State v. Gibson - Anyone care to comment?

[FreeFromContract]

Absolutely correct, they can regulate driving and traffic, which are commercial activities and terms.
However, travel upon public right of ways can not be regulated in any way, shape or form.

Black's 4th edition: Driver. One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon or other vehicle with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, trycycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car.

Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion, to go where and when one pleases, only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct. [emphasis added] American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.

Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the l4th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution. - Schactman v Dulles, 96 App D.C. 287, 293.

The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. - Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.

[UGA Lawdog]

Originally Posted by UGA Lawdog

By the way, here's an example of what the U.S. Supreme Court has to say on this topic:

See Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915) (a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles and, to that end, it may require the registration of vehicles and the licensing of drivers).

You can read the case for free at findlaw.com

What part of "ALL motor vehicles" did you not understand, son?

[UGA Lawdog]

Those cases you cited don't mean what you think they do.

George K. GORDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. George GORDON, Defendant-Appellant.

[Cite as Gordon v. State, 108 Idaho 178, 697 P.2d 1192 ]

Nos. 15092, 15197.


Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 20, 1985.

Review Denied May 29, 1985.

Motorist was convicted in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Deborah A. Bail, J., of failure to produce vehicle registration and failure to exhibit proof of liability insurance. Defendant also brought declaratory judgment action seeking an injunction to prevent further citation by police authorities and declaration of his rights as a "freeman." The District Court, Ada County, Robert Newhouse, J., denied requested injunctions, and defendant appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) constitutional right to travel did not exempt defendant from license or financial responsibility laws, and (2) facts that motorist owe nothing on vehicle and was not engaged in commercial travel did not raise him to a constitutional status exempt from legitimate exercise of police power.

Affirmed.
< Page 179>

George Gordon, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., D. Marc Haws, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated appeals present identical issues. Case number 15197 is an appeal from Gordon's convictions of failure to produce a vehicle registration, I.C. § 49-112, and of failure to exhibit proof of liability insurance, I.C. § 49-245. Case number 15092 is an appeal from the district court's denial of Gordon's request for declaratory relief. In both appeals Gordon argues that state laws requiring a vehicle operator to be licensed, to register his vehicle, and to carry insurance coverage are unconstitutional as applied to him. We affirm the judgments of conviction and the order denying declaratory relief.

Gordon was cited several times during 1981-83 for driving without a license, for operating an unregistered vehicle, and for failing to carry proof of vehicle liability insurance. Following a jury trial in February, 1983, Gordon was convicted of failing to produce a vehicle registration and of failing to exhibit proof of insurance. He was sentenced to thirty-five days in jail and fined $200 on the two convictions; the fines were suspended. On April 13, 1983, Gordon appealed to the district court, which affirmed the convictions on August 8. Gordon filed a petition for declaratory relief on May 28, 1983, seeking an injunction to prevent further citation by police authorities and a declaration of his rights as a "freeman." The district court in all respects denied relief to Gordon on his petition.

Gordon argues that the license, registration and insurance requirements impermissibly impede his constitutional right to travel and that other constitutional rights are infringed when these requirements are applied to an individual who owes nothing on his vehicle and who is not using the vehicle for commercial purposes. We are not persuaded.

[1, 2] It is well settled that the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to travel, although it is not always clear which constitutional provision affords the protection. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1858). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a particular mode of transportation-the operation of a motor vehicle upon public streets and highways-is also a right protected by the federal and state constitutions. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966). Other jurisdictions considering the issue have declared the right to travel on public highways to be a privilege, not a constitutional right. E.g., Standish v. Department of Revenue, M.V.D., 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984); Crocker v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo.1982). Whether it is termed a right or a privilege, an individual's ability to travel on public highways is "subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho at 101, 416 P.2d at 48. See Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 589 P.2d 483 (1979); Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991 (1973).
[3] The Idaho Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (MVSRA), I.C. § 49-1501 to -1540, requires vehicle operators to insure their vehicles "to protect the public using highways against hardship which may result from use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho at 101, 416 P.2d at 48. We have already determined the insurance requirement of the MVSRA to be a permissible exercise of the state's police power. State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 62, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984). Gordon argues not that his conviction for failing to exhibit proof of insurance is unconstitutional, but that requiring him to insure his

< Page 180>

automobile is unconstitutional. This issue was settled in Reed.

