Affidavit Challenging Jurisdiction

Kitchie... this is outrageous... where are you picking up this fantastic information... I love it.

Jerry

[idknow]

Originally Posted by KITCHIE

[cut]

...and one from the sheriff who said to me "In my opinion you need those things".

[cut]
Kithcie

oh!!! i get it now; took me a few days K, you munged the language

well, his opinion is irrelevant unless he is a "judge"

[KITCHIE]

I corrected item 13 in my last post. I wrote commercial and it should be noncommercial.

Livefire thank you so much for those sites!!

Jerry--- my friend told me he is now a genius..."took me 20 years and a lot of trial and error, but I made it"

idknow--- sometimes I get all excited when something happens and my spelling goes right out the door!!

I am going to use this stuff on the 27th when I have to go to sparks muni court... we'll see!

Kitchie

[KITCHIE]

OK I think, with the help of my great friends and mentors, I believe I have figured IT out.

There is a court case comiakanski or something and Sandra Day O’Connor gave the courts opinion in 1988. (As soon as my friend sends me the case I will provide it to y’allll.) Any way in this opinion she states that when you are forced to do something you don’t want to do, that is a violation of the 13th amendment; which specifically prohibits INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE!!

Now since we are all trying to figure out how to make judges and prosecutors who maliciously go after the state citizens for exercising there rights here’s how I believe it works, and I will use my Sparks ticket as an example.

I am traveling along with my friend and suddenly this corporate cop who is armed interrupts my travel and tells me I have to give him my DL and registration. So I notify the cop that I am not in commerce today and so I don’t have those things.

Now he steps outside of his authority and is abusive besides. I am coerced into doing what he says because I am afraid and he has a gun and he could kidnap me. He forces me to sign a contract for $1,025.00 that I must pay to the city, county, state and FEDERAL GOVERNMENT as well.

So What am I going to do about this??? I am going to file a counter claim against the state because one of their corporate employees has injured me!! And where do I file that “insurance claim” against one of their corporate employees you might ask? Well when a DC attorney comes at you with a summons you must answer, file a conter claim, or lose by default. So you serve him at the arraignment. You get a ticket from a debt collector (Cop) you must answer and also bring a compulsary counter claim via Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13.

By doing this you get to the state's bond. Corporations are bonded. States are corporations, cities are corporations, counties are corporations and persons are corporations. YOU are the only noncommercial being in their whole scam.

Keeping it a civil action by bringing a counter claim against the state means you take it to Federal Court.

Article 3 section 2 of the constitution: " If the corporate state comes after a citizen of that same state in a civil action, the state cannot use its own corporate court to judge its own cause"

And we know now why they always turn a civil traffic infraction into a misdemeanor crime. Slick trick eh?

So you file your counter claim for involuntary servitude and serve it on the judge at your arraignment, naming the person known as officer balh blah #7758 and the state of Nevada. Along with that you would serve also the discovery motion I posted and of course your affidavit.

Boy Howdy this is going to be fun!!!!!!

When I talk about insurance, the state is bonded i.e. insured and the state insures the cities and counties inder the state bond. Just like if you and I get in a automobile wreck. Let’s say it’s your fault. Ok so I file a claim for damages due to the injuries you have caused me.

Same with a ticket. The cop who is outside of his authority is now acting in his private capacity. So you file a claim for damages due to the injuries he has caused you. He coerced you into doing something your didn’t want to do which is involuntary servitude for a man is worthy of his hire. And that is what the claim is based on.

So now our corporate judge has no choice except to “give up” the cop. However if the judge decided to proceed (underwrite) the case then you go after that person in their private capacity as well.

So that’s what I am going to do when I get to go to Reno Muni Court on the 27th.

Boy howdy is that going to be fun!!!!!!

Kitchie

[Akira]

Kitchie,

Forgive me ... This sounded so intriquing, I couldn't wait, and just had to go looking...


UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)

Link to the Case Preview

Link to the Full Text of Case & Opinion

U.S. Supreme Court
UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)
487 U.S. 931
UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI ET AL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-2000.

