California v. Pyatt

[weishaupt1776]

TULARE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

MAY 01 2001

LARAYNE CLEEK, CLERK

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TULARE

People of the State of California, Plaintiff(s)

vs
Melvin Pyatt, Defendant(s)

TENTATIVE RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
CASE NO. 65724

FACTS

Defendant Melvin Pyatt was stopped by an officer of the California
Highway Patrol on October 13, 2000, while driving a vehicle on Highway
99 in Tulare County. Defendant was eventually charged with four
criminal
violations, Penal Code Section 148, resisting, obstructing, or delaying
a peace officer in performance of his duties, a misdemeanor, and three
Vehicle Code violations, 12500(A), driving without a license, a
misdemeanor, 16028(A), driving without insurance, an infraction, and
4000(A), unregistered motor vehicle, an infraction. On December 8,
2000,
defendant, who is representing himself, filed a demurrer to all counts
to which the People have responded. On March 16, 2001, the District
Attorney dismissed count one, the violation of Penal Code Section 148,
leaving the defendant charged with the three Vehicle Code violations.

The defendant has submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury that
alleges among other things that: (1) Based upon a religious belief, he
does not have, nor has he ever had, a social security number; (2) He
previously had a valid California drivers license and insurance on his
vehicle; (3) Upon the enactment of Vehicle Code Section 1653.5 (which
was effective January, 1, 1992) he has been unable to renew his
California drivers license because that section made it a requirement
that an applicant for a California drivers license supply the
Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) with their social security number; (4) Vehicle
Code Section 1653.5 also requires that an applicant to register a
vehicle supply DMV with a social security number; and, (5) Because he
cannot obtain a valid California drivers license, he cannot obtain
insurance for the vehicle.

Although the defendant has identified his motion as a demurrer, both
the
People in their response and the court in this ruling are treating it
as
a motion to dismiss.


ISSUE:

The issue raised by defendant is that Section 1653.5, by virtue of the
requirement that an applicant for a California drivers license and/or
vehicle registration supply the DMV with a social security number,
violates his First Amendment right of freedom of religion. This issue
has previously been litigated and Section 1653.5 has been held not to
be
a violation of one's right to freedom of religion, see discussion,
infra. However, other apparent issues are raised by defendant's
demurrer/motion to dismiss.


ANALYSIS:

Vehicle Code Section 1653.5 as effective January 1, 1992, provides
among
other things, that all forms used by the DMV for applications for the
issuance or renewal of drivers licenses, ID cards and vehicle
registrations must contain a section for the applicant's social
security
number.

Section 1653.5 has been challenged in court and three California
Appellate Court cases have upheld the section's validity. Those cases
in
chronological order are Lauderbach v. Zolin (1995) 35 CA4th 578, 41
CR2d
434, Nowlin v. DMV (1997) 53 CA4th 1529, 62 CR2d 409, and Brunson v.
DMV
(1999) 72 CA4th 1251, 85 CR2d 710. All three cases involved the
petitioners therein obtaining an order from the Superior Court
enjoining
the DMV from requiring a social security number before issuing a new or
renewed drivers license, DMV identification cards, and vehicle
registrations. In all three cases the respective appellate courts
overruled the lower court and upheld the requirement within Section
1653.5 mandating an applicant supply a social security number.

Although the orders sought in all three cases were the same, i.e.,
enjoining the social security number requirement, the underlying issues
differed in each case.

The court in Brunson overturned a Los Angeles Superior Court which had
granted a writ of mandate prohibiting the DMV from denying petitioners
a
drivers license because they did not have a social security number.
Petitioners had argued their right to freedom of religion was violated
as it was against their religion to be identified by any sort of symbol
or number. The appellate court determined that the social security
number requirement was "religion neutral" and overruled the lower
court.

In Nowlin the issues included whether the revealing of social security
numbers was protected from disclosure under privacy laws and whether
requiring the number was beyond the purpose for which the number is
issued. The Nowlin Court overruled a Los Angeles Superior Court order
enjoining the DMV from requiring a social security number saying that
statutory provisions allowing the DMV to disclose social security
numbers in certain situations was valid as it involved a legislative
intent to assist in tracking and enforcing errant parents for child
support.

The Lauderbach case evolved from foreign nationals obtaining an order
from the San Francisco Superior Court enjoining the DMV from requiring
a
social security number for drivers licenses or ID cards. The Lauderbach
court overturned the Superior Court order agreeing with the Nowlin
decision, infra, that the privacy issue could not be grounds for
enjoining the DMV and further held that the DMV is not required to
issue
drivers licenses or ID cards to those persons whose presence in the
U.S.
is not authorized by federal law.

While the three above cited cases and the instant case all involve the
Section 1653.5 requirement of a social security number being necessary
for anyone seeking to obtain a drivers license, ID card, or vehicle
registration, the instant case differs in one notable manner. The
defendant herein, rather than seeking an injunction, is charged with a
criminal offense for which he could be subjected to imprisonment and/or
a fine. It further appears that the reason he does not have a drivers
license is because of the mandate within Section 1653.5.

In this day and age, especially in California, driving a motor vehicle
is almost an indispensable part of life as driving enables one to
perform the basics of life-traveling to and from employment, shopping
for necessities, medical appointments, etc. The People in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss properly point out that there is no
constitutional right to drive a vehicle upon the streets and highways.
There is however a privilege to drive subject to one's ability to do so
safely. Thus the state has a public safety interest in licensing
drivers
to assure that they are mentally, physically, and emotionally able to
operate a motor vehicle without endangering the lives and property of
others.

