Text of public law 73-10

Originally Posted by KITCHIE

Iamfreeru2,



Thanks, I have done my homework. Please take a look at 73rd Congress Sess 1 Chapter 25. The date is May 12, 1933 House Resolution 3835, Public No.10.



HJR 192 was added to PL 73-10 almost a month after PL 73-10 was approved.



Like I said if you are interested in the Supreme Court Case that fully discuses HJR 192, I will post it.



Kitchie

Um Kitchie PL 73-10 is the LEGAL CITATION for HJR 192. See the The Bluebook; A Uniform System of Citation which breaks down how Congressional Statutes are cited by Public Law (PL) numbers. Better yet, just walk into any law library and ask the reference librarian.

[iamfreeru2]

Kitchie,



Yes I am looking at 73rd Congress Sess 1 Chapter 25 of May 12, 1933 House Resolution 3835, Public No.10. That is in front of me as well. As I have said HJR 192 Public Law 73-10 has not been repealed. If it had been then gold would again be the medium of exchange or like Jerseee has said, all of congress could be tried for treason. Try going to any bank and exchange FRNs for gold and see what they tell you.



As Cute_chick has rightly said Public Law 73-10 is the legal cite for HJR 192. Also are you familiar with the Supreme Court case Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247, 59 S.Ct. 847 (1939)? That case also discusses HJR192 Public Law 73-10 and has never been overturned.



iamfreeru2

[KITCHIE]

Hey There Iamfreeru2!!



I want you to know I am totally behind what you are doing with the mortgage and all the prelim work as well. I have done much of the same.



I have a bit of a problem (as you can tell) with so much reliance on PL 73-10. My main reason is that I have seen what they do in THEIR court and how they focus on ONE thing and build from there. so since I have a question as to how strong that reference is...



I have come across this case which is exactly about HJR 192. I am only putting part of the opinion here so you can see how the SC refered to HJR 192.



U.S. Supreme Court

PERRY v. UNITED STATES, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)

294 U.S. 330

PERRY

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 532.



Argued Jan. 10, 11, 1935.

Decided Feb. 18, 1935.

[294 U.S. 330, 333] Mr. John M. Perry, of New York City, for Perry.

[294 U.S. 330, 341] Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Angus D. MacLean, Asst. Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

[294 U.S. 330, 346]

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.



Second. The Binding Quality of the Obligation. The question is necessarily presented whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113 (31 USCA 462, 463), is a valid enactment so far as it applies to the obligations of the United States. The resolution declared that provisions requiring 'payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency' were 'against public policy,' and provided that 'every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein,' shall be discharged 'upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.' This enactment was expressly extended to obligations of the United States and provisions for payment in gold, 'contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States,' were repealed. 1 Section 1(a), 31 USCA 463(a). [294 U.S. 330, 350] There is no question as to the power of the Congress to regulate the value of money: that is, to establish a monetary system and thus to determine the currency of the country. The question is whether the Congress can use that power so as to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. In attempted justification of the Joint Resolution in relation to the outstanding bonds of the United States, the government argues that 'earlier Congresses could not validly restrict the 73rd Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to regulate the value of money, borrow money, or regulate foreign and interstate commerce'; and, from this premise, the government seems to deduce the proposition that when, with adequate authority, the government borrows money and pledges the credit of the United States, it is free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient. The government's contention thus raises a question of far greater importance than the particular claim of the plaintiff. On that reasoning, if the terms of the government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the government at its discretion, and that, when the government borrows money, the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge.



Like I said this is only part of the case. What do you think of it?



Kitchie

Originally Posted by KITCHIE

Hey There Iamfreeru2!!



I want you to know I am totally behind what you are doing with the mortgage and all the prelim work as well. I have done much of the same.



I have a bit of a problem (as you can tell) with so much reliance on PL 73-10. My main reason is that I have seen what they do in THEIR court and how they focus on ONE thing and build from there. so since I have a question as to how strong that reference is...



I have come across this case which is exactly about HJR 192. I am only putting part of the opinion here so you can see how the SC refered to HJR 192.



U.S. Supreme Court

PERRY v. UNITED STATES, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)

294 U.S. 330

PERRY

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 532.



Argued Jan. 10, 11, 1935.

Decided Feb. 18, 1935.

[294 U.S. 330, 333] Mr. John M. Perry, of New York City, for Perry.

[294 U.S. 330, 341] Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Angus D. MacLean, Asst. Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

[294 U.S. 330, 346]

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.



Second. The Binding Quality of the Obligation. The question is necessarily presented whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113 (31 USCA 462, 463), is a valid enactment so far as it applies to the obligations of the United States. The resolution declared that provisions requiring 'payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency' were 'against public policy,' and provided that 'every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein,' shall be discharged 'upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.' This enactment was expressly extended to obligations of the United States and provisions for payment in gold, 'contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States,' were repealed. 1 Section 1(a), 31 USCA 463(a). [294 U.S. 330, 350] There is no question as to the power of the Congress to regulate the value of money: that is, to establish a monetary system and thus to determine the currency of the country. The question is whether the Congress can use that power so as to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. In attempted justification of the Joint Resolution in relation to the outstanding bonds of the United States, the government argues that 'earlier Congresses could not validly restrict the 73rd Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to regulate the value of money, borrow money, or regulate foreign and interstate commerce'; and, from this premise, the government seems to deduce the proposition that when, with adequate authority, the government borrows money and pledges the credit of the United States, it is free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient. The government's contention thus raises a question of far greater importance than the particular claim of the plaintiff. On that reasoning, if the terms of the government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the government at its discretion, and that, when the government borrows money, the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge.