Argued February 23, 1988
Decided June 29, 1988

After two mentally retarded men were found laboring on respondents' farm in poor health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society, respondents were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 241 by conspiring to prevent the men from exercising their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude, and with violating 18 U.S.C. 1584 by knowingly holding the men in involuntary servitude. At respondents' trial in Federal District Court, the Government's evidence indicated, inter alia, that the two men worked on the farm seven days a week, often 17 hours a day, at first for $15 per week and eventually for no pay, and that, in addition to actual or threatened physical abuse and a threat to reinstitutionalize one of the men if he did not do as he was told, respondents had used various forms of psychological coercion to keep the men on the farm. The court instructed the jury that, under both statutes, involuntary servitude may include situations involving any "means of compulsion . . ., sufficient in kind and degree, to subject a person having the same general station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no reasonable means of escape and no choice except to remain in the service of the employer." The jury found respondents guilty, and the court imposed sentences. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court's definition of involuntary servitude was too broad in that it included general psychological coercion. The court held that involuntary servitude exists only when the master subjects the servant to (1) threatened or actual physical force, (2) threatened or actual state-imposed legal coercion, or (3) fraud or deceit where the servant is a minor or an immigrant or is mentally incompetent.

Held:

For purposes of criminal prosecution under 241 or 1584, the term "involuntary servitude" necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process. This definition encompasses cases in which the defendant holds the victim in servitude by placing him or her in fear of such physical restraint or injury or legal coercion. Pp. 939-953.


(a) The Government cannot prove a 241 conspiracy to violate rights secured by the Thirteenth Amendment without proving that the conspiracy

Page 487 U.S. 931, 932

involved the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. The fact that the Amendment excludes from its prohibition involuntary servitude imposed "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" indicates that the Amendment's drafters thought that involuntary servitude generally includes situations in which the victim is compelled to work by law. Moreover, the facts that the phrase "involuntary servitude" was intended "to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery," Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332, and that the Amendment extends beyond state action, cf. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1, imply an intent to prohibit compulsion through physical coercion. These assessments are confirmed by this Court's decisions construing the Amendment, see, e. g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, which have never interpreted the guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude to specifically prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological coercion. Pp. 941-944.


(b) The language and legislative history of 1584 and its statutory progenitors indicate that its reach should be limited to cases involving the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. That is the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment's "involuntary servitude" phrase that prevailed at the time of 1584's enactment and, since Congress clearly borrowed that phrase in enacting 1584, the phrase should have the same meaning in both places absent any contrary indications. Section 1584's history undercuts the contention that Congress had a broader concept of involuntary servitude in mind when it enacted the statute, and does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that immigrants, children, and mental incompetents are entitled to any special protection. Pp. 944-948.

(c) The Government's broad construction of "involuntary servitude" - which would prohibit the compulsion of services by any type of speech or intentional conduct that, from the victim's point of view, either leaves the victim with no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of the power of choice - could not have been intended by Congress. That interpretation would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity; would delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes; would subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction; and would make the type of coercion prohibited depend entirely on the victim's state of mind, thereby depriving ordinary people of fair notice of what is required of them. These defects are not cured by the Government's ambiguous specific intent requirement. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S position - that 1584 prohibits any means of coercion that actually succeeds in reducing the victim to a condition [487 U.S. 931, 933]

[KITCHIE]

Thank you Akira!

Kitchie

[idknow]

Originally Posted by KITCHIE

I corrected item 13 in my last post. I wrote commercial and it should be noncommercial.
[cut]

idknow--- sometimes I get all excited when something happens and my spelling goes right out the door!!

I am going to use this stuff on the 27th when I have to go to sparks muni court... we'll see!

Kitchie

Kitchie, spelink erors icn deel wit; you broken the syntax -= lol

[idknow]

[quote=Akira]Kitchie,

Forgive me ... This sounded so intriquing, I couldn't wait, and just had to go looking...


UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)

Link to the Case Preview

Link to the Full Text of Case & Opinion

U.S. Supreme Court
UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)
487 U.S. 931
UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI ET AL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-2000.

Argued February 23, 1988
Decided June 29, 1988

[cut]

/QUOTE]

excellent post


better?

