Traffic Stop Is an Arrest

[weishaupt1776]

The Court reasoned that, although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation. Second, the Court emphasized that traffic stops commonly occur in the "public view," in an atmosphere far "less `police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420438-439

[SansRecours]

1. "In the COP's mind,you are travelling on the Corporate Territory.
Now you are presumed to be under Corporate jurisdiction."

This is hogwash and you know it. I will go out on a limb and say there is not one cop in ten thousand that can presume the foregoing.

Please state your proof of this statement. Like the officer's training manual, or some kind of authority. Whoops, there is none!!!


2. "The main reason that COP stops you,is the fact that THEY have printed in
his sub-conscience an ORDER to bring you( little worm ) into The DEBT."

This is also hogwash. There is no police officer training on this subject. I will go even further on the limb and say that no "COP" knows what you are saying here and I ask for the same proof. Whoops!!!


3. "One simple form of pseudo contract is all capital letters for proper name."

Name one court case, statute, rule, or regulation supporting this statement.If this is a psuedo-contract please show the offer, the acceptance, the meeting of the minds, the consideration, and the documentation proving such a statement. There is no such thing as a "pseudo contract."

These three presumptions on your part are unprovable and have no support. They are not factual, or evidentiary.

The maxim is that he who alleges must prove. Adrian, If you allege 1., 2., and 3. above, I say to prove it!

This nebulous DEBT you speak of seems odd. (if one can even prove its existence, read the two volume biography on the Rothschilds, by Niall Ferguson, dry reading but like Mr. Spock raising his eyebrow, f a s c i n a t i n g!) if there is no substance attaching to the fiction, then the fruit of the fiction is also a fiction.

Don't you think that there are simpler issues to raise that are much more effective and provable?

Think of me as a judge before whom you stand. How are you going to prove by fact and evidence the statements herein?

Respectfully, SANS, oops I mean Sans, or, Sans Recours, or Sans, Recours

[weishaupt1776]

I asked ole adrian numerous times to show us proof such as file stamped copies of his procedures and he produced nothing

Maybe we should change his name to SansProof?

Just wondering.

[weishaupt1776]

Thornton APPLIES to a LAWFUL ARREST.


"Once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment." Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615*


As does Belton.


"In New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest."


http://www.justia.us/us/541/03-5165/case.html


Atwater dealt with a DE FACTO ARREST, an*ADMISSION*and other "undisputed facts."

"Texas law makes it a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. The warrantless arrest of anyone violating these provisions is expressly authorized by statute, but the police may issue citations in lieu of arrest.


...*Given her admission that she had violated the law and the absence of any allegation that she was harmed or detained in any way inconsistent with the law, the District Court ruled the Fourth Amendment claim meritless and granted the City summary judgment...Because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests, the court held the arrest not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes."* ATWATER et al. v. CITY OF LAGO VISTA et*al. http://laws.findlaw.com/us/532/318.html*


"Alternatively, in light of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549], the seatbelt violation which led to the initial detention also supplied probable cause for defendant's de facto arrest." People v. Gomez (2004)117 Cal.App.4th 531 , Cal.Rptr.3d*

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/cal...h/117/531.html

Smith v. Hearod doesn't appear to*be*publicly available.*


*

And Robinson was also BASED on a LAWFUL ARREST.

"Held: In the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment. Pp. 224-237.


...


It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.


...


Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, 6 it is of no moment that Jenks did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect that respondent was armed.*"
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/414/218.html **

[weishaupt1776]

From Patrick:

"In a note to be found in Cooley's Constitutional Limitation, (7th ed.), page 192, it is said that it is not a trespass to arrest a person privileged from arrest, though the officer be aware of the fact. The arrest is only voidable, and the party may waive his privilege. The process of attachment in this case was valid on its face, and was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; and if it be conceded that Price was privileged from arrest at the time, his exemption from arrest was a personal privilege, and as such could be waived by him. (3 Cyc. 924; Woods v. Davis, 34 N.H. 328; Brower v. Tatro, 115 Mich. 368 [73 N.W. 421]; Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138 [49 Am. Rep. 598]; Leal v. Wigram, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 88; Tarlton v. Fisher, 2 Doug. (Eng.) 671; State v. Polacheck, 101 Wis. 427 [77 N.W. 708]; Prentis v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. (Va.) 697 [16 Am. Dec. 782].) If Price was entitled to the immunity claimed, there are legal modes by which that privilege might be vindicated. It might have been done by the order of the court issuing the attachment, or by a judge on habeas corpus. The fact that Price may have been privileged from arrest did not authorize him to obstruct the process of the court."