[4] We believe that driver's license and vehicle registration requirements also constitute a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. See Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915) (a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles and, to that end, it may require the registration of vehicles and the licensing of drivers). Licensing drivers is a means of determining that vehicle operators have acquired a minimal standard of competence. Requiring driver competence is a public purpose within the police power of the state, and the licensing procedure is a reasonable attempt to accomplish that purpose. The vehicle registration requirement also reasonably furthers protection of public health, safety and welfare and, as such, is a proper exercise of the state's police power. Id.; Pawnee County Excise Board v. Kurn, 187 Okl. 110, 101 P.2d 614 (1940).

[5, 6] As previously noted, Gordon does not contend the license, registration and insurance requirements are unconstitutional in all circumstances. Gordon believes the state should issue, without charge to him, a "certificate of competence" instead of a driver's license; that the state should also issue to him license plates free of charge; and that he is not responsible for insuring against loss that might result from his accidents. Gordon is constitutionally entitled to this special status, he argues, because he owes nothing on his vehicle and he is not engaged in commercial travel. He principally relies upon quotations from Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906) and Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930) to support his position. The Supreme Court held in Hale that a corporation does not enjoy the same rights granted to an individual by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, because a corporation is a creature of statute and it is vested with special privileges and franchises, it may not refuse to divulge information, based on the constitutional right to remain silent rather than make incriminating statements, in a criminal proceeding. In some circumstances an individual may enjoy greater protections under the constitution than does a corporation. But Hale in no way grants to individuals the absolute freedom from state regulation that Gordon insists upon. Nor does Thompson v. Smith, supra, support Gordon's position. Although the Thompson court declared the right to travel public highways to be an individual's "common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty ...," the court also stated that "[t]he exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare ...." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. at 583. The city driver's license revocation ordinance at issue in Thompson was upheld except to the extent it granted broad discretion to the city's chief of police to revoke licenses. "The issuance and revocation of such [driving] permits by a city is merely a means of exercising the police power of the state delegated to the city to regulate the use of the public highways in the interest of the public safety and welfare." Id. Only by lifting statements from context and by ignoring difficult language does Gordon make Thompson, Hale, and other cases support his position. Providing similar examples from other cases cited by Gordon would only unnecessarily lengthen this opinion.

[7] Although removing the lien placed on a mortgaged vehicle arguably elevates one to a new level of freedom, we do not believe the state or federal constitution exempts the "freeman" from the regulations imposed here through the state's legitimate use of its police power. The constitutional right to travel does not "destroy the independent power of each State under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its residents." Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4-5, 98 S.Ct. 906, 908, 55 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). See also Salibra v.

< Page 181>

Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.1984).

See? The "I was not operating a commercial vehicle" crap doesn't work either.

How many more losses by the nuts do you have to see before you realize that they are, in fact, nuts?

[FreeFromContract]

Originally Posted by UGA Lawdog

What part of "ALL motor vehicles" did you not understand, son?

What "driving", "traffic" or "motor vehicle" definition don't you understand, troll.

[SansRecours]

It is unfortunate, but those "public right-of-ways" heretofore spoken of in various case cites are buried under federally funded rivers of tar.

The federal funding came in the way of "highway funds" which highway is the subject and object of privilege (my opinion). So much for the "right to travel" argument.

The issue here is if the states had a right to change the character (there's that word again) of the right of way to that of a highway (commercial term?) in order to obtain/accept the funding. Not a subject for lower inferior court cognizance to be sure. The interesting thing about the receiving of the funds is that the state loses sovereign character (there it is again) in order to accept these funds. (Lawson v Shelby County Tenn.)

Since there is a federal nexus that one cannot deny, then the immediate issue I wish the reader could determine is this; What is this creature calling itself the State of _____ v. You in a traffic case? IT certainly is not sovereign in matters of licensing etc. when there is a federal funding nexus.