Like I said this is only part of the case. What do you think of it?



Kitchie

Did you Sheppardize this case to make sure it is still good law and has not been overturned??? That's one way of telling if this is a good case to rely on.

[Jerseee]

Kitchie,



There is a transitional sentence in that post that does not sit right with me. It states, "There is no question as to the power of the Congress to regulate the value of money: that is, to establish a monetary system and thus to determine the currency of the country."



Congress is not to "establish" a monetary system, nor determine the currency for the country--they are to "regulate" the value of money that has already been stated to what it is gold and silver. You can't establish something without authority of the people and that is already in place.



So I would venture to say that this case may or may not be in full effect or even recognized.



that transitional sentence in you post that I pointed out is called the "Jedi Mind Trick". Boy what a play on words!

[KITCHIE]

Cute Chick



I just got this and I haven't been to the law library yet. I will report back after I do that. It's going to snow and be nasty so I won't get there till wednesday or so.



Jeersee,



I have seen those words before in other writings frome the senate. I will check it closer. There is much more to this case, that is only one small part.



The question I am trying to resolve is that since PL 73-10 was repealed in 1936 by the supreme court, why do we keep refering to it???!!!



Thanks for responding



Kitchie



Thanks for pointing those things out.

[Ice]

Check the last statement:



". . . the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge. "



The United States really doesn't have anything to back up a pledge . . . do they ?

[KITCHIE]

Jerseee, sorry for the mispell earlier.



This case is not a trick it is real. Go to findlaw and US Supreme Court and enter 294 330. It come up.



Cute-chick,



I will see what cases I can bring up at findlaw.



Kitchie

Ok, I spent way too much time reading <u>Perry</u>. I Shepardized it (not extensively) and there is no direct negaitive history on it. Here is the limited holding of it: "We conclude that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, <u>in so far </u>as it attempted to override the obligation created by the bond in suit, went beyond the congressional power." But I see the problem with the majority's holding was 2 fold: 1) although Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting HJR 192 (in this [contractual] context), it doesn't matter b/c the 14th amendment says you can't question the validity of the public debt (US Bonds); 2) although Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting HJR 192 (in this [contractual] context), there is no remedy b/c payment of gold per the bond contract is against public policy anyway since the party could not hold it under executive order to turn in all your gold, so no one suffered in damages.



IMHO, what a crock of BULL****!



The dissent is loaded with reasons as to why. Here a but a few excerpts:



"The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes passed by Congress in respect of money and credits, were designed to attain a legitimate end. Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value. Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief."



"This Court has not heretofore ruled that Congress may require the holder of an obligation to accept payment in subsequently devalued coins, or promises by the Government to pay in such coins. The legislation before us attempts this very thing. If this is permissible, then a gold dollar containing one grain of gold may become the standard, all contract rights fall, and huge profits appear on the Treasury books. Instead of $ 2,800,000,000 as recently reported, perhaps $ 20,000,000,000, maybe enough to cancel the public debt, maybe more!"



"The power to issue bills and "regulate values" of coin cannot be so enlarged as to authorize arbitrary action, whose immediate purpose and necessary effect is destruction of individual rights. As this Court has said, a "power to regulate is not a power to destroy." 154 U.S. 362, 398. The Fifth Amendment limits all governmental powers. We are dealing here with a debased standard, adopted with the definite purpose to destroy obligations. Such arbitrary and oppressive action is not within any congressional power heretofore recognized."



END OF EXCERPTS



It is easy to read between the lines and see that the fix was in!!! I encourage the reading of the dissent, which lost by a 5-4 vote, to see what that case was really about.



Kitchie,



Great post. However, courts don't repeal anything - that is what legislatures do. So even if a court holds something unconsitituional, it only means that it cannot be enforced. As such, the law remains on the books. Interesting thing though - the court never expressly declared HJR 192 as unconsitiutional in its entirety. It only stated that Congress exceeded its authority (which is unconsititutional) in enacting HJR 192 in respect to altering contract obligations of the US. But the editors of Lexis who write all the summaries, headnotes, etc. decided to declare HJR 192 as unconstitutional. There was some serious "wiggling" by the majority to not expressly declare it as such b/c then it would be a deprivation of property w/o just compensation. They danced around this issue w/o ever addressing it - amazing. The breach was found solely in contract and not that of a deprivation of property. Apparently, gold is not a substance in the eyes of the Supreme Court, or the Court became blind the very moment the child yelled, "The emperor has no clothes on!!!" I would have loved to have been a fly on the wall the day this case was argued in court.



Ice,



Of course the US has something to back up a pledge - FAITH of the People of the US, and its power of taxation. But how this is measured and accounted for is beyond me.



-squirrels

[Ice]

"Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value. Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief."

The latter description mentioned is:

"Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value."

So they conclude that the Congress basically ripped off the American people... took the gold and gave back "promises to pay".



Ain't that cute ?



At least someone agrees with us on this one.