* In volume 1, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, eighth edition, page 275, we find the following note on the subject of resisting an arrest on the ground of exemption: "On this subject, Cushing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assemblies, 546-597, will be consulted with profit. It is not a trespass to arrest a person privileged from arrest, even though the officer may be aware of the fact. The arrest is only voidable; and in general the party will waive the privilege unless he applies for discharge by motion or on habeas corpus. (Tarlton v. Fisher, Doug. 671; Fletcher v. Baxter, 2 Aik. 224; Fox v. Wood, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 143; Willard v. Sperry, 1 Wend. (N.Y.) 32; Wilmarth v. Burt, 7 Met. (Mass.) 257; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 8 Met. (Mass.) 102; Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 132.) But where the privilege is given on public grounds, or for the benefit of others, discharge may be obtained on the motion of any party concerned, or made by the court sua sponte."

* It is further held that an arrest of one who, at the time of the arrest, may claim immunity therefrom, is not a trespass, and no action for damages will lie by reason of such arrest. (Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138 [49 Am. Rep. 598].) The reason that no action will lie for damages, and that such an arrest is not a trespass, rests on the rule that exemption is a personal privilege to be claimed in a legal manner, and if not claimed, it is waived. The arrest not being void where the exemption exists, and only voidable, it follows that the person arrested has no legal right to offer physical violence to the arresting officer. "Officers are bound to execute writs, although the persons against whom they are directed, are privileged from arrest, and an officer who acts in accordance with his precept, is not a trespasser, although the party arrested is privileged. (Carle v. Delesdenier, 13 Me. 363 [29 Am. Dec. 508]; Tarlton v. Fisher, Doug. 671; Willard v. Sperry, 1 Wend. (N.Y.) 32; Secor v. Bell, 18 Johns. (N.Y.) 52; Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 132.)"

* [5] In answer to the third query, it appears to be very well settled, whether in civil or criminal cases, the exemption being a personal privilege, unless it is claimed by plea or motion, it is waived, and when one goes to trial upon the plea of not guilty of the offense charged, no question of exemption enters into the cause. Thus, in the early case of Geyer's Lessee v. Erwin, 4 Dallas, 107 [1 L.Ed. 762], the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1790 lays down the rule which has been followed ever since, to wit: "But every privileged person must at the proper time, and in a proper manner, claim the benefits of this privilege. The judges are not bound judicially to notice a right or privilege, nor to grant it without a claim. In the present instance neither the defendant nor his attorney suggested the privilege as an objection to the trial of the cause, and this amounts to a waiver by which the party is forever concluded." (The case involved the arrest of a member of the general assembly.)

* To the same effect is the case of Prentis v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. (Va.) 697 [16 Am. Dec. 782.] It is there held that the exemption from arrest must be taken advantage of in the proper way, and at the proper time. A number of cases are found in the note following the above case, holding that the exemption privilege must be interposed by plea or motion, and that going to trial without raising the issue waives exemption.

* In Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 [8 A.L.R. 750, 108 A. 256, 257], we find the rule laid down as follows: "So under the constitution of Maine, senators and representatives, except in certain cases, are privileged from arrest `during their attendance at, going to, and returning from each session of the legislature.' . . . And yet it has been held that this privilege, though guaranteed by the organic law of the state, may be waived. . . . In the case at bar the exemption is created by statute, but there is no reason why the doctrines of waiver and estoppel should not apply and work their legitimate effects the same as if the exemption were created at common law or under the Constitution."

* Following the case to which we have just referred is a long list of citations on the subject of waiver, the general consensus of which is concluded in the following words, which we quote therefrom: "All the authorities affirm that the privilege may be waived. Therefore, the arrest is not void; it is only voidable. The arrest remains valid until avoided. And the witness (person) can avoid the arrest only by applying to the court for a discharge."

* Holding, in substance, as we have stated, is the case of In re Roszynialla, 99 Wis. 534 [75 N.W. 167].