I gotta side in part with UGA (does this make me a "quasi-troll" ??) that the soveregn "argument" goes nowhere in lower inferior courts (and higher on appeal) ESPECIALLY when, in ALL the previous citations, the hapless "sovereign" victims made an appearance at the lower inferior court level.

Gibson only goes to show the futility of making the general apopearance in a lower inferior court.

Once again I ask the question:

Show me where one has a duty to make an appearance to answer to any document that, from an evidentiary standpoint is nothing more than hearsay and a business record, brought by one not a real party of interest (police officer) in the name of another (the State?) when that party bringing the action (police officer) has NO AUTHORITY to bind the other party (the state) with his signature?

SansRecours

[FreeFromContract]

Originally Posted by SansRecours

I gotta side in part with UGA (does this make me a "quasi-troll" ??) that the soveregn "argument" goes nowhere in lower inferior courts (and higher on appeal) ESPECIALLY when, in ALL the previous citations, the hapless "sovereign" victims made an appearance at the lower inferior court level.

Gibson only goes to show the futility of making the general apopearance in a lower inferior court.

Congratulations, you picked up on exactly what the trolls either intentionally ignore or can not comprehend because of their conditioned state.

In all these cases where the person claiming to be a sovereign gets nailed, they fail to make their claims upon the defects of the complaint. I have read too many of these cases (including the lower court decision, not just the appeals) that the trolls bring to support their position . Without fail the self-proclaimed sovereign had opportunities to directly refute the claim against them but never did (and in most cases rest on the "I am a sovereign with God given rights, leave me alone" argument). The reasons run the spectrum, with some of the more common ones being posessing a license, failing to refute driving (which almost all motor vehicle code is based upon it being a commercial activity), to missing the opportunity for a judgement in their favor using common law remedy and defaulting the State.

What is sad is these trolls get so caught up in their arguments and affinity for supporting the police state they've completely perverted the intent of the founders. If you've taken the time to study history and read the public records and writings of Jefferson, Madison and other revolutionaries it's obvious their prophetic wisdom has not been heeded by the so called leaders of our country in the last 125-150 years.

I am quite sure a man like Jefferson would waste no time slapping these trolls up one side and down the other if they began to spew their poison in his presence.

Originally Posted by SansRecours

Once again I ask the question:

Show me where one has a duty to make an appearance to answer to any document that, from an evidentiary standpoint is nothing more than hearsay and a business record, brought by one not a real party of interest (police officer) in the name of another (the State?) when that party bringing the action (police officer) has NO AUTHORITY to bind the other party (the state) with his signature?

SansRecours

Do you believe the trolls will reply with anything of substance? Good luck.

[UGA Lawdog]

Your question proceeds from a false premise.

Law enforcement officials are agents of the federal government, of a state government, or of some political subdivision of a state, such as a county or city. The definition of agent is someone with authority to bind another party (called a principal) by his actions.

If you want specific authorization for the power to arrest and issue citations, you need to look to the Constitution, statutes, and case law of your particular state.

In my state, all traffic tickets are titled "Uniform Traffic Citation and Summons" and inform you of your initial court date, time, and place.

And if you doubt the jurisdiction of the cop or court, just don't show up. Then, when they arrest you on a bench warrant for failure to appear, you can have fun raising jurisdictional challenges to your heart's content.

But I don't recommend it.

[SansRecours]

UGA Posts:

"Your question proceeds from a false premise.

Law enforcement officials are agents of the federal government, of a state government, or of some political subdivision of a state, such as a county or city. The definition of agent is someone with authority to bind another party (called a principal) by his actions.

If you want specific authorization for the power to arrest and issue citations, you need to look to the Constitution, statutes, and case law of your particular state."

I agree with the foregoing. However my premise is intact.

Let's say you live in OH, WV, NY (areas of my actual exprerience) all of which grant a police officer the authority to ISSUE and ARREST under color of state law, but none extend the agency relationship to give the police officer the authority to commence an action in the name of the fed, states, or political subdivisions therof.

