WA - driving is a PRIVILEGE they GRANT to you

[Akira]

Once again this arguement comes down to private vs. public, travel vs. drive, charity vs. commerce, work vs. employment, ect.

I can still remember my Grandfather's old pick up truck with "not for hire" painted on the doors and tailgate.

Personally, I travel on the commons.

The "public" (body politic) is just another fiction. The public doesn't own the roads, any more than the goverment does.

The govt is responsible for the safety? Responsibility without a duty & liability?


For HIS Glory,
Akira

[Shoonra]

Originally Posted by Ice

The above post is in direct contradiction with the court's ruling:

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by a carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a City may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith 154 SE 579.

So, which "opinion" is correct?

No contradiction. I had commented on the Thompson case elsewhere on this forum ....
[link]http://www.suijuris.net/forum/65628-post16.html[/link]
.... the case did not allow unlicensed driving but only prevented arbitrary revocation of existing drivers licenses.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the authority and responsibility of states to allow only licensed motorists on the public roads: Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 U.S. 610; Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535; Kesler v. Utah DPS (1962) 369 U.S. 153; etc.

[David Merrill]

Originally Posted by Akira

Once again this arguement comes down to private vs. public, travel vs. drive, charity vs. commerce, work vs. employment, ect.

I can still remember my Grandfather's old pick up truck with "not for hire" painted on the doors and tailgate.

Personally, I travel on the commons.

The "public" (body politic) is just another fiction. The public doesn't own the roads, any more than the goverment does.

The govt is responsible for the safety? Responsibility without a duty & liability?


For HIS Glory,
Akira

Exactly Akira;


I am no more in the City of Colorado Springs at the moment than I am in the jurisdictions of the Freemason capital on Mesa Hill. They (the Masons) call that the Colorado Jurisdiction but it only effects the members in Freemasonry.

The City of Colorado Springs/METRO organization is a subcorporation of the State of Colorado corporation which is a daughter corporation of the United States corporation of 1871. One can find the judicial powers of the corporate State have been properly delegated when the State formally became a corporation:

http://www.ecclesia.org/forum/images...esignation.gif
Resignation of Judiciary

These are the simple concepts of positive law jural society.



Regards,

David Merrill.

Good point, David - "Fictions arise from the law, and not law from fictions."



legal fiction
n. a presumption of fact assumed by a court for convenience, consistency or to achieve justice. There is an old adage: "Fictions arise from the law, and not law from fictions."
http://dictionary.law.com/default2.a...d=%7C%7C%7C%7C

[Ice]

Originally Posted by Shoonra

No contradiction. I had commented on the Thompson case elsewhere on this forum ....
[link]http://www.suijuris.net/forum/65628-post16.html[/link]
.... the case did not allow unlicensed driving but only prevented arbitrary revocation of existing drivers licenses.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the authority and responsibility of states to allow only licensed motorists on the public roads: Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 U.S. 610; Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535; Kesler v. Utah DPS (1962) 369 U.S. 153; etc.

A right cannot be encroached upon by the state. And as the quote from Thompson points out a right is not a mere privilege which they "may prohibit or permit at will." Isn't a "license" nothing more than "permission" to do that which would otherwise be unlawful? Point: if a state cannot "permit at will" that which is a right... then how can they claim that you need "permission" to exercise a right?

The real mess begins when you realize that there is no state. And that is evidenced by the fact that their is no "duty of protection" by the so called state. Without those reciprocal obligations (allegiance / duty of protection) there can be no state.

[Simply put: a state is made up of citizens which are members of a body politic that owe a duty of allegiance in return for a duty of protection.]

[weishaupt1776]

Originally Posted by free_martha

So, Shoonra according to you, ‘the govt is responsible for the safety of the public streets and has the responsibility and authority to limit the piloting of vehicles to people who have evidenced their fitness and compliance with the laws’ . How does your opinion correlate to the following court cite where it is the court’s opinion that no one has the constitutional right to be protected by the State.


Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 372 (4th Circuit 1994):

'Our survey of the legal landscape as it existed in March 1989 indicates, that, in general, members of the public have no constitutional right to be protected by the State from harm inflicted by third parties. E.g., Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983); Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S.Ct. 1121, 103 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).

Judge Posner aptly explained the reasoning behind this general principle when he stated in Bowers that: The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order....{Thus, because there is no} constitutional duty to provide such protection {the state's} failure to do so is not actionable under section 1983.

http://www.atgpress.com/dtom/dt076.htm

Shoonra ? Shoonra ?
Anxiously awaiting some spinarooski

[squirrel]

It's pathetic to say the least, We bust their as$e$ in a lie and they try to explain it away with bullsh!t and TRY to have us beleive it.

This is the same kind of crap they do to you at the courthouse, when you confront the scumbag prosecuting attorney "before court " with these same type of questions, they cant even look you in the eye, because they know themselfs they are lying.

Start asking questions about how they plan to rebutt your affidavits and the like and they play dumb or they say there's nothing to talk about, i'll see you at the hearing.


Treasonous traitors, pure and simple !!!!!!

[Shoonra]

Originally Posted by free_martha

So, Shoonra according to you, ‘the govt is responsible for the safety of the public streets and has the responsibility and authority to limit the piloting of vehicles to people who have evidenced their fitness and compliance with the laws’.

How does your opinion correlate to the following court cite where it is the court’s opinion that no one has the constitutional right to be protected by the State.

Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 372 (4th Circuit 1994):

You and Weishaupt have trotted out a decision which was vacated and reversed. The decision you cited, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 1944) was vacated by the same court on Oct. 18, 1994 and a new decision was issued about a half year later: Pinder v. Johnson (4th Cir May 30, 1995) 54 F.3d 1169 cert. denied 516 U.S. 994.

In any case, the very tragic fact situation is inapplicable to a general govt function to keep the highways as safe as possible.

A woman's former boyfriend broken into her home, threatened her children, and, at her instigation, was arrested by the police. The defendant policeman told her it was safe for her to go back to work, but the boyfriend was released from jail an hour later, went directly to her house, set the house on fire and killed her children. She sued both the city and the policeman on the grounds that her right to equal protection of the laws had been violated because she was a victim of domestic violence, and also that the policeman's assurances to her constituted some sort of commitment or special relationship. The question at issue was whether an individual victim of a crime could sue the police for failing to protect her. It was decided here, and elsewhere in similar cases, that the general police duty does not create a cause of action for an individual crime victim. This was a long and widely held legal position but it didn't make the court any happier to repeat it.

On the other hand, the govt's responsibility to try to keep the highways safe by limiting driving to motorists who hold a valid license has been repeatedly upheld by the courts.

So far nobody has trotted out a court decision that says, clearly and unambiguously, that driving a motor vehicle on the public highways is such a fundamental right that it doesn't require a driver's license.

It would appear that the public only has the ‘need’ to protect the private through ‘incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty’, DESHANEY v. WINNEBAGO CTY.

In Warren v. District of Columbia, the court said ". . . a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen . . . and that there MUST BE DIRECT CONTACT OR SOME OTHER FORM OF PRIVITY". What is the OTHER FORM of PRIVITY?

DESHANEY v. WINNEBAGO CTY. SOC. SERVS. DEPT., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bi...=489&invol=189
‘The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf See Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at 317 ("When a person is institutionalized - and wholly dependent on the State[,] . . . a duty to provide certain services and care does exist"). 7 The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs - e. g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See Estelle v. Gamble, supra, at 103-104; Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at 315-316.

The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. See Estelle v. Gamble, supra, at 103 ("An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met"). In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf - through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty - which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. 8 [489 U.S. 189, 201]
http://www.healylaw.com/cases/warren2.htm

NICHOL v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE, Nos. 79-6, 79-394.; Decided December 21, 1981.