* In State v. Polacheck, 101 Wis. 427 [77 N.W. 708], the arrest of a legislator, exempt therefrom at the time of arrest, is held to be voidable and not void. We quote therefrom as follows: "The arrest of a legislator, while constitutionally exempt, is not void, since the exemption is a personal privilege only, entitling him to be discharged on plea." There appears some dicta in that case to the effect that had the defendant properly claimed his privilege when he was brought before the police court, he might have been discharged on motion or plea in abatement.

* In 2 R.C.L., page 485, section 44, it is said: "There seems to be some uncertainty as to the proper manner for a person to avail himself of the privilege of exemption from arrest in civil cases. All the authorities appear to agree that it may be by motion to quash the writ, or to set aside the proceedings taken, while the exemption exists. The privilege is considered as a personal one existing primarily for the benefit of the court or the legislative body in which membership is claimed, and accordingly the privilege ordinarily is one of grace rather than of right, and one as to which there is room for discretion as to its allowance. Suing out a writ of habeas corpus is in many cases considered a proper mode of raising the question of lawfulness of an arrest of one claiming an exemption. Courts do not of their own motion notice the exemption from arrest granted to legislators; the privilege must be promptly and properly claimed, or it may be lost and considered as having been waived.* Since the exemption from arrest is merely a privilege, it is usually held that in case of its breach the aggrieved party does not have any action for damages."

* That one relying upon an exemption privilege must appear and claim that privilege at the proper time, further appears in the case of Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway, 210 Iowa, 126 [68 A.L.R. 1465, 230 N.W. 548].
...


When the warrant issued in this case was served upon the petitioner does not appear, but the date of the plea entered by the petitioner is set forth in the record. At that time, if any privilege existed (which we have held did not exist), it was the duty of the petitioner, either by motion or plea in abatement, to seek his discharge. (5 C.J. 470.)

* In view of what we have said, and the authorities cited, the conclusion is inescapable that the exemption of legislators from arrest does not apply in criminal cases; that the petitioner had no legal right to assault the officer; and that any claim of exemption was waived in this case by reason of not tendering the question of privilege by proper plea at the proper time to the trial court."* IN RE EMMETT, 120 Cal.App. 349 (1932)


Maybe people shound REALIZE that the EXEMPTION from ARREST does not just apply to the legislature.

[weishaupt1776]

"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."* HALE v. HENKEL, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/201/43.html**

And maybe people should REALIZE that the COURTS often view*the FAILURE to ASSERT a RIGHT is often taken as CONSENT or the WAIVER of that RIGHT*do to the PRESUMPTIONS & INFERENCES their use in*their FICTIONS OF LAW.



"Waiver may be express or implied. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.) Generally, an implied waiver based on failure to assert a right, including a constitutional right, must be accompanied by an informed intent to relinquish that right. (Id. at p. 31; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 371, 374-375 [waiver implied where no invocation of right to counsel]; People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 989 [waiver implied where defendant, who was not tricked or coerced, understood his rights but chose to speak with police].)
...
“Case law is clear that ‘“[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts.” [Citations.] The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver” [citation].’ (City of Ukiah v. Fones (1962) 64 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [48 Cal.Rptr. 865, 410 P.2d 369]; DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 60 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 515] [‘“‘Waiver always rests upon intent.’”’];* [citations].) The waiver may be either express, based on the words of the waiving party, or implied, based on conduct indicating an intent to relinquish the right. (Brookview Condominium Owners’ Assn. [v. Heltzer Enterprises-Brookview (1990)] 218 Cal.App.3d [502,] 513.)” (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.)"* PIONEER ELECTRONICS (USA), INC. v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, No. B174826 (Super. Ct. No. BC257222) (2005)
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/revpub/B174826.PDF


