Right to Travel

The following argument - http://www.6towns.com/driving/brief.html - has been used in at least three states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) as a legal brief to support a demand for dismissal of charges of "driving without a license."

It is the argument that was the reason for the charges to be dropped, or for a "win" in court against the argument that free people can have their right to travel regulated by their servants.

The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to travel on the roads which are provided by their servants for that purpose, using ordinary transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of free people, because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of a right.

The driver's license can be required of people who use the highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their living on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads. If you are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to have a driver's license.

The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect ... THE PUBLIC SAFETY, HAS NO REAL OR SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TO THOSE OBJECTS OR IS A PALPABLE INVASION OF RIGHTS SECURED BY THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661

[squirrel]

People gave up their rights to become a U.S. citizen/slave by accepting by hand "signing a SS-5 form" a benefit from the great satan, now they are to be licensed, taxed and regulated under the "amended" trading with the enemy act of Oct 6th 1917 as a enemy of the state under the war powers act A.K.A Banking relief act of 1933.

Some people say it does'nt matter, make them prove it.

Tell that to the antisocial braindead thug with an attitude problem who could never think for him/her self that just pulled you over for rolling through a stop sign in the middle of the night when there was no one around. BIG emergency ?

[UGA Lawdog]

Here's a good example of what happens when you try your "sovereign citizen" arguments in court:

846 P.2d 928

STATE of Idaho v. Donald L. CRISMAN.

[123 Idaho 277]

No. 19829.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
December 28, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1993.

Petition for Review Denied March 11, 1993.


Donald Crisman, pro se.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

After a trial before the magistrate, Donald Crisman was convicted of driving without a license, I.C. § 49-301, and of operating an unregistered vehicle, I.C. § 49-456(1). Crisman appeals from the judgments of conviction contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that he was denied due process and that his rights to freely exercise his religion were infringed. We affirm.

Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Crisman held a valid Alaska driver's license. Crisman returned his Alaska driver's license and did not obtain a new license from Idaho or any other state. Crisman sent notices to the Idaho Department of Transportation, the Idaho State Police, the Bonner County Sheriff's Office and other governmental entities informing them of his refusal to obtain a driver's license and to register his vehicle for the express reason that he did not think he was bound to do so because he intended to conduct only personal, and not business, activity on the public highways. In his notices, Crisman requested the various agencies to supply him with the legal authorities, if any, that mandated his compliance with the licensing and registration laws. After not receiving any response, Crisman apparently believed that he need not comply with the licensing and registration laws of Idaho.

On February 4, 1991, a Bonner County Deputy Sheriff stopped the vehicle Crisman was driving because he had noticed that it did not have proper license plates. Crisman's vehicle had blue plates with large gold lettering which read "YHWH" and underneath, in smaller silver lettering, "AMBASSADOR." When asked for his driver's license, registration and proof of insurance, Crisman told the deputy that he did not have them. The deputy arrested Crisman for operating a vehicle without a driver's license and without proper registration and for failure to carry proof of insurance.

On February 20, Crisman filed a "notice of special appearance" for the purpose of challenging the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Apparently he supported his challenge with a "verified statement and memorandum" which is not contained in our record.

[....]

Crisman next filed a motion to dismiss as provided for in I.C.R. 12(a) and noticed it up for hearing. In the motion Crisman renewed his challenge to the court's jurisdiction. Although Crisman complains he was denied due process in part because the magistrate did not address his challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction at the first appearance, Crisman was not harmed by the delay in addressing the issue of jurisdiction until he presented it in his motion to dismiss. No waiver of his challenge to jurisdiction resulted from either I.C. § 1-2214 or I.C.R. 2.2(d). After a hearing on the merits, the magistrate issued a written order denying Crisman's motion to dismiss. The case proceeded to trial before another magistrate. Judgments of conviction were entered July 9, 1991, on both counts and they provided that Crisman was to serve five days in jail on each count with the sentences running concurrently.

[....]

