State v. Gibson - Anyone care to comment?

[planetmark]

Hi, I have no access to a law library, so I can't verify the accuracy of this case. But if it is as shown below, this is very disturbing. Is there something about this that I'm missing? Maybe it was overturned? I dunno. I'd appreciate some commentary from the group here:


-------------------

STATE v. GIBSON, 108 Idaho 202, 697 P.2d 1216 (1985)

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
David R. GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14918.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 25, 1985.

Motorist's conviction in magistrate's division for failure
to register and to insure his motor vehicle was affirmed by the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, W.E.
Smith, J., and motorist appealed.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Courts 442
Original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court under the
United States Constitution cannot be interpreted as conferring
such jurisdiction in every cause in which the state elects to
make itself strictly a party plaintiff of record and seeks not to
protect its own property, but only to vindicate the wrongs of
some of its people or to enforce its own laws or public policy
against wrongdoers generally. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, sec. 2,
cl. 2.

2. Criminal Law 95
The courts of Idaho, not the United States Supreme Court,
have original jurisdiction in prosecution charging motorist with
failure to carry proof of liability insurance on his motor
vehicle and failure to register his motor vehicle annually. I.C.
secs. 49-116, 49-245; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 2.

3. Constitutional Law 83(1)
Individuals must sacrifice part of their liberty in order to
empower a government to regulate, through passage and
enforcement of laws necessary for the general public welfare.

4. Automobiles 43
Motorist, by failing to obtain an operator's license, was
not relieved of obligation to obtain liability insurance or
register his motor vehicle on ground that he had not consented to
be regulated in the free, responsible, exercise of his rights of
liberty, and the use of his property. I.C. secs. 49-116, 49-245.

5. Constitutional Law 83(1)
An individual has no right to unilaterally withdraw from
society, rejecting his obligations to that body, while at the
same time retaining the advantages of that society, advantages
for which others have sacrificed part of their liberty.

6. Automobiles 316
Laws requiring an operator of a motor vehicle to carry proof
of liability insurance in his motor vehicle and to register the
motor vehicle annually are valid laws which the operator has a
legal duty to obey. I.C. secs. 49-116, 49-245.

7. Jury 4
Provision of the Idaho Constitution that the jury shall
consist of not more than six in cases of misdemeanor and civil
actions within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the
district court, whether such a case or action be tried in such
inferior court or in district court, not only permits a six-man
jury, but also forbids a greater number in such cases. Const.
Art. 1, sec. 7.

8. Jury 4
Motorist's lack of consent did not imbue him with the right
to a 12-person jury
[1217]
instead of a six-person jury in prosecution in magistrate's
division for failure to register and to insure his motor vehicle
and did not imbue him with the right to insist upon such a jury.
Const. Art. 1, sec. 7.

9. United States 90
State officials are bound by the definition of legal tender
promulgated by Congress and, since Congress has defined federal
reserve notes to be legal tender, state officials must abide by
such a definition. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 1;
Amend. 6; 31 U.S.C. (1976 Ed.) sec. 392.

10. Payment 9
The State could compel motorist to pay his fines in Federal
Reserve notes or other coins and currencies of the United States
upon motorist's misdemeanor conviction in magistrate's division
for failure to register and to insure his motor vehicle.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 1; Amend. 6; 31 U.S.C. (1976
ed.) sec. 392.

----------

David Gibson, in pro. per., for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., A. Rene
Fitzpatrick, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

David Gibson was convicted of failure to carry proof of
liability insurance on his motor vehicle, I.C. sec. 49-245, and
failure to register his motor vehicle annually, I.C. sec. 49-116.
The magistrate imposed a fine and one-year probation. Gibson
appealed to the district court, which affirmed. He then appealed
to us, raising four issues: (1) Do the courts of the State of
Idaho have jurisdiction over a case in which the state is a
party? (2) Is a "free man," who withholds his consent to be
regulated, nevertheless subject to the law? (3) Is a jury of
six persons permissible in a misdemeanor case absent the consent
of the defendant? (4) Are federal reserve notes legal tender
for the payment of state imposed fines? Because we answer each
of these questions in the affirmative, we affirm.

I
[1, 2] Gibson's first argument is apparently that Idaho
state courts have no jurisdiction in this case. He cites Article
III, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution: "In
all cases . . . in which a state shall be party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. . . ." This original
jurisdiction, however, is "not to be interpreted as conferring
such jurisdiction in every cause in which the State elects to
make itself strictly a party plaintiff of record and seeks not to
protect its own property, but only to vindicate the wrongs of
some of its people or to enforce its own laws or public policy
against wrongdoers, generally." State of Oklahoma v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 220 U.S. 277, 289, 31 S.Ct. 434,
437, 55 L.Ed. 465 (1911) (emphasis added). We hold that the
courts of Idaho, not the United States Supreme Court, have
original jurisdiction in this case.