MAXIMS OF LAW
To him consenting no injury is done.
He who consents cannot receive an injury.
Consent removes or obviates a mistake.
Every consent involves a submission; but a mere submission does not necessarily involve consent.
One who wills a thing to be or to be done cannot complain of that thing as an injury.
The agreement of the parties overcomes or prevails against the law.
He who approves cannot reject.
Agreement takes the place of the law: the express understanding of parties supercedes such understanding as the law would imply.
Manner and agreement overrule the law.
He who does not deny, admits.*
Certain legal consequences are attached to the voluntary act of a person.
It is immaterial whether a man gives his assent by words or by acts and deeds.
A fiction is a rule of law that assumes something which is or may be false as true.
Where truth is, fiction of law does not exist.
There is no fiction without law.
Fictions arise from the law, and not law from fictions
Fiction is against the truth, but it is to have truth.
In a fiction of law, equity always subsists.
Fiction of law is wrongful is it works loss or injury to any one.
He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived.
Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.
He who does not prevent what he can, seems to commit the thing.
He who does not prevent what he can prevent, is viewed as assenting.
He who does not forbid what he can forbid, seems to assent.
He who does not forbid, when he might forbid, commands.
He who does not repel a wrong when he can, induces it.
Ignorance of fact may excuse, but not ignorance of law.
Ignorance of facts excuses, ignorance of law does not excuse.
An error not resisted is approved.
He who is silent appears to consent.
Things silent are sometimes considered as expressed.[/b]

[weishaupt1776]

As such EVERYTHING*is CORAM NON JUDICE.





CORAM. In the presence of; before. Coram nobis, before us; coram vobis, before you; coram non judice, is said of those acts of a court which has no jurisdiction, either over the person, the, cause, or the process. 1 Con. 40. Such acts have no validity. Where a thing is required to be done before a particular person, it would not be considered as done before him, if he were asleep or non compos. Vide Dig. 4, 8, 27, 5; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t.; 5 Harr. & John. 42; 8 Cranch, 9; Paine's R. 55; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.



Which means they SHOULD DISMISS the CASE for LACK OF PROOF.


And since the ARREST itself is UNLAWFUL, all of the people involved are ACTING under "color of law", and once you EVIDENCE those FACTS and obtain a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT they can be HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE for their ACTIONS.


*


The SAME FACTS that you "believe" are IRRELEVANT.


*


And your EVIDENCE that I am "ignoring the very case cits you post" IS???


*


And yes THORNTON did deal with a LAWFUL ARREST.


"In New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest. We have granted certiorari twice before to determine whether Belton's rule is limited to situations where the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or whether it applies as well when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle. We did not reach the merits in either of those two cases. Arizona v. Gant, 540 U. S. ___ (2003) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 76 P. 3d 429 (2003)); Florida v. Thomas, 532 U. S. 774 (2001) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). We now reach that question and conclude that Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle."* Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615


http://www.justia.us/us/541/03-5165/case.html


And it IS NOT up to the LEO to DETIRMINE if the ARREST is truly LAWFUL or if there is*truly PROBABLE CAUSE.


"That warrantless misdemeanor arrests do not demand the constitutional attention Atwater seeks is indicated by a number of factors, including that the law has never jelled the way Atwater would have it; that anyone arrested without formal process is entitled to a magistrate's review of probable cause within 48 hours, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.*S. 44, 55-58; that many jurisdictions have chosen to impose more restrictive safeguards through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenses; that it is in the police's interest to limit such arrests, which carry costs too great to incur without good reason; and that, under current doctrine, the preference for categorical treatment of Fourth Amendment claims gives way to individualized review when a defendant makes a colorable argument that an arrest, with or without a warrant, was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to his privacy or physical interests, e.g., Whren, 517 U.*S., at 818. The upshot of all these influences, combined with the good sense (and, failing that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and peace officers, is a dearth of horribles demanding redress. Thus, the probable cause standard applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.*S. 200, 208."* ATWATER et al. v. CITY OF LAGO VISTA et al.


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/532/318.html*


That's WHY on a WARRANTLESS ARREST they are SUPPOSED to take you to a MAGISTRATE for a PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION so he/she can make a DETIRMINATION in their is SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE to TRY you.


*


The simple FACT that you have OBVIOUSLY MISSED*is that Atwater DID NOT look into whether there was a LAWFUL ARREST, did it?


*


"The question is whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. We hold that it does not."* ATWATER et al. v. CITY OF LAGO VISTA et al.


*


Since they FAILED to ALLEGE that the ARREST was UNLAWFUL, the PRESUMPTION that it was LAWFUL stood.


*


Of course, NO ONE can POINT these things out to people if you NEVER bother to POST the LAW.