A Metropolitan Police Department officer arrived at the scene. In response to the officer's direction, appellant's companion ceased any further efforts to obtain identification information of the assailants. When the officer then failed to get the information, leaving Nichol unable to institute legal action against his assailants, Nichol brought a negligence action against the officer, the Metropolitan Police Department and the District of Columbia.

The trial judges correctly dismissed both complaints.

In a carefully reasoned Memorandum Opinion, Judge Hannon based his decision in No. 79-6 on "the fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen." See p. 4, infra. The duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists. Holding that no special relationship existed between the police and appellants in No. 79-6, Judge Hannon concluded that no specific legal duty existed. We hold that Judge Hannon was correct and adopt the relevant portions of his opinion. Those portions appear in the following Appendix.[fn1]

Judge Pryor, then of the trial court, ruled likewise in No. 79-394 on the basis of Judge Hannon's opinion. In No. 79-394, a police officer directed Nichol's companion to cease efforts to identify the assailants and thus to break off the violent confrontation. The officer's duty to get that identification was one directly related to his official and general duty to investigate the offenses. His actions and failings were solely related to his duty to the public generally and possessed no additional element necessary to create an overriding special relationship and duty.[fn2]

In Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763 (1978), the police department voluntarily assigned a school crossing guard to cover a particularly busy intersection in Brooklyn. For the first two weeks of school, the infant plaintiff's mother accompanied him to school and saw a guard at the intersection every day. When the mother accepted employment, she sent the child to school by himself, relying on the guard's presence at the intersection. Page 11 One day, the guard was ill and the police department failed to provide a replacement or to notify school officials that there would be no guard at the crossing. The child was struck by a taxi cab as he tried to cross the street alone; the mother sued the city in negligence. Upholding a jury verdict for the child, the court emphasized two factors distinguishing that case from general duty cases. First, the duty assumed by the police was a limited one; it was directed toward a specific class of individuals rather than toward the public in general. Id. at 196-97, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587, 375 N.E.2d at 767. Second, the mother had witnessed the provision of services and had relied to her detriment on the guard's performance. Id. The combination of these two factors led the court to conclude that the general duty to provide police services had become a special duty owed to that child.[fn3]

As both the Bloom and Florence courts noted, the concept of special duty is actually no more than an application of the cardinal principal of tort law that, even where no duty to act may exist originally, once one undertakes to act, he has a duty to do so with due care. Florence v. Goldberg, supra at 196, 404 N YS.2d at 587, 375 N.E.2d at 766; Bloom v. City of New York, supra at 1079, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 981. Cf. Security National Bank v. Lish, D.C.App., 311 A.2d 833, 834 (1973) ("[o]ne who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.") (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922)). More precisely, one who begins to perform a service to another, whether gratuitously or not must perform with reasonable care; thus, he subjects himself to liability for any harm suffered because the other reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the actor's performance. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 56 (4th ed. 1972); 2 F. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts § 18.6 (1956); 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). In the words of Chief Judge Cardozo:

If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward. [Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928); citation omitted.]

This is not, of course, a theory of strict liability; the ACTOR need only do that which is reasonable under the circumstances. Prosser, supra.

To summarize, there are two prerequisites to a finding of a special duty. FIRST, THERE MUST BE DIRECT CONTACT OR SOME OTHER FORM OF PRIVITY BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE POLICE DEPARTMENT SO THAT THE VICTIM BECOMES A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE PLAINTIFF. Second, there must be specific assurances of police services that create justifiable reliance by the victim. Without both of these elements, the duty to provide police services remains a general, nonactionable duty to the public at large.

[palani]

Shoonra posted

the govt's responsibility to try to keep the highways safe by limiting driving to motorists who hold a valid license has been repeatedly upheld by the courts

And they are doing a very good job! I don't believe I have ever seen or heard of an injured highway.