II
[3, 4] Gibson next argues that he "has not accepted the
[motor vehicle operator's] license and by not accepting the
license, has not consented to be regulated in the Free, and of
course, responsible, exercise of his rights of liberty, and the
use of his property." (Emphasis original.) In other words, he
contends that he need not obtain liability insurance or register
his car unless he first agrees to obtain an operator's license.
Only then, according to Gibson, is a "contract" with the state
created, binding him to the laws related to the use of motor
vehicles. The "rights of liberty," however, are not entirely
free. Individuals must sacrifice part of their "liberty" in
order to empower a government to regulate, through passage and
enforcement of laws necessary for the general public welfare.
John Locke, the English philosopher who wrote of government and
freedom, said: "Where there is no law, there is no freedom."
Quoted in W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 69 (B. Gavit ed.
1941). A law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made and
[1218]
promulgated by him who has care of the community." L. FRANKEL,
LAW, POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 64 (1975) (quoting St. Thomas
Aquinas).
[5] Blackstone also commented on man's liberty:

The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, are
denominated the natural liberty of mankind, which consists
in a power of acting, as one thinks fit, without any
restraint or control, unless by the law of nature; being a
right inherent in us by birth, when God endowed man with
free will. But every man, when he enters into society,
gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a boon, and obliges himself to conform to those
laws, which the community has thought proper to establish.
Otherwise there would be no security to individuals in any
of the enjoyments of life.

BLACKSTONE, supra, at 68-69. Gibson "entered into our society
when he began to live in it. He has no right to unilaterally
withdraw from society, rejecting his obligations to that body,
while at the same time retaining the advantages of that society--
advantages for which others have sacrificed part of their
liberty. John Marshall, the great Chief Justice of the United
States, said "the best rule for freemen . . . in the opinion of
our ancestors [those who had produced and ratified our
constitution], was . . . that . . . of obedience to laws enacted
by a majority of" the people's representatives. II A. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 402 (1916). See also Mutual Loan Co.
v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 32 S.Ct. 74, 56 L.Ed. 175 (1911).
Marshall also stated:

Whenever hostility to the existing system shall become
universal, it will be also irresistible. The people made
the constitution, and the people can unmake it. . . . But
this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake,
resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any
sub-division of them. The attempt of any of the parts to
exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those
to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling
it.

IV A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 352 (1919) (emphasis
added).

[planetmark]

Furthermore, we note a premise dating back at least to the
time of Plato: "The 'just powers' of government derive from the
consent of the governed.'" E. Rostow, "The Obligation To Obey
Valid Law In A Society Of Consent," in FRANKEL, supra, at 759.
Rostow concluded from this premise that

in a society of consent the powers of government are just in
Jefferson's sense: that is, they are legitimate, because
authorized and renewed by procedures of voting all must
respect. As a consequence, a citizen of such a society owes
his fellow citizens, and the state they have established
together, a moral duty to obey valid laws until they are
repealed or fall into desuetude.

Id. (emphasis original). Indeed, one of the maxims of common law
provides: "The sovereignty of the state over its citizens is
supreme." BLACKSTONE, supra, at 952.
[6] While our discussion of Gibson's first two issues has
been general, we are inevitably led to these specific
conclusions: The laws requiring an operator of a motor vehicle
to carry proof of liability insurance in his motor vehicle and to
register the motor vehicle annually are valid laws enacted by the
state. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842
(Ct.App.1984). Gibson has a legal duty to obey them.

III
[7, 8] Gibson also argues that he did not voluntarily
consent to being tried by a six-person jury and he therefore had
the "right to a Common Law Jury of twelve." Article 1, section 7
of the Idaho Constitution provides in part that "in cases of
misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any
court inferior to the district court, whether such case or action
be tried in such inferior court or in district court, the jury
shall consist of not more than six." (Emphasis added.) The
Idaho Constitution thus not
[1219]
only permits a six-person jury, but it forbids a greater number.
A jury composed of less than twelve is also permissible under the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). In
Williams, the trial court refused the defendant's request to seat
a twelve-person jury instead of a six-person jury. The Supreme
Court held that such refusal did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. The defendant's lack of consent in
Williams did not imbue him with the right to a jury of twelve;
nor did Gibson's lack of consent allow him to insist upon such a
jury. Neither the Idaho nor the United States Constitution
requires it.

