Traffic Ticket Question

[612Actual]

farmer_giles_of_ham wrote - No, I have no contract with any DMV (neither do pedestrians) but the states do retain jurisdiction of the active use of the public roads.

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IF you have a driver license then you have a contract with the DMV. The ONLY way you get any privilege from a government agency is by a CONTRACT. And how do you know that a pedestrian, any pedestrian doesn't have a driver license?

IF you have a driver license then you have AGREED to TERMS & CONDITIONS that are found in the VC. The APPLICATION that one fills out at the DMV is an "Adhesion Contract". If you don't know what that is you might want to check it out.

The States retain jurisdiction of the active use of the public roads for LIMITED PURPOSES.

Again, DRIVING IS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY.

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farmer_giles_of_ham wrote - And a pedestrian has no nexus with the DMV.

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How do you know unless you ask the "pedestrian" in question? Just because someone is walking doesn't mean they haven't applied for and were granted the DRIVING privilege.

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farmer_giles_of_ham wrote - And evidently, the State HAS provied the rules of quasi-criminal procedure- they are the VC rules of process for detentions and arrests. Quasi-criminal is a civil type action, with criminal implications.

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Waddaya mean "evidently"? It's an either/or proposition.

I suppose in PA the Legislature has provided for an action named QUASI-CRIMINAL, but not here in Cal so good luck untangling the mess.

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farmer_giles_of_ham wrote -As far as WHO the VC applies to what I get from it is that the person who is in physical control of a device used to transport or draw persons or property is a driver subject to the licenseing requirements, or exempt therefrom.

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Well then I guess you better do what you believe you gotta do.

I dunno but the source material I've provided leads me to an entirely different conclusion. I don't DRIVE. I don't have a MOTOR VEHICLE. I'm not required to ASK for a BUSINESS PRIVILEGE when I'm not nor have any intention of engaging in the BUSINESS the LICENSE permits.

[aksis]

Originally Posted by steve762

I am just toying with Aksis when I refer to myself as Shogun.

steve762,

And I was addressing that persona when I alluded to this:

愚かな人

You know I see all People as sovereign, even if some People don't share my point of view or are unaware of this part of them or have yet to see their way clear on the Nationality issues and take the steps to adjust the record, amoung other issues.

I would post more in this thread, but the flow is addressing the source of it, Friendsplacect's lady friend.

I see this whole thread is very useful to everyone, but there were certian subtle points that would be a detriment were a sovereign to apply them. i.e. using TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > §1983 rather then using TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > § 242 amoung others.

People, READ THESE VERY CLOSE! Be mindful what you use in your complaints and other processes.


Much Love,

Christopher Theodore: Rhodes

[612Actual]

steve762 wrote - Someone mentioned that the courts are hesitant to mention "arrest".

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This is not an impediment. Just ask the cop.

Officer, is it a fact that you initiated contact with me?
Your honor, I'd like to read Cal VC section 40500 & 40504 into the record.
(They'll let you do it.)
Officer, according to the Legislature, you made an arrest is that correct?

There's only ONE correct answer and if the cop says NO after you've read those two sections then he/she is truly incompetent and you should immediately move the court to strike the testimony and have him removed from the court room as an incompetent witness. Even if the commissioner refuses you can then disqualify the commissioner for bias and you got your very important statement ON THE RECORD for appeal purposes.

It doesn't matter what the court believes because you will have elicited the TRUTH from your accuser under penalty of perjury, as long as the cop isn't a total moron.

[612Actual]

I have the Staph case and that's real good, as is the Bishop case. BTW, it's 27 Cal.App.3d 197

Re discovery, due to the cheaters playing the QUASI-CRIMINAL hand you need to focus on inducing the commish to make reversible errors. You can qualify them by asking questions that will lead to them making legally untenable statements which you can then use against them.

Commissioners CAN NOT make "legal determinations". If they do they make a reversible error.

Your honor, are you making a legal determination that the NOTICE TO APPEAR is a verified complaint?