[1] Crisman challenges the court's ruling that subject-matter jurisdiction existed. Crisman bases his right of non-compliance with the applicable statutes upon his status as an "ambassador" from the "Kingdom of YHWH (Yahweh)." Crisman further contends that his status as an "ambassador" of "Yahweh" entitles him to immunity. He also contends because of his ambassador status, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides in part: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."

[2] We exercise independent review over the issue of a magistrate's jurisdiction. In re Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992). The record reflects that, at the hearing on Crisman's motion to dismiss, the magistrate relied upon "State v. Blume" in ruling that Crisman's claimed ambassadorial status was not recognized and therefore it created no bar to the court's exercise of its personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. The written opinion issued by the magistrate at a later date cited no case authority.

Apparently, the case the magistrate relied upon was Gregersen v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 743 P.2d 88 (Ct.App.1987), which was a companion case to State v. Blume, 113 Idaho 224, 743 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1987). In Gregersen v. Blume, we upheld the authority of a state licensing agency to license and regulate the commercial practice of barbering by persons who profess religious beliefs that do not recognize secular authority being imposed upon them. State v. Blume, on the other hand, involved an appeal from a magistrate's order finding Blume in contempt for refusal to pay a fine in a criminal case in which Blume was convicted for operating a barbershop without a license. We find support in the Blume cases for the state's position here, although these cases do not control this appeal.

[3] Crisman further asserts that he did not receive a copy of the Blume opinion upon which the magistrate relied, that the magistrate had promised to send a copy of the opinion, and therefore, jurisdiction was improperly exercised. We accept the factual basis for Crisman's argument, that he did not receive a statement of authority for the court's exercise of jurisdiction, but we are not persuaded that this failure in any way affected the court's right to exercise the jurisdiction it had.

[4, 5] If jurisdiction was properly exercised below, even if the magistrate relied upon improper authority, the decision to exercise jurisdiction will be affirmed. See State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Engelbert, 114 Idaho 89, 753 P.2d 825 (1988) (where order of lower court is correct, but based upon erroneous theory, order will be affirmed upon correct theory). Ambassadorial status cannot be obtained through unilateral proclamation as Crisman has attempted. The receiving state's executive branch must recognize the sovereignty of the other state before diplomatic immunity exists. United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.1984). The record does not reflect that either the United States Department of State or the Idaho Secretary of State has recognized the "Kingdom of YHWH (Yahweh)" as a sovereign. Furthermore, the record fails to show that either of these departments has granted Crisman immunity. Therefore, Crisman cannot claim diplomatic immunity and the magistrate properly exercised jurisdiction. See id.; State v. Davis, 745 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.App.1988).(fn2)

[....]

[7] Next, Crisman contends that he was wrongfully denied an administrative hearing before the Idaho Department of Transportation which he had requested in his letter to the department dated August 13, 1990. Crisman asserts that because he notified the department that he would not register his car, had rescinded his license, requested that the department notify him if his intentions were not approved, and requested a hearing, he should have been afforded some process by the department prior to being charged criminally. Crisman contends that criminal prosecution of the instant offenses is premature until further administrative proceedings take place before the department.

In his brief, Crisman cites Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), in support of his contention that he was wrongfully denied an administrative hearing. The facts of Bell are distinguishable from those before us. In Bell, the petitioner was entitled to an administrative hearing where he was liable, in a civil proceeding, to have his license suspended by the Georgia Department of Public Safety following an accident. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the inquiry into the fault attributable to the licensee need not consist of a full adjudication on the issue of liability. Bell, 402 U.S. at 540, 91 S.Ct. at 1589. In the criminal case before us, Crisman was afforded more process than that available at many administrative procedures, including a hearing on his motion to dismiss, and a trial. Crisman was not wrongfully denied due process.

[....]

Moreover, the motor vehicle laws under which Crisman was prosecuted do not unconstitutionally impair his rights to religious freedom. Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865, 727 P.2d 1293 (Ct.App.1986). See also Gregerson v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 743 P.2d 88 (Ct.App.1987). Crisman has been afforded due process below and upon appeal in having his issues and arguments addressed and considered.