The only one with that authority is an attorney, namely, a US Attorney, a state prosecuting attorney, D.A. or the like, or a city law director. Look to the constitutions, statutes, law, city charters, and rules of pleading to prove what I say.

One must figure out how to enter facts and evidence, pre-plea and pre-appearance, as that is the ONLY place in a lower inferior court to make argument relative to in personam, subject matter, nature and character of the parties. Then having done all, sack up, avoid the experience and the temptation to argue with a Marxist useful idiot magistrate- you probably already know more about the issue than he does (facetiously said).

Just look at ALL the rules of pleading, for instance. An action can only be brought by the real party of interest, or its attorney. In the case of a legal fiction making an appearance, it must ALWAYS be represented by an attorney. Is the police officer an attorney?

Why are you the only "party" showing up at the arraignment anyway?

Secondly, It is true that there exists an agency nexus. However, is the writing on the traffic ticket, the writing that the officer swears to be true an correct under penalty of perjury, personal testimony or official testimony.

If personal- then where is the agency relationship in regard to the writing on the ticket?

If official- there is no such thing as official testimony. All testimony is personal (Briscoe v. LaHue, on police officer perjhurious testimony, and witness immunity)

If official, then the character of that traffic ticket is nothing more than hearsay and a business record.

Where in the Constitution, laws, statutes, rules, and regulations is a DUTY placed upon me to assist the state (if it is a party) in my own prosecution, seeing that a prosecutor, or the writer of the ticket, does not enter into the fray until AFTER I make an appearance or a plea. Show me where in the foregoing, is there a DUTY placed directly upon me to make that which is not and cannot be a fact, magically become a fact, or presumption thereof, MERELY by my appearance in that lower inferior court.

My premise reaches beyond that.

And no, I do not for one minute believe myself to be "sovereign" as I am the son of the Sovereign, and that is a topic for another thread.

Until HE Returneth, I am forever
SansRecours

[weishaupt1776]

Originally Posted by SansRecours

none extend the agency relationship to give the police officer the authority to commence an action in the name of the fed, states, or political subdivisions therof.

The only one with that authority is an attorney, namely, a US Attorney, a state prosecuting attorney, D.A. or the like, or a city law director. Look to the constitutions, statutes, law, city charters, and rules of pleading to prove what I say.

In florida, here is the golden goose, the Supreme court Left to some state attorneys for that issue:(scroll down to the red highlight-left the holding for context)

Supreme Court of Florida.
William Clarence HURLEY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 46174.
Oct. 15, 1975.

Appeal was taken by motorist from an order of the County Court, Duval
County, Ambrose Olliff, J., denying motion of motorist to dismiss two
traffic charges. The Supreme Court, England, J., held that trial
court possessed jurisdiction to prosecute motorist for driving while
intoxicated on basis of a traffic ticket rather than an information,
and that statute directing deposit of all traffic offense tickets
with appropriate court, after which judicial proceedings commenced,
did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial
authority to a police official.
Affirmed.


West Headnotes

[1] KeyCite this headnote

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak351 Charging Instrument; Summons or Ticket
48Ak351.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 48Ak351, 48Ak349)

Statute which repealed former statute allowing prosecution for
traffic violations on basis of uniform traffic tickets did not
eliminate authorization for prosecution by traffic ticket, but merely
eliminated a specific form set forth in text of prior statute in
order to allow Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to
prescribe a new format. West's F.S.A. § 316.018.

[2] KeyCite this headnote

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak351 Charging Instrument; Summons or Ticket
48Ak351.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 48Ak351)

Trial court did not lack jurisdiction to prosecute motorist for
driving while intoxicated on basis of a traffic ticket as opposed to
an information. West's F.S.A. § 316.018.

[3] KeyCite this headnote

92 Constitutional Law
92VI Vested Rights
92k92 k. Constitutional Guaranties in General. Most Cited Cases

Motorist had no vested right under the Constitution or the laws of
the State to require a state's attorney or a grand jury to pass upon
probable cause for commission of traffic offense with which he was
charged. West's F.S.A.Const. art. 1, § 15(a).