It took me three times once but he finally said yes. Thank you your honor for your mistake.

We need to focus on the commissioner because they're the joker in the deck. The cop will cut his own throat by his testimony depending on the YES or NO questions you ask. The commissioner on the other had needs to be kept out of the mix because they tend to jump in and save the cop.

If you know what "stare decisis" is then in your effort to hamstring the commish you'll want to file a Judicial Notice re Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450. That locks the commish. If they refuse to take JUDICIAL NOTICE of that case then you want to immediately disqualify them for bias. When you read the case you'll understand why.

Additionally, the cop is MANDATED to provide exculpatory evidence to you whether you ask for it or not. They MUST produce discovery. Wait till you see what's in these cases:

People v. Robinson (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 494 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 183
In re Pratt (1999) , 69 Cal.App.4th 1294
People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) , 80 Cal.App.4th 1305

[1] The prosecutor has a constitutional (Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218]) and statutory (§ 1054.1, subd. (e)) fn. 4 duty to disclose to the defense any exculpatory evidence. "The prosecution's duty to disclose 'extends to all evidence that reasonably appears favorable to the [31 Cal.App.4th 499] accused, not merely to that evidence which appears likely to affect the verdict.' (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1 , 30, fn. 14 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843].) When the prosecution suppresses evidence which is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of whether that suppression is intentional or inadvertent, the defendant's due process rights are abridged. (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218, 83 S.Ct. 1194]; People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406 [121 Cal.Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341])." (People v. Jackson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1676 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 778].)
People v. Robinson (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 494

[612Actual]

"The Court: There is an obligation on the prosecution to turn over any information that may be favorable to the defense, discovery motion or not.
People v. Robinson (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 494

"It is the duty of the district attorney, not to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present to the court the evidence material to the charge upon which the defendant stands on trial and it is the solemn duty of the trial judge to see that the facts material to the charge are fairly presented and the constitutional guarantees of a defendant neither violated nor infringed." (People v. Sheffield, 108 Cal.App. 721, 732 [293 P. 72].)
People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal.2d 748 (1960)

Prosecutors have a constitutional mandate to disclose exculpatory material evidence to defendants in criminal cases. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 ( Brady ).)

In United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107, the Brady rule was extended to impose a duty on prosecutors to volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense even without a request for such material. (Accord, In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525 , 532-533.)

A prosecutor's duty under Brady to disclose material exculpatory evidence extends to evidence the prosecutor -- or the prosecution team -- [80 Cal.App.4th 1315] knowingly possesses or has the right to possess.

A prosecutor has a duty to search for and disclose exculpatory evidence if the evidence is possessed by a person or agency that has been used by the prosecutor or the investigating agency to assist the prosecution or the investigating agency in its work.
People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) , 80 Cal.App.4th 1305

Thus, "whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government." (Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154 [92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104]; Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 439 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1568].)

As a concomitant of this duty, any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf is imputed to the prosecution. "The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with the government's investigation." (U.S. v. Payne (2d Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (Payne); see Smith v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, supra, 50 F.3d at pp. 824-825, and cases cited therein.) The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle: "whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation [to learn of favorable evidence] [17 Cal.4th 880] (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith, [citation]), the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable." (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 437-438 [115 S.Ct. at pp. 1567-1568]; see also Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 154 [92 S.Ct. at p. 766].) fn. 4

The principles Brady and its progeny embody are not abstractions or matters of technical compliance. (Cf. United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677].) The sole purpose is to ensure the defendant has all available exculpatory evidence to mount a defense. To that end, a do***ent sent but not received is as useless as a do***ent not sent at all.