IV
[9, 10] Gibson finally argues that the state cannot compel
him to pay his fines in federal reserve notes. This is not a
novel argument. See cases cited in Herald v. State, 107 Idaho
640, 691 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App.1984). He claims if a state can
require fines to be paid in federal reserve notes, that state
violates Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
The constitution does, in fact, forbid states to "make anything
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." However,
Congress, which is authorized to coin money and regulate its
value, has decreed federal reserve notes to be "legal tender for
all debts, public and private." 31 U.S.C. section 392 (emphasis
added). State officials are bound by the definition of legal
tender promulgated by Congress. If Congress has defined federal
reserve notes to be legal tender, states must abide by such a
definition. See Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan.App.2d 301, 564 P.2d 552
(1977). Therefore, the state may compel payment of fines in
federal reserve notes or other coins and currencies of the United
States. We wish to assure Gibson that payment of his debts by
means of federal reserve notes extinguishes those debts and
leaves him indebted to no one.
We have examined the other arguments presented in this case
and find them also to be without merit. The district court's
order is affirmed.

WALTERS, C.J., and BURNETT, J., concur.


[UGA Lawdog]

I'm sure you find it "disturbing." It's yet more proof that your theories are bogus and do not work in the real world.

[planetmark]

No time for your attitude and hostility. You're now on my ignore list.

[AndyK]

But if it is as shown below, this is very disturbing. Is there something about this that I'm missing? Maybe it was overturned? I dunno. I'd appreciate some commentary from the group here:

But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a boon, and obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish.

Otherwise there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life.

Gibson "entered into our society when he began to live in it. He has no right to unilaterally withdraw from society, rejecting his obligations to that body, while at the same time retaining the advantages of that society--advantages for which others have sacrificed part of their liberty.

Whenever hostility to the existing system shall become universal, it will be also irresistible. The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. . . . But this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any sub-division of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it.

What is it that you find disturbing?

Is it the idea that you can not unilaterally withdraw from the obligations of society while still retaining the advantages which other members of the society are providing?

Or is it the petty issue concerning the driver's licesne?

[Shoonra]

State v. Gibson (1985) 108 Ida 202, 697 P.2d 1216 is a real decision, never overturned, and cited as authority by more than half a dozen subsequent court decisions, including some outside Idaho.

The same David R. Gibson had previously tried to stonewall the IRS by submitting a very uninformative 1040, utilizing many of the ploys and arguments I have seem on this website, and lost on all issues. Gibson v. C.I.R., Tax Ct Memo 1979-279 affirmed (9th Cir 1980) 634 F.2d 634.

[SansRecours]

If this is the best one can hope for in a lower inferior court, why is one still going in there to argue?

SansRecours

[Ice]

Originally Posted by planetmark

3. Constitutional Law 83(1)
Individuals must sacrifice part of their liberty in order to
empower a government to regulate, through passage and
enforcement of laws necessary for the general public welfare.

We do not have to sacrifice any part of our Liberty and we do not need government to "regulate" as much as they do. As a matter of fact, government was not instituted to "regulate" anything more than commerce.

And, I re-state this:

Among rights, liberty is ranked as fundamental. Freedom from physical restraint is at the core of our understanding of liberty. It is not society, nor any social right that allows or forbids the actions of men - it is the unalienable individual right of others, a line of division that preserves both rights untouched. The division is not derived from an edict of society – but from inalienable individual right. The definition of this limit is not set arbitrarily by society – but is implicit in the definition of the individual right. The right to the pursuit of happiness means a man’s right to live for himself, to choose what constitutes his own private, personal individual happiness and to work for its achievement, so long as he respects the same right in others. It means that Man cannot be forced to devote his life to the happiness of another nor of any number of other men. It means that the society cannot decide what is to be the purpose of a man’s existence or prescribe his choice of happiness. Whenever a man is made to act without his own free, personal, individual, voluntary consent – his right has been violated. A right cannot be violated except by physical force. One man cannot deprive another of his liberty, nor enslave him, nor forbid him to pursue his happiness, except by using force against him.

At present, the only thing that I see "society" providing is a fast track to the loss of ALL Liberty because they are too lazy, ignorant and/or too filled with fear to protect the Liberty of ALL Men.

With that in mind, ask yourself: how could anyone "owe" "society" anything?

[UGA Lawdog]

Here's another case from the Idaho Court of Appeals, citing Gibson, where another "sovereign" individual takes it on the chin.

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William E. SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.

[Cite as State v. Simmons, 115 Idaho 877, 771 P.2d 541 ]

No. 17372.


Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 14, 1989.

Petition for Review Denied May 22, 1989.

