct when they toss out your arguments that sound in the pleasing tone of Tort, when you are a party to a Contract Law jurisprudential grievance. Willful Failure to File and Highway Traffic Infractions are all Contract Law grievances. Remember that invisible contracts are in effect whenever benefits have been accepted and reciprocity is being expected back in return. Your use of the state's highways automatically creates the existence of such an invisible juristic contract, and also attaches the summary features of a giblet cracking regulatory adjudicating Star Chamber that American Traffic Courts have infamous reputations for.

Occasionally, I have heard rumblings from Highway Contract Protesters to the effect that both the United States and the several States lack jurisdiction to exclude foot passengers from using the Interstate Highway System. They cite the Common Law Doctrine that:

"...all persons have a right to walk on a public highway, and are entitled to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of persons driving carriages along it." - Joseph Angell in Law of Highways, at 454 [Little Brown (1886)]. [Joseph Angell also cites Brooks vs. Schwerin, 54 New York 343 to state that foot passengers have equal rights with those driving in carriages.]

The answer lies in another Common Law Doctrine that gave improved methods of Locomotion Superior Privileges on highway use. See a Case entitled Macomber vs. Nichols, 34 Michigan 212 (1875), for an Opinion by Chief Judge Cooley discussing this Doctrine, and the interesting Case citations therein. See also Road Rights and Liability of Wheelmen by George Clemenston [Callaghan & Company, Chicago (1895)]. Sorry, Protesters, but our Father's Common Law is not being damaged by the placement of signs at entrances to Interstate Highways that exclude foot passengers; such Public Notice reasonably creates expectations of reciprocity by the highway's owners that they are conditionally offering the use of that highway to you as a benefit, and so now contracts are in effect. Those Interstate Highways are special purpose limited use highways constructed along sealed corridors where any type of use limitation is purely discretionary by their Government owners. Government is not required to build those Interstate Highways for you, so when they do so, they are built and offered for use on their terms.

Yet, there is some minimal merit present in the Patriot position out on the highways. Patriots have been silent on a judicial enlightenment analogy that should be made here, as some Patriots like to enlighten Judges on reasoning and Principles applicable to favorite Patriot factual setting confrontations. The Supreme Court has ruled that shopping center owners, who open up their premises for public ingress and egress, lose some of their property rights, i.e., there is a declension in status from having absolute authority to eject with discretion anyone they want, down to being restrained from doing so.


Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); [A company owned town had taken on a public function and could not prohibit the distribution of religious material on the town's privately owned streets.]

Amalgamated Food Employees vs. Logan Valley Pizza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); [Shopping center management cannot interfere with union pickets, reasoning that shopping centers were the functional equivalent of central business districts. (Logan Valley was later modified in Lloyd Corporation vs. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)].

Pruneyard Shopping Center vs. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); [Shopping center management restrained from ejecting persons (high school students) disseminating political literature (a petition in opposition to the United Nations Resolution against Zionism). Affirmed on the basis of adequate and independent California state grounds; property owners face diminished expectations of property rights when their property is open to the public.]

If this legal reasoning, which diminishes the rights of property owners, were to be applied to a highway setting by way of comparative analogy, then the fact that Government Highways are open to the public should, theoretically, partially restrain the State from exercising absolute jurisdiction to eject a person from merely using the highways without a license, down to a reduced property rights status where the mere non-existence of a compelled Driver's License is insufficient grounds for incarceration, absent, perhaps, collaborating causal damages. Of and by itself, that argument won't win any Cases (the quiescent environmental ambiance one enjoys walking down a row of store fronts in a shopping center really does not have any factual parity with the high-powered accelerated velocity of contemporary highways). I know that Protesters would very much like to hear me throw invectives at Traffic Court Star Chamber Magistrates and state that Principles of Nature are being violated by Judges by their consenting to incarcerate unlicensed drivers at Sentencing Hearings, but Traffic Courts are merely enforcing contracts, and no restrainment exists in appellate court rulings or other pronouncing instruments of Law; nowhere is there specific wording to disable expectations of reciprocity denominated in penal terms, on those Highway Contracts.

As for the analogy in status declension, this property rights declension in status experienced by property owners who open up their property for public use is just the same old longstanding Common Law restrainment that English judges placed on the King of England updated and applied to a contemporary Commercial factual setting of privately owned shopping centers, that restrained the King from selectively excluding persons from using the King's Highways by requiring free and open access and use of the King's Highways to everyone.

And in real property law, a variation of this Principle surfaces in the Ingress and Egress Doctrine, which forces the neighbors of a landlocked parcel of land to yield some of their property rights and grant a right of way easement to the nearest public thoroughfare for the benefit of the fellow who is landlocked.


The application of this Principle also surfaces again with the rights of property owners adjoining public highways, to yield their expectations of exclusion and privacy whenever the highway itself becomes impassable or otherwise founderous, and allows travelers to leave the highway and start using your property.

"If the usual track is impassable, it is for the general good that people should be entitled to pass another line." - Lord Mansfield, in Comyn's Digest, "Chemin," D.6.

[heyday]

I neglected to provide the link to Invisible Contracts.

It should also be said that this post contained only excerpts from the original.

A good place to get the complete zip version is here.