Equally important, the Supreme Court has unambiguously assigned the duty to disclose solely and exclusively to the prosecution; those assisting the government's case are no more than its agents. (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 438 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1568]; Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 154 [92 S.Ct. at p. 766]; Fero v. Kerby (10th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 1462, 1472, fn. 12.) By necessary implication, the duty is nondelegable at least to the extent the prosecution remains responsible for any lapse in compliance. Since the prosecution must bear the consequences of its own failure to disclose (see, e.g., U.S. v. Ellis (4th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 908, 914 (Ellis); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corporation, supra, 291 F.2d at p. 570), a fortiori, it must be charged with any negligence on the part of other agencies acting in its behalf (Fero v. Kerby, supra, 39 F.3d at p. 1472, fn. 12; cf. Ellis, supra, 121 F.3d at p. 914 [defense counsel's failure to renew request for witness statements at trial does not discharge prosecution's Brady obligation]; U.S. v. Alvarez (9th Cir. 1996) 86 F.3d 901, 905 (Alvarez) [delegating to nonattorney police officer responsibility to determine if officers' rough notes contain [17 Cal.4th 882] Brady material deemed "problematic"]; Walker v. City of New York (2d Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 293, 299 ["It is appropriate that the prosecutors, who possess the requisite legal a***en, be charged with the task of determining which evidence constitutes Brady material that must be disclosed to the defense. A rule requiring the police to make separate, often difficult, and perhaps conflicting, disclosure decisions would create unnecessary confusion."]). Accordingly, the risk and consequences of nonreceipt must fall to the prosecution.
In re Brown (1998) , 17 Cal.4th 873

The high court has since held that the duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there has been no request by the accused ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107), that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence ( United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676), and that the duty extends even to evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor ( Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 438). Such evidence is material " 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " ( Id . at p. 433.) In order to comply with Brady , therefore, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." ( Kyles , supra , 514 U.S. at p. 437; accord, In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873 , 879.)

"[T]he term ' Brady violation' is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence--that is, to [35 Cal.4th 1043] any suppression of so-called ' Brady material'--although, strictly speaking, there is never a real ' Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." ( Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, fn. omitted.) Prejudice, in this context, focuses on "the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence." ( United States v. Agurs , supra , 427 U.S. at p. 112, fn. 20; accord, U.S. v. Fallon (7th Cir. 2003) 348 F.3d 248, 252.) Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible (cf. Wood v. Bartholomew (1995) 516 U.S. 1, 2), that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction "more likely" ( Strickler , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 289), or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness's testimony "might have changed the outcome of the trial" ( ibid .). A defendant instead "must show a 'reasonable probability of a different result.' " (Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 699.)

The first element of a Brady claim is that the evidence be favorable to the accused. ( Strickler v. Greene , supra , 527 U.S. at pp. 281-282.)
People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031

[farmer_giles_of_ham]

What is the forum's take on this? (from PA Rules of Crim Proc)

Rule 400. Means of Instituting Proceedings In Summary Cases.

Criminal proceedings in summary cases shall be instituted either by:

(1) issuing a citation to the defendant; or

(2) filing a citation; or

(3) filing a complaint; or

(4) arresting without a warrant when arrest is specifically authorized by law.

Later on it describes how even parking tickets may be converted into a "criminal procedure", although these types of local ordinance violations are not initially criminal-specifically, a parking ticket or other similar presentment is not a citation.

[Bailey]

What is a summary case? Just curious.

Legislators nor courts can make laws/rules that do not give you "due process of law" and "equal protection" of the law. You can of course waive any requirements that they have in your case by just saying nothing.

See my other posts on this.

- No prosecutor
- No summons
- No complaint
- With all of the above there is no case, there is no jurisdiction, unless you waive them by remaining silent.
- The legislators and courts have no power to change this.

Originally Posted by farmer_giles_of_ham

What is the forum's take on this? (from PA Rules of Crim Proc)

Rule 400. Means of Instituting Proceedings In Summary Cases.

Criminal proceedings in summary cases shall be instituted either by:

(1) issuing a citation to the defendant; or

(2) filing a citation; or

(3) filing a complaint; or

(4) arresting without a warrant when arrest is specifically authorized by law.

Later on it describes how even parking tickets may be converted into a "criminal procedure", although these types of local ordinance violations are not initially criminal-specifically, a parking ticket or other similar presentment is not a citation.