Defendant appealed from judgment of the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, George D. Carey, J., affirming judgments entered in magistrate division for operating vehicle without valid driver's license, without proof of liability insurance, and with expired vehicle registration. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) magistrate division had jurisdiction over defendant; (2) defendant charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses was not denied right of assistance of counsel when magistrate prohibited lay person from assisting defendant at trial; and (3) evidence was sufficient to support convictions.

Affirmed.
< Page 878>

William E. Simmons, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Jack B. Haycock, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.

Before WALTERS, C.J.,

SWANSTROM, J., and HART, J. Pro Tem.

PER CURIAM.

William Simmons was found guilty by a jury in the magistrate division of operating a vehicle without a valid driver's license, without proof of liability insurance and with an expired vehicle registration. The judgments were affirmed on appeal to the district court. Simmons further appeals, contending that the magistrate had no personal jurisdiction over him, that the magistrate erroneously denied Simmons' right to assistance of counsel and that the verdicts were unsupported by the evidence. We affirm.

[1] Because we are reviewing an appellate decision of the district court, we will independently examine the trial record and reach our own determinations of law upon the facts presented. Simmons' jurisdictional argument is three-fold. First, he submits that personal jurisdiction under the common law was not established. We note that Simmons is a resident of this state and that he committed citable traffic offenses in this state. We see no jurisdictional defect in that regard.

[2] Second, Simmons insists that personal jurisdiction is lacking where a criminal prosecution is not initiated through indictment by a grand jury. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226-27, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held: "Although the Due Process Clause guarantees ... a fair trial, it does not require the States to observe the Fifth Amendment's provision for presentment or indictment by a grand jury." Further, our Supreme Court has held that article 1, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, providing for presentment or indictment by a grand jury, does not prohibit prosecution of misdemeanor offenses by filing a complaint. Collins v. Crowley, 94 Idaho 891, 499 P.2d 1247 (1972).

[3] Third, Simmons maintains that the state cannot assert personal jurisdiction over him without a contract or an agreement with him. We have consistently and unequivocally rejected the notion that a state must contract with a citizen either to obtain personal jurisdiction or to subject the citizen to its laws. See Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Von Schmidt, 109 Idaho 736, 710 P.2d 646 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Gibson, 108 Idaho 202, 697 P.2d 1216 (Ct.App.1985); Gordon v. State, 108 Idaho 178, 697 P.2d 1192 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984). We hold that the magistrate had jurisdiction over Simmons and the prosecuted offenses.

[4, 5] Simmons next contends he was denied the right to assistance of counsel when the magistrate prohibited a lay person from assisting Simmons at trial. We see no breach of Simmons' constitutional rights. A defendant in a criminal prosecution in Idaho has no constitutional right to be represented at trial by a person who is not an attorney. See State v. Brake, 110 Idaho 300, 715 P.2d 970 (1986); State v. Fanning, 114 Idaho 646, 759 P.2d 937 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Harrold, 113 Idaho 938, 750 P.2d 959 (Ct.App.1988). In State v. Ritchie, 114 Idaho 528, 757 P.2d 1247

< Page 879>

(Ct.App.1988), we noted an exception to this rule where a minor may receive assistance in court from a parent or guardian. However, Simmons does not fall within this exception.

[6] Finally, Simmons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence presented at trial shows that a Boise police officer stopped Simmons for operating a pickup without displaying a current registration tag. Simmons did not have a valid current registration. The officer also determined that Simmons did not have a valid driver's license. Nor did Simmons produce any evidence of proof of liability insurance either at the time of the stop or at the time of trial.(fn1) Indeed, Simmons presented no evidence in his behalf at trial, choosing to stand mute. Applying our standard of review as set forth in State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 701 P.2d 303 (Ct.App.1985), and State v. Palmer, 114 Idaho 895, 761 P.2d 1247 (Ct.App.1988), we hold that the evidence amply supports the verdicts.

The judgments are affirmed.

_____________________
Footnotes:

1. Under Idaho motor vehicle laws an operator or owner must display upon his vehicle a current registration tag. I.C. § 49-125 (redesignated as § 49-456). Further, upon request by a police officer, a driver must manually surrender his driver's license, I.C. § 49-319 (redesignated as § 49-316), and provide proof of liability insurance, I.C. § 49-245 (redesignated as § 49-1232).

Emphasis added for the parts in bold-faced type.

I'm telling you, these lunatic "sovereign" individual theories just don't work in the real world. How many more examples do some of you need?

[UGA Lawdog]

By the way, here's an example of what the U.S. Supreme Court has to say on this topic:

See Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915) (a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles and, to that end, it may require the registration of vehicles and the licensing of drivers).

You can read the case for free at findlaw.com