The obvious intent of Vehicle Code Section 12500 (driving without a
license) with which defendant Pyatt is charged is to require that
anyone
operating a vehicle upon the streets and highways of the state be
"screened" before they drive to insure they can safely operate that
vehicle and are knowledgeable with the traffic laws. Thus the licensing
requirements of a written exam, driving test, eye examination, etc. It
would most certainly appear that Section 1653.5 is not relevant to this
"screening" process. In fact this position is conceded in Lauderbach
wherein the court said, "It is undisputed that the Legislature's
purpose
in enacting section 1653.5 was to help affected agencies seek `more
effective ways to locate the whereabouts of errant parents for purposes
of carrying out child support programs and directives."' Thus, it is
clear that Section 1653.5 is included within the DMV application
procedure to facilitate a state interest separate and apart from the
state interest of assuring that only persons capable of safely
operating
a vehicle be allowed the privilege of driving.

Section 1653.5 could just as well require an applicant submit proof of
payment of taxes, proof of having voted, proof of employment, or any
other thing in which the state has an interest; this list could be
endless and would still be meaningless to the purpose of issuing a
drivers license. The state does have an interest in licensing drivers
but this interest is one which concerns public safety. In essence, the
state's interest under the licensing laws is to protect motorists, and
those motorists want to be assured that other motorists can drive their
vehicles properly and could care less whether they have social security
numbers.

[weishaupt1776]

The question then becomes, assuming defendant Pyatt is fully capable of
obtaining a drivers license as he has in the past and only the lack of
a
social security number is preventing his being lawfully licensed at
this
time, is he being denied a privilege and thereby subjected to criminal
charges only because he does not have a social security number?
Obviously, the simple answer is that the defendant can avoid such
prosecution by simply not driving however, that seems to beg the
question. It would appear that defendant Pyatt is being denied a
privilege available to others for a reason which is conceded to have
nothing to do with his being able to satisfactorily perform that
privilege. Thus, it appears that he is being denied equal protection of
the law.

The respondents in Lauderbach contended that the DMV policy denied them
equal protection of the law. The court bypassed this saying that the
DMV
was not required to issue licenses or II) cards to persons whose
presence in the U.S. was not authorized under federal law. The
Lauderbach Court however, did "conclude that those aliens whose
presence
in the United States is authorized under federal law, but are
ineligible
to obtain SSN's, are entitled to the subject DMV documents if otherwise
qualified therefor," 35 CA4th at p. 584, 41 CR2d at p. 438. In adapting
this holding to the instant case an equal protection argument is
raised.

Defendant Pyatt has declared that he has never applied for a social
security number therefore it is unknown if he is eligible or ineligible
to obtain one. Assuming he had applied but was declared by the Social
Security Administration to be ineligible, it appears he could then
obtain a drivers license notwithstanding Section 1653.5. The same would
be true of any other person lawfully within the U.S. found to be
ineligible for a social security number. Defendant Pyatt has declared
that he has never applied for such a number, therefore he has the same
status as the person ineligible for a social security number when both
go to the DMV to apply for a drivers license. While the other person is
issued a drivers license defendant Pyatt is denied one for a reason
which, as earlier stated, has nothing whatsoever to do with the ability
to operate a vehicle upon the streets and highways. The distinction
between "ineligible" and "refusing to obtain" would appear to have no
substance within the context of determining who can and who cannot
safely drive a vehicle. This would appear to be an unequal application
of the law.

There is another aspect of the equal protection argument that seems to
be relevant. The implementation of Section 1653.5 by virtue of which
defendant Pyatt is now unable to become a licensed driver, has an "ex
post facto ring" to it.

An ex post facto law is one which is passed after the occurrence of
some
act or conduct and makes that act or conduct unlawful. Section 1653.5
was passed at a time when defendant Pyatt was already a licensed
driver,
thus he had satisfactorily passed all DMV tests and requirements to
obtain the license and had never performed in such a manner as to have
the license revoked or suspended. While it is true that Section 1653.5
does not impose any criminal sanctions, and therefore cannot be
classified as an ex post facto law, it nevertheless does have the
effect
of terminating defendant Pyatt's privilege to drive, a privilege that
he
was lawfully engaged in, unless he submit to a requirement that he
obtain a social security number. This analogy to an ex post facto law
would have no relevance if the new requirement were related to an
applicant's physical, mental, or emotional ability to safely operate a
vehicle, but being identified by a social security number has no
legitimate purpose in assuring such ability.

The end result herein is that a privilege to drive is afforded to all
citizens who can prove the ability to do so safely, defendant Pyatt had
previously proven such ability and was in fact lawfully exercising that
privilege, and he is now being denied that privilege and is subjected
to
criminal sanctions simply because a new bureaucratic regulation, which
has no conceivable connection to the state's interest in assuring that
only competent drivers use the streets and highways, has been passed to
which defendant Pyatt chooses not to conform. This would appear to be a
classic case of big government overreaching to accommodate a separate
state interest and in doing so has denied this defendant an equal
application of the law.

For the reasons above stated defendant Pyatt's motion to dismiss is
granted. This ruling is not intended to afford to defendant Pyatt or
anyone else in a similar position a privilege to drive unlicensed but
rather is limited to this case and these facts.

Dated: 5-1-01
Ronin M. Couillard, Judge of the Superior Court

[Livefire]

Kudos to the judge on that decision! He called things as they are.....the requirement for SSN's for "licenses" are more big brother BS. Now he needs to see that "licenses" themselves are BS

[ezrhythm]

YESSSSS! Great post!

I noticed how the judge's opinion gives an example that it is OK for the DMV to require SS# for the state's interest in child support collections, in which some cases they suspend the driver's license. AND THEN the judge uses Equal Protection Under the Law as a cause for dismissal, which is RIGHT but those who are getting their licenses suspended because of child support issues are not getting Equal Protection Under the Law.

But we knew that already. It's just interesting to read about a judge squirm and twist his opinion because he was forced in to a corner.