[farmer_giles_of_ham]

anything not a misdemeanor or felony, but with any type of criminal implications, and an arrestable offense by inital procedure, is called "summary". The law makes some distinctions there, that for example there are summary offenses under the criminal code and summary under other codes, which have their own status.

But these rules are generally duplicated at least as far as "summary violations of the vehicle code".

what might be excluded are certain violations of municipal ordinances, although one can be arrested and impounded, so to speak, for fines outstanding. Maybe even that some of these "offenses" can only be issued by citation or complaint filed with judicial authority- arrest without judge-issued warrant is prohibited.

However one might be required to at least write their legal name in the presence of the officer- and failure or refusal does create an arrestable offense, at least in the vehicle code. But because other minor infractions are excluded from the definition of "crimes", and there is no further law requireing cooperation, I dont know what happens if one "fails" to identify.

Apparently because of this legal exclusion from "crimes" the authors of the VC found it neccesary to include a specific requirement to provide the written name when requested.

And further, what if I have no LEGAL NAME. that could be the nexus to attach the govt jurisdiction, as Merrill keeps pointing out.

On the other hand in order to claim any license at all I must have a LEGAL NAME, and a billable address, and a flag of residence, besides a bond and physical description to secure the same.

But I dont need a license to walk or ride a bike.

They want their money.This is all really screwed up because it gives an automatic in for the MAN on tiny, tiny things. In Europe and probably many other countries all this is purely administrative and civil.

[612Actual]

farmer_giles_of_ham wrote - (4) arresting without a warrant when arrest is specifically authorized by law.

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There MUST BE "enabling language" ie; "peace officer may" in regards to their making a warrantless arrest. It's got to exist. Cops can't just AUTHORIZE themselves to make warrantless arrests. That authorization comes from the Legislature and MUST BE written in one of your codes.

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farmer_giles_of_ham wrote -

Rule 400. Means of Instituting Proceedings In Summary Cases.

Criminal proceedings in summary cases shall be instituted either by:

(1) issuing a citation to the defendant; or

(2) filing a citation; or

(3) filing a complaint; or

(4) arresting without a warrant when arrest is specifically authorized by law.
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I don't see any words that make a VC infraction a crime. What I see is PROCESS oriented issues but I don't see anything that establishes that VC infractions are crimes.

Do you get a Public Defender paid for at public expense when you're charged with an VC infraction? Is there a jail sanction upon conviction for a VC infraction? Are you entitled to a jury trial when accused of a VC infraction? Does the DA appear at trial to prosecute on behalf of the people in a VC infraction trial?

Absent ALL these elements and notwithstanding the fact that a VC infraction is processed as a CRIME, the ingredients that result in what happens to someone convicted of a crime simply don't exist. Smoke & Mirrors.

[612Actual]

farmer_giles_of_ham - What is the forum's take on this? (from PA Rules of Crim Proc)

Rule 400. Means of Instituting Proceedings In Summary Cases.
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In California there is case law that informs us that the procedures on warrantless arrests are those found in the VC NOT the Penal Code.

The exclusive procedure to be followed after a warrantless arrest for a Vehicle Code violation is that prescribed in division 17, chapter 2 (§§ 40300-40604) of the Vehicle Code. (People v. Wohlleben (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 [67 Cal.Rptr. 826].)
People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal.3d 186
[L.A. No. 29881. Supreme Court of California. May 19, 1972.]

Remember, CRIMES are listed in the Penal Code. See if you can find any VC INFRACTION listed in the Penal Code. If you can't then I submit that you can make a reasonable argument that the allegation of an INFRACTION of the VC MAY be a PENAL PROVISION BUT ISN'T A CRIME.

Again, PENAL means CRIME. Does the allegation carry a jail sanction upon conviction? IF not then I submit that you can make an argument that an INFRACTION isn't a crime.

I might set out to verify whether an infraction of the VC is a crime or not. That's the KEY. It's is or it isn't.