[....]

We conclude that the magistrate lawfully exercised jurisdiction and did not err in denying Crisman's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction for driving without a license and for operating an unregistered vehicle.

WALTERS, C.J., and SILAK, J., concur.

_____________________
Footnotes:

[Footnote 1 omitted]

2. With some empathy, we note that in Davis, Holstein, J., wrote in a concurring opinion that the argument that one is entitled to diplomatic immunity as an ambassador of God "border[s] on the absurd." Such arguments also divert judicial energies. Davis, 745 S.W.2d at 253 (Holstein, J., concurring).

Parts in bold are not in bold in the original decision.


The Lawdog

[UGA Lawdog]

For good measure, here's another one, this time from my own state:

DOWIS v. THE STATE.

501 S.E.2d 275, 232 Ga. App. 111

A98A0716

JOHNSON, Judge

The procedural history of this misdemeanor case is as follows: Cary E. Dowis was charged by accusation with two counts of hunting without a license and one count each of driving with a suspended license, no proof of insurance, driving a vehicle without a valid license plate, hunting with a prohibited weapon, hunting without a big game license, and hunting without fluorescent orange clothing. Acting pro se, Dowis subsequently filed a notice and demand by special appearance to abatement and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the relief sought by this pleading was denied. Approximately one month later, Dowis filed a Writ of Prohibition against the Chief Judge of the superior court. The writ was denied. Dowis was convicted of the above eight counts in a bench trial.

Dowis appealed his judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of Georgia, raising several constitutional claims. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court, holding that the constitutional issues raised were not ruled upon by the trial court. The Supreme Court further held that any viable constitutional claims remaining involve an application of unquestioned and unambiguous constitutional provision.

The salient facts of this case are as follows: A ranger with the Georgia Department of Natural Resources responded to a complaint of shots being fired. Upon his arrival, the ranger observed a man emerging from the woods. This man produced a license to hunt big game and was not detained. Dowis emerged from the woods a short time later. He was riding a four-wheeler ATV and had a crossbow on his back; it was the only weapon the ranger saw. Dowis admitted that he was hunting. When asked to produce his hunting license, Dowis stated that "he was a sovereign citizen and did not have a license to hunt or drive." He also stated that he was not required to have a driver's license "because he was using the highway in the extraordinary use."Dowis did not have any type of license in his possession. A GCIC check revealed that Dowis' driver's license had been suspended. Dowis was cited for hunting without a license and hunting with a prohibited weapon; the crossbow was held as evidence. The ranger informed Dowis that he would later check with his superior to verify whether Dowis' possession of the crossbow was illegal. Dowis was not cited for driving without a license at this time, although the ranger informed him of its suspended status. The ranger subsequently performed a records check and determined that Dowis had not, in fact, been issued a special permit to hunt with the crossbow.

Two days later, during deer season, the ranger and his partner observed Dowis in a tree stand holding a loaded rifle. The tree stand was on private property belonging to others. Dowis was not wearing the fluorescent clothing required by OCGA § 27-3-40, although he had a fluorescent vest in his pocket. Dowis admitted that he did not have a hunting license and asserted that he "wasn't required to have one." Dowis was arrested for the hunting violations and his rifle seized. Dowis' vehicle was present and a re-check revealed that his driver's license was still suspended. Approximately two months later, Dowis drove a pickup truck to and from the county courthouse for a hearing. The ranger who had initially stopped Dowis in the woods saw appellant driving the untagged vehicle on a public roadway and notified a deputy sheriff of these facts. Based on this information, the deputy sheriff stopped Dowis' truck. Dowis' truck did not have a valid license tag or decal. The only tag which it had displayed was a paper tag which either read, "C. E. Dowis, Sovereign Citizen" or "Citizen of Georgia." Dowis failed to produce a driver's license or proof of insurance. Dowis asserted that he was exempt from the insurance requirement. A police check confirmed that Dowis' driver's license was suspended. The deputy then arrested Dowis. Dowis has consistently asserted that he is not required to have a driver's license, car tag, car insurance, or a hunting license because he is a sovereign citizen of this state.