[4] KeyCite this headnote

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak351 Charging Instrument; Summons or Ticket
48Ak351.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 48Ak351, 48Ak349)

92 Constitutional Law
92III Distribution of Governmental Powers and Functions
92III(A) Legislative Powers and Delegation Thereof
92k59 Delegation of Powers
92k62 To Executive
92k62(5) Particular Matters
92k62(5.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k62(5))

Statute directing deposit of all traffic offense tickets with
appropriate court, after which judicial proceedings commence, does
not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial
authority to a police official. West's F.S.A. § 316.018.
*506 Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and K. V. Canipelli and
Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Surkowski, Asst. Atty.
Gen., for appellee.


ENGLAND, Justice.
This case is here on direct appeal from an order of the Duval County
Court which denied appellant's motion to dismiss two traffic offense
charges. The county court expressly upheld the constitutionality of
Section 316.018, Florida Statutes, thereby giving us jurisdiction
under Article V, Section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.
Appellant was arrested and charged with failing to drive in a single
lane, and driving while intoxicated. Following the disposition of
procedural matters not pertinent here,[FN1] appellant moved to
dismiss the charges lodged against him, which motion was denied. In
the written order of denial the court directly ruled on the validity
of Section 316.018. Appellant then pled no *507 contest to the
charges against him and was appropriately sentenced by the county
judge.


FN1. Appellant filed a suggestion for writ of prohibition in this
Court which was denied after hearing, without prejudice to his right
to raise appropriate issues in the trial court. Hurley v. Olliff,
Case No. 45,660. (July 2, 1974).


Appellant contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
him on the basis of a traffic ticket rather than an information, and
in the alternative that Section 316.018 is unconstitutional. The gist
of appellant's first argument is that the statute which formerly
allowed prosecution for traffic violations on the basis of uniform
traffic tickets[FN2] was repealed by a subsequent enactment of the
same Legislature.[FN3] Appellant couples this argument with the
mandate of Florida Traffic Rule 6.07, promulgated by this Court,
which requires prosecution for traffic violations by way of
affidavit, information or indictment in the absence of statutory
authority for prosecution by way of uniform traffic citation.


FN2. Chapter 71--135, Laws of Florida.



FN3. Chapter 71--321, Laws of Florida.


Rule 6.07 provides:
'All prosecutions for traffic violations by law enforcement officers
shall be by uniform traffic complaint as prescribed for in Florida
Statutes 316.018 or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit,
information or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedures.'
[1][2][3] Appellant's first contention is without merit. Rule 6.07
authorizes prosecution on the basis of a traffic ticket prepared by a
police officer. It merely recognizes, however, that the Legislature
may prescribe a uniform format for traffic tickets in Florida. The
second statute to which appellant refers, read in conjunction with
the first,[FN4] does not eliminate the authorization for prosecution
by traffic ticket. It merely eliminates a specific form set forth in
the text of the prior statute in order to allow the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to prescribe a new format.
Appellant has no vested right under the Constitution of the laws of
this State to require a state attorney or a grand jury to pass upon
probable cause for the commission of a traffic offense.[FN5]


FN4. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Tampa, 159 Fla. 287, 31 So.2d 468
(1947).



FN5. Art. I, s 15(a), Fla.Const. (1968).


[4] Appellant argues in the alternative that Section 316.018 is an
unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial authority to a police
official. This contention is also without merit. Sections 316.018(2)
and (3) direct the deposit of all traffic offense tickets with the
appropriate court, after which judicial proceedings commence. A state
attorney or his assistant actually prosecutes these matters on behalf
of the state. The issuing police official is not the prosecutor.
The order of the Duval County Court is affirmed.

ADKINS, C.J., ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., and FERRIS,
Circuit Judge, concur.
Fla. 1975.
Hurley v. State,
322 So.2d 506

[SansRecours]

Yes, it is a golden goose for the attorneys, but the case does not reach to where the real issue lies, and that is the character of the parties.