[charlesa6]

Originally Posted by Akira

Kitchie,

Forgive me ... This sounded so intriquing, I couldn't wait, and just had to go looking...


UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)

Link to the Case Preview

Link to the Full Text of Case & Opinion

U.S. Supreme Court

UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)
487 U.S. 931
UNITED STATES v. KOZMINSKI ET AL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-2000.

Argued February 23, 1988
Decided June 29, 1988



After two mentally retarded men were found laboring on respondents' farm in poor health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society, respondents were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 241 by conspiring to prevent the men from exercising their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude, and with violating 18 U.S.C. 1584 by knowingly holding the men in involuntary servitude. At respondents' trial in Federal District Court, the Government's evidence indicated, inter alia, that the two men worked on the farm seven days a week, often 17 hours a day, at first for $15 per week and eventually for no pay, and that, in addition to actual or threatened physical abuse and a threat to reinstitutionalize one of the men if he did not do as he was told, respondents had used various forms of psychological coercion to keep the men on the farm. The court instructed the jury that, under both statutes, involuntary servitude may include situations involving any "means of compulsion . . ., sufficient in kind and degree, to subject a person having the same general station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no reasonable means of escape and no choice except to remain in the service of the employer." The jury found respondents guilty, and the court imposed sentences. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court's definition of involuntary servitude was too broad in that it included general psychological coercion. The court held that involuntary servitude exists only when the master subjects the servant to (1) threatened or actual physical force, (2) threatened or actual state-imposed legal coercion, or (3) fraud or deceit where the servant is a minor or an immigrant or is mentally incompetent.

Held:

For purposes of criminal prosecution under 241 or 1584, the term "involuntary servitude" necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process. This definition encompasses cases in which the defendant holds the victim in servitude by placing him or her in fear of such physical restraint or injury or legal coercion. Pp. 939-953.


(a) The Government cannot prove a 241 conspiracy to violate rights secured by the Thirteenth Amendment without proving that the conspiracy

Page 487 U.S. 931, 932

involved the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. The fact that the Amendment excludes from its prohibition involuntary servitude imposed "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" indicates that the Amendment's drafters thought that involuntary servitude generally includes situations in which the victim is compelled to work by law. Moreover, the facts that the phrase "involuntary servitude" was intended "to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery," Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332, and that the Amendment extends beyond state action, cf. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1, imply an intent to prohibit compulsion through physical coercion. These assessments are confirmed by this Court's decisions construing the Amendment, see, e. g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, which have never interpreted the guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude to specifically prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological coercion. Pp. 941-944.


(b) The language and legislative history of 1584 and its statutory progenitors indicate that its reach should be limited to cases involving the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. That is the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment's "involuntary servitude" phrase that prevailed at the time of 1584's enactment and, since Congress clearly borrowed that phrase in enacting 1584, the phrase should have the same meaning in both places absent any contrary indications. Section 1584's history undercuts the contention that Congress had a broader concept of involuntary servitude in mind when it enacted the statute, and does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that immigrants, children, and mental incompetents are entitled to any special protection. Pp. 944-948.

(c) The Government's broad construction of "involuntary servitude" - which would prohibit the compulsion of services by any type of speech or intentional conduct that, from the victim's point of view, either leaves the victim with no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of the power of choice - could not have been intended by Congress. That interpretation would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity; would delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes; would subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction; and would make the type of coercion prohibited depend entirely on the victim's state of mind, thereby depriving ordinary people of fair notice of what is required of them. These defects are not cured by the Government's ambiguous specific intent requirement. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S position - that 1584 prohibits any means of coercion that actually succeeds in reducing the victim to a condition [487 U.S. 931, 933]

Good finding.

[weishaupt1776]

Charles, and ID know, you guys are killin' me. You hit the quote button and quote a huge post and then post pat on the back stuff like "great job" "keep up the good work", etc . . . Not only that, but back to back posts?

You guys do this quite a bit and it is beginning to be a bit monotonous. Do you think you guys could be a little more introspective and expand/expound, etc . . .?