1. Dowis' contention that the trial court erred in deciding that he has no right to use the highways and streets of Georgia is without merit. Although Dowis claims that he does not have to have a license
when using highways for the ordinary and usual purposes of life, the right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is a qualified right which can be exercised only by obtaining a state driver's license. Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 (1) (373 SE2d 65) (1988).

[....]


(d) Arrest of Dowis. Based on the information relayed by the ranger to the sheriff's department, the deputy sheriff had the articulable suspicion required to stop Dowis' truck for a traffic violation. See Walton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) (390 SE2d 896) (1990). During the course of the investigative detention, the deputy obtained sufficient evidence of Dowis' various traffic violations to give him probable cause to arrest Dowis without a warrant. See generally Callaway, supra.

(e) Constitutional claims. As the trial court did not rule on any constitutional claims asserted by appellant, none of these issues are preserved for appeal. See Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 75 (1) (395 SE2d 582) (1990).

3. Notice of demand by special appearance to abatement and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The record reveals that a hearing was held on Dowis' pleas in abatement and motion to dismiss but no transcript of this hearing is included in the record on appeal. The record before us contains no viable evidence of lack of jurisdiction. "The burden is on the complaining party, including pro se appellants, to compile a complete record of what happened at the trial level, and when this is not done, there is nothing for the appellate court to review." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kegler v. State, 267 Ga. 147, 148 (3) (475 SE2d 593) (1996). Without the hearing transcript to review, this Court must assume as a matter of law that the evidence presented supported the trial court's findings. Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. 678, 679 (2) (409 SE2d 500) (1991).

Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

Decided April 7, 1998

Hunting without a license. Banks Superior Court. Before Judge Adamson.

Cary E. Dowis, pro se.

Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, for appellee.

Again, parts in bold were not in bold in the original text.

[Akira]

The lesson here?

It's not just about knowing your rights... it's also about knowing how to lawfully defend your rights in THEIR color of law courts.

This is exactly the same mistake all these tax protestors are doing.. trying to play soveriegn in the slaves sandbox.

Why would anyone expect lawful arguements to work in color of law courts, anymore than french law works in US courts.

It all boils down to one line.. "prove your authority". All they have is the BS that flows from their mouths, and the allegience of the mental midgets who have already bought into the psycho babble.

When my servant tells me how I will run my estate.. there's a problem. It makes me laugh when our learned servants come to SJ and talk about the 'law', when all they mean is their law.. color of law..

Who can tolerate such arrogance..


For HIS Glory,
Akira

Exactly, Akira – make them prove their authority. Our learned servants who come to SJ have indeed forgotten that they are servants and the tail is trying most earnestly to wag the dog. A guy I know was hunting on what was ostensibly crown land, asked for the proof that it was indeed crown land and it was not forthcoming and this was years ago. In Canada there has been a Federal gun registry for some years now, with major credit units expended but with the result that not many have registered their guns - so now this exercise in futility is being abandoned, as people see no need to register their private property. Asking someone to register a gun is like asking an Indian to register their fishing line. Getting a license is ‘agreeing’ to be subject to regulation under ‘police power’.

In his notices, Crisman requested the various agencies to supply him with the legal authorities, if any that mandated his compliance with the licensing and registration laws. After not receiving any response, Crisman apparently believed that he need not comply with the licensing and registration laws of Idaho.

Constructive fraud - were the facts disclosed to Crisman by obtaining any kind of a license he was surrendering his rights? Is this not conversion of a right into a crime? "The state cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516

We upheld the authority of a state licensing agency to license and REGULATE THE COMMERCIAL PRACTICE of barbering … Blume was convicted for operating a barbershop without a license.

"A permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the POLICE POWER." Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203