If you remember my thread Driver License and Registration Please? in the Travel section of the forum, I touched on the nature and character of the parties in my quest to show the nature of a driver license and traffic ticket, and advance some of the points that I make in this thread.

As in Gibson, this Hurley case, and the statutes relative to both cases, NOWHERE will you find the character in which the "state" acts against those two (sovereign, quasi-sovereign, proprietary, in loco parentis, etc. See Georgia v Penna RR) nor will you find the ACTUAL capacity of the others, excepting that Gibson did try a "sovereign" approach, failing at it, along with countless others. WHY? Wrong place to advance the position.

The character of the parties is the CORE issue of all the various and sundry legal, or quasi-legal positions. From, sovereign, State national, American national, secured party, etc., on the one side, to STATE OF, State of, and many, many cases defining the way in which the state acts or gains jurisdiction, on the other side, we are all talking about character of the parties.

The problem that EVERYONE is trying to address, in whatever way they try to address it, is the fact that the state is acting in such a way against us, be it coercion, adhesion, commercial, whatever, resulting in outright tyranny and debt worship. We percieve that the state is treating us like a piece of paper, or a THING (the res, if you will), in opposition to the flesh and blood man or woman that we percieve ourselves to be during the struggle.

So we SPECULATE as to who we are or what we are, because we really do not know in what character the state percieves us because the state no longer makes distinction between reality and fiction, and we therefore do not know who or what we advance our position on any given legal matter.

The TRUTH of the matter is this:

There is no distinction by statute and/or declaration of legislature by way of definition, showing the difference existing between living souls and corporations.

One has rights of an unalienable nature, antecedent to the organic documents founding the nation (the living soul, provided he is not in a condition of bondage, impairment, or agency of a commercial nature), and the other has rights as a matter of privilege and of a civil nature (the corporations) To compound the matter, of the living souls, (now don't anyone get sensitive on me) some maintain distinguishing characteristics and conditions of impairment relative to each other along color lines (Indians 3/5 of a person and not taxable, and non-whites not in contemplation of the original organic documents See Dred Scott Decision), causing division and worship of the fiction amongst those not satisfied with their condition of impairment and the logic behind it.

So NONE of us really KNOWS in what character the state acts, and what character the state through its legislature percieves those subject of any given statute on the books. We do not even know who or what we are anymore in relation to the government because definitions like sovereign, citizen, resident, person, people, nation, ad nauseam are awash in confusion.

These questions need asking and the respondents (the branches of government, specifically the legislatures) are duty bound to disclose, or find out, or tell us who our masters really are.

One cannot ask a lower inferior court presiding official to render a decision on the status and/or character of the parties in a case presently before him, because he has no capacity to entertain the argument in the first instance, so decision rendering along the lines of Hurley and Gibson are non sequitors, bad case law, and opressive to liberty. One must avoid that arena if at all possible. Read the Declaration of Independence,especially about writs of assistance and swarms of officers, and the inability to pass laws needful for our national survival.

Now if you are worried about going to jail or becoming a victim of process gone awry, then you need to commence drinking or smoking doobies, turn on the TV, the video games, your favorite music, Oprah Winfrey, CNN, NBC, ABC, NPR, and get yourself comatose so that you will not even have to think about posting your intelligence on this forum. WAKE UP! You are already a victim and a captive. Your chains are just satin and furry, (they are comfortable, but they are still chains.)

The time for bloodshed has long since past (not a threat or incitement to violence, just the TRUTH) WE need national repentance, rededication to our original Christian moral principles, and nothing less than the direct intervention of Jesus the Christ. For God's sake, government (or lack thereof) idiots are stealing our lives, our fortunes, our families, our children, and our sacred honor!!

It's great that we can run to Lexis/Nexis, Westlaw, Blacks', Bouvier's etc. and enjoy the Blessing and Curse of legal research, but I would rather the whole nation goes down in flames on my watch, as I am fighting, than to selfishly pass the cross on to the next generatio..THWACK! AAAAUGH! THUD!

And as the tomatoes hit him in the face, he fell off the soap box with a thud.

Its time to start another thread on the character of the parties.

Now you know why I am

SansRecours