*


And I suspect that if you did some RESEARCH, you just might find out the Texas Legislature has at one time DEFINED what constitutes an "offense against the public peace" and that a PEACE OFFICER'S authority to LAWFULLY ARREST someone*without a WARRANT is actually quite LIMITED.


Art. 14.01. [212] [259] [247] Offense within view****************************
(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant,*arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or*within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an*offense against the public peace.
(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any*offense committed in his presence or within his view.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.* Amended by Acts 1967,* 60th Leg., p. 1735, ch. 659, Sec. 8, eff. Aug. 28, 1967.
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statu....000014.00.htm


The simple FACT is that most of the STATE LAWS are UNIFORM, so what APPLIES in ONE STATE will usually be APPLICABLE in the OTHERS.


*


And*the FACT is that*I have rarely seen you PROVE anything in LAW and you keep making unwarranted ASSUMPTIONS.


*


And the cases YOU POSTED*DO NOT*"show that once the LEO determines there is probable cause, the arrest is lawful."


*


DOCUMENTATION beat conversation and you are coming up EMPTY on the DOCUMENTATION.


*


For example you said "It is fact that defacto arrests have been found to be lawful."


*


Oh really??? PROVE*IT!!!


*


I think the closest*opinion that you*find is that a DE FACTO arrest that WAS NOT CHALLENGED was held to be VALID.


*


LAWFUL and VALID do not mean the SAME THING.*


And for the RECORD, NEITHER Pete NOR any of the people who have been "booted" are among the people I was referring to when I said "several people have have emailed me indicating that he is an "agent provocateur" or he that he can NOT "see the forest for the trees."


*

[weishaupt1776]

"His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."* HALE v. HENKEL, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/201/43.html



The POINT is*(and has been) that most WARRANTLESS ARRESTS are UNLAWFUL and WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.



"In this connection appellant contends that his arrest, to which the search was incidental, was without probable cause.
...
Whether appellant's arrest was lawful depends upon whether it was made on probable or reasonable cause. (See U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1509, 78 S.Ct. 1245]; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 738, 83 S.Ct. 1623]; Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3.)
...
[3] In closing we note that it is now established that more evidence is required in support of probable cause to make a lawful arrest without a warrant therefor than is required to justify the issuance of a search warrant. (Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 111 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 726]; People v. Madden, 2 Cal.3d 1017, 1023 [88 Cal.Rptr. 171, 471 P.2d 971].)



The judgment is reversed. The purported appeal from the denial of appellant's motion for a new trial is dismissed."*** People v. Johnson (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 742



http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/cal...d/13/742.html*



A WARRANTLESS ARREST is PRIMA FACIE case that the ARREST was UNLAWFUL.


"It is true, as stated in Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 [294 P.2d 23]: "... the defendant makes a prima facie case when he establishes that an arrest was made without a warrant ..., and the burden then rests on the prosecution to show proper justification." However, in the case before us a reading of the record does not disclose that the officers made the arrest without a warrant. The question of whether the officers had a warrant was never asked, nor raised in the trial court. Appellant had ample opportunity to make the simple inquiry, but she apparently chose not to do so." *People v. Holguin, 145 Cal.App.2d 520 (1956)



http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/cal...d/145/520.html



That is IF you CHALLENGE the PRESUMPTION that it was LAWFUL.



And IF the ARREST was UNLAWFUL there is NO VALID SERVICE of PROCESS and the COURT has NO JURISIDICTION.


"[6] Courts of law have no inherent power to arrest citizens or place them in jail. The Legislature makes the law on that subject within constitutional limits. The jurisdiction of courts in matters of arrest is controlled by the Constitution in the first instance, and the next by statutory authorization. (In re Mulford, 73 Cal.App.2d 453 [166 P.2d 890].)


...


The citation used in the case at bar lacks the necessary ingredients to comply with the requirement of summons, and therefore the service of it does not confer upon the court jurisdiction of the person.."* Pousson v. Superior Court, 165 Cal.App.2d 750 (1958)



http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/cal...d/165/750.html


"Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance."* PENNOYER v. NEFF, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/95/714.html [/b]

[KITCHIE]

"It is not the function of our government to keep the Citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the Citizen to keep the government from falling into error." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,Â*Â*339 U.S. 382, 442.

Kitchie